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INTRODUCTION 
 
The 9/11 has provoked a change in the way many international actors modelled and 
implemented their respective foreign policies. For instance, within a post-9/11 
environment and Global War On Terror (GWOT) strategy context, in the United 
States of America (USA), academia and policy makers alike invoked for a 
combination of hard and soft powers with the aim of strengthening existing alliances, 
bolstering potential allies as well backing up and supporting failing states who were 
perceived as vulnerable to extremist penetrations. This calling upon and attempts to 
invoke the global appeal of US values, its strengthening of partnerships with like-
minded states, and imperatives for a multilateral diplomacy became paramount 
benchmarks for an informed and effective foreign policy. On the other side of the 
Atlantic, the European Union (EU) factually emerged as and developed into an 
important actor in international politics. The nature of EU’s foreign and security 
cooperation has been and continues to be object of discords among academia. Latest, 
on the one side, there are authors who sustain that an analysis of European Foreign 
Policy (EFP)1 is better explained through a structural realist analysis, and 
accordingly, its development should be seen as ‘a function of systemic changes in the 
structural distribution of power’; on the other side, other authors argue that stressing 
only an interest-informed foreign policy does not take into account the vast array of 
‘EU actions in world politics [which indeed demand for] a wider and more 
appropriate approach’. The most prominent idea, according to these last ones, 
highlights the thorough ‘principled’ behaviour of the EU foreign activities, which 
sustains that the EU, through ‘the domestication of international relations [by 
emphasising] equality, institutions and peace’, has become a civilian/normative 
power. It is argued that within this prism is possible to provide with ‘a wider and 
more appropriate approach in order to reflect what [the EU] is, does and should do’. 
                        
1 A discussion on the European foreign policy and her global role will be provided in Chapter 4. 
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The foreign policies of both these actors towards the Global South were also 
informed of the paradigm shifts in the conceptualisation of security and 
development, which emerged in the 1990s and were firmly established after the 
shock of 9/11. Reference is being made to the salience of the Human Security (HS) 
concept as opposed to a traditional state-centric security as well as to the Security-
Development Nexus which has made peremptory comprehensive and coherent 
policies that take into account the symbiotic interrelationship between security and 
development concerns. Another important paradigm has been that on regional 
integration and cooperation as an appropriate instrument in tackling security and 
instability concerns. The EU has proved a weighty example in this matter. 
Concerning Africa, this last issue intensified and reached its peak with the creation of 
the African Union (AU) at the dawn of the new century, providing thus Africa with 
an important structure with which to present itself as a unified actor within the 
international arena.  
This dissertation, broadly speaking, has as its object of interest the agendas that the 
USA and the EU have set up with regards to Africa since the dawn of the 21st 
century. As it will be shown throughout this writing, Africa gained an increasingly 
important place on the respective agendas. On the one side of the Atlantic, the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, changed the American perceptions of, especially, 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and on the other side of the pond, the African conflicts 
and wars, which reached their peak just right at the dawn of the new century, did 
much of the same. Since, there has been a steady incrementing concerning the quality 
as well as the quantity of efforts/capacities, which both the US and the EU, dedicated 
to Africa. The year of 2007, was kind of pivotal, in terms of demonstrating the 
strategic relevance of the continent to this two actors. Two groundbreaking policies, 
US Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and the Peace and Security Partnership within 
the Joint Africa–European Union Strategy (JAES P&S), were announced months 
apart from each other, and both aimed at putting Africa definitively into the high 
politics agenda. These two policies, which are also chosen as case studies, will serve 
to this dissertation as paramount policies through which, according to the imperatives 
of the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), a comparison of US and EU peace and 
security strategies in Africa, will be made. The argument of this dissertation is that 
while both policies put Africa into the high politics agendas, the outputs generated 
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differed: AFRICOM was faced with an ‘unprecedented unity of opposition’ and 
hostility among African leaders as well as with an amounting resistance among the 
US government civilian agencies involved; on the other side, JAES P&S was widely 
accepted by the African leaders. Thus, the core question is how to explain these 
different attitudes, since both policies aimed to support Africa in better dealing with 
its security problems. The answer will be found by squarely placing the empirical 
analysis within the approach offered by the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), a sub-
field within the International Relations (IR) theory. FPA is chosen, not only because 
this approach offers a useful structure for a comparative analysis but also because is 
‘a means [to bring together] foreign and domestic action under the same umbrella’, 
and last but not least, because FPA ‘highlights the virtues of case studies as a basis 
for comparing, analysing and interpreting foreign policy phenomena’2. Such 
concords with the aims of this research effort. The analysis will centre on the notion 
of a foreign policy system in action which is composed of the context, actors 
involved, policy processes, issues, instruments and finally, the output3.  
Based on the above said, as follows: 
Hypothesis 1. Since it is assumed that the output is generated as a result of 
the interrelationship between the context, actors involved, 
policy processes, issues, and instruments, then a difference on 
how they are conceptualised by the concerned actors as well as 
a partly/wholly omission of one or more of these elements 
may/will cause deviations from the desired output.  
It is argued that, firstly, the reason for the African hostility to AFRICOM is to be 
found on the fact that the US decision-makers failed to take into account the above 
elements evenly, i.e. the changed African context/sensitivities, and thus did not fully 
consider the costs produced by such planning i.e. hostility to AFRICOM. The EU, 
while taking stock from, continuing on and strengthening the previous conflict 
                        
2 Rosenau, J, N 2008 ‘Forward’, in Smith, S, Hadfield, A, Dunne, T 2008 ‘Foreign Policy: 
Theories-Actors-Cases’, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.i.  
3 White, B, 2004 ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and European Foreign Policy’, in Tonra, B, 
Christiansen, T, (eds.) 2004 ‘Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy’, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester/NY, pp.45-61; White, B 2001 ‘Understanding European 
Foreign Policy’, Palgrave, Hampshire, pp.27-46. 
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prevention and crises management policy thinking, seems to have wholly involved 
the African party on the formulation of JAES P&S, resulting in broad accordance 
among both parties.  
Secondly, the outputs of both policies have been influenced at varying degrees by the 
respective bureaucracies involved, who inasmuch as bureaucracies have a clear 
preference for continuity as opposed to change4, unless change means increase in 
own organisational health. Both policies demanded change, thus the second 
hypothesis would read as follows:  
Hypothesis 2. Since bureaucracies resist policies which imply change, then 
the involved bureaucracies would try to mould them 
(AFRICOM, JAES P&S) in a way that would best fit their own 
organisational health/interests.  
This seems to have accounted for less than optimal policy outputs.  
 
THE ROAD TO AFRICOM: The terrorist attacks on September 11 changed the 
American strategic perceptions of Africa5. Less than two months after these attacks, 
it was officially declared that Africa was an important region for the US 
government’s high priority war on international terrorism. On 30 October 2001, the 
then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated that: ‘Africa’s history and 
geography give it a pivotal role in the war on terrorism. […] Africa is critical to our 
war on terrorism’6. The US national ‘Security Strategy’ launched in September 2002 
clearly highlighted this same objective. It was pointed out that ‘the events of 
                        
4 Hill, C 2003 ‘The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy’, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, p.85; 
Allison, G, T 1971 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’, Little, Brown 
and Company, Boston, p.167; Allison, G, Zelikow, P 1999 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining 
the Cuban Missile Crisis‘, 2nd Edition, The Edison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc.; 
Allison, G, 2008 ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis’, in Smith, S, et al (eds.) 2008 ‘Foreign Policy: 
Theories, Actors, Cases’, Oxford University Press, Oxford/NY.  
5 Schraeder, P, J 2005 ‘La guerre contre le terrorisme e la politique américaine en Afrique’, in 
Politique Africaine, vol. 98, pp. 42-62; Pham, J, P 2005 ‘US National Interests and Africa’s 
Strategic Significance’, in American Foreign Interests, no. 26, pp.19-29. 
6 Hentz, J, J 2004 ‘The contending currents in United States involvement in sub-Saharan Africa’, 
in Ian Taylor and Paul Williams (eds.) 2004 ‘Africa in International Politics. External 
involvement on the continent’, Routledge, London, pp. 37-8. 
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September 11, 2001 taught us that weak states […] can pose as great a danger to our 
national interest as strong states […and that] poverty, weak institutions and 
corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels 
within their borders. [...] An even more lethal environment exists in Africa as local 
civil wars spread beyond borders to create regional war zones […]’7. The ‘Security 
Strategy’ emphasized that a crucial aim was ‘[…] together with our European allies 
[... to] help strengthen Africa’s fragile states, […] help build indigenous capacity to 
secure porous borders and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence 
infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists’8. Together with the strong emphasis on 
failed states, the ‘Security Strategy’ also concerned one of the traditional instruments 
in US Africa policy, namely development aid9. In the ‘Strategic Plan for 2004-2009’, 
the State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
jointly accentuated that development assistance ‘must be fully aligned with the US 
foreign policy’10. The Plan left no doubt that the US’s own security was the highest 
priority in relation to Africa and other parts of the world. Thus, ‘[w]hat happens in 
Africa is of growing concern to the United States and our active engagement 
advances significant US interests […]’. And therefore, the focus must be on 
‘resolving regional conflicts, countering global terror networks, [and] combating 
international crime’11.  
On February 6, 2007, President Bush and Defence Secretary Robert Gates announced 
the creation of a US Africa Command. The decision is a clear acknowledgment of 
the emerging strategic importance of Africa, and of the recognition that peace and 
stability on the continent impacts not only Africans, but the interests of US and 
international community as well. Until this point, the regional command structure of 
                        
7 The White House, 2002 ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States’, p.10, document 
available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/, last accessed on 
30.03.2009. 
8 Ibid., pp.10-11. 
9 Ibid., pp.21-23. 
10 US DoS and USAID 2003 ‘Strategic Plan for FY 2004-2009: Aligning Diplomacy and 
Development Assistance‘, US DoS/USAID, Washington DC, p.4, available at: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24299.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
11 Ibid., pp.5, 8. 
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the Department of Defence (DoD) did not account for Africa in a comprehensive 
way, since it had three different US military headquarters maintaining relationships 
with African countries. The creation of US AFRICOM was aimed at enabling DoD 
to better focus its resources in supporting and enhancing existing US initiatives that 
help African nations, the African Union (AU), and the regional economic 
communities (RECs) succeed. The DoD would function as an integrated coordination 
point in addressing security and related needs. AFRICOM was created with the aim 
of pointing at the interrelationship between security, development, diplomacy and 
prosperity in Africa, incorporating so the so-called three D approach to foreign 
affairs12. At the security/defence end AFRICOM would bring into one the actions of 
three separate commands, improving so the US/DoD abilities to act in Africa. At the 
diplomacy end, AFRICOM would present the goodwill to treat African partners as 
equal, providing so an opportunity for continuous dialogue13 to develop and help 
building partner capacity through coordinating the kind of support that would enable 
African governments and existing regional organizations to have greater capacity in 
providing security. At the development end, AFRICOM is designed to ‘prevent 
problems from turning into crises and crises from turning into conflicts’, convinced 
of the fact that the securing of a peaceful and stabile environment promotes 
economic prosperity This last one provides us with an important clue of AFRICOM 
centring the ‘development-security nexus’ discourse as one of its relevant concerns. 
As a result, AFRICOM’s staff structure would include significant management and 
staff representation by the Department of State (DoS), USAID, and other US 
government agencies involved in Africa. It would also ‘seek to incorporate partner 
nations and humanitarian organizations, from Africa and elsewhere, to work 
alongside the US staff on common approaches to shared interests’14.  
                        
12 The 3-Ds approach stands for Defense, Diplomacy, and Development. The 3-Ds approach, as 
introduced by the then US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, in 2006, is part of the 
‘transformational diplomacy’. For more see: Nakamura, K, H, Epstein, S, B 2007 ‘Diplomacy 
for the 21st Century: Transformational Diplomacy’, US Congressional Research Service 
Report, Washington DC, available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/ crs/row/RL34141.pdf, last 
accessed on 23.12.2008. 
13 Tieku, T, K 2010 ‘The African Union and AFRICOM’, in Francis, D, J (ed.) 2010 ‘US 
Strategy in Africa: AFRICOM, Terrorism and Security Challenges’, Routledge, Oxon/NY, 
p.133.  
14 USAFRICOM, 2008 ‘Mission statement approved by the Secretary of Defense May 2008’, 
available at: http://www.africom.mil, last accessed on 12.06.2008. 
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‘AFRICOM, in concert with other US government agencies and 
international partners, aims at conducting sustained security 
engagement through military-to-military programs, military-
sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to 
promote a stable and secure African environment in support of US 
foreign policy15.  
AFRICOM would also aim at putting into practice the conceptualisations on 
soft/smart power, inasmuch it would seek to address human rights abuses, poverty 
alleviation, the building of health clinics and schools as well as the digging of 
wells16. So far, the new command presents itself as having the best of intentions. 
These, though, stand in stark contrast with US’s behaviour in Africa. In recent years, 
access to alternative oil supplies has increasingly become a US policy priority 
towards Africa. As a matter of it, the policy goal of fighting international terrorism 
has increasingly been mixed with another classical US national security issue: access 
to oil supplies17. According to the National Intelligence Council forecasts, the US 
could be importing as much as 25% of its oil from Central Africa by 2015 compared 
with 16% at the beginning of this century18. The increasing emphasis on securing oil 
supply from Africa and other regions but the Middle East has led the Pentagon to 
reflect on new strategic initiatives19. These changes have resulted in a situation where 
it has gradually become difficult to separate the protection of oil from the war against 
terrorism which it seems to amount to one and the same thing20. These analyses seem 
                        
15 Ibid. 
16 Tieku, T, K 2010 ‘The African Union and AFRICOM’, p.139.  
17 Klare, M, T 2005 ‘Blood and Oil: How America's Thirst for Petrol Is Killing Us’, Penguin 
Books, London; Schraeder, P, J 2005 ‘La guerre contre le terrorisme e la politique 
américaine en Afrique’, p.52. 
18 Pham, J, P 2005 ‘US National Interests and Africa’s Strategic Significance’; Servant, J, C 2003 
‘Africa: External Interests and Internal Insecurity The New Golf Oil States’, in Le Monde 
Diplomatique, available at: http://mondediplo.com/ 2003/01/08oil, last accessed 25.11.2008. 
19 Volman, D 2003 ‘Oil, Arms and Violence in Africa’, Online Report: The African Security 
Research Project, Washington DC, available at: http://www.prairienet.org/ 
acas/military/oilandarms.pdf, last accessed 25.11.2008; Klare, M, T 2005 ‘Blood and Oil: 
How America's Thirst for Petrol Is Killing Us’. 
20 Klare, M, T 2005 ‘Blood and Oil: How America's Thirst for Petrol Is Killing Us’, Penguin 
Books, London; Schraeder, P, J 2005 ‘La guerre contre le terrorisme e la politique 
américaine en Afrique’, p.52. 
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to stand nearer to the truth, since AFRICOM generated an ‘unprecedented unity of 
opposition’ and hostility across Africa as well as a mounting resistance among 
involved US government agencies, especially the civilian ones. 
THE ROAD TO JAES P&S: Due to its history of colonial involvement in Africa, 
Europe shares a common past with the African countries and has maintained a close 
partnership with them ever since their independence. This was done through the 
Yaoundé (1964-1969) and Lomé (1975-2000) agreements. An increasing emphasis 
on political stability and on security was then progressively introduced into the two 
last Lomé agreements and their successor, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement 
(CPA), signed in 2000. Thus, while development policies have a long history, 
security issues gained salience, particularly as the conflicts, civil wars and interstate 
wars in Africa (especially SSA) reached a peak during the 1990s and continued to 
remain a concern of the EU also at the dawn of the new century.  
In 2000, the EU Portuguese Presidency stated clearly security concerns by 
interlinking them with development issues: ‘Being realistic about development 
means thinking in an integrated manner about politics, security, and trade as well as 
development aid itself’21. 
At about the same time, the EU and Africa held their first ever summit on continental 
level, in Cairo, Egypt. The resulting Cairo Declaration together with an Action Plan 
highlighted the main issues of concern among the two parties: security figured 
prominently in both the documents, due to the acknowledgement that, 
‘persistence of numerous conflicts, which continue to cause [...] 
loss of human life as well as destruction of infrastructure and 
property and threaten peace, stability, regional and international 
security and hinder the aspirations of African peoples to peace, 
prosperity and development’22. 
                        
21 Cardoso, F, J, Kühne, W, Honwana, J, B 2000 ‘Reflection Paper: Priorities in EU 
Development Cooperation in Africa: Beyond 2000’, Brussels, Council of Ministers, cited in 
Hadfield, A 2007 ‘Janus Advances: An Analysis of EC Development Policy And the 2005 
Amended Cotonou Partnership Agreement’, in European Foreign Affairs Review, Volume 12, 
Kluwer Law International, London, p.45. 
22 SN 106/4/00 REV 4, Africa-Europe Summit under the Aegis of the OAU and the EU, Cairo, 3-
4 April 2000 ‘Cairo Declaration’, available at: http://www.iss.co.za/Af/RegOrg/ 
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Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the already ongoing debate on European 
security focused on the necessity to tackle terrorism adequately23. As a result, in the 
European Union’s Security Strategy (ESS) agreed upon by the European Council in 
December 2003, terrorism was placed as one of the main threats to the EU followed 
by the threats from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional 
conflicts, state failure and organized crime24. The ESS points out that ‘conflicts can 
lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure [and] it provides opportunities for 
organized crime’. On state failure the ESS underlines that ‘collapse of the state can 
be associated with obvious threats, such as organized crime or terrorism. State failure 
is an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance and adds to regional 
instability’25. With time, the focus on terrorism faded, and in general it can be said 
that the ESS, by continuing on the above mentioned, furthered a close link between 
the new and old security threats and underdevelopment by stating that ‘Security is 
the first condition for development’26. 
Despite the first steps undertaken through the Cairo Process towards a 
comprehensive EU Africa policy, there was still a wealth of sectoral and fragmented 
policies. The challenges to coordination for a more efficient and effective action, 
asserted the need for a new and comprehensive single approach, which evolved 
under the form of the ‘EU Strategy for Africa’ (ESA). The main objectives of this 
Strategy were the provision of a single framework for all EU actors as well as the 
development of Africa, namely the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) as one of the EU’s main political priorities. Peace and security was again 
                                                                  
unity_to_union/pdfs/au/afreurdecl00.pdf, last accessed 17.11.2009; Africa-Europe Summit 
under the Aegis of the OAU and the EU, Cairo, 3-4 April 2000 ‘Cairo Plan of Action’, 
available at:  http://www.issafrica.org/AF/RegOrg/ unity_to_union/pdfs/au/afreurplan00.pdf, 
last accessed 17.11.2009. 
23 Allen, D, Smith, M 2002 ‘External Policy Developments’, in Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Annual Review of the European Union 2001/2002, Volume 40, p.97; Boer, M, 
Monar, J 2002 ’11 September and the Challenge of Global Terrorism to EU as a Security 
Actor’, in Journal of Common Market Studies, Annual Review of the European Union 
2001/2002, Volume 40, pp.11-28. 
24 Council of the European Union, 2003 ‘A Secure Europe In A Better World: European Security 
Strategy’, Brussels, p.3, available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/st15/ 
st15895.en03.pdf, last accessed on 17.11.2009. 
25 Ibid, p.4. 
26 Ibid, p.15. 
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seen as prerequisites to a sustainable accomplishment of MDGs. The greatest 
problem of EU Strategy for Africa (ESA), was that the African partners saw 
themselves excluded from it, since they perceived it as a strategy FOR rather than a 
strategy WITH Africa. In a second try, at the Lisbon Summit, the second between 
Europe and Africa, the EU-Africa relationship marked a real turning point. Its 
agenda has been characterized by far-flung objectives and an all-embracing list of 
measures for future activities.  Its Action Plan sets out the steps the EU will take by 
2015 in supporting the African efforts to build a peaceful future. JAES defines the 
long-term policy orientations between the two continents, based on a shared vision 
and common principles such as the African unity, interdependence between the 
continents, ownership and responsibility, respect for human rights and democratic 
principles, right to development, strong political dialogue, burden-sharing, solidarity, 
common and human security, etc. The main objectives of JAES consist on improving 
the Africa-EU partnership, promoting peace, security, democratic and human rights, 
basic freedoms and gender equality, sustainable economic development, including 
industrialization, regional and continental integration, ensuring that all MDGs are 
met by 2015, effective multilateralism and a people centred partnership. 
The Strategy’s First Action Plan, jointly agreed by the European and African parties, 
outlines eight areas for strategic partnership for the period of 2008-2010. The list is 
headed by the peace and security agenda. The objective of the JAES P&S is to 
cooperate in enhancing the capacity of Africa and EU to respond timely and 
adequately to security threats, and also to join efforts in addressing global challenges. 
Priority actions foresee the enhancing of the dialogue on challenges to peace and 
security, the full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA) and last but not least predictable funding for African-led Peace Support 
Operations (PSOs).  
 
OF NEW CONCEPTUALISATIONS AND PARADIGM CHANGES 
The referral, made at the beginning, to the new conceptualisations and paradigm 
shifts concerning security, development, their interrelationship, and the regional 
integration as an instrument to tackle and solve security problems, as well as the 
informed foreign policies of the US and EU concerning concepts such as 
13 
 
hard/soft/smart and civilian/normative power, make peremptory to provide these 
concepts with short definitions.      
 
HUMAN SECURITY & SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS: As has been above 
mentioned, both policies (AFRICOM, JAES P&S) did further supplement the close 
link between security and development. The thinking about development and 
security and more so the relationship between them has indicated a paradigm shift 
since the 1990s. In the post-9/11 world, it became a commonplace to talk about the 
all-encompassing role of security. Three major changes in international relations 
have been crystallised as factors for such paradigm shift: firstly, new threats – 
international terrorism, organised crime, energy security, spread of WMDs, etc; 
secondly, steady growth of global or universal norms crystallised within the 
framework of international law; and thirdly, the consequences of globalisations. No 
longer exclusively defined in terms of national safety, security is seen broadened to 
include protection of the individual from threats such as lack of basic necessities, 
human rights abuses, and environmental degradation as well violence from conflicts 
or wars. The concept of Human Security (HS) emphasizes the ‘developmentalisation’ 
of security, since it includes ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’27. In 
opposition to the traditional state-centric security concept, HS is an individual-centric 
approach, which includes ‘the protection of communities and individuals from 
internal violence’28. The paradigm shift, thus, consists in ‘[r]ather than viewing 
security as being concerned with ‘individuals qua citizens’ (that is of their states), the 
HS approach views security as being concerned with ‘individuals qua persons’29. HS 
                        
27 UNDP, 1994 ‘Human Development Report 1994: new Dimensions of Human Security’, 
available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/, last accessed on 17.11.2009; 
Athanasiou, E 2007 ‘Human Security at Test: The United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo’, in Human Security Journal, Volume 5, pp.72-80. 
28 Annan, K 2000 ‘We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century’, p.2[43], 
available at: http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/full.htm, last accessed on 17.11.2009 
29 Poku, N, K, Renwick N, Glenn, J 2000 ‘Human Security in a Globalising World’, in Graham, 
D, T, Poku, N, K (eds.) 2000 ‘Migration, Globalisation and Human Security’, Routledge, 
London, p.17. 
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is ‘the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and 
fulfillment’30. 
‘Human Security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the 
absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good 
governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that 
each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her 
potential […]. Freedom from want, freedom from fear, and the 
freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural 
environment—these are the interrelated building blocks of 
human—and therefore national security’31 
Development itself has been increasingly fused with and subjected to security 
concerns32. During the 1990s matured the recognition that there is a two way 
interrelation between the salience on armed conflict as well as crime and violence 
with economic inequality, underdevelopment and poor governance. Conflicts and/or 
wars had themselves massive costs in terms of missed development opportunities, 
translated in i.e. failing states and low indexes of human development33. From here 
on, it has become imperative to facilitate coherent, holistic or comprehensive 
approaches which integrate conflict prevention and resolution, post-conflict 
reconstruction and good governance with development interventions34. For ‘the 
political, security, economic and social spheres are interdependent: failure in one 
risks failure in all others. International actors should move to support national 
                        
30 Liotta, P, H, Owen, T 2006 ‘Why Human Security?’, in Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and 
International Relations, Winter/Spring, pp.37-54. 
31 Annan, K 2000 ‘Secretary General Salutes international Workshops on Human Security in 
Mongolia’, 2-day Session, 8-10 May 2000, UN Press Release: SG/SM/7382, available at: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000508.sgsm7382.doc.html, last accessed on 
17.11.2009. 
32 Duffield, M 2001 ‘Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and 
Security’, Zed Books, London. 
33 UNDP, 1994 ‘Human Development Report 1994: new Dimensions of Human Security’. 
34 OECD/DAC 2004 ‘The Security and Development Nexus: Challenges for Aid’, DAC high 
Level meeting, 15-16 April 2004, DCD/DAC(2004)9/REV2, available at: http://www.oecd. 
org/dataoecd/40/59/31526546.pdf; IPA 2004 ‘IPA Report: The Security Development Nexus: 
Conflict, Peace and Development in the 21st Century’, IPA, NY, p.3, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/59/31526546.pdf,all last accessed on 17.11.2009. 
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reformers in developing unified planning frameworks for political, security, 
humanitarian, economic and development activities at a country level’35. This 
phenomenon has highlighted what within the developmental circles is called the 
‘securitisation of development’. There is still an ongoing debate whether the merging 
of development and security should be viewed positively inasmuch it potentially 
provides for coherent and comprehensive policies, or whether this new paradigm 
points towards a subordination of development and poverty reduction to the security 
needs of major powers, mostly Western ones, i.e. US and its leadership in the Global 
War on Terrorism (GWOT)36, or even the Western powers’ desire to contain the ‘at 
risk’ regions of potential instability away from their borders37.  
REGIONALISATION & SECURITY: The 1990s as well as the dawn of the new 
millennium showed an intensifying of, on the one side, intrastate conflicts and wars 
and on the other side, a renaissance concerning regional cooperation, both 
                        
35 OECD/DAC 2007 ‘The Fragile States Principles: Principle 5’, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,3343,en_21571361_42277499_45359811_1_1_1_1,00.ht
ml, all last accessed on 17.11.2009. 
36 For instance see: Beall, J, Goodfellow, T, Putzel, J 2006 ‘Introductory Article: On the 
Discourse of Terrorism, Security and Development', in Journal of International Development, 
Volume 18, Issue No.: 1, pp. 51-67; Picciotto, R 2004 ‘Aid and Conflict: The Policy 
Coherence Challenge’, in Conflict, Security & Development, Volume 4, Issue No.: 3, pp.543-
562; DFID 2005 ‘Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: A Strategy for Security and 
Development’, Department for International Development, London, available at 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/security forall.pdf, last accessed on 17.11.2009; IPA 2004 
‘Strengthening the Security–Development Nexus: Assessing International Policy and Practice 
since the 1990s’, International Peace Academy, New York; IPA 2004 ‘The Security–
Development Nexus: Conflict, Peace and Development in the 21st Century’, International 
Peace Academy, NY; IPA 2006 ‘Program Report: The Security–Development Nexus: 
Research Findings and Policy Implications’, International Peace Academy, NY. 
37 For instance see: Duffield, M 2001 ‘Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of 
Development and Security’, Zed Books, London; Duffield, M 2003 ‘Social Reconstruction 
and the Radicalisation of Development: Aid as a Relation of Global Liberal Governance’, in 
Jennifer Milliken, ed., State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 
291–312; Duffield, M 2006 ’ Human Security; Development, Containment and Re-
territorialisation’, Paper prepared for Humanising Security or Securitising Development? 
Conference convened by Christian Aid and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Institute 
of Commonwealth Studies, London’; Abrahamsen, Abrahamsen, Rita (2004) ‘The Power of 
Partnerships in Global Governance’, Third World Quarterly 25(8): 1453–67; Abrahamsen, 
Rita (2005) ‘Blair’s Africa: The Politics of Securitization and Fear’, Alternatives 30(1): 55–
80.; Harrison, 2001; Harrison, Graham (2001) ‘Post-Conditionality Politics and 
Administrative Reform: Reflections on the Cases of Uganda and Tanzania’, Development and 
Change 32(4): 634–65. Harrison, Graham (2004) The World Bankand Africa: The 
Construction of Governance State, London: Routledge.; Fraser, 2005 Fraser, Alastair (2005) 
‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: Now Who Calls the Shots?’ Review of African Political 
Economy 104(5): 317–40. 
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phenomena observed especially in Africa. The endemic presence of a large number 
of weak and/or failing/failed states also accounts for a potential spill-over of 
instability beyond states and across regions. In trying to find a response to these 
problems, regional cooperation became an important and appropriate instrument in 
curbing instability and insecurity. EU provides an example par excellence in this 
case. This interrelationship between regional cooperation and security/conflict 
prevention is not new. Its sources reach as back as 16th and 18th century with the 
writings of Erasmus von Rotterdam, Abbé de Saint Pierre as well as Immanuel Kant 
and its perpetual peace. At a later period, regional cooperation was intrinsic and 
present within situations and concepts such as balance of power, emergence of 
alliances when states are faced with common enemies and threats, the influencing of 
state behaviour through regional structures thus reducing the chances for conflict38. 
As a result though of the above-mentioned paradigm shifts concerning 
security/development and of the changed international context (prevalence of 
intrastate as compared to interstate conflicts/wars) states are seen as coming together 
out of a common threat rather than to restore a balance of power between themselves. 
Since threats themselves are of a transnational nature, it implies that security 
becomes increasingly a matter of regional concern. The current state-of-the-art for 
such interdependence is given through Buzan and Weaver’s concept of regions rising 
as security actors39. ‘The existence of (positive) linkages between regional economic 
integration and peace and security is accepted by many and is an assumption behind 
                        
38 These concepts can be found within the Realist, Neo-realist and Institutionalist schools of 
thought. For more see: Waltz, K, N 1979 ‘Theory of international Politics’, Addison-Wesley, 
Reading; Walt, S 1987 ‘The Origins of Alliances’, Cornell University Press, Ithaca/NY; 
Ikenberry, J, G 2002 ‘After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of 
Order After Major Wars’, Princeton University Press, Princeton; Keohane, R, O 1989 
‘International Institutions and State Power: Essays on International Relations Theory’, 
Boulder, SF/London; Moravcsik, A 1997 ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of 
International Politics’, in International Organisation, Volume 51, Issue No.: 4, pp.513-553.. 
39 Buzan, B, Weaver, O, de Wilde, J 1998 ‘Security: A New Framework For Analysis’, Lynne 
Rienner, Boulder. This book sustains that with the state increasingly losing its role as a central 
security actor, regions do present themselves as the appropriate arena upon which to stage 
common action since security threats, and especially because their increasingly transnational 
character, often are shared among most actors in the same region. 
 An interesting analysis of the interdependence between regional cooperation and 
security/conflict prevention in Africa, as explored in the example of four Central African 
states, is to be found at: Meyer, A 2006 ‘L’Intégration Régionale Et Son Influence Sur La 
Structure, La Sécurité Et La Stabilité D’Etats Faibles: L’Exemple De Quatre Etats 
Centrafricains’, Universität Wien. 
17 
 
many contemporary discourses in favour of more cooperation and integration at the 
regional level in order to avoid or end bilateral, regional and even domestic conflicts. 
European post-war history and the initial phases of European integration are thereby 
explicitly or implicitly presented as a demonstration of the validity of the 
assumption. [...] It is often assumed that this experience is replicable in other parts of 
the world’40.  
Concerning Africa, the pan-African movement has strong endogenous political, 
economic and security motives. Its political motive is based on the strong 
pan‐African urge towards ‘a continental identity and coherence’41, and a, as much 
stronger, urge based on economic motives for a regional cooperation, given the small 
size of most African economies. Concerning the security motives, the erosion of the 
state’s powers and consequently their being unable to capably and efficiently tackle 
security challenges, sees an increase in reliance on regional structures, since doing so 
it provides for a more efficient use of scarce resources and a more effective tackling 
of security problems.   
 
US: HARD/SOFT/SMART POWER42. Hard power is defined as the ‘wilful power, [...] 
the ability to impose one’s goals without regard to others’, and ‘the ability to talk 
instead of listen and to afford not to learn’43. Its source is seen in ‘large population 
and territory, extensive natural resources, economic strength, military force, and 
social stability’44. The context within the new century made peremptory the 
                        
40 de Lombaerde, P 2005 ‘Regional Integration and Peace’, in Peace & Conflict Monitor, 
University for Peace–The UN Mandated Graduate School for Peace Studies, available at: 
http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=268, last accessed on 17.11.2009. 
41 McCarthy, S 1995 ‘Africa: The Challenge of Transformation’, I B Tauris, London, p.14, cited 
in Matthews, A 2003 ‘Regional Integration and Food Security in Developing Countries’, 
FAO, Roma, available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/ 004/Y4793E/y4793e00.htm#Contents, 
last accessed on 28.12.2009 
42 Hard/soft/smart power will be dealt at greater detail on Part II where these conceptions will be 
applied and thus evaluate on these same grounds the concerned US policies in Africa since 
the dawn of the new century. 
43 Deutsch, K 1963 ‘The Nerves of Government’, Free Press, NY, p.111. 
44 Nye, Jr, J S 2004 ‘Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in World Politics’, PublicAffairs, New 
York, p.3 
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strengthening of existing alliances, bolstering potential allies and backing up and 
supporting failing states that were perceived as vulnerable to extremist penetrations. 
Such, was argued, invoked for a combination of hard and soft powers. Joe Nye 
defines soft power as the ability to ‘[...] shape the preferences of others and getting 
others to want the outcomes that you want’45. Nye adds that in reaching the desired 
results one must decide which type of power is the most expedient by taking into 
consideration the context within which power is executed. Hence, smart power: a 
mix of hard and soft power skills and resources, the exact dosage depending on the 
context46. Nye’s academic deliberations did have a stark impact on the way US 
implements its foreign policy, as evidenced by the CSIS Commission on Smart 
Power (2007)47. The Report provided with a guidebook-like on the international US 
behaviour. 
EU: CIVILIAN/NORMATIVE POWER48. Following on Duchêne’s conceptualisation of 
the EU –then EC– as a new kind of civilian power/actor49, his academic ‘successors’ 
have developed a thesis which maintains that the Union, inasmuch uniquely capable 
and/or uniquely configured, constitutes an effective exporter of values and norms in 
the international system50. A civilian power implies acceptance of the necessity for 
cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives, a preference for 
civilian means, and a willingness to develop supranational structures to address 
pressing international issues, as well as the development of a set of values 
                        
45 Nye, Jr, J S 2004, ‘Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in World Politics’, p. 60, (emphasis 
added). 
46 Nye, Jr., J S 2008 ‘The Powers to Lead‘, Oxford University Press, New York, p.x 
47 Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007 ‘CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A 
Smarter, More Secure America‘, CSIS, Washington DC, p.4 
48 Civilian/normative power will be dealt at greater detail on Part II where these conceptions will 
be applied and thus evaluate on these same grounds the concerned EU policies in Africa since 
the dawn of the new century. 
49 Duchêne, F 1972 ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’, in Mayne, R (ed.) 1972 ‘Europe Tomorrow: 
Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead’, Fontana, London, pp.32-47 
50 Manners, I, 2002 ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, in Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Volume 40, Issue 2; Sjursen, H, 2006 ‘EU as a Normative Power, 
How can this Be?’, in Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 13, Issue 2; Lucarelli, S, 
Manners, I (eds.) 2006 ‘Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy’, 
Routledge, Oxon. 
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encompassing ‘solidarity with other societies, and a sense of responsibility for the 
future of the world’51. The civilian attribute has come under attack, for ‘civilising’ is 
seen as a far too laden term from the historical European relations with the rest of the 
world52. Manners has advanced that the notion of Normative Power Europe (NPE) 
better describes the EU, which focuses on the ‘ideational impact of the EU’s 
international identity/role’53. EU’s normative ambitions have their source from, 
firstly, an explicit rejection of the divisive nationalisms, imperialism and war of 
Europe’s past, secondly, its unique character as a ’hybrid polity’, and thirdly, the 
development, over the past 50 years, of a body of values which are firmly embedded 
in successive Treaties and in the Union’s practices54. 
 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
‘[T]he essence of FPA is that it offers an actor rather than a state 
perspective, and, equally important, it provides a policy focus 
[...]’55. 
A glance at the already existing large literature focused on analyzing the US and EU 
policies in Africa, and we would quickly find out that, little work is available 
concerning a systematic comparative analysis between them. It seems that, apart 
from globalisation and the end of the cold war era, this is due to other four main 
reasons56. Firstly, Africa has only lately acquired an important and even strategic 
                        
51 Maull, H, 1990 ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’, in Foreign Affairs, Volume 
69, Issue No. 5, pp.92-3. Maull’s definition of civilian power, although it refers specifically to 
Germany and Japan, has been regularly used with reference to the EU. 
52 Spivak, G, C 1999 ‘A Critique of Post-Colonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing 
Present’, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, p.91-93. 
53 Manners, I 2002 ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, in Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Volume 40, No.2, p.238. 
54 Ibid., p.240. 
55 White, B 2004 ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and European Foreign Policy’, in Tonra, B, 
Christiansen, T 2004 ‘Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy’, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester/NY, p.54¸ White, B 2001 ‘Understanding European Foreign Policy’, 
Palgrave, Hampshire, pp.27-46 
56 Although, an assessment of these factors is in itself highly interesting, they are only mentioned 
and not further elaborated within this research effort.  
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position within the agendas of both actors; Secondly, prior to 9/11, the array of 
policies and issues was rather limited, with development policies featuring 
prominently; Thirdly, with the institutionalisation of a common European security 
and foreign policy, the EU surfaced as an actor within the international arena, thus, 
attracting greater academic interest for its policies; and fourthly, arguably, the 
emergence of a ‘sui generis’ actor such as the EU, that does not fit the traditional 
actor’s theorizing, accounts for the most prominent reason for such a gap in the 
literature. The new developments and conceptualizations, which engage a critical 
approach to foreign policy, have opened the way for and make possible such 
comparison. 
This research effort finds as most applicable two definitions of foreign policy. The 
first offers a classic explanation of foreign policy, which is seen as encompassing 
‘those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments 
and/or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of 
their sovereign communities, are directed towards objectives, conditions and actors –
both governmental and non-governmental– which they want to affect and which lie 
beyond their territorial legitimacy’57. The second one, while not conflicting with the 
above-mentioned, it offers a broader definition which does not exclusively focus on 
actions performed by nation-states, thus allowing for an analysis of foreign policy 
actions performed by i.e. non-state/sui generis actors such as the EU. This definition 
is well accepted by many theorists in the field of foreign policy.  
‘[Foreign policy] is the sum of official external relations conducted 
by an independent actor (usually a state) in international 
relations’58.   
This notion of foreign policy is easier applicable to actors other than the state, since 
nowadays, academics, pundits and decision-makers alike view foreign policy as 
‘something that a variety of actors do, from influential social movements on the one 
                        
57 Carlsnaes, W 2002 ‘Foreign Policy’, in Carlsnaes, W, Risse, T, Simmons, B, A (eds.) 2002 
‘Handbook of International Relations’, Sage, London, p.335. 
58 Hill, C 2003 ‘The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy’, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p.3. 
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hand to regional actors like the EU on the other’59. The inclusion of these new actors 
is explained by the fact that through their foreign policies ‘they have a high impact 
on other states and organisations’60.   
While an analysis of foreign policy through a FPA-like approach is seen as having 
been ‘around as long as there have been historians and others’61 who have sought to 
understand the reasons for the choices made regarding relations with external 
entities, the FPA approach within the field of IR per se is dated back to the 1950s and 
early 1960s. Its first thirty years are characterised by a vibrant research community in 
IR. At that time, there were three main themes, each of them concerning a 
paradigmatic publication. Firstly, the publication of Snyder, Bruk and Sapin62 in the 
1950s and the consequential work on the bureaucratic and organisational politics in 
the 1960s and early 1970s by Allison and Halperin63, inspired an analysis of foreign 
policy focused on the decision-making. Secondly, FPA was referenced to the psycho-
milieu, by which is to be understood the psychological, situational, and social 
contexts, within which individuals, involved in the decision-making process, act. 
This strand had its paradigmatic guidance in mainly the publication of the Sprouts64. 
The third strand centred on the work of Jim Rosenau which focused on the 
                        
59 Smith, S, Hadfield, A, Dunne, T 2008 ‘Introduction’, in Smith, S, Hadfield, A, Dunne, T (eds.) 
2008 ‘Foreign Policy: Theories-Actors-Cases’, Oxford university Press, Oxford, p.2. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Hudson, V, M 2008 ‘The History and Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis’, in Smith, S, 
Hadfield, A, Dunne, T (eds.) 2008 ‘Foreign Policy: Theories-Actors-Cases’, Oxford 
university Press, Oxford, p.12. 
62 For more see: Snyder, R, C, Bruck, H, W, Sapin, B 1954 ‘Decision-Making as an Approach to 
the Study of International Politics’, in Foreign Policy Analysis Project Series No.: 3, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton; ____________ (eds.) 1963 ‘Foreign Policy Decision-
Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics’, Free Press, Glencoe; 
____________ (eds.) 2002 ‘Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revised)’, Palgrave-
Macmillan, NY. 
63 Allison, G, T 1971 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’, Little, Brown, 
Boston; Allison, G, T, Halperin, M 1972 ‘Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy 
Implications’, in World Politics, Volume 24, pp.40-79; Allison, G, Zelikow, P 1999 ‘Essence 
of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’, 2nd Edition, Longman, NY; Halperin, M 
1974 ‘Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy’, Brookings Institution, Washington DC; 
Halperin, M, Kanter, A (eds.) 1973 ‘Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic 
Perspective’, Little, Brown, Boston. 
64 Sprout, H, Sprout, M 1956 ‘Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of 
International Politics’, Princeton University Press, Princeton;  
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relationship between genotypes of states and the sources of their foreign policy in the 
1960s65. The dynamics of foreign policy are, thus, found in a wide range of social 
science fields66. Recently there is observable a new development which bears witness 
of a dynamic interplay between IR concepts and ideas and what would previously 
have been termed FPA67.   
The occurrence of 9/11 did give salience to FPA approaches, which since the late 
1980s had fallen out of fashion. This new salience is explained by the fact that 9/11 
incited the scholarly body to ‘focus attention on the centrality of decisions taken by 
states and by other independent actors, as well as why the US and UK intelligence 
service turned out not to be fit for purpose [sic]’68. As mentioned above, the focus of 
this research goes on these same lines: it focuses on the decisions taken by the US 
and EU concerning Africa since the beginning of the new millennium, as well as 
looks at why two paramount policies, although aiming the same, at their 
announcement were so diversely greeted, especially by the African parties.  
FPA is seen as an appropriate theoretical framework for this research, applicable to 
the analysis of US and EU foreign policy in Africa. There are two fundamental 
reasons which sustain this claim. First, FPA has lost its state-centricity, and as result 
of it, the analytical techniques associated to FPA can be transferred from the state to 
other significant international actors69, just such the EU. This brings no losses to the 
FPA as an approach, for when the FPA was born, the state, as the most significant 
actor in IR, was the logical unit with which to analyse international relations. From 
the very beginning, though, it was always the actor perspective, rather than a specific 
                        
65 Rosenau, J, N 1966 ‘Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy’, in Farrell, R, B (ed.) 1966 
‘Approaches to Comparative and International Politics’, Northwestern University Press, 
Evanston, pp.27-92. 
66 Smith, S, Hadfield, A, Dunne, T 2008 ‘Introduction’, p.4. 
67 For more see: Hill, C 2003 ‘The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy’, Palgrave Macmillan, 
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68 Smith, S, Hadfield, A, Dunne, T 2008 ‘Introduction’, p.2. 
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type of actor/actors, that was important to the foreign policy analyst70. The second 
reason concerns the perceived focus of FPA on government and governmental 
power. As a matter of fact, this problem pertains not just to foreign policy analysts 
but to ‘all political scientists’ evident since the emergence of the so-called ‘authority 
structures that are not coterminous with geographic borders, whether territorially or 
regional based (like the EU) [...]’71. The accepted solution here has been by replacing 
the term ‘government’ with that of ‘governance’, allowing so the study of 
government-like activities. Thus, ‘as with replacing state by actor, it does not 
obviously damage the essence of an FPA approach to replace government with 
governance’72. By building on the premises that the essence of FPA is that it offers 
an actor perspective and a policy focus, the rest of the analysis is done by posing the 
six standard FPA questions concerning contexts, actors, processes, issues, 
instruments and outputs. All of them are assumed to be interrelated to each other and 
thus, constitute a foreign policy system in action, by which it is understood that the 
nature of processes is affected by the identity of the actors involved, the concerned 
issues, the available policy instruments and the context within which policy is made. 
Outputs are then generated as a result of such interrelationship73.  
By building on these premises, a critical foreign policy analysis, methodologically 
seen, has to follow certain imperatives which take five relevant features74. Firstly, 
critical foreign policy should be empirical, meaning that analysis ought to look at 
actual cases and evidence, of course within an explicit theoretical framework; 
secondly, both structure and agency should be taken into consideration, since both of 
them are involved in foreign policy, with decisions being made –agency– but always 
                        
70 Hill, C 1974 ‘The Credentials of Foreign Policy Analysis’, in Millennium, Volume 3, issue 
No.: 2, cited in White, B 2004 ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and European Foreign Policy’, p.50. 
71 Krasner, S 1995 ‘Compromising Westphalia’, in International Security, Volume 20, issue No.: 
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72 White, B 2004 ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and European Foreign Policy’, p.51. 
73 Clarke, M, White, B 1989 ‘Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems 
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74 This section is dissected out of: Williams, P 2005 ‘British Foreign Policy Under New Labour 
1997-2005’, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp.5-7; Smith, S, Hadfield, A, Dunne, T 2008 
‘Introduction’, p.5. 
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within a set of constraints –structure; thirdly, a critical approach to foreign policy 
accepts a broad view of politics, meaning that politics does not exclusively happens 
at the governmental level, for politics is shaped by NGOs and transnational norms; 
fourthly, critical foreign policy means confronting important theoretical issues with 
knowledge –constitutive of ideas/beliefs/discourses which shape the context within 
which decision-making happens– and reality. This implies that ‘all critically inclined 
scholars search for gaps between words and deeds’; and fifthly, the critical foreign 
policy study recognises the contingency of the political process, meaning that 
decision makers find themselves operating within parameters which constrain their 
freedom, but equally they do make decisions. Accordingly, ‘a critical approach 
accepts that things could have always been different’.  
In trying to satisfy all the above-mentioned imperatives, it seems to this author that, 
Graham T. Allison’s three-level framework75 does exactly that. The first level of 
analysis, the Rational Actor Model (RAM) it assumes that X (in this case AFRICOM 
and JAES P&S) is the action of an international actor (here USA and EU), which has 
a coherent utility function, it acts in relation to external threats and opportunities, and 
its actions are value-maximising; and it asks what threats and opportunities arise for 
the actor; what is its utility function; and what is the best choice in order to maximise 
its own objectives. Thus, it can be said that RAM satisfies wholly/partially the first 
four imperatives for a critical foreign policy analysis. The second and third models, 
respectively the Organisational Behaviour Model (OBM) and the Bureaucratic 
Politics Model (BPM) go at a deeper level and provide so a detailed analysis by 
identifying the units at the governance level involved with the concerned policies, the 
constraints or capabilities created as a result of their respective standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) as well as views and values that shape the choice and action 
made. Thus, this analysis counts for the satisfaction of the fourth and fifth features 
for a critical foreign policy analysis. 
The models complement each other. RAM squares up the broader context, the larger 
national/supranational patterns and the shared images. The RAM assumptions and 
                        
75 Allison, G, T 1971 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’, Little, Brown, 
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logic is apparent –unitary actors with specified objective, maximising value. Such is 
applicable to foreign policy of non-state actors, for as Allison argues, ‘In explaining 
actions of nonstate actors, from international institutions such as the European Union 
or IMF to international businesses and nongovernmental organisations such as the 
Red Cross, this paradigm is also predominant. One reason the model is so pervasive 
is that it does have significant explanatory power’76. 
OBM, on the other side, focuses on the organisational routines (SOPs) which effect 
information, options and actions, while BPM goes further onto detail by highlighting 
politics and procedures which shape perceptions and preferences. As it will be 
shown, none of the three models simply describe events, for  
‘[i]n attempting to explain what happened, each of them 
distinguishes certain features as the relevant determinants. Each 
combs out the numerous details in a limited number of causal 
strands that are woven into the most important reasons for what 
happened [and] by integrating factors identified under each model 
explanations can be significantly strengthened’77.  
As it becomes clear Allison’s framework is used with the aim of analysing the 
concerned polices at different levels: the role of US/EU as international actors 
concerning Africa at macro and meso levels, the concerned organisational routines as 
well as the politics and procedures within relevant governmental units. For this 
purpose, the research was focused on gaining an overview about technical 
discussions in political documents of US, EU and AU/SROs; gathering official 
statements; comparison of legal texts; analysis of information provided through 
official websites such as EU Council, EC, JAESP, White House, US DOD, US DoS, 
AFRICOM, AU, African SROs; contacts with relevant research institutions and think 
tanks across the globe, etc. The output expectations of this research effort are to 
provide the discussion with a stronger empirical as well as analytical base on, 
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generally, the role of US and EU in Africa, and particularly, of their peace and 
security strategy since the dawn of the 21st century. 
 
 
OUTLINE  
By building on the notion of a foreign policy system in action, the dissertation is 
divided in three main parts. The first is concerned with the contexts and actors; the 
second with issues, instruments and the nature of processes; while the third and last 
one will look at two specific outputs of such foreign policy system in action, 
respectively one policy for each the US and EU agendas in Africa: AFRICOM and 
JAES P&S.  
CONTEXTS AND ACTORS: This part is divided in four chapters. The first two analyse 
the changed African context. The first chapter concerns the changes due to the 
increased presence of emerging powers, above all of China, in Africa. The questions 
posed here are i.e. how the unorthodox methods, concerning trade and development 
cooperation, used by the emerging powers have had an impact on the way the 
traditional methods employed by Western countries (most prominently, USA, EU, 
etc) are perceived in Africa?; does the presence of i.e. China and its sheer volume of 
investments provide Africa with a leverage that allows it to better negotiate and 
bargain with the other partners i.e. with US and EU?; has the scramble for access to 
African resources contributed towards a heightened competitiveness among 
traditional (US, EU) and new (China, etc.) actors in Africa? As a matter of fact, 
‘African states are today actively courted by a range of new partners and suitors 
[and] Africa has become a far more intensely competitive political and economic 
marketplace’78. The second chapter is exclusively concentrated on Africa, by looking 
at the main trends and mega challenges that confront today the continent. It is 
important to identify them, for they are relevant to the analysis of respective US and 
EU agendas in Africa at a later stage (Part II). Since the research aims to highlight 
the peace and security strategies, greater attention will be given to the evolution, and 
                        
78 Cooke, J, G, Morrison, J, S 2009 ‘A Smarter US Approach To Africa’, p.3. 
27 
 
institutionalisation of peace and security structures at a pan-African level. Thus, the 
emergence of the AU, and that of the African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA) will be analysed at greater detail. Chapter three and four leave the African 
continent and focus on the US and EU’s actorness and their foreign policy making. 
Chapter three begins with an analysis of the main actors involved in US foreign 
policy in general, for then continuing to explore the US foreign policy during the 
G.W. Bush years. Clearly, that the neoconservative way of thinking and its 
repercussions on the US foreign policy, deserve a short stop. The EU foreign policy, 
which is the object of concern in the fourth chapter, is advanced through the ‘EU-as-
actor’ approach. This is, arguably seen as dominating the existing analyses on 
Europe’s global role and consequently, explaining conceptually the impact of EU on 
world politics. By working backwards, as it were from impact, scholars have tried to 
conceptualise the kind of actorness the EU has acquired, which evidently has enabled 
her to become such an influential global player. Such approach is chosen for a 
second reason as well: the actor focus of the analysis is expedient to and perfectly 
marries with FPA theoretical approach. 
ISSUES, INSTRUMENTS AND NATURE OF PROCESSES: Part II is divided in two chapters, 
which each analyse the respective 21st century US and EU agendas in Africa on the 
grounds of their informed foreign policies concerning hard/soft/smart and 
civilian/normative power discourses. The evaluation of these two different 
approaches will concern the issues of interest that each actor has in Africa, how they 
are advanced, what means and instruments are chosen/available, and how the identity 
of actors has influenced the nature of the processes. As specified by the critical 
foreign policy analysis here special attention will be placed on the ‘search for gaps 
between words and deeds’.  
OUTPUTS: AFRICOM AND JAES P&S: By using Allison’s approach in critically 
analysing these two foreign policy case studies, once again is seen the foreign policy 
system in action –the interrelationship between contexts, actors, issues, instruments 
and processes has a direct impact on the output, with RAM and OBM/BPM covering 
them all. It is proved that the omission of one or more of these elements on the 
decision-making process accounts for outputs which though aiming the same will be 
recognised differently by the concerned parties. For instance, the US policy-makers 
failed to wholly take into account the changed African context and their sensibilities 
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concerning i.e. the pan-African aspirations and institutions in tackling peace and 
security, or the differences on the conceptualisation of security between US and 
Africa: seemingly, the US conceptualises security in traditional state-centric and 
militaristic terms, while the Africans have moved onto accepting a more holistic 
concept, namely that of human security. On the EU side, the research results point 
out that while the standing up of JAES P&S did take into consideration the necessary 
strategic steps, the implementation of JAES P&S, as the insights gained through the 
BPM approach seem to suggest, faces considerable operational challenges. The 
JAES P&S risks to be stamped with a ‘too good to be true’. 
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CHAPTER 1 
A ‘NEW’ SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA? 
 
‘Today emerging-market giants are fighting for oil, gas and metal 
ore in Africa as energetically as 19th-century European colonialists 
grabbed land’1. 
The dawn of the new century saw a run among old and emerging powers to gain 
influence in Africa. The emerging powers, among them the most prominent a group 
called also BRIC2 countries, have intensified their respective relations with Africa 
and accordingly invested heavily in the continent.  
 
OF CHINA INTO AFRICA 
‘[W]hereas some 3,6% of Chinese imports come from Africa and 
Africa absorbs 2,8% of Chinese exports; whereas the value of 
Chinese trade with Africa increased from USD 2 billion in 1999 to 
roughly USD 39,7 billion in 2005; whereas China is now Africa's 
third most important trading partner; whereas Africa is clearly 
becoming the economic frontier for China, which is very effective 
in coupling aid-for-oil strategies with foreign policy tools’3.    
                                                            
1 Mathews, O 2007 ‘Racing for new riches’, in Newsweek, November 08th, 2007, available at: 
http://www.newsweek.com/2007/11/08/racing-for-new-riches.html, last accessed on 
03.09.2010. 
2 BRIC is an acronym which stands for Brazil – Russia – India – China. 
3 European Parliament, 2008 ‘China’s Policy and its effect on Africa: European Parliament 
Resolution of 23 April 2008’, p.5, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meet 
docs/2004_2009/documents/dv/d-cn20080602_09/D-CN20080602_09en.pdf, last accessed on 
20.08.2010. 
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China-Africa relations, also seen as an expression of the ‘South-to-South 
cooperation’, are not new but do have a long history. Such relations have been forged 
since African liberation movements sought to free themselves from colonialism. Of 
course there have been strong ideological ties in this sense, but China has also 
heavily invested in Africa such as i.e. scholarships for 18 thousand African students, 
900 infrastructure projects such as building of railways, roads, national parliaments, 
as well as some 240 million patients in 47 African countries were treated by 16 
thousand Chinese personnel etc. As of 2006, China’s trade with Africa amounted to 
$55.5 billion as compared to $39.7 billion just one year before. Within this 
framework, some 800 Chinese companies have invested $1 billion, established 480 
joint ventures and employed over 78 thousand Chinese workers. 32 percent of 
China’s oil imports come out of Africa, and in these terms, its oil related investments 
account for at least $16 billion. It has cancelled $1.3 billion in debt from 31 African 
countries, as well as it has abolished tariffs on 190 kinds of goods from 29 African 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and promised to do the same with other 400 
goods. Over 3 thousand Chinese nationals partake in the UN peacekeeping in 
Africa4.  
China stages its relations with Africa within the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC)5, and is genuinely convinced that their approach deriving from their own 
developmental model is valuable to Africa’s own developmental quest. This is 
brought about, successfully, via a rhetoric of ‘South-to-South cooperation’ and 
perceptions of better understanding Africa’s development needs, which seem to 
resonate ‘powerfully in Africa’6. China’s leverage in Africa is also explained by the 
fact that 
                                                            
4 Cited in  
5 For more information on China’s Africa Policy, their political and cultural exchanges, as well as 
their economic and trade cooperation, visit FOCAC’s official website available at: 
http://www.focac.org/eng/, last accessed on 20.08.2010; as well as Berger, B, Wissenbach, U 
2007 ‘EU-China-Africa Trilateral Development Cooperation: Common Challenges and New 
Directions’, in Discussion Paper 21/2007, German Development Institute, Bon, p.3, available 
at: http://www.die-gdi.de/CMSHomepage/openwebcms3.nsf/%28ynDK_contentByKey%29/ 
ADMR7BRFHU/$FILE/BergerWissenbachEU-China-Africa.pdf, last accessed on 
20.08.2010. 
6  Huang, C, H 2008 ‘China’s Renewed Partnership with Africa: Implications for the United 
States’, in Rotberg, R, I (ed.) 2008 ‘China Into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence’, Brooking 
Institution Press, Washington DC, p.298. 
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‘China is not interested in territorial conquest, in exporting its own 
surplus nationals (although the presence of Chinese nationals in 
Africa is growing), or, necessarily, in gaining converts for a 
Chinese model of development’7. 
Its attractiveness in Africa is further heightened by the fact that China seems to offer 
faster implementation of programmes, in a time when western partners fail to deliver 
on i.e. the promise of scaling up aid for Africa. China’s immense mercantilist 
appetite especially for raw materials, ranging from petroleum to diamonds to 
ferrochrome and so on, has also positive effects on SSA countries, for apart from 
buying raw materials China invests heavily in their infrastructure. China’s 
engagement is ‘a transformative’ one, inasmuch it couples her voracious appetite 
with the promise of doing more for economic growth and poverty alleviation in 
Africa than anything attempted before by traditional donors. There are estimates that 
due to the Chinese investments, the African countries have experienced an increase 
of 1 to 2 percent in their overall economic growth figures. This is quite a remarkable 
feature, in a time when an international crisis is ravaging havoc, the world market 
economy has not yet found a way to end the marginalisation of African economies, 
and most importantly, a growing realisation that traditional relations and partnerships 
have failed to deliver on Africa’s poverty eradication and reversing of economic 
marginalisation. The growing literature on the topic sustains that China’s policies 
involve much long-term strategic planning, and that  
‘[i]n comparison, Western foreign policies toward Africa seem 
short term in their focus and often improvised in response to 
specific events rather than strategically conceived’8. 
Another characteristic of China into Africa is the absence of ‘moral judgements’, as 
compared to the western partners’ conditionality clauses on i.e. governance and 
democratic benchmarks. Thus in posing the question of how Chinese involvement 
into Africa is shaping the parameters with which Africa relates with the west and 
                                                            
7  Rotberg, R, I 2008 ‘China’s Quest for Resources, Opportunities and Influence in Africa’, in 
Rotberg, R, I (ed.) 2008 ‘China Into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence’, Brooking Institution 
Press, Washington DC, p.2. 
8 Van der Walle, N 2009 ‘Capsule Reviews: China Into Africa’, in Foreign Affairs, Volume 88, 
Issue No.: 6. 
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vice-versa, one might conclude that, while on the one side, Africans perceive China 
viewing them as attractive economic partners, on the other side, the western partners 
are perceived as seeing them through the lenses of donor-beneficiary relationship, 
and furthermore, the western political conditionalities as a neo-colonial imposition9.  
China’s diplomatic efforts have been as intensive as its trade and aid policies. For 
instance, it has established embassies in 38 out of 48 African countries, exchanged 
military attachés in 14 of them, erected Confucius institutes in several African 
capitals as well as partly finances a renowned think tank in South Africa.  
It has, though, to be said that China’s activities into Africa, call for caution too. The 
very fact named above, of China desiring Africa’s resources and priding itself of not 
meddling with the internal affairs, points at its opportunistic, exploitative nature.  
‘Africans and Westerners certainly, further complain about China’s 
disdain for human rights and mayhem in Africa. The fact that 
China may have been and may still be morally complicit in the 
Sudan’s massacring of Darfuri civilians or the repressions of 
Equatorial Guineans and Zimbabweans, through the supply of 
weapons of war to the relevant militaries and through the refusal to 
employ its evident economic leverage appropriately on the side of 
peace, weighs heavily in the balance’10.   
 
OF BRAZIL INTO AFRICA 
President Lula da Silva, decided to visit Africa in November 2003, just a year after 
he was in office. Such gesture explains the importance that Africa holds on Brazil’s 
foreign policy agenda. Brazil-Africa relations are based on the principles of 
                                                            
9 Ferreira, P, M 2007 ‘Global Players in Africa: Is There a Scope for an EU-China-Africa 
Partnership?’, available at: http://www.ieei.pt/files/6PMFerreira.pdf, last accessed on 
12.09.2009. 
10  Rotberg, R, I 2008 ‘Preface’, in Rotberg, R, I (ed.) 2008 ‘China Into Africa: Trade, Aid and 
Influence’, Brooking Institution Press, Washington DC, p.ix. 
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solidarity and cooperation11 and such solidarity and cooperation is felt as most 
needed in no other area than that of HIV/AIDS pandemic fight. Based also on 
Brazil’s own successful cutting off by 50 percent the HIV/AIDS mortality rate, 
contracts in Namibia and Mozambique were concluded to manufacture generic anti-
retroviral (ARVs) drugs to combat HIV/AIDS. In Angola, Brazil is involved with 
health, education, agriculture and $150 million water supply projects; in 
Mozambique much of the same including a cancel of $20 million in debts; in 
Namibia it trains marine and air force personnel. More than 100 Brazilian businesses 
compete for contracts in Africa especially for oil and mining projects, including the 
mining giant Companhia do Vale do Rio Doce which plans to get involved and 
rehabilitate the Moatize coal mine and the approaching railway, a mammoth project 
valued at some $700 million. Brazil has been important in creating a perfect example 
of South-to-South cooperation, with the establishment of a tripartite alliance among 
Africa, India and itself aiming global agriculture trade and UN Security Council 
reform12.    
 
OF RUSSIA INTO AFRICA 
On the other side, Russia has trebled its trade with Africa since early 2000s reaching 
$3 billion a year, and Russian businesses have invested $5 billion in buying African 
assets. Lukoil, Rosneft and Stroytransgas – all Russian oil giants – have concluded 
contracting worth $3.5 billion earmarked for oil exploration contracts to be 
completed by the end of the decade with Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt and Angola. Until 
2007 the four big Russian metal companies have invested over $5 billion in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) alone. Such expansion fits perfectly with Russia’s desire to 
restore its international position and expand its ‘sphere of influence’ in Africa13, for 
                                                            
11 Harsch, E 2004 ‘Brazil repaying its ‘debt’ to Africa’, in Africa Recovery, Volume 17, Issue 4, 
available at: http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol17no4/174brazil.htm, last acces-
sed on 03.09.2010. 
12 More information on Brazil-Africa relations see: An interesting and thorough analysis of 
Brazil’s policies towards Africa can be found at Captain, I 2010 ‘Brazil’s Africa Policy under 
Lula’, in Global South, Volume 4, Issue 1, pp.183-198. 
13 More on Russia-Africa relations see: Mathews, O 2007 ‘Racing for New Riches: Russian and 
Chinese Investors are battling for African Resources to fuel their Growing Empires’, in 
Newsweek, available at: http://www.newsweek.com/2007/11/08/racing-for-new-riches.html, 
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‘a move to create a bloc of countries rich in energy sources […] would increase the 
political weight of its participants and change the balance of power and influence in 
the world’14. 
 
OF INDIA INTO AFRICA 
India is intended to jump on the ring, as well. In April 2008, following the example 
of China two years ago, India invited the African leaders in Delhi in a summit aiming 
at strengthening trade and diplomatic ties. Such move comes not just as a result of 
India having lost a number of contracts to China in oil exploration, but also due the 
historical ties it has especially with African countries on the Indian Ocean Rim, 
which it actually considers as its own strategic backyard15. During the above-
mentioned summit, India’s Prime Minister announced that his country would provide 
$500 million for projects in Africa. Trade with Kenya between 2004-5 showed an 
increase of 55 percent, reaching some $450 million – slightly lower than the trade 
balance sheet between China and Kenya. India is among the top ten investors in 
Mozambique, especially interested in oil and gas. India’s private businesses are also 
competing and implementing diverse contracts in the region, such as India’s Essar 
Group, who participates in three oil and gas exploration in Madagascar. In general 
Indian exports to Africa include engineering goods, cotton and pharmaceuticals, 
while it imports inorganic chemicals, gemstones and other precious metals16. A new 
feat of the cooperation with Africa is India purchasing and/or lending arable land, as 
evidenced by the Indian southern state of Andhra Pradesh which has signed letters of 
                                                                                                                                                                        
last accessed on 22.06.2009; Cohen, A 2009 ‘Russia’s New Scramble For Africa: Moscow 
Attempts to Build its Sphere of Influence in the African continent in The Wall Street Journal’, 
p.A13 available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124639219666775441.html, last accessed 
on 12.09.2009; Filatova, I 2009 ‘Russia’s Plans for Africa’ in The Guardian, available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/26/russia-africa-dmitry-medvedev, last 
accessed on 12.09.2009. 
14 Filatova, I 2009 ‘Russia’s Plans for Africa’. 
15 Vines, A, Oruitemeka B, O 2008 ‘India’s engagement with the Indian Ocean Rim States’, in 
Chatham House Africa Programme Paper AFP P 1/08, available at: http://www.chatham 
house.org.uk/files/11293_india_africa0408.pdf, last accessed on 22.06.2009. 
16 Ibid. 
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intent with Kenya and Uganda, concerning some 50 000 and 20 000 acres 
respectively17. 
--- 
It is not clear whether these new emerging powers’ thrust into Africa will turn out to 
be better than the Westerns’ turned out to be. By concluding this chapter it can be 
said that these new and emerging powers seem not to be in Africa for territorial grabs 
as the European colonisers did in the past, neither to gain converts for a given model 
of development as the whole West aims at. At a first glance seems that what they are 
looking for is rather to grasp the opportunity for enormous profit. African leaders are 
attracted by the new powers’ approaches because the Western’s formulae and 
conditionalities failed to deliver the promised results. Now Africa may turn to the 
new countries, because at least they bring cash. A point in the case is also provided 
by the fact that ‘Africa's exports to China increased at an annual rate of 48 percent 
between 2000 and 2005, two and half times as fast as the rate of the region's exports 
to the United States and four times as fast as the rate of its exports to the European 
Union over the same period’18.  
‘[...] the boom is a potentially pivotal opportunity for African 
countries to move beyond their traditional reliance on single-
commodity exports and move up from the bottom of the 
international production chain, especially if growth-enhancing 
opportunities for trade and investment with the North continue to 
be as limited as they have been historically’19. 
                                                            
17 More on India-Africa relations see: Vines, A, Oruitemeka B, O 2008 ‘India’s engagement with 
the Indian Ocean Rim States’, in Chatham House Africa Programme Paper AFP P 1/08, 
available at: http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/ files/11293_india_africa0408.pdf, last 
accessed on 22.06.2009; Broadmann, H, G 2008 ‘China And India Go To Africa: New Deals 
In The Developing World’, in Foreign Affairs, Volume 87, Issue No.: 2; Africa Business 
Pages ‘India – Boosting Trade with Africa’ available at: http://www.africa-
business.com/features/ india_africa.html, last accessed on 12.09.2009; BBC, 2008 ‘India 
Pledges African Investment’, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7335882.stm, last 
accessed on 22.09.2009. 
18  Broadmann, H, G 2008 ‘China And India Go To Africa: New Deals In The Developing 
World’, in Foreign Affairs, Volume 87, Issue No.: 2. 
19  Broadmann, H, G 2008 ‘China And India Go To Africa: New Deals In The Developing 
World’. 
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On the other side, China’s approach to aid and for that matter the approaches of the 
‘new donors’ have steered high attention, for they seem to be of an independent 
nature which does not fit within the established western aid and development 
standards or institutions, such as those implemented through DAC/OECD20. A 
debate among developmentalists has been prompted on the appropriateness and 
timeliness of these last ones. It becomes possible to imply that due to the 
counterweight offered by the growing presence of new powers in Africa and their 
development cooperation, Africa has the possibility to place itself in a better position 
while negotiating and bargaining with the other/traditional donors involved in the 
continent.  
‘African states are today actively courted by a range of new 
partners and suitors from Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, Russia, 
and others [and] Africa has become a far more intensely 
competitive political and economic marketplace’21. 
But, there are also worries too, as an analyst argues, a flood of cash may help flourish 
corruption in countries where that it is already a problem, and as it is known, alas, 
resource-rich developing countries are prone to corruption and instability. With this 
picture in mind, analysts worry that if the West loses its leverage in Africa then the 
‘fruits of Africa’s resources may be squandered’22. Thus, there is an imperative for  
‘the US and Europe [to] utilize their technological, financial and 
‘soft power’ advantages– or be overtaken by ruthless 
competitors’23. 
 
                                                            
20 Karlen, M, T, 2007 ‘New Donors: China’s Africa Policy as a prime example’, Development 
Policy Briefing 02/07, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Berne. 
21 Cooke, J, G, Morrison, J, S 2009 ‘A Smarter US Approach To Africa’, p.3. 
22 Cohen, A 2009 ‘Russia’s New Scramble For Africa: Moscow Attempts to Build its Sphere of 
Influence in the African continent’. 
23 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 2 
OF AFRICA’S ‘AWAKENING’ AT THE BEGINNING OF 
THE 21ST CENTURY  
 
‘Ex Africa Semper Aliquid Novum’, Pliny the Elder 
Africa is no longer just a development issue, but rather it has become an independent 
political actor within the international politics. First and foremost, ‘the advent of the 
AU can be described as an event of great magnitude in the institutional evolution of 
the continent’1. Africa’s ownership of ‘poverty eradication, sustainable growth and 
development, better integration within the world economy’, hit all the right keys and 
is best reflected through the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 
and the creation of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which aims to 
‘accelerate the process of intra-African cooperation and integration’. Many countries 
throughout the continent have moved away from despotic regimes and have picked 
up the pace towards comprehensive reforms and adopted democratic principles. 
Economically speaking, Africa has witnessed an incredible growth, boosted by high 
demand on and soaring prices of commodity goods, especially oil and other natural 
resources. 
The strategic importance of Africa has seen continuous increase also as a result of 
the rearrangement of the global powers and emergence of new ones, notably ‘with 
the arrival of China and the return of USA’, reducing so the EU’s role as the natural 
partner of Africa. At a first take, this growing competition on the continent for 
influence and resources can explain in a way the wider and deeper engagement of the 
EU, US and others in Africa. A last but not least issue is the demography of the 
African continent, which it will in short have as many inhabitants as China or India, 
and this will have repercussions pertaining to mobility and migration, especially an 
issue of concern to the EU. 
                                                            
1 African Union in a nutshell, available at: http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/au_ 
in_a_nutshell_en.htm, last accessed on 01.03.2010. 
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The following will concentrate on the changes or trends, Africa has been 
experiencing since the dawn of the new century, seen in terms of democratic 
governance, economic boom, and wars/conflicts, for continuing with the 
phenomenon of pan-African regionalisation analysing especially the emergence of 
the AU and its institutions.   
 
MEGA CHALLENGES2 AND TRENDS IN AFRICA 
Africa is overwhelmingly present in the world press, especially for its mega 
challenges, be it conflict, disastrous pandemic diseases’ statistics, food insecurity, or 
migratory flows. Pandemic diseases remain one of the main concerns in Africa: 
HIV/AIDS being one of the deadliest diseases. In 2007, according to UNAIDS, of 
the world’s 33 million living with HIV/AIDS, 22 million or 67 percent of the global 
figure live in SSA. If one looks at the fatality rate, the statistics get even grimier: 75 
percent of the global annual deaths or some 1.5 million people die in SSA3. In 2008, 
of the world’s 2 million infected children younger than 15 some 90 percent of them 
live in SSA and of the approximately 375 thousand newly infected also 90 per cent 
of them live in SSA. The adult HIV prevalence is as well in SSA at its highest at 
some 5 percent in a time where the immediate next on the list is at around 1 percent. 
The Southern Africa has an adult HIV prevalence which roams around 15 – 28 per 
cent with Botswana and Swaziland reaching the high 30s. In overall figures the adult 
HIV prevalence tends to be higher among women than men4. Another health threat is 
the recurrence of the tuberculosis (TB) pandemic at the same areas hit hardest by the 
HIV/AIDS as well. Greater numbers of Africans are found to be infected with both 
the diseases making so treatment even more difficult, especially since they seem to 
                                                            
2 Part III of this dissertation will have a detailed look at how the US and EU policies and 
instruments do try to tackle these issues. A thorough analysis of how the new US 
administration should tackle these African challenges can be found at: Cooke, J, G, Morrison, 
J, S (eds.) 2009 ‘US Africa Policy Beyond the Bush Years’, CSIS, Washington DC.  
3 UNAIDS 2007 ’Report of the Global AIDS Epidemic‘, UNAIDS, Geneva, available at: 
http://www.unaids.org/en/KnoeledgeCentre/HIVData/EpiUpdate/EpiUpdArchive 
/2007/default.asp, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
4 UNAIDS 2008 ’Report of the Global AIDS Epidemic‘, available at: http://www.un 
aids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/GlobalReport/2008/2008_Global_report.asp, last 
accessed on 30.03.2010. 
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be infected by a TB strand which is resistant to usual treatment drugs. Such co-
infection is associated and thus responsible to higher mortality rates. Added to them 
is malaria, which according to WHO is the disease which causes the highest 
mortality rates. 
The second mega-challenge which faces Africa is the social constrains caused by its 
demographics. For instance, SSA is characterised by a very young population which 
in many cases accounts for most than the half of the total adult population. And since 
fertility rates continue to remain high throughout the continent, than this ‘fastest 
growing labor force in world’5 creates a condition that requires provision and 
creation of new jobs. Another challenge connected to African demographics is its 
rapid urbanisation. By 2030 it is expected a total population of two and a half times 
higher than that of 2000 – from 294 to 742 million6, and by 2025 more than half of 
them is expected to live in urban areas7, in a time when, currently more than 72 
percent of the African urban population lives in slums. This of course, due to the 
high potential of destabilising effects, i.e. a swelling of migratory pressure becomes a 
major issue of concern to the African states themselves but also to Europe, this last 
one as the African migrant’s chosen end-destination.    
Environmental degradation and climate change are the next major challenges for the 
SSA. Although Africa counts for less than 5 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions8, 
its share as the result of the climate change is disproportionally high, since its 
ecosystems are changing at a faster pace than anticipated9. Such conditions create 
                                                            
5 UNDESA, 2007 ‘Chapter 3: Overcoming the Barriers of Poverty: Challenges for Youth 
Participation in Sub-Saharan Africa’, in ‘UNDESA 2007 World Youth Report‘, UNDESA, 
NY, pp.79-113, available at: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/documents/wyr07_chapter 
_3.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
6 UNFPA, 2007 ‘State of the World Population 2007: Unleashing the Potential of Urban 
Growth’, available at: http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2007/english/introduction. html, last 
accessed on 30.03.2009. 
7 UNHABITAT, Global Urban Observatory and Statistics Unit, Africa Trends, available at: 
http://ww2.unhabitat.org/habrdd/africa.html, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
8 World Economic Forum, 2008 ‘Africa at Risk Report’, available at http://www.we 
forum.org/pdf/Africa2008/Africa_RiskReport_08.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009 
9 Boko, M, et al, 2007 ‘Africa: Climate Change 2007 – Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’, 
in IPCC 4th Assessment Report, available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ assessment-
report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter9.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
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high probabilities of increasingly frequent and violent natural disasters, shortages of 
clean water, loss of arable land as a result of accelerated and amplified 
desertification10, which in its own terms creates bottlenecks for crop production. As a 
matter of fact, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that 
by 2020 Africa will face a 50 percent reduction in crop yields, and 75-250 million 
Africans will be put under water stress11.  
Africa is among, if not, the region most at risk to food insecurity. It unfortunately is 
accelerated by the environmental degradation and climate change mentioned above, 
but it also has other deep and endogenous roots. For instance, the underdeveloped 
infrastructure and still relying on traditional ways of farming, are two of them, but 
also the declining of foreign investment in agriculture, speculation at financial 
markets and of course the unjust world trading system that puts developing countries 
at great disadvantages as compared to the first world, constitute other factors. During 
2008 many African countries were faced with rioting masses, which, as a result of 
spikes in food prices, were no longer able to afford food for themselves and their 
families 
This grim picture, though, does not count for all the facets of Africa. For instance, 
there is evidence about a growing support for democratic governance across SSA. 
Africa in general and SSA in particular, provide many examples of having changed 
from single parties to multiparty systems as a significant step towards attaining 
democratic governance12. For instance, autocratic leaders of one-party systems have 
either stepped down or have been defeated in multiparty elections such as in Kenya, 
Togo or Zambia. SSA offers many examples of multiparty elections with varying 
degrees of success such as the ones in Ghana, Togo, Benin, Liberia, Uganda, 
Zambia, Tanzania and Senegal. According to a Freedom House global survey, some 
21 percent of, or 10, SSA countries are listed as ‘free’, while 48 percent, or 23 of 
them are listed as ‘partly free’; the rest, some 31 percent or 15 countries, though are 
                                                            
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 The main stream of analysts tends to view democracy in Africa in terms of pluralism and 
elections, although, arguably rightly, democracy should include much more than that. 
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attributed as ‘not free’13. Such surge for democratic governance has been as much an 
endogenous phenomenon, as certified by the data provided through a survey of 
African people by Afrobarometer. For instance, 62 percent of African citizens 
interviewed in 2005 preferred democracy to any other form of governance, although 
support for democracy from 2000 to 2005 has slightly dipped from 69 – 61 percent14. 
The urge for democratic governance is due also because of the pressure that the 
international community has increasingly mounted on Africa, especially for NEPAD 
and the APRM in meeting certain requirements15. In these terms, an exogenous push 
is also provided by the conditionality clauses attached to development policies of 
Western actors like US’ African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), or EU’s 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA)16, etc.   
Economically speaking, the African continent has been in the midst of ‘a profound 
economic transformation’ with growth rates at an average level of 6 percent 
annually. International trade accounts for nearly 60 percent of Africa's GDP, and 
foreign direct investment in Africa reaches nowadays figures of over US $15 billion 
per year. Overall, private-sector investment constitutes more than twenty percent of 
GDP, and not forgetting the ever growing number of countries with stock-markets in 
SSA, which handle a volume that has risen ‘from virtually nothing’ to $245 billion 
                                                            
13 Freedom House, 2009 ‘Freedom in the World 2009 Survey: SSA’, available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/FH_MOF09_SSAfrica_F3.pdf, last accessed on 
12.02.2009. Countries listed as ‘free’: South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia, Botswana, Benin, 
Ghana, Cap Verde, Sao Tome e Principe, Mauritius and Mali; Countries listed an ‘partly 
free’: Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Togo, 
Niger, CAR, Gabon, Djibouti, Somaliland, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, 
Malawi, Zambia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Seychelles and Comoros; ‘not free’ countries 
are: Mauritania, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Chad, Cameron, Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia, Equatorial 
Guinea, Congo, DRC, Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe and Swaziland. 
14 Afrobarometer, ‘2000-2006 Surveys on Democracy: Popular understanding of, support for, and 
satisfaction with democracy, as well as any desire to return to, or experiment with, 
authoritarian alternatives’, cited in Bratton, M 2007 ‘Institutionalising Democracy in Africa: 
Formal or Informal?’, paper presented at the Princeton Institute for International and regional 
Studies (PIIRS), available at: http://www. princeton.edu/~piirs/calendars/Bratton_paper.pdf, 
last accessed on 12.02.2009.   
15 Soola, E, O, 2009, ‘Media, Democracy and Misgovernance in Africa’, in International Journal 
of African Studies, Issue 1/2009, pp.25-35, available at: http://www.eurojournals.com/ijas_ 
1_04.pdf, last accessed on 12.05.2009. 
16 A detailed analysis the conditionality of AGOA, CPA and other EU and US policies as well as 
their impact on the promotion of democratic governance will be provided in Part II of this 
writing. 
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(South Africa not included)17. This success is observable not just in oil producing 
countries but also across most SSA countries, i.e. ‘about two dozen sub-Saharan 
African nations are enjoying real growth rates in excess of 5 percent. Only one nation 
- Zimbabwe - is really going backward quickly’18. Africa plays a strategic role in the 
global energy market. It is one of the big suppliers of oil, natural gas as well as it is 
thought to have enormous reserves, thus meaning a huge potential in meeting global 
future demands. This has led to a dramatic increase in foreign direct investment, 
which seem to have triggered a fiery competition for access, not just among 
traditional actors such as Europe and the US but also, and especially, China and other 
emerging energy powers such as India, Brazil, etc. Credit for this economic success 
is not just due to energy investments and high commodity prices but also equally due 
to reforms effected throughout Africa with the international assistance through 
Breton Woods institutions as well as EU, US, etc.    
It has though, to be said, that for all the positive development in terms of democratic 
governance and economic progress, they continue to remain fragile. For instance, in 
the later years, there have been some setbacks as evidenced by ‘coups in Guinea and 
Mauritania and profoundly flawed elections in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda and 
Zimbabwe’19. Nevertheless, the 2000s witnessed a declining trend in conflicts and 
wars in Africa as compared to the 1990s and ‘casualty counts across Africa are well 
down compared to the late 1990s’20. For instance major conflicts in Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Angola, between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as between the North and South Sudan have ended21. It 
                                                            
17 Kapstein, B E 2009, Africa’s Capitalist Revolution: Preserving Growth in a Time of Crisis, in 
‘Foreign Affairs‘, July/August, CFR, New York. Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ 
articles/65158/ethan-b-kapstein/africas-capitalist-revolution, last accessed on 25.12.2009. 
18 Moss, T, 2008 ‘Africa: An Emerging Strategic Partner’, Policy Speech delivered by the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Todd Moss at The Baltimore Council of 
Foreign Affairs, available at: http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1708&lang=0, last 
accessed on 12.02.2009. 
19 Cooke, J, G, Morrison, J, S 2009 ‘A Smarter US Approach To Africa’, in Cooke, J, G, 
Morrison, J, S (eds.) 2009 ‘US Africa Policy Beyond the Bush Years’, CSIS, Washington DC, 
p.3. 
20 Bellamy, W, M 2009 ‘Making Better Sense of US Security Engagement in Africa’, in Cooke, 
J, G, Morrison, J, S (eds.) 2009 ‘US Africa Policy Beyond the Bush Years’, CSIS, Washington 
DC, p.11. 
21 Moss, T, 2008 ‘Africa: An Emerging Strategic Partner’, Policy Speech. 
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has, though, to be said that in very few instances have the conflicts ended definitively 
and mostly where peace negotiations have been concluded no consequential political 
actions have been followed. Thus, though a trend in Africa is towards the resolution 
of conflicts, peace continues to remain very fragile in many post-conflict areas. An 
important trend at the pan-African level concerning peace and security in the 
continent is undoubtedly the emergence of the African Union, its specialised 
institutions on the matter as well as their emergent capacity for peacekeeping 
missions. They are testimony to a strong and re-emergent pan-African movement on 
the continent. As a matter of fact, and especially since the dawn of globalisation, it 
can be noticed that the pan-African movement as well as regionalism in Africa have 
strong political, economic and security motives. Its political motive is based on the 
strong pan‐African urge towards ‘a continental identity and coherence’22, and a, as 
much stronger, urge based on economic motives for a regional cooperation, given the 
small size of most African economies. Concerning the security motives, the erosion 
of the state’s powers and consequently their being unable to capably and efficiently 
tackle security challenges, sees an increase in reliance on regional structures: a more 
efficient use of scarce resources for a more efficient tackling of security problems. 
The following will handle the ‘securitisation’ of regionalisation in Africa as 
presented through the creation of an African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA). The emergent APSA, which Salim Ahmed Salim, a former Organisation for 
African Unity (OAU) Secretary General and member of the AU Peace and Security 
Council (PSC) Panel of the Wise, defines it as ‘the structures, norms, capacities and 
procedures relating to averting conflict and war, mediating for peace, and 
maintaining security’23, is currently composed by a set of AU structures which 
together with African Sub-Regional Organisations (SROs) are spearheaded by the 
AU PSC. 
 
                                                            
22 McCarthy, S 1995 ‘Africa: The Challenge of Transformation’, I B Tauris, London, p.14, cited 
in Matthews, A 2003 ‘Regional Integration and Food Security in Developing Countries’, 
FAO, Roma, available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/ 004/Y4793E/y4793e00.htm#Contents, 
last accessed on 28.12.2009 
23 Ahmed Salim, S, 2002 ‘The Architecture of Peace and Security in Africa’, address delivered at 
the African Development Forum III: Defining Priorities for Regional Integration, 3-8 March 
2002, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
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AU: AFRICAN SECURITY REDEFINED 
In 1999 African leaders met in Sirte, Libya to celebrate the achievement of the main 
aim of the OAU, namely that of liberating the continent from colonialism and at the 
same time review the Charter of the OAU and draft a new one. The Constitutive Act 
of the new organization – the African Union – was agreed in Lomé, Togo, in 2000. 
The official inauguration in 2002 in Durban, South Africa, signified that the 
advancement of the ideal of Pan-Africanism was brought at another, higher level. 
The emergence of the African Union is due particularly to two African leaders, who 
sought to reform the OAU. First and foremost, the President of South Africa, Thabo 
Mbeki, who driven by commercial interest,  
‘called for the reconstruction of African identity in order, first, to 
conclude the work of the earlier Pan-Africanist movements and, 
second, to re-invent the African state to play its effective and 
rightful role on the global terrain’24. 
In achieving these aims Mbeki introduced the concept of ‘African Renaissance’, 
which is to be understood as a ‘holistic vision [...] aimed at promoting peace, 
prosperity, democracy, sustainable development, progressive leadership, and good 
governance’25.  
The President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, on the other side motivated by 
security-political considerations, supported Mbeki’s reform calls. His own vision of a 
‘new’ Africa saw a reformed OAU at the centre of African development, focused on 
four calabashes: security, stability, development and cooperation26. A significant 
characteristic of this vision is that of seeing security in terms of human security as 
well as the interdependency of security in Africa. For instance, it views security as a 
                                                            
24 Tieku, T, K 2004 ‘Explaining the Clash and Accommodation of Interests of Major Actors in 
The Creation of the African Union’, in African Affairs, Issue 103, p.255, cited in Dokken, K 
2008 ‘African Security Politics Redefined’, Palgrave/Macmillan, NY/Houndsmills, p.123. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. Part of Obasanjo’s reform package was included into the Memorandum of Understanding 
on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-Operation in Africa (CSSDC), 
adopted later on at the OAU/AU summit in Durban in July 2002. Full text of the 
memorandum’s history and report can be found at: www.sarpn.org.za/documents/ 
d0001513/.../Conference_CSSDCA_History.pdf and http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/ 
d0001513/documents/Conference_CSSDCA_SG-report.pdf, last accessed on 22.06.2009. 
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multi-dimensional phenomenon that goes beyond military considerations and 
embraces all aspects of human existence, including economic, political and social 
dimensions of individual, family, community and national life. President Obasanjo 
saw peace and security as central to the realization of development of both the state 
and individuals27. 
‘Thus the security of the African people, their land and property 
must be safeguarded to ensure stability, development and 
cooperation of African countries; The security of each African 
country is inseparably linked to that of other African countries and 
the African continent as a whole […] A fundamental link exists 
between stability, human security, development and cooperation in 
a manner that each reinforces the other’28.   
The AU’s main goals are the intention to bring to an end the deep segmentation 
caused by the many sub-regional organisations, which hindered a pan-African 
cooperation. A second goal was the achievement through the AU of an institution 
that advocates an engagement at the political, social and economic levels so that war 
among African states becomes unlikely. The third goal for such institution concerned 
access and participation in the international markets and international negotiations 
related to trade, finance and debt29.  In achieving these goals, AU established 17 
institutions –the most important among them, as follows: the African Heads of State 
and Governments –the supreme organ–; the Executive Council; the Commission 
(AUC); the Permanent Representatives’ Committee; Peace and Security Council 
(PSC); Pan-African Parliament; the Economic, Social and Cultural Council 
(ECOSOCC); Court of Justice; Specialised Technical Committees (STCs); and 
financial institutions (African Central Bank, African Monetary Fund, African 
Investment). After having read the above names, the reader is forgiven if it sees a 
striking resemblance with the EU institutions. At the OAU Summit in Lusaka, 
                                                            
27 Memorandum of Understanding on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and 
Co-Operation in Africa (CSSDC), available at: http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/ 
Multilateral/africa/cssdca.htm, last accessed on 22.06.2009. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Dokken, K 2008 ‘African Security Politics Redefined’, p.127. 
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Zambia in 2001 ‘several references were made to the African Union being loosely 
based on the European Union model’30. But, for all the resemblance, the reader is 
warned, as one analyst writes, that: ‘whereas the architects of the AU relied on the 
EU template, the two entities are not only spatially, but also fifty years apart’31.  
The emergent African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is currently 
composed by a set of AU structures which together with African Sub-Regional 
Organisations (SROs) are spearheaded by the AU PSC. 
The PSC was established in 2002 at the AU Durban Summit32 with the aim of Africa 
having a military mechanism which was able to deal with the different security 
threats. The US’ war in Iraq might have triggered among African leaders the 
realisation that ‘the UN could no longer guarantee world peace and that alternative 
arrangements had to be sought, particularly for weak states such as those in Africa’33. 
Consequently, in January 2004 a Draft Framework for a Common African Defence 
and Security Policy (CASDP) was adopted34, which entered into force a month 
later35. The policy sets out the guiding principles, the interdependence of African 
states concerning security as well as, again, the notion of security including both the 
traditional state-centric and that of human security36. While all African states are, 
principally, responsible for the implementation of CASDP, the 15-member37 PSC has 
                                                            
30 For more see: http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/background/oau_to_au.htm, last accessed on 
22.06.2009. 
31 Babarinde, O 2007 ‘The EU as a Model for the African Union: The Limits of Imitation’, in 
Jean Monet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Volume 7, Issue No.: 2, pp.3-4. 
32 African Union 2002. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council 
of the African Union, available at: http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Documents/Treaties/ 
Text/Protocol_peace%20and%20security.pdf, last accessed on 22.06.2009. 
33 Dokken, K 2008 ‘African Security Politics Redefined’, p.128. 
34 African Union 2004 ‘Draft Framework for a Common African Security and Defence Policy’, 
Document Prepared at the first meeting of the African ministers of defence and security on 
the establishment of the African Standby Force and the Common African Security and 
Defence Policy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 20-21 January 2004.  
35 African Union 2004 ‘Solemn Declaration on a Common African Security and Defence Policy’, 
Document prepared by the heads of state and governments of the member states of the AU, 
Sirte, Libya, 28 February 2004. 
36 Ibid. 
37 5 of its members are elected for 5 years, while the other 10 for 2 years. 
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the immediate responsibility of promoting ‘collective security and early-warning 
arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis 
situations in Africa’38, and it has the authority to mount and deploy peace and 
support missions as well as to ‘recommend to the Assembly of Heads of State 
intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined 
in relevant international conventions and instruments’39. The PSC has also authority 
over the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the 
African Standby Force (ASF), Military Staff Committee and the Special Fund. The 
Panel of the Wise is ‘composed of five highly respected African personalities [...] 
who have made outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and 
development on the continent’ mandated to advise the PSC ‘on all issues pertaining 
to the promotion, and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa’. It is 
expected to carry out ‘discreet diplomatic’ efforts at the very early stages of conflict 
prevention to avoid escalation and prevent it from escalating further40. The PSC is 
assisted and advised as well on matters concerning military and security 
requirements from a Military Staff Committee, this last one composed of the chiefs 
of defence of the countries serving on the PSC. The CEWS who collects and 
analyses data, enabling and supporting the PSC in the anticipation and prevention of 
conflicts, is composed of a ‘Situation Room’ located at the Conflict Management 
Division of AUC41, and is linked to ‘Regional Mechanisms’42 who link the AU with 
                                                            
38 African Union 2002. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council 
of the African Union. 
39 Ibid., Article 7(e), p.10. 
40 Ibid., Article 11.2 and 11.3. The current five members of the Panel, as nominated at the 8th 
Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in January 2007, are: Salim Ahmed Salim, former SG 
OAU, Brigaglia Bam, Chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, 
Ahmed Ben Bella, former Algerian President, Elisabeth Pognon, President of Constitutional 
Court Benin, and Miguel Trovaoda, former President of Soa Tomé et Principe. 
41 Conflict Management Division together with the Division of Peace and Support Operations as 
well as the Secretariat constitute the Department of Peace and Security headed by the AU’s 
Peace and Security Commissioner, currently, Ramtane Ramamra. 
42 Ibid., Article 12. The PSC and the Chairperson of the AU Commission are charged with 
harmonising and coordinating activities of Regional Mechanisms. The AU and the Regional 
Mechanisms of Conflict Prevention and Resolution signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
on peace and security in 2007.  
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the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)43. The third body PSC makes use of in 
fulfilling its mandate is the ASF, composed of ‘standby multidisciplinary 
contingents, with civilian and military components [...] and ready for rapid 
deployment at appropriate notice’. The ASF is composed of five regional brigade-
sized units and is expected to reach full operability by 2010. The conditions upon 
which ASF are to be deployed are defined by articles 4(h) and 4(j) of the AU’s 
Constitutive Act, which cover circumstances of war crimes, genocide, crimes against 
humanity, as well as at the request of a member state44. A last instrument, relevant 
for AU’s emerging profile in peace and security is the Special Fund created as a 
continental financial mechanism for AU’s activities in the peace and security field. 
Its finance sources are the AU’s regular budget as well as direct contributions by AU 
MS and from other donors within Africa, including the private sector (civil society 
and individuals)45. A last component of the APSA is provided by the civil society 
comprised of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based civil 
society organisations (CSOs), especially women’s organisations, all of which are 
invited to contribute and participate in promoting peace and security in Africa as well 
as they may be invited to address the PSC46.   
By taking stock of these developments, that have contributed towards an AU rising 
to continental prominence, which in its own terms ‘proffers a substantive opportunity 
for peacekeeping and the attenuation of other security threats that often compete for 
                                                            
43 Africa has various RECs many of which have overlapping memberships. There are eight RECS 
as recognised by the AU: The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); The 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); The Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS/CEEAC); The East African Community (EAC); The 
Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS); The Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD); The Southern African Development Community; and the 
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA). 
44 African Union 2000. The Constitutive Act of the African Union. Article 4(h) and 4(j). 
Available at: http://www.africa-union.org/About_AU/AbConstitutive_Act.htm, last accessed 
on 22.06.2009 
45 African Union 2002. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council 
of the African Union, Article 21 (2). 
46 Ibid., Article 20. 
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attention in Africa’47, the AU has/is indeed venturing some peacekeeping missions in 
Africa. 
By concluding on ‘Africa’s awakening’, it can be said that as a result of all said 
above, Africa, through the AU has entered the international arena as a more 
confident and unified actor, which is increasingly able to negotiate its interests not 
anymore on the basis of beneficiary-donor relations. 
 
  
                                                            
47 Banseka, C ‘The New Era of African Union Peacekeeping and the Culture Question’, 
available: http://www.hollerafrica.com/showArticle.php?artId=122&catId=1&page=1, last 
accessed on 22.06.2009.   
52 
 
 
53 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
OF US FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE G.W. BUSH YEARS 
‘An unprecedentedly dominant Unites States [...] is in the unique 
position of being able to fashion its own foreign policy. After a 
decade of Prometheus playing pygmy the first task of the new 
[Bush] administration is precisely to reassert American freedom of 
action’1 
George W. Bush delivered the ‘unbound America’2 
The making of the US foreign policy is complex and extremely messy and, in many 
ways, an impenetrable process3. Most people think, that the US foreign policy is 
made and defined ‘at the top of the political hierarchy’, especially by the president4. 
While, the president and his conviction play an important, if not, a crucial role, 
nevertheless, he is not the only one to make US foreign policy. Apart from him, a 
variety of other individuals and institutions are involved within the government, such 
as White House advisors, high level officials within the executive branch, and huge 
and complex foreign policy bureaucracies, most notably the State Department, the 
Department of Defence and the National Security Council. Consequently, the 
presidential administrations are a key player and they usually ‘tend to place great 
                                                            
1 Krauthammer, C 2001 ‘The New Unilateralism‘, in Washington Post, 8 June 2001, p.A29. 
2 Daalder, I, H, Lindsay, J, M, 2005 ‘America Unbound: The Bush Revolution In Foreign Policy‘, 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New Jersey, p.1. 
3 For more see: Brewer, T, L, Teitelbaum, L, 1996 ‘American Foreign Policy: A Contemporary 
Introduction’, 4th Edition, Prentice Hall College Div; Rosati, J, A, Scott, J, M, 2007 ‘The 
Politics of United States Foreign Policy’, 4th Edition, Cengage Learning, Woodsworth, p.5; 
McCormick, J, M, 2009 ‘American Foreign Policy and Processes’, 5th Edition, Wadsworth 
Publishing, Beverly, MA; Parmar, I, Miller, L, B, Ledwidge, M, 2009 ‘New Direction in US 
Foreign Policy’, Routledge, Oxon; Ikenberry, G, J, 2010 ‘American Foreign Policy’, 6th 
Edition, Cengage Learning, Florence, KY. 
4 Rosati, J, A, Scott, J, M, 2007 ‘The Politics of United States Foreign Policy’, 4th Edition, 
Cengage Learning, Woodsworth, p.5. 
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emphasis on maintaining a unity of purpose. Adopted policies are usually defended 
by all members of the administration regardless of personal leanings’5. AFRICOM, 
though, as it will be analysed further on, did constitute a so-called exclusion to the 
rule. 
The fiscal power over the federal budgets makes of the Congress another key player 
in the process of foreign policy formulation6. The function of the Congress takes 
mainly a twofold nature7. On the one side, through its control of the government’s 
purse it adjusts, –approving, modifying or rejecting– the foreign policy aspirations of 
the president and its executive branch, and on the other hand, it attempts to control 
policy by taking advantage of the legislative process and the annual budgetary cycles 
initiating so action on their preferences as well8. The role of the Congress is 
strengthened by the tendency of Presidents to use foreign policies for domestic, 
political gain which, in turn, leads to a ‘domestication of foreign policy’9. In 
addition, to presidential administrations and Congress, the political parties, the 
media, and international actors as well as foreign policy lobbies, non-governmental 
groups and public opinion, play a highly visible role in US foreign policy debate. 
This variety of individuals and institutions involved within the foreign policy process 
accounts, as well, for the ‘messiness’ of the process itself, since these players ‘do not 
                                                            
5 Toje, A 2008 ‘America, the EU and Strategic Culture: Renegotiating the Transatlantic 
Bargain’, Routledge, Oxon, p.6. 
6 For more information see: Hersmann, R, K, C, 2000 ‘Friends and Foes: How Congress and the 
President Really Make Foreign Policy’, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC; Colton, C, 
C, Rae, N, C, Stack, Jr., J, F, 2003 ‘Congress and the Politics of Foreign Policy’, Prentice 
Hall, New Jersey; Carter, R, G, Scott, J, M, 2009 ‘Choosing to Lead: Understanding 
Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs’, Duke University Press, Durham.  
7 The Congress’ powers over the US foreign policy are concentrated on four main policy areas. 
The first being the War Powers (granted through the Public Law 93-148, known as the War 
Powers Act in 1973), though, the Congress has been very parsimonious in it – it has declared 
war on only five cases in the American history; while the President on over 200 ones. The 
second power it concerns the advice on and consent to appointments and treaties. The third 
and most powerful one concerns the power of the purse and the power to make laws. The last 
area concerns the power of oversight and investigation. For a more detailed information see: 
i.e. Rosati, J, A, Scott, J, M, 2007 ‘The Politics of United States Foreign Policy’, pp.291-325; 
Hersmann, R, K, C, 2000 ‘Friends and Foes: How Congress and the President Really Make 
Foreign Policy’, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. 
8 Rosati, J, A, Scott, J, M, 2007 ‘The Politics of United States Foreign Policy’, p.316. 
9 Toje, A 2008 ‘America, the EU and Strategic Culture: Renegotiating the Transatlantic 
Bargain’, p.8. 
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stand still but constantly interact with and have an impact on one another’10. This 
feature of the policy process has become more intense and increasingly visible:  
‘Presidents now have much greater difficulty marshalling 
governing coalitions [...] it is a much looser power game now, more 
wide open, harder to manage and manipulate’11. 
‘The making of American foreign policy [has] entered a new and 
far more ideological and political phase’12. 
Consequently, the making of US foreign policy is, apart from being a very complex 
and messy process, also inseparable to politics. These complexities of US politics has 
been elevated even further with the collapse of the cold war era, the war on terror and 
as well as the economic global crisis.  
The following will concentrate on the US foreign policy during the Bush years by 
concentrating on the influences, which it incorporated, from the foreign policy 
lobbies and advocacy groups, most notably the neoconservative one. It will start with 
an analysis of the neoconservative idea by identifying its key tenets and will continue 
in analysing the great deal of influence they had on the execution of US foreign 
policy during the Bush years, by showing that the thinking of some of the 
neoconservative’s major advocates, who won key positions in the Bush 
administration, are mirrored in the policies this last it executed. 
 
OF THE NEOCONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY: 
‘The neo-conservative story [...] spans a period of over thirty years. 
It is complex and diverse, comprising [...] a fascinating intellectual 
migration from the left to the right and from domestic to foreign 
policy. Occasionally, it includes wild-eyed obsessives [...] [b]ut 
                                                            
10 Rosati, J, A, Scott, J, M, 2007 ‘The Politics of United States Foreign Policy’, p.5. 
11 Smith, H, 1988 ‘The Power Game: How Washington Works’, Ballantine Books, NY, p.xvi. 
12 Destler, I, M, Gelb, L, H, Lake, A, 1984 ‘Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American 
Foreign Policy’, Simon and Schuster, NY, p.20. 
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more often [...] mild-mannered East Coast academics of formidable 
ability serving conservative administrations in senior positions’13. 
The origins of the neoconservative thought14 are deemed as to have derived from ‘the 
disillusioned liberal intellectuals of the 1970s’15. They felt that, whatever America’s 
errors were, her political values and system were superior to the alternatives, 
insisting hardly on the American exceptionalism16.  
Apart from domestic issues17, the neoconservatives had also a foreign policy agenda. 
As fervent anti-communists, they emphasised the ideological and moral superiority 
of democracy, while advocating the maintenance of a strong military18. In the name 
of restoring the prestige and power of the US military, they argued for strong military 
budgets, even in times of economic strain. As a result of the implosion of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War Era, the Neocon found themselves on the 
ideological and political margins. It only was at mid and late 1990s that that they 
gathered further momentum, especially with the articles of William Kristol and 
Robert Kagan, in particular with ‘Toward a Reaganite Foreign Policy’ which 
appeared in the Foreign Affairs, July/August 1996. This article is nowadays widely 
                                                            
13 Halper, S, Clarke, J 2005 ‘America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order’, 
Cambridge University Press, NY, p.9. 
14 The neoconservatives do not accept to be categorised as belonging to a movement since they 
‘never had or aspired to the kind of central organisation characteristic of a movement’; 
Neoconservative prominent figures such as Irving Kristol speak of ‘the neoconservative 
persuasion’; Joshua Muravchik of ‘a distinctive neoconservative sensibility’; and Norman 
Podhoretz of a ‘neoconservative tendency’. 
15 Quotation from the ‘acknowledged godfather of neoconservatism’, Irving Kristol, cited in 
Stelzer, I 2004 ‘Neoconservatives and Their Critics: An Introduction’, in Stelzer, I (ed.) 2004 
‘The Neocon Reader’, Grove Atlantic, NY, pp.33-37.  
16 With American exceptionalism is referred to that attribute ‘[...] which implies the United 
States’ moral superiority as well as the uniqueness of its origins, political system, social 
organisation and values and cultural and religious characteristics’. Quotation from: McEvoy-
Levy, S 2001 ‘American Exceptionalism and US Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy at the 
End of the Cold War’, Palgrave, NY, p.25. 
17 The neoconservatives hold the ‘view that ambitious social engineering often leads to 
unexpected consequences and often undermines its own ends’, such as rewarding undesirable 
social behaviour like single motherhood through welfare support, cited in Fukuyama, F 2007 
‘America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy’, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, p.5. 
18 Kristol, W, Kagan, R, 2004 ‘National Interest and Global Responsibility’, in Stelzer, I, (ed.) 
2004 ‘The Neocon Reader’, Grove Press, pp.57-74. 
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considered as the seminal foreign policy statement of the contemporary 
neoconservative thought. The authors argue that the United States’ international role 
is to exercise ‘benevolent global hegemony’ since the US is ‘a leader with 
preponderant influence and authority over all others’, and to continue and maintain 
this status ‘a neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military supremacy and moral 
confidence’ was needed. This strategy consisted of three main points: firstly, a 
consistently strong defence budget that reinforces the power disparity between the 
US and the new-coming and/or would-be challengers; secondly, educating 
Americans of the role they can play in understanding and supporting US army, in 
carrying out the ‘responsibilities of global hegemony’; and thirdly, by having a clear 
moral purpose behind American foreign policy, achieved through the US’ promotion 
of democracy, free markets, and individual liberty overseas19. 
A further reason for gaining momentum was especially provided through the 
establishment of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) in 1997, a 
neoconservative-keen think tank whose many of its founders later received senior 
positions within the Bush Administration. Thus, ‘no one can doubt that PNAC was 
an important contributor to the Bush administration’s foreign policy’20.  
In putting together the neoconservative thought, as derived from the writings and 
analyses of prominent scholars and pundits alike21, four main tenets crystallise. The 
first of them concerns the conviction that moral clarity in foreign policy is of outmost 
importance. Such it derives from the belief that the human condition is defined as a 
                                                            
19 Kristol, W, Kagan, R, 1996 ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’, in Foreign Affairs, 
Volume 75, Issue No. 4, pp.18-32. 
20 Cited in Stelzer, I 2004 ‘Neoconservatives and Their Critics: An Introduction’, in Stelzer, I 
(ed.) 2004 ‘The Neocon Reader’, Grove Atlantic, NY, p.5. 
21 Vaise, J, 2010 ‘Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement’, Bleknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge; Stelzer, I (ed.) 2004 ‘The Neocon Reader’, Grove Atlantic, NY; 
Kristol, I 1995 ‘Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea’, Free Press, NY; 
Thompson, C, B, Brook, Y 2010 ‘Neoconservatism: An Obituary for an Idea’, Paradigm 
Publishers, Boulder; Murray, D, 2006 ‘NeoConservatism: Why We Need It’, Encounter 
Books, NY; Dorrien, G 2004 ‘Imperial Design: Neoconservatism and the New Pax 
Americana’, Routledge, NY; Kristol, W, Kagan, R, 1996 ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign 
Policy’, in Foreign Affairs, Volume 75, Issue No. 4, pp.18-32; Wattenberg, B, J 2008 
‘Fighting Words: A Tale of How Liberals Created Neo-Conservatism’, St. Martin’s Press, 
NY; Halper, S, Clarke, J 2004 ‘America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global 
Order’, Cambridge University Press, NY; Fukuyama, F 2007 ‘America at the Crossroads: 
Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy’, Yale University Press, New Haven. 
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choice between good and evil and that the true measure of political character is to be 
found in the willingness of goods to confront the evil. Thus, neoconservatives 
analyse international issues in black-and-white, absolute moral categories. In practice 
it means democratic leaders and liberal democracies are good; tyrants and tyrannical 
regimes are bad, and consequently it is morally peremptory and at the same time in 
the interest of the US ‘not to shy away from regime change and democracy 
promotion’22. The second pillar concerns the assertion that the fundamental 
determinant of the relationship between states rests on military power and the 
willingness to use it. Consequently, the US should strive to preserve its military pre-
eminence and work towards ‘a benevolent US hegemony’23, where the US ‘enjoys 
strategic and ideological predominance’24. The third pillar concerns the imperative 
that the US should be willing to use military force in pursuing her foreign policy 
goals. Neoconservatives argue that if one’s ends are noble and good, then one is 
morally dilapidated if not all the means at disposal –including military force– are 
used in the pursuit of those ends. Consequently, in executing their foreign policy 
actions, i.e. such as invading Iraq, ‘the Bush administration saw itself not as acting 
out of narrow self-interest but as providing a global public good’25. To this, as it has 
been called in some circles, ‘Wilsonianism on steroids’, it is added the fourth tenet 
which concerns the deep scepticism about the ability of multilateral international 
institutions to secure peace and justice in the world. UN and other institutions are 
seen as mechanisms used by weaker powers to tie down the US. This view is seen as 
being further encouraged by the international criticism, and as a confirmation of the 
American virtue.  
                                                            
22 Kristol, W 2004 ‘Postscript –June 2004: Neoconservatism Remains the Bedrock of the US 
Foreign Policy’, in Stelzer, I (ed.) 2004 ‘The Neocon Reader’, Grove Atlantic, NY, p.75-76. 
The twining between morality and interests is in stark contrast with i.e. the classical realists 
who believe that in foreign policy the US actions have to be guided by an interest-based 
pragmatism rather then, as sustained by the neoconservatives, a value-based modus operandi. 
23 Kristol, W, Kagan, R, 1996 ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’, in Foreign Affairs, 
Volume 75, Issue No. 4, pp.18-32. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Fukuyama, F 2007 ‘America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative 
Legacy’, Yale University Press, New Haven, p.95. 
59 
 
John Quincy Adams has warned that America should not go ‘abroad in search of 
monsters to destroy’: Neoconservatives’ reply is ‘Why not?’ 
‘The alternative is to leave monsters on the loose, ravaging and 
pillaging on their hearts’ content [...] Because America has the 
capacity to contain or destroy many of the world’s monsters, most 
of which can be found without much searching, and because the 
responsibility for the peace and security of the international order 
rests so heavily on America’s shoulder, a policy of sitting atop a 
hill and leading by example becomes in practice a policy of 
cowardice and dishonour’26.  
 
OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S FOREIGN POLICY: 
‘[...] the neocon [sic] vision has become the hard core of American 
foreign policy’27 and ‘[the neoconservatives] have penetrated the 
culture at [...] every level from the halls of academia to the halls of 
the Pentagon’28.  
‘[T]he neo-conservatives have taken American international 
relations on an unfortunate detour, veering away from the balanced, 
consensus-building, and resource-husbanding approach that has 
characterized traditional Republican internationalism [...] and acted 
more as a special interest focused on its particular agenda’29. 
‘[T]he United States no longer pays what Thomas Jefferson called 
‘a decent respect to the opinions of mankind’’30. 
                                                            
26 Kristol, W, Kagan, R, 1996 ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’, p.31 
27 Hirsh, M, 2003 ‘Neocons on the Line’, in Newsweek, 23 June 2003. 
28 Zeller, T, 2003 ‘The Nation; Father Strauss Knows Best’, in The New York Times, 4 May 2003. 
29 Halper, S, Clarke, J 2005 ‘America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order’, 
Cambridge University Press, NY, p.9. 
30 Cited in Stelzer, I 2004 ‘Neoconservatives and Their Critics: An Introduction’, in Stelzer, I 
(ed.) 2004 ‘The Neocon Reader’, Grove Atlantic, NY, p.3. 
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At the time when President Bush took office, US foreign policy has been for some 
time somewhat incoherent and inconsistent31. The Cold War Era was replaced by an 
increasingly complex international and domestic environment in which the days of 
grand design had given way, despite the enormous power of the United States, ‘to a 
more pragmatic time of muddling through’32.  
Commentators think that this ‘muddling through’ best describes the initial months of 
the new Bush administration. This is also sustained by the fact that during the 
campaign, great emphasis was placed on the need to minimise commitments, 
highlight vital national interests and exercise greater humility abroad33. Once in 
office, one did not have the impression that the new administration had a global 
vision in executing their foreign policy. Rather, it seemed ‘to be heavily influenced 
by a realpolitik and power politics approach to world politics, leading to a strategy 
that remained heavily conditioned by the cold war legacy, especially given his 
selection of so many foreign policy advisers who had [previously] worked [within 
the Bush Sr. administration]’34. Nevertheless, several members of the new 
administration had a clear propensity towards viewing power, especially military 
power, as indispensable and at the same time rejected traditional strategies which 
emphasised deterrence, containment, multilateralism, international agreements and 
rules. In short, the new administration held ‘a view fundamentally committed to 
maintaining a unipolar world and acting unilaterally’35. 
With September 11, this orientation became even more aggressive, and placed the 
global war on terrorism at the very top of the foreign policy agenda. Prominent US 
administration officials compared the post-World War II with post-9/11 ‘in that the 
                                                            
31 Rosati, J, A, Scott, J, M, 2007 ‘The Politics of United States Foreign Policy’, p.35. 
32 Ibid., For more see: Cox, M 1995 ‘US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Superpower Without 
a Mission?’, Royal Institution of Foreign Affairs, London; Rosati, J, A 1997 ‘Readings in the 
Politics of the United States Foreign Policy’, Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmond; 
Scott, J, M 1998 ‘After the End: Making US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World’, 
Duke University Press, Durham.  
33 Rice, C 2000 ‘Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest’, in Foreign Affairs, Volume 
79, Issue No. 1. 
34 Rosati, J, A, Scott, J, M, 2007 ‘The Politics of United States Foreign Policy’, p.36. 
35 Ibid. 
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events so clearly demonstrated that there is a big global threat’36 alluding to 
communism as compared with terrorism. Terrorism, Al-Qaeda, Iraq and Saddam 
Hussein, provided the administration ‘with an irreconcilable enemy, the sort of 
black-and-white challenge’37, which the neoconservatives had so long been in need 
of. As it has been mentioned on the neocon section, these last ones had proposed a 
foreign policy agenda which claimed as necessary regime change, preemtive action, 
benevolent hegemony, unipolarity and American exceptionalism, which all came to 
be included at the Bush administration’s foreign policy38 and became crucial part of 
the Bush Doctrine. Bush starkly believed that, on the one hand, in a increasingly 
dangerous world the best and only way to ensure America’s security interests was to 
relieve it from constraints and entanglements imposed by ‘friends, alliances, and 
international institutions’, and on the other hand, that America should make use of its 
unprecedented strength to change the status quo in the world. These beliefs 
fundamentally impacted the US foreign policy. Consequently, he and his 
administration endorsed a foreign policy which underlined the imperative for a major 
defence build up, ‘homeland security’, and ‘with us or against us’ rhetoric. This 
meant that the US approached her foreign policy by heavy relying on the use of force 
abroad; the international institutions, such as the UN were deemed as futile and in 
those very few cases when multilateral action was chosen, then in the form of ad hoc 
coalitions of the willing, a sort of a ‘à la carte multilateralism’39; his administration 
assumed that international support is often a function of coercion, that Western 
values and principles, such a democracy, should and can spread throughout the 
                                                            
36 Quotation from the then National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, cited in Lehmann, N 
2001 ‘The Next World Order: The Bush Administration May Have a Brand-New Doctrine of 
Power’ in The New Yorker of 1st April 2002, p.1.  
37 Hirsh, M 2002 ‘Bush and the World’, in Foreign Affairs, Volume 81, Issue No.5. 
38 Fukuyama, F 2007 ‘America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative 
Legacy’, p.3. 
The text of i.e. the speech that the President Bush held in West Point on the 1st June 2002 can 
be found at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news /releases/2002/06/20020601-
3.html, last accessed on 31.03.2009. 
The text of the National Security Strategy, 2002 can be found at: http://georgew bush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html, last accessed on March 08. 
39 Quotation from the then US State Department Director for Policy Planning, Richard Haass. 
Cited in Forman, S, Patrick, S 2002 ‘Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy: Ambivalent 
Engagement’, Lynne Rienner Publishers, New York, p.14 
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world, and last but not least, pre-emption was no longer a last resort of US foreign 
policy. He delivered America unbound. 
‘Bush has set in motion a revolution in American foreign policy. It 
was not a revolution in America’s goals abroad, but rather in how 
to achieve them’40. 
Such acclaim may be founded also on the fact that many believed that since the 
shock of 9/11, the US ability to deal with changes broke as a result of ‘the loss of 
American confidence’ and of a ‘culture of fear [propagated] everywhere’41. This is in 
stark distinction with the traditional US approach in handling problems, notably with 
confidence42. 
While for some scholars and analysts, George W. Bush, after 9/11, has presided over 
the most sweeping redesign of US strategy since the days of Franklin D. Roosevelt43, 
others argue that for as much as sweeping this redesign was, it represented not a one 
of its kind feature, but rather that, in times and again, the US was posed in front of 
situations which did not leave much room for other than acting pre-emptively, 
unilaterally and secure her own hegemony. So did John Quincy Adams after the 
British burning of Washington in 1814 and so did Franklin D. Roosevelt after the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941 and so did George W. Bush after Al-
Qaeda’s attacks on 9/11.  
In a 2007 article in Foreign Affairs, a former Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, notes that the mistake of the Bush administration in concentrating its foreign 
policy, as mentioned above, on mainly just one topic –that of the global war on terror 
(GWOT)– lies at ‘a profound misunderstanding of the relationship between strategy, 
                                                            
40 Daalder, I, H, Lindsay, J, M, 2005 ‘America Unbound: The Bush Revolution In Foreign 
Policy‘, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New Jersey, p.2; see also: Ikenberry, G, J 2002 ‘Americas 
Imperial Ambitions’, in Foreign Affairs, Volume 81, Issue No.5. 
41 Quotation from Zigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s National Security Adviser, cited in 
Brzezinski, Z, Scawcroft, B, Ignatius, D 2008 ‘American and the World: Conversations on 
the Future of the American Foreign Policy’, Basic Books, NY, pp.2-3. 
42 Ibid., p.3. 
43 Gaddis, J, L 2005 ‘Surprise, Security and the American Experience: The Joanna Jackson 
Goldman Memorial Lectures on American Civilisation and Government’, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge. 
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power, and diplomacy’. The Bush administration failed to make use of, what he calls 
‘smart statecraft’, a pulling together of ‘wits, wallet, and muscle to create realistic 
policies’. The smartness of it all relies in setting ‘them in motion through agile 
diplomacy’. 
‘Smart statecraft does not dispense with hard power; it uses hard 
power intelligently, recognizing both its potential and its limits and 
integrating it into an overarching strategy. [...] Diplomacy, contrary 
to the current misconception, is not about making nice, exchanging 
happy talk, and offering concessions. It is the engine that converts 
raw energy and tangible power into meaningful political results. In 
other words, diplomacy is all about the intelligent use of power. 
Diplomacy is not an alternative to coercion and other forms of 
power; its effectiveness depends on their skilful use’44. 
As it becomes clear, the emphasis on the war on terrorism and the approach used in 
winning it, had become the ‘core and the mantra of the G W Bush administration’s 
foreign policy, to the neglect of numerous other foreign policy issues and 
approaches’45. 
                                                            
44 Crocker, C, A 2007 ‘The Art of Peace: Bringing Diplomacy Back to Washington’, in Foreign 
Affairs, Volume 86, Issue No. 4. 
 Statecraft is dealt in greater detail at: Ross, D 2007 ‘Statecraft: And How to Restore 
America’s Standing in the World’, Farar, Straus and Giraux, NY. 
45 Rosati, J, A, Scott, J, M, 2007 ‘The Politics of United States Foreign Policy’, p.36. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EU WITHIN THE 21ST CENTURY INTERNATIONAL ARENA 
 
‘[I]ndeed we are a global actors. With 25 member states, with over 
450 million inhabitants, a quarter of the world’s GNP, and around 
40% of the world merchandise exports [sic]; and with the 
comprehensive array of instruments – economic, legal, diplomatic, 
military – at our disposal, that claim is not an aspiration but a 
statement of fact’ 
Javier Solana, 24 January 2005 
‘The European Union is a global actor, ready to share in the 
responsibility for global security’  
European Council, 2010 Headline Goals, 17/18 June 2004 
 
By looking at the institutional structures governing EU’s foreign actions, it becomes 
immediately clear that they are dissimilar from their nation-state counterparts. The 
very fact that the Union, within the international arena, is seen as an actor, a process 
and a project, all simultaneously, makes it behave differently as compared to the 
traditional actors in world politics. On the one side we have the EU Commission 
which acts as the implementing organ and which also shares, in definite issues, the 
right of initiative with the MS. On the other side, we have the Council, the institution 
where the strategic and forward-looking elements of the EU’s foreign policy are 
decided through a policy-making process characterised by intergovernmental 
bargaining. It is here where the definition of the principles, general guidelines and 
common strategies to be implemented by the EU, is made. Although, here decisions 
are taken under the unanimity procedure by which all the 15-25-27 MS have an 
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absolute veto over any policy1, the system does not operate under a perpetual threat 
of veto2, rather decision-making is made by consensus which is reached through 
‘carefully crafted ambiguities, consensus building and horse trading’3. Another 
important structure, prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, was 
provided by the so called ‘Troika’, comprising the holder of the rotating EU 
presidency, the EC Commissioner for External Relations, and the High 
Representative for CFSP and their staff, which have played an important role in 
formulating EU policies. All of these actors have been proved fertile, if one looks at 
the generated body of policies, be they in form of common positions or joint actions.  
As briefly mentioned above, the EU has built up a distinct institutional architecture 
which combines supranational and intergovernmental features, political and 
economic integration. During this last decade it has come to engage an increasingly 
significant position within the contemporary discussions about world politics. For 
instance, some see her institution-building practices as a model to follow in 
mastering processes of regionalisation and/or globalisation. On the other hand, others 
see in her a sui generis creature and have focused on the internal dynamics and the 
distinct features as compared to other regional and global organisations. 
Notwithstanding this division the EU’s role and influence within the international 
arenas has gained increasing attention. 
Seen in these terms, a vast wealth of literature has been produced by European 
studies scholars, who have long been involved with questions regarding the extent to 
which the EU’s external actions have developed so as to make, or not, the Union a 
capable and coherent actor within the international arena4. As pointed out above, 
                                                            
1 Article 5a TEC: ‘if a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of 
national policy, it intends to oppose the granting of an authorisation by qualified majority, a 
vote shall not be taken’. 
2 Nuttall, SJ 2000, ‘European Foreign Policy’, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.187-8 
3 For more see: Wallace, H, Wallace, W, Pollack, M (eds.) 2005, ‘Policy-Making in the European 
Union’, 5th Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Ch.1-3 
4 Cameron, F 2007, ‘An Introduction to European Foreign Policy’, Routledge, Oxon; Bretherton, 
C, Vogler, J (eds.) 2006, ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’, 2nd Edition, Routledge, 
Oxon; Lucarelli, S, Manners, I (eds.) 2006, ‘Values and Principles in European Union 
Foreign Policy’, Routledge, Oxon; Elgström, O, Smith, M (eds.) 2006, ‘The European 
Union’s Roles in International Politics. Concepts and Analysis’, Routledge, Oxon; Hill, C, 
Smith, M (eds.) 2005 ‘International Relations of the European Union’, Oxford University 
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since the EU does not complies with the model provided by the traditional actors (i.e. 
nation-states), this discussion has raised important questions about what constitutes 
‘actorness’ in contemporary international relations, and can and / or has the EU, in 
her capacity as a regional entity, emerged as a significant actor in world politics? 
To this work, the issue of actorness is a relevant one: firstly, because actorness is 
seen as being attributed ‘to an individual, group, organisation or other collectivity’5, 
so per extension it encompasses the EU; secondly, it implies that the outcome of it is 
‘a variable indicating the state of another social entity [i.e.] behaviour, beliefs, 
attitudes or policies of a second actor’6; and thirdly, that such actorness is constituted 
through the ability to influence other actors –and the ability to resist attempts at 
such7. Consequently, being or not attributed with it is very important, since in the 
jargon of IR, it implies being or not designated with power attributes within the 
international arena8.  
The scope and the intent of this chapter is, first and foremost, to present an overview 
on how issues that contribute to a weighted EU actorness in the world arena have 
been tackled by the European studies scholars. Consequently it will handle issues 
concerning theory, conceptualisation and analytic approaches in current research on 
EU’s actor and actorness status9. Given the EU’s unique character, the 
conceptualisation concerning EU foreign policy becomes an uneasy exercise. 
Scholars have focused on three main matters, which provide differing understandings 
on the issue. The first focuses on the EU’s Pillar II structures and the institutional 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Press, Oxford; Smith, M E 2004, ‘Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy. The 
Institutionalization of Cooperation’, Cambridge Uiversity Press, Cambridge; Knodt, M, 
Princen, S (eds.) 2003, ‘Understanding the European Union’s External Relations’, Routledge, 
Oxon. 
5 Nagel, J 1975 ‘The Descriptive Analysis of Power‘, Yale University Press, New Haven, p.29. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Toje, A 2008 ‘America, the EU and Strategic Culture: Renegotiating the Transatlantic 
Bargain’, Routledge, Oxon, p.9. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Empirical analysis will be amply handled on the second and third part of this work. 
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machinery of CFSP/CSDP10. The second strand of literature focuses primarily upon 
the MS’s foreign policy11. The third branch of literature concerns the external 
relations of the EC, notably Pillar I issues such as i.e. development aid, economic 
cooperation, international trade, etc.12.   
It seems relevant that in defining the EU foreign policy, this last must be 
encompassing all the above-mentioned branches13. This work, though aims at 
focusing on the EU as a political system, therefore, it will look ‘[...] at EU foreign 
policy as the political actions that are regarded by external actors as ‘EU’ actions and 
                                                            
10 For more see: Eliassen, K, A (ed.) 1998 ‘Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union’, 
Sage, London; Holland, M (ed.) 2005 ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy: The First Ten 
Years (Continuum Studies in Citizenship)’, 2nd Edition, Continuum, London; Blockmans, S 
(ed.) 2008 ‘European Union Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects’, Asser Press, The 
Hague; Howorth, J 2001 ‘European Defence and the Changing Politics of the European 
Union: Hanging Together or Hanging Separately?’, in Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Volume 39, No.3, pp.765-789; Jorgensen, K, E (ed.) 1997 ‘European Approaches in Crisis 
Management’, Kluwer Law International, The Hague; Missiroli, A 2000 ‘CFSP, Defence and 
Flexibility’, in Chaillot Paper 38, ISS, Paris; Missiroli, A 2001 ‘European Security Policy: 
The Challenge of Coherence’ in European Foreign Affairs Review, Volume 6, pp.177-196. 
11 This branch was predominant at the times when the European Political Cooperation served as 
the framework for coordinated EU foreign policy. With the development of EU’s own foreign 
policy, this branch of literature has lost some of its strengths; notwithstanding this the MS’ 
foreign policies continue to play a crucial role. For more see: Hill, C (ed.) 1996 ‘The Actors in 
Europe’s Foreign Policy’, Routledge, Oxon; Manners, I, Whitman, R, Allen, D (eds.) 2000 
‘The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States’, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester; Gross, E 2009 ‘The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Continuity and 
Change in European Crisis Management (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics)’, 
Palgrave Macmillan, London.  
12 For more see: Cox, A, Chapman, J (1999) ‘The European Community External Cooperation 
Programmes: Policies, Management and Distribution’, Overseas Development 
Institute/European Commission, London/Brussels; Eeckhout, P (2004) ‘External Relations of 
the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations’, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford; Brühlhart, M, Mathews, A 2007 ‘Part IV EU External Relations: EU External Trade 
Policy; The EU and the Developing World’ in El Agraa, A (ed.) 2007 ‘European Union: 
Economics and Policies’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Bourdet, Y, Gullstrand, J, 
Olofsdotter, K (eds.) 2007 ‘The European Union and the Developing Countries: Trade, Aid 
and Growth in an Integrating World’, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., Glos. 
13 For more see: Lucarelli, S, Manners, I (eds.) 2006 ‘Values and Principles in European Union 
Foreign Policy’, Routledge, London; Bretherton, C, Vogler, J (eds.) 2006, ‘The European 
Union as a Global Actor’, 2nd Edition, Routledge, Oxon; Smith, H, 2002 ‘European Union 
Foreign Policy What it is and What it does’, Pluto Press, London; Smith K 1999 ‘The Making 
of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe’, Macmillan Press, London. 
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that can be considered the output on the Union’s multilevel system of governance in 
foreign policy’14. 
I have already presented a short rationale on why the issue of being or not attributed 
the quality of actorness is important for the EU. This part of the chapter will proceed 
by focusing on the theory, conceptualisation and analytical approaches to EU 
actorness from a legal and organisational point of view, for progressing then with the 
debate and analysis approaching the EU actorness from the behavioural and 
structural criteria, to conclude then on a constructivist note. 
 
OF THE LEGAL AND THE ORGANISATIONAL DEBATE: 
From a purely legal point of view, an actor, which has since the 1648 Treaty of 
Westphalia been equivalent with a sovereign state, has a legal personality. Through 
the legal personality an actor can make treaties, join international organisations, and 
be held accountable by other actors. ‘Legal actorness confers a right to participate, 
but also to be held responsible by other actors, and to incur obligations’15. The EC 
has been vested with it concerning defined competencies (economic issues)16.  
From a purely IR theories point of view, neither of its major schools of thought have 
been able to create a theory that properly puts in a nutshell the many different 
elements of the EU: it is not a state, the unit of measurement chosen by the 
traditional theories (i.e. Realist) neither a clear-cut international organisation nor a 
supranational institution, the unit of measurement favoured through the pluralist 
approaches. For instance, the traditional Realist theorising has focused on the 
international inter-state political system. The state is seen as the basis of power 
                                                            
14 Lucarelli, S 2006 ‘Introduction: Values, Principles, Identity and European Union Foreign 
Policy’, in Lucarelli, S, Manners, I (eds.) 2006 ‘Values and Principles in European Union 
Foreign Policy’, Routledge, London, p.9. 
15 Bretherton, C, Vogler, J (eds.) 2006, ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’, 2nd Edition, 
Routledge, Oxon, p.14. 
16 Smith, H, 2002 ‘European Union Foreign Policy What it is and What it does’, Pluto Press, 
London, p.2. 
The rejected Constitutional Treaty (Article I-7) did provide the Union as a whole with a legal 
personality; the now ratified and in force since December 2009 Treaty of Lisbon (Article 46a 
TEU) does the same. 
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within the international system where ‘the uneven distribution of military might is a 
still formidable factor in determining outcomes’17. The Realist thought also provides 
for a possibility to include other non-state actors, such as the intergovernmental 
organisations18 and transnational business corporations, nevertheless, they are seen as 
subordinated to the state19. This categorization though, does not take into account nor 
the role that the EU institutions play and neither the many formal or legally binding 
commitments that the MS have signed at EU level.  
Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism theory20 remains a state-centric approach 
inasmuch states continue to be the initiators of policies. This approach fails to 
acknowledge the value–added of the EU’s supra–national institutions21. The neo-
functionalists head off from the state-centric approach, and put an emphasis on the 
role of EU’s community actors. They sustain the idea of ‘incremental political 
change driven by the logic of a self-sustaining process’22, best described by the 
phrase of ‘spill-over effect’. Nevertheless though, due to the distinction they make 
between high and low politics, –where integration is assumed to happen at the low 
rather than high end–, neo-functionalists fail to give an encompassing explanatory of 
EU’s i.e. CFSP/ESDP developments. Therefore, the hypothesis sustained by a neo-
                                                            
17 Hill, C, 1993 ‘The Capability – Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International 
Role’ in Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 31, No.3, p.306. 
18 For more see: Keohane, O R, Nye, J S Jr, 1973 ‘Transnational Relations and World Politics’, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, p. 380. Here they categorize the EU as an 
intergovernmental organisation. 
19 For instance Hyde-Price sees the EU as serving three main purposes of her MS: as an 
instrument for the collective economic interests in the context of globalisation; as an 
instrument for collectively shaping the regional milieu; and finally as a repository for second-
order normative concerns (p.31). In these terms the EU is seen more as a marionette at the 
hands of MS rather than an international actor. For more see: Hyde-Price, A 2008 ‘A Tragic 
Actor? A Realist Perspective on ‘Ethical Power Europe’’, in International Affairs, Volume 
84, Issue 1, pp.29-44. 
20 Moravcsik, A 1993 ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach’, in Journal of Common Foreign Market Studies, Volume 
No.3, Issue No.4, p.480. (pp. 472-524). 
21 Branch, A, P, Ohrgaard, JC, 1999 ‘Trapped in the Supranational – Intergovernmental 
Dichotomy: A Response to Stone Sweet and Sandholtz’, in Journal of European Public 
Policy, Volume No.6, Issue No.1, p.125. (pp.123-143). 
22 Risse-Kappan, T, 1996 ‘Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and 
Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the European Union’, in Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Volume No.34, Issue No.1, p.55. (pp.54-80). 
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functionalist reasoning of the EU as an economic giant and a political pygmy, is no 
longer relevant23. 
 
OF THE AGENCY VERSUS STRUCTURE DEBATE 
The ‘Westphalian assumption’ has been challenged, inasmuch an actor is no longer 
an absolutely and exclusively predefined, traditional ‘unit of a system’24, i.e. a 
nation-state. From a strictly behavioural point of view, a unit to be recognised as an 
international actor it has, firstly, to behave as such. Thus, an actor is ‘an entity that is 
capable of formulating purposes and making decisions and thus engaging in some 
form of purposive action’25, highlighting so the attributions of autonomous and 
purposeful actions. Scholars focusing on autonomous actions, analyse the internal 
procedures of certain EU institutions, such as i.e. European Commission. Through 
these studies it has been possible to arrive at, albeit different, conclusions on whether 
the EU is or not an actor26. For example, depending on the competences endowed 
upon the EC it can be concluded that the Union acts as an actor only on certain given 
                                                            
23 Ginsberg, R, 2991 ‘The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire’, Rowmann 
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Boston, pp.277-9. 
24 Bretherton, C, Vogler, J (eds.) 2006, ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’, p.16. 
25 Ibid., p.17. 
26 One of the possible approaches is provided by i.e. the Principal – Agent (PA) model, which 
assumes that the EU actorness can be derived from two sets of circumstances: firstly through 
delegation of certain authorities to an agent (i.e.EU Commission) and secondly through a 
substantive understanding among principals (i.e. MS declaring that ‘’A common foreign and 
security policy is hereby established). Cited in Ekengren, M, Engelbrekt, K 2005 ‘The Impact 
of Enlargement on EU Actorness: Enhanced Capacity Weakened Cohesiveness’, Paper 
presented at the 46th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association March 2005, 
Honolulu, Hawaii, US, pp.19-20, available at: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p72151_ 
index.html, last accessed on 30.03.2009. For more see: J. Pollak, J, Puntscher Riekmann, S 
2002 ‘Small States - Big States: Who has the Political Clout in the European Union?’, in 
Bischof, G, Pelinka, A, and Gehler, S (eds.), 2002 ‘Austria in the EU, (Contemporary 
Austrian Studies Vol. X), Transaction Pub, New Brunswick/London; Elgie, R 2002, ‘The 
Politics of the European Central Bank: Principal-Agent theory and the Democratic Deficit’, 
Journal Of European Public Policy, Volume 9, Issue. 2, pp186-200; Meunier, S, 2005, 
‘Trading Voices: The European Union in International Commercial Negotiations’, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton; Blom-Hansen, J, 2005, ‘Principals, agents, and the 
implementation of EU cohesion policy’ in Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 12, 
Issue 4, pp.624–648; Comparative European Politics, Volume 7, Issue 4, December 2009, 
Special Issue: The Principal-Agent Approach to EU Studies, pp.409-475, Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
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issues and in others not. The same is valid about conceptualisation depending on the 
voting arrangements within the Council of Ministers: so long the absolute voting is 
requested the EU cannot play ‘a specific role independent of [her] constituent 
members’, ergo it cannot be attributed with the quality of actorness; in anyway, since 
the number of areas covered by qualified majority voting (QMV) has lately been 
largely extended, it can be concluded that the EU is so capable of playing ‘a specific 
role independent of [her] constituent members’, and has become at least a 
disaggregated actor27. The scholars, who have focused on the purposeful action 
criteria, have inspected the EU deeds undertaken abroad and the nature of her diverse 
global interventions. They focus on two behavioural criteria that condition the 
attribution of actorness: the first concerns the ‘impact on inter-state relations’ 
generated through the ability to perform ‘significant and continuing functions’, and 
the second underlines the importance accorded to the EU through interaction from 
members and third parties.28 These criteria must be met ‘in some degree for most of 
the time’, in order for the entity to be attributed the quality of actorness. Under this 
formula, since the late 1960s, the EU –then EC– has been ‘a viable international 
actor’29.  
Increasingly, certain circles within the academia as well as pundits and decision-
makers alike, are keen to see in the EU an international actor with a ‘principled 
behaviour’ within the international arena30. They argue that the best way to 
understand the foundations of the EU actorness is by looking at the concept of 
identity, rather than deliberating on the Union’s interests31. This inclination seems to 
                                                            
27 Bretherton, C, Vogler, J (eds.) 2006, ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’, p.225. 
28 Cosgrove, C A, Twitchett, K J (eds.) 1970, ‘The New International Actors: The UN and the 
EEC’, Macmillan, London, p.12. (cited in Bretherton, C, Vogler, J 2003, ‘The European 
Union as a Global Actor’, p.17). 
29 Ibid. 
30 For more information see: Duchêne, F 1972 ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’, in Mayne, R 
(ed.) 1972 ‘Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead’, Fontana, London, pp.32-47; 
Bretherton, C, Vogler, J 2003, ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’, Routledge, Oxon; 
Smith, H, 2002 ‘The European Union Foreign Policy: What It Is And What It Does?’, Pluto 
Press, London. 
31 Tonra, B, 2003 ‘Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of a 
Cognitive Approach’, in Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 42, Issue 4; Aggestam, 
L, 1999 ‘Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy’, in ARENA Working 
Paper, No.: 8; Aggestam, L, 2000 ‘A Common Foreign and Security Policy: Role 
73 
 
be attributable to the very patterns the EU creates upon delivering her foreign policy 
actions. So we have a discussion on EU’s actions which sees her as a civilian and/or 
normative actor/power32. Consequently, attention to values, norms and principles, 
becomes central in conceptualising EU’s actorness and the process of her foreign 
policy actions: 
‘The VIPs [values, images, principles] present in the Union’s 
international conduct, are not simply idealistic symbolism in the 
pursuit of EU material gains, but they are the defining elements of 
a polity which is constructed differently to pre-existing political 
forms, and that this particular difference predisposes it to act in a 
[different] way’33 
The EU, ‘[...] promotes [so her] domestic values’ through her capable ability to make 
and implement policies abroad34. Although, it has to be said, that scholars have quite 
differing views concerning the EU’s capability. Hill’s ‘expectations-capability gap’35 
concept, for instance, is quite something else as compared to the above-cited view of 
H. Smith. According to Hill, the actorness of the EU resides upon three elements, her 
‘sui generis’ character and uniqueness as compared to other political entities, the 
autonomy it enjoys in making its own laws and her possessing a variety of actor 
capabilities. Capability, here, is defined as ‘the ability to formulate effective policies 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in the EU’, in Aggestam, L, Hyde-Price, A (eds), 
‘New Perspectives on Security and Identity in Europe’, Macmillan, London; Bretherton, C, 
Vogler, J (eds.) 2006, ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’; Manners, I, Whitman, R 
2003 ‘The ‘difference engine’: Constructing and Representing the International Identity of the 
European Union’, in Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 10, Issue 3. 
32 For a more detailed analysis see the next chapter which will deal more extensively on EU’s 
civilian / normative / transformative powers. 
33 Manners, 2006 cited in Lucarelli, S, Manners, I (eds.) 2006 ‘Values and Principles in 
European Union Foreign Policy’, Routledge, London, p.15. 
34 Smith, H, 2002 ‘The European Union Foreign Policy: What It Is And What It Does?’, Pluto 
Press, London, p.8. 
35 Hill, C, 1993 ‘The Capability – Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International 
Role’ in Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 31, No.3, Hill argues that expectations 
are not matched by EU’s available capabilities; Hill, C, 1997 ‘Closing the Capability – 
Expectations Gap?’, Paper presented at the 5th Biennial International Conference of the 
European Community Studies Association of the United States, 29 May – 1 June 1997, 
Seattle, Washington, available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/2616/01/002811_1.PDF, last accessed on 
30.03.2010. 
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and the availability of appropriate policy instruments’36. The EU does posses such 
capability; it is rather in her ability to effectively coordinate her own and with the 
MS’ policies, where deficiencies arise. 
Moving away from the behavioural approach, the EU actorness has also been tackled 
from a structuralist point of view. It takes as a starting point Waltz’s neo-realist 
theory and its maxim that the sources of behaviour among actors within the 
international arena are not to be seen on the purposive action of actors rather on the 
‘need to survive and flourish’ within the international, anarchical system. Within this 
constellation, the respective power possessed by states becomes the significant factor 
which determines the behaviour among actors37. Nowadays, state–power has come 
under constant battering and states seem to be less and less able to guarantee order –
domestically or internationally. Consequently, an international framework, such as 
the international organisations, becomes peremptory, since they seem to be better 
suited to handle global problems and supply applicable global solutions38. As 
Keohane and Nye argue, international/regional organizations bring officials together, 
help to activate potential coalitions in world politics, provide a forum in which weak 
states can share their view and permit linkage strategies. International regimes and 
organizations are seen as sources of information, improving coordination, allowing 
burden sharing and introducing stability39.  
Another structural factor, which supplied the EU with a niche where her action 
would be applicable40, was the fact that, although after the end of the Cold War, the 
                                                            
36 Bretherton, C, Vogler, J (eds.) 2006, ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’, p.29. 
37 For more details see: Waltz, K, N 1979 ‘The Theory of International Politics’, Addison 
Wesley, Reading. 
38 Ibid., p.109. 
39 Keohane, O R, Nye, J S Jr, 2001 ‘Power and Interdependence’, 3rd edition, Addison Wesley 
Longman, New York, pp.31; 291-2. 
40 European Council, 2003 ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’, 
Brussels, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf; 
European Council, 2008, S407/08, ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security 
Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World’, Brussels, available at: http://www.consi 
lium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf, both last accessed on 
30.03.2009. 
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prospects for a peaceful and prosperous world seemed rosier than ever41, the number 
of conflicts continued to grow, and the risks, –or necessity–, of involvement and 
spill-over loomed ever larger. Undoubtedly, that the great historical changes such as 
the end of the Cold War and the globalisation process, have accounted for the 
rearrangement of power within the international system, which in its own turn 
accounts for the emergence of complex, multi-layered systems of governance which 
have challenged the Westphalian assumptions of sovereignty and territoriality42. 
Ikenberry sustains, that it is in moments of great historical upheaval when the world 
order becomes more ‘anarchical’ and the balance among power distributions gets 
destabilised. The actors within the new order are posed before the imperative to 
arrange themselves to the new power distributions43. These conditions facilitate the 
emergence of actors such as the EU44. The surfacing of the EU as an actor within the 
international arena is further sustained through the process of regionalism and 
interregionalism45, which are seen as responses to the needs to deal with the 
pressures of globalization and interdependence46. The EU has been eager to establish 
strategic partnerships with regional and continental organisations such as AU and it 
                                                            
41 For more see: Fukuyama, F 1992 ‘The End of the History and the Last Man’, Hamish 
Hamilton, London 
42 For instance see: Cox, R 1986 ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory’, in Keohane, R, O (ed.) 1986 ‘Neorealism and its Critics’, Columbia 
University Press, NY, pp.204-254; Cox, R 1993 ‘Structural Issues of Global Governance: 
Implications for Europe’, in Gill, S (ed.) 1993 ‘Gramsci, Historical Materialism and 
International Relations’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.259-289. 
43 For more on this topic see: Ikenberry, G, J 2001 ‘After Victory: Institutions, Strategic 
Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars’, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
44 For more see i.e.: Wiener, A, Diez, T 2004 ‘European Integration Theory’, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, pp.8-9; Nugent, N 2003 ‘The Government and Politics of the European 
Union’, 5th edition, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp.465-474. 
45 Regionalism is defined as a situation within which states and non-state actors cooperate and 
coordinate strategy within a determined zone composed of various entities such as states, 
groups or territories whose members share some identifiable traits, cited in Farrell, M, Hettne, 
B, Van Langehove, L (eds.) 2005, ‘Global Politics of Regionalism – Theory and Practice‘, 
Pluto Press, London, p.24. Interregionalism, on the other side, refers to cooperative contacts 
between regions to address issues of mutual concern. In relation to the EU it refers to region-
to-region contacts in which the EU participates, cited in Söderbaum, F, Van Langenhoven, L 
2005 ‘Introduction: The EU as Global Actor and the Role of Iinterregionalism’, in European 
Integration, Volume 27, Issue 3, p.256. 
46 Hettne, B 2002 ‘The Europeanization of Europe: Endogenous and Exogenous Dimensions’, in 
European Integration, volume 24, Issue 4, p.329. 
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has formulated strategies towards other regions as well. In this context, region to 
region relations represents a novel field of international relations and an extension of 
multilateral arrangements. Here, the actorness of the EU is seen in terms of 
‘contributing to order in world politics’47. The successful model that the EU 
constitutes, is a perfect showcase from which other regions in the world can subtract 
lessons on how i.e. regional rivalry can be structurally contained. Apart from the 
passive effect of the EU as a model, there are the very actions that the EU herself 
undertakes in encouraging regionalism throughout the world, which are done, firstly, 
through the help that the EU gives in creating other regions – which in its turn 
endows her with greater credibility and leverage, and secondly, by using this 
leverage to shape other regions in the EU’s image via the export of all its preferred 
values of order48, i.e. her preference for ‘cooperation’ rather than confrontation. This 
is mirrored by the weighted positions of instruments, such as i.e. those concerned 
with aid and trade, which the EU has developed. This does not mean that the EU has 
not or does not make use of her coercive capabilities49, rather it shows that the EU 
has a preference of putting the execution of direct, i.e. military coercion within wider 
international fora, preferably within the UN Security Council50.  
 
 
OF EU ACTORNESS AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM 
Assertions, such as the first two mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter, are 
an excellent example of ‘social constructions by which shared understandings evolve 
                                                            
47 van Veen, E 2006 ‘Order in World Politics: An Inquiry Into the Concept, Change, and the 
EU’s Contribution’, in UNU-CRIS Occasional Papers, 0-2006/17, available at: 
http://www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/20060724144024.O-2006-17.pdf, last ac-
cessed on 30.03.2009.  
48 The reader is reminded of the EU ‘predetermining [through the system of values and 
principles] a well-defined framework within which interactions [with other entities] occur’, as 
mentioned on the above section ‘of the agency versus structure debate’. 
49 Sanctions are a coercive instrument, just as much conditionality is as well. The EU’s economic 
weight and other incentives she provides make them very effective, indeed. 
50 Farrell, M, Hettne, B, van Langehoven, L (eds.) 2005, ‘Global Politics of Regionalism – 
Theory and Practice‘, p.282. 
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over time and play a role in shaping - enabling or constraining - subsequent action’51. 
Actorness, as sustained by social constructivism, is not alone decided by the 
structural determinants, since they do not determine outcomes, but rather provide 
‘action settings’ or distinct patterns of opportunity and constrains within which 
agency is displayed52. In this sense, social constructivism provides an analytical 
framework which does emphasise neither structure, nor agency, but the relationship 
between them. So actorness generally, and EU actorness in particular, is seen as the 
resultant of a dynamic relationship between structure and agency.  
The focus here is one of a normative and ideational approach, which emphasises that 
the world of international relations does not exist independently of human action and 
cognition but rather it is an intersubjective and meaningful world53 whose rules and 
practices are made and reproduced by human interaction. This strand further 
emphasises the function of identities in international relations, and does this by 
pointing at the constitutive role that norms and ideas play in defining identities54. 
This aspect, which is ignored by other theories that do not concern themselves with 
cultural and historical influences, is very helpful in explaining the significance of the 
Union’s civilian and normative foundations. Further, it simultaneously examines the 
relationship between internal and external factors, taking so into account 
international terrorism, interstate conflicts, and globalisation, and further illustrates 
how the EU internalizes these issues and then produces or fails to produce a 
response. For Bretherton and Vogler an actor is defined ‘as an entity that is capable 
of agency; of formulating and acting upon decisions. [Agency is not seen] as 
unlimited, rather [they] consider that the capacity to act reflects the interaction 
between understandings about internal character and capabilities and external 
                                                            
51 Bretherton, C, 2003, ‘Opportunity and reluctance: implications of the Euro for the European 
Union's role in world politics’, in Politique européenne, Volume 2, No. 10, p.77. 
52 Bretherton, C, Vogler, J (eds.) 2006, ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’, p.21. 
53 Constructivism does not see structures in material terms, as compared to other grand theories; 
rather they are intersubjective and ‘consist of shared understandings, expectations and social 
knowledge [... they] give meaning to material ones, and it is in terms of meanings that actors 
act’, cited in Wendt, A, 1994 ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’ in 
American Political Science Review, Volume 88, Issue No. 2, pp.384-396. 
54 Carlsnaes, W, 2008 ‘Actors, Structures, and Foreign Policy Analysis’ in Smith, S, Hadfield, A, 
Dunne, Tim (eds.) 2008 ‘Foreign Policy: Theories – Actors – Cases’, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, p.93. 
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opportunities’55. They identify three areas, which are seen as crucial in achieving 
international actorness, namely opportunity, presence and capability. 
Opportunity is a structural attribution and sets the context that frames and shapes 
EU’s actions, i.e. globalisation and the failure of the state to regulate and control 
them ‘presented opportunities for the EU to act externally on behalf of its members56. 
Discourses that focus on the ‘construction of Europe [...] in the light of external 
challenges’57 have consequently, become quite common. These external demands 
have also attributed to heightened expectations, which as we know haven’t been 
entirely fulfilled by the EU – the discourse on the expectations-capability gap 
reminds us of such. In taking advantage from the opportunities presented, the EU has 
to elaborate on her impact within the global system, through her presence, consisting 
of EU’s own external behaviour and the way it is perceived by other international 
actors58. Further, it can be said, that presence is an indication of the EU’s structural 
power, which combines understandings about the fundamental nature, or identity of 
the EU and the (often unintended) consequences of the Union’s internal priorities 
and policies59. Consequently, if opportunity explains the political room for EU 
action, presence examines the nature of the role that the EU has in international 
relations. This examination accounts i.e. for how the rich civilian expertise of EU 
member states results in the ‘civilian actor’ reputation of the EU. Another facet of the 
presence accounts for the EU’s influence in international affairs, in as much the EU 
serves as model of i.e. regional economic integration, ‘a stabilising factor and a 
model in the new world order’, etc.60. Capability, on the other side, refers to the 
behavioural attributions of the EU’s actorness, namely the internal context of EU 
                                                            
55 Bretherton, C, Vogler, J (eds.) 2006, ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’, p.35. 
56 These issues where handled by the previous section which focused on the structural approach 
towards conceptualising EU’s actorness.  
57 Rosamond, B, 2001 ‘Discourses of Globalisation and European Identities’, in Christiansen, T, 
Jorgensen, K, E, Wiener, A, (eds.) 2001 ‘The Social Construction of Europe’, Sage, London, 
pp.158-175.  
58 Allen, D, Smith, M, 1990 ‘Western Europe’s presence in the contemporary international 
arena’, in Review of International Studies, Volume 16, Issue No. 1, pp.19-37. 
59 Bretherton, C, Vogler, J (eds.) 2006, ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’, p.24. 
60 These issues where handled by the previous section which focused on the structural approach 
towards conceptualising EU’s actorness. 
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action and inaction. It serves as the interchangeable bridging element between the 
EU’s capitalising on presence and her responding to demands arising from 
opportunities. By looking at capability, it is possible to evaluate coherence and 
consistency, which continue to remain very much an issue for the EU61 and clearly 
describe how internal issues make it difficult for the EU to live up to the external 
expectations. 
  
                                                            
61 These issues where handled by the previous section which focused on the behavioural 
approach towards conceptualising EU’s actorness. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN AFRICA 
 
‘Despite historic ties with the continent, US policy towards Africa 
has generally been marked by indifference and neglect’1. 
‘In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, 
war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the 
United States – preserving human dignity – and our strategic 
priority – combating global terror’2. 
‘[The US recognises Africa] as a high priority [and] that our 
security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen 
fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the 
control of effective democracies’3. 
Policy documents and statements, in particular those released post 9/11, suggested 
that Africa required more attention in US foreign policy4 due to its increasing 
                                                            
1 Putman, R 2008 ‘US Foreign Policy in Africa’, in Cox, M, Stokes, D (eds.) 2008 ‘US Foreign 
Policy’, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.316. 
2 The White House, 2002 ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States’, p.10, document 
available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/, last accessed on 
30.03.2009. 
3 The White House, 2006 ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States’, p.37, document 
available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/, last accessed on 
30.03.2009. 
4 White House Africa Policy, available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ 
infocus/africa/, last accessed on 30.03.2009; The White House, 2002 ‘The National Security 
Strategy of the United States’, pp.26, 31, 37-38; The White House, 2006 ‘The National 
Security Strategy of the United States’, Mills , G 2006 ‘Africa’s New Strategic Significance’, 
in The Washington Quarterly, Volume 27, Issue No.4, pp.158-162; Princeton N. Lyman, P, N, 
Morrison, J, S 2006 ‘More Than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach Toward 
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importance concerning US national and economic security, and because of the 
humanitarian crises that emanates from the continent. 
At the height of the Cold War era, the US pursued a foreign policy towards Africa, 
which was mostly informed by the interests to contain the influence from the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the African continent, at the same time itself 
influencing and supporting the African authoritarian regimes5 and securing so access 
to strategic mineral resources. The US national security interests in Africa in a post-
Cold War environment were outlined through concerns about under-development 
and humanitarian issues, failed states, HIV/AIDS epidemic, drought and famines as 
well as a conviction that the international community could work jointly in 
facilitating solutions that assure Africa’s democratic promotion and consequently its 
peace and security. This is exemplified by the George H W Bush administration’s 
willingness to participate in UN humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, such as 
the UN authorised and US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia during 
1992-3. Subsequently, as a result of ‘Black Hawk Down’ images well known to all 
of us6, the US policies in Africa were severely cut. The new security threats as a 
direct result of 9/11 and the emergence of Africa, especially its resources, as strategic 
and vital to the US national interests, outline the new 21st century U-turn US policy 
in Africa, from retreat to full-scale engagement. The Bush administration’s legacy 
and track record includes a US military base in Djibouti, active counterterror 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Africa’, Council on Foreign Relations, Independent Task Force Report, No. 56, Washington 
DC, pp.9-14; Cohen, H, J 2003 ‘The United States and Africa: Nonvital Interests Also 
Require Attention’, in American Foreign Policy Interests, Volume 25, pp.20-24; Stevenson, J 
2003 ‘Africa’s Growing Strategic Resonance’, in Survival, Volume 45, Issue No.4, pp.155-
166. 
5 This US ‘selective engagement’, as delineated in its national security doctrine which focused on 
external threats, framed the US Cold War Africa policy. For more see:  Putman, R 2008 ‘US 
Foreign Policy in Africa’; Rothchild, D, Keller E (eds.) 2006 ‘Africa-US Relations: Strategic 
Encounters’, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO; Magyar, K (ed.) 2000 ‘United States Interests and 
Policies in Africa: Transition to a New Era’, Macmillan, London; Schraeder, P 1994 ‘United 
States Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change’, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
6 The so called Somalia Syndrome had a significant impact on the retreat of the US from Africa. 
The Clinton administration, especially through PDD 25 (Presidential Decision Directive 25), 
outlawed US unilateral deployment and partaking in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, 
except of course when the direct national interests made it peremptory. The full text of the 
PDD 25 is available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm, last accessed on 
30.03.2009.  
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programmes, a massive expansion of aid and trade policies, extended support for UN 
peace operation and, most obviously, the launch of the US Africa Command 
(AFRICOM).  
 
Prior to analysing the US engagement in Africa since the early 2000s, it is envisioned 
to put a greater focus on the different patterns and nuances that power takes, as 
expressed by its different appellatives, and as it is attested to and/or executed by the 
United States of America in order to bring about its foreign policy in the world7. The 
focus will, obviously, be on hard, soft and smart power, which in their turn will 
provide this author with valuable conceptions to be applied and thus, evaluate on 
these grounds, the concerned US policies in Africa.  
 
 
US: FROM HARD THROUGH SOFT TO SMART POWER 
US foreign policy has a split personality, between (1) realism-
conservatism, the need for military power and political will to 
maintain friendly alliances [... and] (2) idealism-liberalism, the 
need to perfect and spread democracy8. 
The agenda of world politics has become far more complicated and as shown by the 
Bush years, it does not allow to put at play only the military or economic might – the 
so called ‘carrots and sticks’, in pursuing what is widely perceived as national 
                                                            
7 The author is well aware that, as pertaining to the power tools that the US and /or EU is attested 
to and /or uses in executing their respective foreign policies, – from hard to soft, smart, 
civilian and normative – no clear cut can be made, the distinguishing line has, especially 
lately, become very vague, since both actors make use of tools which may belong to the type 
of power indicated here as predominantly performed by the other actor. Therefore, the aim of 
this paper is not seen as an all comprehensive analysis of the US and EU types of power, 
rather it focuses itself at the respective foreign policies and the power discourse it has 
accompanied them since the early 2000s, when both actors decided ground breaking policies 
towards Africa. 
8 Billington, H J 1986 ‘Realism and Vision in the American Foreign Policy‘, in Foreign Affairs, 
Volume 65, number 3, America and the World 1986, pp. 630-652. Henry Kissinger, in my 
opinion, gives the best description of this ‘split personality’ of the American Foreign Policy in 
the first two chapters (The New World Order and especially The Hinge: Theodore Roosevelt 
or Woodrow Wilson) of his ‘Diplomacy’ book. For more information see: Kissinger, H 1994, 
Diplomacy, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, New York, pp.17-55. 
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interests. For Nye, this agenda of the world politics it resembles ‘a three- 
dimensional chess game in which one can win only by playing vertically as well as 
horizontally’9.  
The vertical board, hegemonised by the USA, concerns the hard power which is 
defined as ‘wilful power, [...] the ability to impose one’s goals without regard to 
others’, ‘the ability to talk instead of listen and to afford not to learn’10. Its source is 
seen in ‘large population and territory, extensive natural resources, economic 
strength, military force, and social stability’11. The primacy of the US in some of 
these fields is being challenged by the emergence of new powers such as China, 
India, Russia, perhaps Brazil, etc., so much so that some forecasted the decline of the 
US, sure that ‘ultimately history will happen’ to it12. 
In one particular field, though, the primacy of the US continues to remain the 
dominant one throughout the whole world: its military capacity. The US asserts that, 
as a result of the anarchic nature of the international politics and the self-help 
environment it provokes, a great power’s, and consequently its own, most important 
resource is the military capability it possesses13. Accordingly, the US spends more on 
its military than all other nations in the world combined14. This condition triggered a 
                                                            
9 Nye, Jr, J S 2004, ‘Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in World Politics’, PublicAffairs, New 
York, p.4 
10 Deutsch, K 1963 ‘The Nerves of Government’, Free Press, NY, p.111. 
11 Nye, Jr, J S 2004 ‘Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in World Politics’, p.3 
12 ‘Every ten years, it is decline time in the United States’. So starts Joseph Joffe his last article in 
Foreign Affairs, where he makes a short collage of the main US decline theories starting with 
the 1950s ‘sputnik scare’ till to the last claim fuelled by the global economic strangle. For 
more see: Joffe, J 2009 ‘The Default Power: The False Prophecy of America’s Decline’ in 
Foreign Affairs, Volume 88, Issue No. 5, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington DC. 
Fareed Zakaria mentions in his ‘The Post-American World‘ the ways how ‘history happened’ 
to Great Britain, and he skilfully outlines why USA will avoid that fate. For more see: 
Zakaria, F  2008 ‘The Post- American World’, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York 
13 McMahon, P C, Wedeman, A 2006 ‘Introduction’ in Forsythe, D P, McMahon, P C, 
Wedeman, A (eds.) ‘American Foreign Policy in a Globalized World‘, Routledge Taylor & 
Francis Group, New York, p.4 
The above authors sustain that this position is vindicated from the history of the USA, 
sustained through the realist theoretical explanations.  
14 Bremmer, I 2009 ‘Obama or not, U.S. still needs hard power‘ in Foreign Policy, September 2, 
2009, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com; Forsythe, D P, McMahon, P C, Wedeman, 
A (eds.) ‘American Foreign Policy in a Globalized World‘, Routledge Taylor & Francis 
Group, New York 
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fervent debate among academia, pundits and politicians alike, on the best and 
effective ways the US has to exercise its power within the foreign policy, whether 
unilaterally or multilaterally15. The neoconservative thought16 took the upper hand 
during the years of the Bush administration. Following their reasoning, the US, as the 
only superpower, must act unilaterally in order to protect its interests and for the 
greater good of humanity. In making this statement, the sustainers create and at the 
same time legitimise a sort of causal relation between the fact of being a great power 
on the one side and the greater responsibility for international affairs on the other 
hand. In other words, the US, because of its primacy, has different responsibilities 
than other states and, with it, it comes this sense of right and even duty to undertake 
the role of the world’s policeman, by also acting unilaterally and in a pre-emptive 
way. The US, is seen as ‘mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic 
Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true 
security and the defence and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the 
                                                            
15 For more on this see i.e.: Gärtner, H 2008 ‘Obama/McCain: Weltmacht was nun? Hoffnung auf 
Veränderung?‘ LIT Verlag, Vienna; Krauthammer, C 1990/1991 ‘The Unipolar Moment’ in 
Foreign Affairs: America and the World, Volume 70, No.1, pp.23-33; Kagan, R 2003 ‘Of 
Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order’, Knopf, New York; 
Ikenberry, G J 2000 ‘After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraints, and the Rebuilding of 
Order After Major Wars’, Princeton University Press, Princeton; Nye, Jr., J S 2003 ‘The 
Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone’, Oxford 
University Press, New York; Buchanan, P J 2002 ‘A Republic, Not an Empire: Reclaiming 
America’s Destiny’, Regnery Publishing Inc., Washington DC; Mearsheimmer, J J 2003 ‘The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics’, W.W. Norton & Company Inc., New York; Lind, M 2000 
‘Towards a Global Society of States’ in The Wilson Quarterly, August, 59; Lind, M 2006 
‘The American Way of Strategy: US Foreign Policy and the American Way of Life’, Oxford 
University Press, New York 
16 Vaise, J, 2010 ‘Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement’, Bleknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge; Stelzer, I (ed.) 2004 ‘The Neocon Reader’, Grove Atlantic, NY; 
Kristol, I 1995 ‘Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea’, Free Press, NY; 
Thompson, C, B, Brook, Y 2010 ‘Neoconservatism: An Obituary for an Idea’, Paradigm 
Publishers, Boulder; Murray, D, 2006 ‘NeoConservatism: Why We Need It’, Encounter 
Books, NY; Dorrien, G 2004 ‘Imperial Design: Neoconservatism and the New Pax 
Americana’, Routledge, NY; Kristol, W, Kagan, R, 1996 ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign 
Policy’, in Foreign Affairs, Volume 75, Issue No. 4, pp.18-32; Wattenberg, B, J 2008 
‘Fighting Words: A Tale of How Liberals Created Neo-Conservatism’, St. Martin’s Press, 
NY; Halper, S, Clarke, J 2004 ‘America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global 
Order’, Cambridge University Press, NY; Fukuyama, F 2007 ‘America at the Crossroads: 
Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy’, Yale University Press, New Haven; 
Friedman, M 2006 ‘The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of 
Public Policy’, Cambridge University Press, New York; Fukuyama, F 2007 ‘America at the 
Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy’, Yale University Press, 
London;  Kristol, W, Kagan, R, 1996 ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’, in 
Foreign Affairs, Volume 75, Issue No. 4; Buras, K L 2008 ‘Rightist Multiculturalism: Core 
Lessons on Neoconservative School Reform’, Routledge, Tailor and Francis, New York. 
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possession and use of military might’. In order for the USA to keep policing the 
world, which it is no longer seen as a choice but actually as a ‘requirement of the 
system’, it has to keep the primacy in military means17. The Latin adage ‘si vis 
pacem, para bellum’ describes it best. 
As Daalder and Lindsay in 2003 but also Ikenberry in 2002 notice18, the Bush 
administration relied on the unilateral exercise of the American hard power, and 
disdained the utility of international law and international institutions, such as the 
UN, which were deemed as futile. In those very few cases when multilateral action 
was chosen, then in the form of ad hoc coalitions of the willing, a sort of a ‘à la carte 
multilateralism’19. It assumed that international support is often a function of 
coercion and preferred regime change to direct negotiations with countries and 
leaders loathed. The outcome of such policy-making within the international arenas 
was an –at best– undermining of the US claim to the moral high ground:   
‘there has probably never been a time when there was such a wide 
gap between our military and political standing in the world’20. 
Various prominent scholars, pundits and politicians alike, argued that in order to 
expel this acrimony, things must change. Policy has to be more of a collaborative 
venture between partners instead of a relationship based in power among un-equals. 
In this new constellation, where America’s power does not have the sway it once 
had, in a time when other nations now have the potential to opt-out of ‘the carrot and 
                                                            
17 Kagan, R 2002, ‘Power and Weakness: Why the United States and Europe see the world 
differently‘, Policy Review, No.113, June/July, Hoover Institution, Stanford 
18 Daalder, I, H, Lindsay, J, M, 2005 ‘America Unbound: The Bush Revolution In Foreign 
Policy’; Ikenberry, G, J 2002 ‘Americas Imperial Ambitions’, in Foreign Affairs, Volume 81, 
Issue No.5. 
19 Quotation from the then US State Department Director for Policy Planning Richard Haass. 
Cited in Forman, S, Patrick, S 2002 ‘Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy: Ambivalent 
Engagement’, Lynne Rienner Publishers, New York, p.14 
20 Quotation from Zbigniew Brzenzinski, cited in Diamond, L 2003 ‘Patching Things Up’ in 
Hoover Digest 2003, No.3, Hoover Institution, Stanford. A series of surveys further sustain 
Brzenzinski’s claim. For more see surveys from the Pew Global Attitudes Project, i.e. 
‘Americans and Europeans Differ Widely on Foreign Policy Issues’, April 2002; ‘America’s 
Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties’, March 2003; ‘Views of a Changing 
World 2003’, June 2003; ‘A Year after Iraq: Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, 
Muslim Anger Persists’, March 2004; ‘America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share US Concerns 
over Iran, Hamas’, June 2006; ‘Global Unease with Major World Powers’, June 2007; 
‘Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years’, December 2008. 
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stick’ incentive programmes, and in order to accomplish its foreign policy goals, the 
US must rely on soft power, for it ‘will face great difficulties […] unless it is able to 
persuade other countries that their vital interests are best served by cooperation with, 
rather than balancing against the US’21. By stressing US’ soft power and its potential 
decline22, analysts could advocate a much more prudent and varied foreign policy 
strategy that it [is] sensitive to claims [of] legitimacy and cultural attraction23. 
By turning to the two other boards of Nye’s three dimensional chess game, the 
middle one concerns the interstate economic issues where the distribution of power is 
multipolar and the US has to share its power with the EU, Japan, China, and others. 
On the bottom board of transnational issues like terrorism, organized crime, climate 
change, swell of epidemic diseases, power is distributed and chaotically organized 
among state and non-state actors. Accordingly, in approaching Africa, issues 
concerning mainly the ‘middle and bottom board’ gain greater relevance and hence, 
the one-dimensional players cannot but be insufficient in their handlings. ‘In the long 
term, that is the way to lose, since obtaining favourable outcomes on the bottom 
transnational board often requires the use of soft power assets’24. 
[... S]oft power [means] getting others to want the outcomes that 
you want [and] [S]oft power rests on the ability to shape the 
preferences of others.25 
                                                            
21 Holsti, O, R 2008 ‘To See Ourselves as Others See Us: How Publics Abroad View the United 
States after 9 / 11’, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, p.219 
22 For more information on the decline of the US soft power, among others see:  Judt, T 2002 ‘Its 
Own Worst Enemy’ in The New York Review of Books, Volume 49, No.13, pp.12-17; Shuja, S 
2008 ‘Why America Cannot Ignore Soft Power’ in Contemporary Review, Spring, pp.16-22. 
23 Guzzini, S 2009 ‘On the measure of power and the power of measure in international 
relations‘, in DIIS Working Papers 2009:28, p.13. 
24  Nye, Jr, J S 2004 ‘Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in World Politics’, p.5; ________ 2008 
‘Recovering American Leadership’, Survival, Volume 50, No.1, pp. 58-66; ________ 2008 
‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Sciences, Volume 616, pp. 94-109; ________ 2008 ‘Toward a Liberal Realist Foreign Policy: 
A memo for the next president’, Harvard Magazine, Volume 110, No. 4, pp.36-8, 84; 
________ 2008 ‘Security and Smart Power’, American Behavioral Scientist, Volume 51, No. 
9, pp.1351-6.  
25 Ibid., (emphasis added). Nye, in presenting and analysing soft power, differs between 
behavioural power: ’the ability to obtain outcomes you want‘, and resource power: ‘the 
possession of resources that are usually associated with the ability to reach outcomes you 
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Thus, attractiveness is very important in getting others to want the desired outcomes 
and shaping their preferences so as to serve the proper interests. Such it ‘depends 
very much upon the values [...] express[ed] through the substance and style of [...] 
foreign policy’26, i.e. development assistance to third world countries provides an 
important soft power source. Acting multilaterally, is another soft power source since 
desired goals ‘are far more likely to succeed and be less costly if shared with others’. 
Consequently, the traditional sources of soft power production range from 
international agenda-setting to leading multilateral events and institutional practices, 
through the transmission of information, ideas, policies, values and norms that are 
attractive to other countries. Soft power, though, it is not a substitute or alternative of 
hard power, as some seem to think about27, rather it represents in itself ‘real power’, 
it is an ability to gain objectives and it is more than just ‘image, public relations and 
ephemeral popularity’. As much as the military strength, the dominance of US 
culture and language can sustain American power. And as all power has limits, so 
does soft power no exception. Since, ‘all power depends on context – who relates to 
whom under what circumstances – but soft power depends more than hard power 
upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers. Moreover, attraction often 
has a diffuse effect, creating general influence rather than producing an easily 
observable specific action’28. Thus, ‘[one] must use what has been called ‘smart 
power’: the full range of tools at our disposal –diplomatic, economic, military, 
                                                                                                                                                                        
want‘. Behavioural power is a continuum, with hard or command power at one extreme, and 
the soft or co- optive power at the other end of the continuum. In terms of resources needed to 
exercise hard and soft behavioural power, Nye sees for the first (hard power) the substantial 
economic and military strength as a condition for coercive hard power, while the 
attractiveness of one’s culture and the adeptness of institutions and information technologies 
to disseminate persuasive information as linked to soft power. For more see also: Keohane, B, 
Nye, Jr, J S 1998 ‘Power and Independence in the Information Age’, in Foreign Affairs, 
September/October, pp. 81-94; Nye, Jr, J S 2002 ‘The Paradox of American Power: Why the 
World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone’, Oxford University Press, New York; Nye, Jr, J 
S 2004 ‘Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics‘, Public Affairs, New York. 
26 Nye, Jr, J S 2004, ‘Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in World Politics’, p. 60. 
27 For instance see: Cooper, R 2004 ‘Hard Power, Soft Power and the Goals of Diplomacy‘, in 
Heald, D and Koening-Archibugi, M (eds.), 2004 ‘American Power in the 21st  Century‘ 
Polity Press, London, pp. 167-180; Campbell, K M O’Hanlon, M E (eds.) 2006 ‘Hard Power: 
The New Politics of National Security‘, Basic Books, Cambridge. 
28  Nye, Jr., J S 2004 ‘Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics‘, p.16 
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political, legal, and cultural– picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each 
situation’29. 
Hence, with smart power, is to be understood a mix of hard and soft power skills and 
resources, the exact dosage depending on the context it -smart power- is to be 
exercised. In Nye’s analysis, there are two concepts which are basic to smart power. 
The first being ‘effective leadership’, which it ‘requires a mixture of soft and hard 
power skills’30; and the second concept concerns ‘contextual intelligence’, which it 
combines cognitive abilities with the emotional intelligence, both learnable and 
increasable through experience. It is the contextual intelligence that determines the 
interplay between hard and soft power skills. Following Nye’s rationale, a good 
leadership, ‘effective and ethical’31, needs to combine three essential soft power 
skills –communication, vision and emotional intelligence- with two other skills, 
located at the repertoire available to hard power –organizational ability and political 
wisdom32. In other words, leaders must understand and adapt according to the 
‘followers’ and in the context in which they work. Thus five important dimensions 
emerge to contextual intelligence: culture, distribution of power, the needs and 
demands of followers, crisis and time urgency, and the flow of information. 
On the level of international politics and specifically at the US foreign policy level, 
the CSIS Commission on Smart Power (2007) did tackle these issues from a practical 
point of view. The report provided with a guidebook-like on what the US must do in 
order to resume its global leadership33. The first step in achieving this proposition is, 
understanding that being the only superpower does not justify a domineering attitude:  
                                                            
29 US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2009, Statement of Senator Hillary Rodham 
Clinton, Nominee for Secretary of State, January 13, 2009, p.4, available at: 
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/ClintonTestimony090113a.pdf, last accessed on 
29.12.2009.  ‘Smart power’, an idiom coined in 2004, not by Nye as most believe, but by 
Nossel, a former US diplomat at the UN. For more see: See Nossel S 2004 ‘Smart Power: 
Reclaiming Liberal Internationalism’ in Foreign Affairs, Volume 83, No.2, March/April, 
Council on Foreign Relations, Washington DC, pp. 131-142. 
30 Nye, Jr., J S 2008 ‘The Powers to Lead‘, Oxford University Press, New York, p.x 
31 Ibid., p.147 
32 Ibid., p.69 
33 Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007 ‘CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A 
Smarter, More Secure America‘, CSIS, Washington DC, p.4 
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‘The United States can influence, but not control, other parts of the 
world’34.  
The other lesson to be learned was that despite the fact that the Pentagon is the best-
trained and best-resourced arm of the government, it does not mean that there are no 
limits to what hard power can achieve.  Turning all to the Pentagon because it can get 
things done will inexorably lead to an over- militarized foreign policy, which in its 
own way attracts distrust and hostility and provokes friction with the approaches, 
deemed more adapt to given contexts from other actors. Therefore, to formulate it 
with the words of The Powers to Lead, contextual intelligence must take into 
consideration not just the muscles but also the limits of US power. Thus, there has to 
be equilibrium between the military and non-military means in executing the foreign 
policy.  
‘Military might does constitute a part, but only a part of possible 
responses to the threats by which US feels endangered. For the 
response to be comprehensive it necessitates cooperation between 
governments and international institutions’35,  
Confronted with such statements one might be forgiven  if tempted to think, arguably 
due to a Europhile inclining, that such enlightenment is actually plain common sense. 
The main recommendation of the CSIS Commission is that for the sake of its own 
interests, the US must invest in the global good, which in the absence of a US 
leadership they cannot be attainable to the rest of the world36. Therefore, contextual 
intelligence must come again into play: in terms of style, the attitude of the US ought 
to change, it must learn to cooperate and listen37 and in terms of substance, while it 
                                                            
34 Nye, Jr. J S 2009, ‘Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power‘, July/August, CFR, 
Washington DC, available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65163/joseph-s-nye-
jr/get-smart, last accessed on 28.12.2009 
35 Ibid. 
36 CSIS, 2007 ‘A Smarter, More Secure America‘, p.1 
37 For instance see: Nye, Jr., J S 2002 ‘The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only 
Superpower Can’t Go It Alone’, p.xiv; ________ 2004 ‘Soft Power: The Means to Success in 
World Politics’, p.111, 125; ________ 2009, ‘Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power’.  
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must first ensure its national survival, it should also provide global public goods38.  
There are five areas deemed crucial for securing a welcomed US world leadership: 
the reinvigoration of alliances, partnerships, and institutions that serve US interests 
and help solve the 21st century challenges, translated in i.e. a renewed commitment 
for a reformed UN and ‘working to erase the perception that the [US] has double 
standards when it comes to abiding by international law’; an elevated role of global 
development within the US foreign policy, helping so align US interests with 
aspirations of people around the world; an enhanced, long-term public diplomacy 
that can bring foreign populations to hold the US side; economic integration also for 
those left behind at home and abroad; and technology and innovation, especially 
concerning energy security and climate change39. 
The following will handle the US engagement in Africa; its main policies will be 
analysed through the application of the conceptions of hard, soft and smart power. 
 
THE US POLICIES IN AFRICA 
As the new Bush administration started its work, little was expected from it 
concerning the Africa policy40. Analysts predicted that the US Africa policy would 
                                                            
38 Nye, Jr., J S 2008 ‘Recovering American Leadership’ in Survival, Volume 50, No.1, p.64. The 
World Bank gives the following definition on public goods: ‘Goods that are non rival- 
consumption by one person does not reduce the supply available for others- and non 
excludable- people cannot be prevented from consuming them. [...] they are often supplied by 
government. Public goods are usually national or local. [...] There can also be global public 
goods, benefiting most of the world's population, for example global peace and security, or 
information needed to prevent global climate change. Providing such goods (and services) is 
a function of international organizations’. (emphasis added) The World Bank 2004 
‘Beyond Economic Growth: Student Book’ WB, Washington DC, p.142, Available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/beyond/global/ glossary.html, last accessed on 
28.12.2009. From the last sentence in this definition, one might, arguably rightly, ask whether 
the US in order to secure its leader role, is willing to take over functions, which up to date 
were fulfilled by international organizations. Nye writes that one of the great challenges the 
US faces is ‘how to better control the non-state actors that will increasingly share the stage 
with nation-states’. For more on it see: Nye, Jr., J S 2008 ‘Recovering American Leadership’, 
p.62. 
39 CSIS, 2007 ‘A Smarter, More Secure America‘, pp.27, 29-30, 37, 47, 53, 57.  
40 George W Bush interview during the election campaign at the PBS NewsHour with Jim Lehrer 
on 16 February 2000, Bush was quoted saying that Africa ‘doesn’t fit into the national 
strategic interests’. For the full transcript of the interview see: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/ 
bb/election/jan-june00/bush_2-16.html, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
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continue to be run by the State Department bureaucrats41. The DoD would rather 
continue its ‘business as usual’ behaviour, since ‘ultimately [... the DoD] see[s] very 
little traditional strategic interest in Africa’42.  
These low expectations were actually proved wrong, since quite almost immediately, 
the administration embarked on a major diplomatic endeavour in trying to put an end 
to the north-south conflict in Sudan43. This change of mind was followed suit by 
what became to be considered important initiatives with a predominant focus on 
Africa: the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the US Africa Command (AFRICOM).  
Broadly speaking, there are three main issues which are seen as pointing at the 
heightened relevance of Africa to the US national interests. Firstly, Africa’s role to 
the Global War on Terror (GWOT) which includes also the potential that failed 
states, porous borders, ungoverned areas, poverty etc, provide in facilitating terrorist 
activities. Secondly, Africa’s abundant natural resources, especially oil. Thirdly, 
humanitarian concerns as a result of conflicts, poverty, and disease44. In 2004 an 
advisory panel of Africa experts, authorized by Congress to propose new policy 
initiatives, went into greater detail and identified five factors that have shaped the 
increased US interest in Africa: oil, global trade, armed conflicts, terror, and 
                                                            
41 Schraeder, P J 2001 ‘Forget the Rhetoric and Boost the Geopolitics: Emerging Trends in the 
Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy towards Africa, 2001’, in African Affairs, Volume 100, 
Issue No. 400, pp. 402–3. See also Cohen, H J 2003 ‘The United States and Africa: Non-vital 
Interests Also Require Attention’, in American Foreign Policy Interests, Volume 25, Issue 
No. 1, pp. 19–24. 
42 US Department of Defence, Office of International Security Affairs, 1995 ‘United States 
Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa’, Washington DC. Report available at:  http://www. 
dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA297401&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. See also: 
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=943. Both last accessed 30.03.2009. 
43 In May 2001, the appointment of the USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios as the US Special 
Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan; In August 2001, the appointment of John Danforth as 
the US Special Envoy for Sudan’s Peace Process; In June 2001 the Senate passed the Sudan 
Peace Act, which made available funds of up to $ 10 million to assist the population in the 
areas outside the Sudanese government control. For more information see: Huliaras, A 2006 
‘Evangelists, Oil Companies, and Terrorists: The Bush Administration’s Policy Towards 
Sudan’, in Orbis, Volume 50, Issue No. 4, pp.714-5. 
44 Pham, J P 2010 ‘AFRICOM: Terrorism and Security Challenges in Africa’, in Francis, D, J 
(ed.) 2010 ‘US Strategy in Africa: AFRICOM, Terrorism and Security Challenges’, 
Routledge, Oxon, p.65. 
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HIV/AIDS45. They suggested that these factors had led to a ‘conceptual shift to a 
strategic view of Africa46.  
This section of the chapter will continue to analyse the US agenda in Africa at the 
dawn of the 21st century by focusing on the main policies within following core 
fields: security, energy, aid and trade, democratisation and governance, 
demographics, food security, and climate change. The section prior to wrap up with 
some concluding remarks on the US in Africa will also have a look at the US stance 
about China’s engagement in Africa. 
 
 
US SECURITY ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA 
In having a look backwards, US hard power engagement in Africa, in terms of 
security policies and military instruments, has usually taken traditional forms such as 
concealed military, security and counter terrorism operations, combined military 
exercises and training programmes with different African militaries, as well as peace 
support operations and peacekeeping missions on African ground, plus humanitarian 
relief operations. Nevertheless,  
‘despite this long history of engagement on the continent, the DoD 
has never focused on Africa with the same level of consistency 
with which it has focused on other regions of the world’47.  
                                                            
45 CSIS Africa Policy Advisory Panel Report 2004 ‘Rising U.S. Stakes in Africa: Seven 
Proposals to Strengthen U.S.-Africa Policy’, CSIS, Washington DC, p.6, available at: http://cs 
is.org/files/media/csis/pubs/rising_u.s._stakes_in_africa.pdf, last accessed on 30.3.2009. It has 
lately been argued that environmental security / climate change serve as a ‘threat multiplier’ 
and consequently it should be added to the list of issues concerning the national security 
interests, the more so the one concerning Africa as argued by a DoD official, in his testimony 
before Congress. Examples from Nigeria, Sudan, and Somalia further highlight this argument 
asserting that, ‘beyond the more conventional threats we traditionally address, I believe we 
must now also prepare to respond to the consequences of dramatic population migrations, 
pandemic health issues and significant food and water shortages due to the possibility of 
significant climate change’. For a detailed information see: US Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, 2007 ‘Testimony of General Charles Wald, Member, Military Advisory Board, at 
a hearing on Climate Change and National Security Threats before the Committee of Foreign 
Relations, US Senate, May 9, 2007’, p.2, available at: http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/ 
doc/WaldTestimony070509.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
46 CSIS Africa Policy Advisory Panel Report 2004 ‘Rising U.S. Stakes in Africa: Seven 
Proposals to Strengthen U.S.-Africa Policy’, CSIS, Washington DC, p.6. 
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A U-turn in the US thinking came as a direct result of 9/11. Concerns about terrorist 
attacks originating from Africa, seemed to take the upper hand among US officials 
and observers in general, who thought of Africa, with its large Muslim populations, 
failed states, and porous borders, as being the ideal breeding grounds for extremism 
and terrorism48. As a result of it, a heightened intelligence cooperation was stood up, 
accompanied by policies such as mutual antiterrorism assistance, more insistent 
developmental and public diplomacy projects, aiming at targeting the ‘root causes’ of 
extremism and terrorism. This was sustained by the conviction that US security 
depends as much on the success of preventive measures in weak states as on combat 
operations against the obvious enemies.  
‘[...] military success is not sufficient to win: economic 
development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting 
internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services 
to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police 
forces, strategic communications, and more [...] help protect our 
security and advance our interests and values’49. 
Such policy statements, and especially the DoD directive 3000.05 (2005)50, become 
exemplary of ‘a tendency to conflate all forms of US assistance to Africa –security, 
development, humanitarian– with overriding counterterrorism objectives’51. Initially, 
the African parties welcomed this surge of US interest in African security matters, 
                                                                                                                                                                        
47 Quotation from Theresa Whelan, a current DoD functionary, who served from September 2003 
to June 2009 as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence (DASD) for African Affairs.  
48 Pham, J P 2010 ‘AFRICOM: Terrorism and Security Challenges in Africa’, in Francis, D, J 
(ed.) 2010 ‘US Strategy in Africa: AFRICOM, Terrorism and Security Challenges’, 
Routledge, Oxon. 
49 Quotation from Secretary of Defence Robert Gates, 26 November 2007. 
50 This directive delineated for the first time that stability operations were a core DoD mission, 
thus chronic weaknesses that had traditionally attracted the attention of humanitarian and 
developmental experts (corruption, weak governance, poverty, disease, etc.) were discovered 
to have new strategic importance. 
51 Bellamy W, M 2009 ‘Making Better Sense of US Security Engagement in Africa’, in Cooke, J 
G, Morrison, J S (eds.) 2009 ‘US Africa Policy Beyond the Bush Years: Critical Challenges 
for the Obama Administration’, CSIS, Washington DC, p.16. 
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although they felt that the continent had other more pressing security matters than 
terrorism52.   
By turning to the counterterrorist projects, the US initially focused on the Horn of 
Africa. Paramount example is the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa 
(CJTF-HOA), a 1600 person strong new US military base in Djibouti established in 
early 2003 with the assignment to tackle a possible surge in extremist or terrorist 
activities in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa53. The mission’s mandate –disrupting 
the activities of ‘transnational terrorist movements’– seems to have been ill-defined 
(alas, a mistake repeated with AFRICOM as we shall see later on) since it has been 
discarded as non achievable54. The force though, evolved over time to include 
intelligence gathering, civic action operations, and host country training exercises, 
which were executed in close cooperation with the US embassies in the region. 
Surprisingly, contrary to the dominant thought within the strongly neocon-influenced 
administration about the need for a robust firepower, the CJTF-HOA had little means 
to fight55, which in its own turn, it seems to have prompted it to better cooperate with 
other US agencies and host governments in trying to address the root causes of 
violent extremism56. This seems to have contributed in large parts to the CJTF-
HOA’s soft/smart power image since it concurs with an important feature of soft 
power, where preference for policies that are more of a collaborative venture 
                                                            
52 Osikena, J 2010 ‘Geopolitics Beyong Washington: Africa’s alternative security and 
development partnerships’, in Francis, D, J (ed.) 2010 ‘US Strategy in Africa: AFRICOM, 
Terrorism and Security Challenges’, Routledge, Oxon; Bellamy W, M 2009 ‘Making Better 
Sense of US Security Engagement in Africa’, in Cooke, J G, Morrison, J S (eds.) 2009 ‘US 
Africa Policy Beyond the Bush Years: Critical Challenges for the Obama Administration’, 
CSIS, Washington DC; Mohamed Salih, M A 2010 ‘An African Perspective on Security’, in 
Francis, D, J (ed.) 2010 ‘US Strategy in Africa: AFRICOM, Terrorism and Security 
Challenges’, Routledge, Oxon. 
53 More information about CJTF-HOA is available at: www.hoa.africom.mil/AboutCJTF-
HOA.asp, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
54 Bellamy W, M 2009 ‘Making Better Sense of US Security Engagement in Africa’, p.23. 
55 Its kinetic (combat) capability was often represented by a single rifle company. It has, though, 
to be said that these diminished means of fight are diametrically opposed to the budget CJTF-
HOA it uses annually. For instance, speaking in figures, CJTF-HOA disposes of an estimated 
$330 million annually, almost as much as the annual operating expenses of AFRICOM 
headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. For more see: www.hoa.africom.mil, last accessed on 
30.03.2009. 
56 Bellamy W, M 2009 ‘Making Better Sense of US Security Engagement in Africa’, p.23. 
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between partners instead of a relationship based in power among un-equals, is 
central. After all, Nye sustains that ‘soft power is about mobilizing cooperation from 
others without threats or payments’57. Concerning smart power, the CJTF-HOA 
seems to exemplify a proper employment of ‘contextual intelligence’ in terms of 
appropriate use of soft and hard power means. Regarding the changed US style and 
attitude, it seems ‘it [has] learn[ed] to cooperate and listen58; and in terms of 
substance, in ensuring first its national survival, ‘it [has] also provide[d] global 
public goods’59. 
Another project was the East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative launched in mid 
2003, just short of the first visit of President Bush in Africa. The programme was 
dotted with $100 million, largely from previously budgeted money for projects 
across East Africa within the security, governance and development fields. Countries 
concerned were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and assistance 
ranged from improvements in airport security to helping herd owners in remote areas 
to bring their animals to market. Yet another counterterrorist project was the Pan 
Sahel Initiative (PSI), also launched in 2003 with a focus in Chad, Mali, Mauritania 
and Niger, and focused on assisting the respective militaries track and neutralise 
suspect terrorist targets within the Sahel region. In 2004 the PSI advanced to become 
the Trans Saharan Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), dotted with $500 million 
over a five-year time span, and focused on training the local militaries as well as 
programmes concerning governance and public diplomacy.  
Albeit the good coordination example set up by CJTF-HOA, these programmes 
pointed towards a, for many worrying, trend in authority transfers that the Bush 
administration has set in motion. Reference is being made of the transfer to DoD of 
authorities which once were executed exclusively by civilian agencies, most notably 
the Department of State and USAID. An exemple par excellence is provided through 
                                                            
57 Nye, Jr, J S 2004, ‘Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in World Politics’, p.60. 
58 For instance see: Nye, Jr., J S 2002 ‘The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only 
Superpower Can’t Go It Alone’, p.xiv; Nye, Jr., J S 2004 ‘Soft Power: The Means to Success 
in World Politics’, p.111, 125; Nye, Jr. J S 2009, ‘Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft 
Power’.  
59 Nye, Jr., J S 2008 ‘Recovering American Leadership’ in Survival, Volume 50, No.1, p.64; 
CSIS, 2007 ‘A Smarter, More Secure America‘. 
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the sections ‘1206’ and ‘1207’ authorities of the National Defence Authorisation Act 
(NDAA) of 200660, through which the DoD can in predefined circumstances train 
and equip non military counterparts and transfer its funds to the State Department for 
purposes of security and stabilisation requirements. This authority transfer has 
obviously created frictions between the two departments. Such function has been 
followed with suspicion and distrust not just by the State Department but also the 
Congress itself, as well as the broader developmental and nongovernmental 
community over an alleged erosion of civilian command within the assistance 
programmes. It is thought that this ‘militarisation’ –programmes, including the non-
military ones, funded and/or executed by DoD– has progressively expanded to 
include large percentages of the US policy towards Africa61. Generally speaking, in 
1998 USAID managed 64.3 percent of US official development assistance; the State 
Department 12.9 percent; DoD only 3.3 percent. Meanwhile in 2006, USAID 
dropped to 45 percent while DoD rose to 18 percent. Other agencies, apart from 
State, USAID and DoD, saw an increase in official development assistance as well, 
from 19.3 percent to 23.6 percent62.   
                                                            
60 US Congress, 2006 ‘National Defence Authorisation Act: Public Law 109-163, Jan.06, 2006’, 
US Congress, Washington DC. For the full text of the National Defence Authorisation Act of 
2006 see: http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/olc/docs /PL109-163.pdf, the sections 1206 and 1207 to 
be found at, respectively, p.322 and p.324, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
61 Anderson, G W 2008 ‘USAID Collaboration with DoD: Why? How? With Whom?’, 
Presentation at the USAID-DoD Cooperation and Implications for Development Event, Centre 
for Global Development, Washington DC, presentation and transcript available at: 
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/events/5.06.08/Event_Transcript.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009; 
Oxfam America, 2008 ‘Smart Development: Why US Foreign Aid Demands Major Reform’, 
Oxfam America, Boston, available at: hffp://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublications/ 
publiccations/briefing_papers/smart-development/smart-development-may2008.pdf, last ac-
cessed on 30.03.2009; Moncrieff, V M 2008 ‘Potentially Lethal: Increased Relationship 
Between Military and Aid’, in The Huffington Post December 22, 2008, available at: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/virginia-moncrieff/military-civilian-policy_b_152749.html, 
last accessed on 30.03.2009; Cherico, A, 2009 ‘Humanitarian Organisations Fight for 
Federal Funds’, available at: http://upiu.com/articles/humanitarian-organizations-fight-for-
federal-funds, last accessed on 30.03.2009; Williams, R 2010 ‘Militarisation of US Foreign 
Policy: Why it Matters to DoD’, available at: http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2010/01/11/ 
militarization-of-us-foreign-policy-why-it-matters-to-dod/, last accessed on 25.06.2010. 
62 Oxfam America, 2008 ‘Smart Development: Why US Foreign Aid Demands Major Reform’, 
Oxfam America, Boston, p.12, available at: hffp://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpubli 
cations/publications/briefing_papers/smart-development/smart-development-may2008.pdf, 
last accessed on 30.03.2009 
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These features would account for a diminished soft/smart power image since ‘turning 
all to the Pentagon because it can get things done will inexorably lead to an over-
militarized foreign policy’63, which in its own way attracts hostility and distrust and 
provokes friction with the approaches, deemed more adapt to given contexts from 
other actors. On the other hand, for all the talk of ‘DoD getting things done’, 
nevertheless, it is sustained that the DoD is ill-suited as compared to other US 
civilian services to afford such civilian activities, i.e. training police officers, etc., 
especially within the African continent64. Another related concern is that aid may 
increasingly be pressed to fit into preset counterterrorism templates, thus ‘flattening 
out and obscuring the true complexity of Africa’s security problems’65. The idea for 
a greater role of DoD in foreign assistance, despite the fact that the DoD accounts 
today for 21 percent of overall US ODA, is seen as a dangerous one, since it may 
‘misconceiv[e] the nature of development and threatening the role and credibility of 
development agencies and NGOs’66.   
The template of civilian-military cooperation created by the CJTF-HOA, served as a 
good example upon which AFRICOM would then be found67. AFRICOM68 is 
intended as a new kind of military command, aimed at integrating traditional security 
functions with humanitarian aid and development, through application of i.e. hard 
power for counterterrorist and security issues, and soft power for military training, 
officer exchanges and humanitarian projects. This was to be achieved through a 
greater and closer cooperation between the DoD, State Department and USAID. In 
this sense, AFRICOM’s potential to increase US soft power is given, since ‘the 
military can sometimes play an important role in the generation of soft power [… 
with its] broad range of officer exchanges, joint training, and assistance programs 
                                                            
63 CSIS, 2007 ‘A Smarter, More Secure America‘, p.4. 
64 i.e: Moncrieff, V M 2008 ‘Potentially Lethal: Increased Relationship Between Military and 
Aid’; Cherico, A, 2009 ‘Humanitarian Organisations Fight for Federal Funds’. 
65 Bellamy W, M 2009 ‘Making Better Sense of US Security Engagement in Africa’, p.23. 
66 Quoted in Lyman, P, N 2009 ‘US Foreign Assistance and Trade Policies in Africa’, p.121. 
67 Bellamy W, M 2009 ‘Making Better Sense of US Security Engagement in Africa’, p.24. 
68 A much more detailed account of AFRICOM will be provided on the following chapter IV of 
this work. 
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with other countries in peacetime’69. For all the potential, the military, failed to send 
out a soft power message, in large parts because its ‘belated and clumsy outreach 
generated suspicion about the military’s true motives’70. Africa did not buy 
AFRICOM’s claim to ‘help development, health education, democracy, and 
economic growth’. A further reason for distrust was presented by the fact that the 
search of a headquarters in the continent was started prior to explaining how the 
command would help Africa, so Africans felt that ‘very little was really known by 
the majority of people or countries in Africa who were supposed to know before such 
a move was made’71. The failure to explain AFRICOM to Africans is also sustained 
by the fear that AFRICOM could provide an excuse for a presence of US troops in 
the continent, and consequently, the felt imperative was that ‘Africa has to avoid the 
presence of foreign forces on its soil’72. A further cut to the soft power image was the 
perception that AFRICOM ‘was an inappropriate and knee-jerk US militaristic 
response to clumsy Chinese mercantilism’73. The so much looked-after soft power 
image failed because as Nye says:  
‘a communications strategy cannot work if it cuts against the grain 
of policy. Actions speak louder than words and public diplomacy 
that appears to be mere window dressing for hard power projection 
is unlikely to succeed’74. 
Apart from the above–mentioned policies, the Bush administration, in stark contrast 
to its predecessor, did support peacekeeping missions in Africa, be they UN or AU 
missions. The contributions are seen as to have been in the form of troops, financial, 
                                                            
69 Nye, Jr, J S 2008, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, in The ANNALS of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 616, Issue No.1, p.106. 
70 Bellamy, M, Hicks, K, Morrison, J, S 2007 ‘Strengthening AFRICOM’s Case’.  
71 Quotation from Mosiuoa Lekota, South African Minister of Defence, cited in Mills, G 2008 
‘The U.S. and Africa: Prisoners of a Paradigm’, in Current History, Volume 107, Issue No. 
709, pp.228-9. 
72 Quotation from retired Kenyan General Daniel Opande, cited in DeYoung, K 2008 ‘U.S. 
Africa Command Trims its Aspirations’, in The Washington Post, June 1, 2008, A18. 
73 Geldof, B 2008 ‘Sir Bob Geldof’s Travels with George Bush’ in The Sunday Times, March 9, 
2008, available at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article3510768.ece, 
last accessed 30.03.2009. 
74 Nye, Jr, J S 2008, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, p.102. 
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logistic and / or political support. Thus, by mid 2001 a large UN force was deployed 
in Sierra Leone, followed by UN peacekeeping operations in DRC in 2001, Liberia 
in 2003 and Côte d’Ivoire in 200475. A new development from the continent, in this 
sense, was the creation of the AU, and its peace and security architecture. This 
provided for an opportunity to improve US soft/smart power, since ‘[m]ultilateralism 
helps to legitimate American power’76 be it hard, soft or smart, as well as US’ 
legitimacy and standing in Africa may well increase if it cooperates at a closer level 
with these international institutions, for they enjoy ‘broad political support among 
Africa’s elected leadership, military officers, and general public’77. It has to be said 
that the AU and its peace and security architecture were not a focal point of the Bush 
administration in addressing security problems in Africa; the appointment of an 
ambassadorial-level envoy to the AU, although a good step in the right direction, 
failed to account for great improvement78.  
The above-mentioned engagements account for the traditional security assistance 
including the counterterrorism programmes. It is well known that Africa is facing 
other new security challenges which do not fit with the traditional approaches. 
Reference is being made to international drug trafficking (a predominant security 
challenge that West African countries face), organised crime, money laundering and 
human trafficking. Although the State Department’s Bureau of International 
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INL) is charged with tackling these 
African challenges, the results seem to fall on a modest scale. The budget allocation 
exemplifies best the small priority Africa occupies i.e. for the FY2008, less than 3 
percent of the total budget, only $34 million out of $1.24 billion, were earmarked for 
                                                            
75 Detailed information about mission mandates as well as contributing countries and other 
statistical data see the official website of the UN peacekeeping operations: http://www.un.org/ 
en/peacekeeping/, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
76 Nye, Jr, J S 2004, ‘Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in World Politics’, p.65. 
77 Bellamy, M, Hicks, K, Morrison, J, S 2007 ‘Strengthening AFRICOM’s Case’, in CSIS 
Commentary, p.3, available at: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080305_africom.pdf, last 
accessed on 30.03.2009. 
78 Office of Inspector General 2010 ‘Report of Inspection Number ISP-I-10-65, US Mission to the 
African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’, US Department of State and the Broadcasting Board 
of Governors, Washington DC. 
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Africa79. Another reason for the modest results, seems to lay on the fact that capacity 
building programmes for Africa’s national law enforcement and criminal justice 
systems are scattered all over the administration’s structure –some two dozen 
departments and agencies! The result is ‘a fragmented mosaic of loosely connected 
initiatives covering many countries and addressing many diverse issues in a generally 
superficial fashion. [... Therefore] it is nearly impossible to correlate these efforts 
with any durable improvements in African law enforcement or judicial capacity’80. 
To speak with the wording of the CSIS Report on Smart Power, these fractured and 
compartmentalised US foreign policy institutions, cannot but only deliver a ‘wrong-
headed’ and ‘incoherent’ agenda, that ‘lack[s] in credibility’, all of which, ultimately, 
account for a diminished smart power image81.   
 
US ENERGY INTERESTS IN AFRICA 
The US thirst for foreign oil imports, as predicted by the US Department of Energy, 
will grow from 24.4 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2003, to an estimated 26,7 
million bpd in 202082. Predictions offered by the US National Energy Policy (NEP) 
in 2005 moved on these same lines. Perceived threats to the US energy security 
globally arouse after 9/11 and the consequent Global Wars On Terror (GWOT) 
especially that in Iraq. This feeling was further sustained by the perceived ‘new 
scramble’ for Africa’s strategic resources particularly the competition flamed by the 
hunger of China as well as that of other emerging economies in the Global South. 
Such situation seems to have influenced the Bush administration to regard Africa and 
especially African oil resources as a ‘strategic national interest’ of the US.  
                                                            
79 Information gathered from the official website of INL available at: http://www.state.gov/p 
/inl/rls/rpt/pbg/c24130.htm. Detailed information about programmes concerning African 
countries can be is available at: http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rpt/pbg/c24130.htm. Both 
websites last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
80 Bellamy W, M 2009 ‘Making Better Sense of US Security Engagement in Africa’, p.14. 
81 CSIS, 2007 ‘A Smarter, More Secure America‘, p.62-5 
82 US Energy Information Administration, ‘Table A4, World Oil Consumption by Regions: 1990 
– 2030’, available at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/ ieoreftab_4.pdf, last accessed on 
30.03.2009.   
104 
 
The 2005 Council on Foreign Relations report on Africa stressed that the ‘US energy 
security is based on achieving a stable supply of energy at affordable prices from as 
diverse a set of suppliers as possible’83. The situation in the Middle East, and 
particularly after the US’ Iraq war, made it all too clear that turmoil and instability in 
one country can at worse hinder access to oil and at best raise the global price of it. 
In the search for alternative sources, President Bush announced in his 2006 State of 
the Union address the intention to ‘replace more than 75 percent of [US] oil imports 
from the Middle East by 2025’84, further strengthening a previous commitment made 
in 2002 ‘to expand the sources and types of global energy supplies, especially in [...] 
Africa [...]’85. The Assistant Secretary of State Department for African Affairs is 
quoted to have said that:  ‘African oil is of national interest to us, and it will increase 
and become more important as we go forward’86.  Apart from the fact that the US has 
invested heavily, the low sulphur quality of crude oil extracted from Africa, 
especially from the Gulf of Guinea countries, is highly valued by the US market87. 
Thus, African countries such as Nigeria and Angola are seen to have gained an 
increasing importance for the US in particular and within the global energy market 
generally: ‘In 2000, Nigeria and Angola’s combined exports to the US totalled 1.2 
million bpd; an amount that is expected to double or triple in the next ten years’88.  
Or ‘the global energy market is such that rising mid range producers like Nigeria and 
Angola today are increasingly critical to the reliability and stability in global oil 
                                                            
83 Lake, A, Whitman, C, T, Lyman, P, N, Morrison, J, S 2006 ‘More than Humanitarianism: A 
Strategic U.S Approach Toward Africa’, in Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task 
Force Report No. 56, p.29, available at: http://www.technoserve.org/assets/documents/council 
onforeignrelationspaperhumanitarianism.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2006. 
84 The White House, 2006 ‘President Delivers State of the Union Address, 31 January 2006’, 
available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/, last accessed 
on 30.3.2009. 
85 The White House, 2002 ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States’, available at: 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/, last accessed on 30.3.2009. 
86 Quotation from Walter Kansteiner 2002, then the US Assistant Secretary of State Department 
for African Affairs. Cited in Klare, M, T 2004 ‘Blood and Oil: The Dangers and 
Consequences of America’s Growing Dependency on Imported Petroleum (American Empire 
Project)’, Metropolitan Books, NY, p.65.  
87 Lake, A, et al 2006 ‘More than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S Approach Toward Africa’, 
p.30. 
88 Klare, M, T 2004 ‘Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing 
Dependency on Imported Petroleum (American Empire Project)’, p.121. 
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prices’89. The main issues, though, apart from this strategic importance, are the 
pervasive security troubles that these African countries are faced with, the risks of 
poor governance and corruption, as well as, ironically, the economic challenges that 
African countries are faced with as a result of the discovery of oil. All in all 
contributes to what has been called as the ‘resource curse’90.  
Concerning the Bush administration’s energy security policy, although it did identify 
the importance of Africa as a strategic supplier, the risks of poor governance and 
corruption and the need for engagement91, critics point at the fact that it is much of 
the same strategy since the Carter Doctrine92, which calls for military intervention in 
                                                            
89 Lake, A, et al 2006 ‘More than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S Approach Toward Africa’, 
p.28. 
90 ‘Resource curse’ is defined as the negative linkages that the natural resources create, mainly 
the following three: poor economic growth, civil war and bad governance. As contributors to 
the resource curse are seen the negative impacts of large resource revenues of the economy, 
named also ‘short-term boom and long-term bust’, or the ‘Dutch disease’, which it refers to 
the situation experienced by the Netherland, after the discovery of natural gas in the North 
Sea; this lead to a deindustrialisation of other manufactures as the economy depended on only 
one commodity. Another source is the lack of human capital development, as well as the size 
and type of natural resources. For more on the ‘resource curse’ see: Gelb, A, H, and 
associates, 1988 ‘Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse’, A World Bank Research Publication, 
Washington DC; Jensen, L, Wantchekan, L 2004 ‘Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in 
Africa’, in Comparative Political Studies, Volume 37, issue No.7, pp.816-841; Leite, C, 
Weidmann, J 1999 ‘Does Mother Nature Corrupt – Natural Resources, Corruption and 
Economic Growth’, IMF Working Paper 99/85, IMF, Washington DC; Rosser, A 2006 ‘The 
Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey’, Institute of Development 
Studies, Brighton. For more on the contributors to the ‘resource curse’ see: Bhattacharyya, S, 
Hoddler, R 2009 ‘Natural Resources and Corruption: Is Democracy the Missing Link?’, 
available at: http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4201, last accessed 12.12.2009; 
Bhattacharyya, S, Hodler R 2009 ‘Natural Resources, Democracy and Corruption’, available 
at: http://www.isid.ac.in/~pu/conference/dec_08_conf/Papers /SambitBhattacharyya.pdf, last 
accessed on 15.01.2010. 
91 National Energy Policy Development Group, 2001 ‘Report: Reliable, Affordable, and 
Environmentally Sound Energy for America’s Future’, Washington DC, p.162, available at: 
http://www.wtrg.com/EnergyReport/National-Energy-Policy.pdf, last accessed on 
30.03.2009. The NEPD Group recommends that the president direct the secretaries of state, 
energy, and commerce to reinforce the US-Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum 
and the US-African Energy Ministerial process; deepen bilateral and multilateral engagement 
to promote a more receptive environment for US oil and gas trade, investment, and 
operations; and promote geographic diversification of energy supplies, addressing such issues 
as transparency, sanctity of contracts, and security. The NEPD Group recommends that the 
president direct the secretaries of state, commerce, and energy to support more transparent, 
accountable, and responsible use of oil resources in African producer countries to enhance the 
stability and security of trade and investment environments. 
92 President J Carter, 1980 ‘The State of the Union Address Delivered before a Joint Session of 
the Congress, January 23, 1980’, available at the Presidential Audio/Video Archive: 
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assuring US access to oil93.  In assessing the energy policy one has to look at the US 
engagement with the suppliers, the technical and other assistance on energy policy 
itself as well as related issues of transparency and governance, and a policy response 
to emerging threats to US investment and personnel94. In terms of diplomatic 
engagement the record is at best mixed, since ‘[a]s part of a general dismantlement 
and minimisation of standing bilateral policy dialogues, the US retreated from 
engagement with most suppliers’95. For instance, the US-Africa Energy Ministers 
Partnership, a forum which brought together all energy producers and aimed at 
addressing energy security, investment security and sustainable development, was, 
after the first rounds, a failure, due to little political effort from the US side in 
sustaining it. Or for that matter, in a time when policy dialogues at the head-of-state-
level, were launched annually by other parties, such as EU-Africa, China-Africa, 
Russia-Africa, etc., US engagement, i.e. bilateral commissions with Angola, Nigeria, 
and South Africa, lapsed. For example, the agenda on US engagement with Nigeria 
was rather enlarged, including issues from Liberia, to Sudan, to Sierra Leone, but 
only episodically were discussed issues concerning the strained situation on the 
Niger Delta96. US engagement with other parties such as the EU or China on Africa 
can also be defined as negligible. These attitudes do not qualify as soft power, since 
as Nye points out diplomatic engagement, as well as multilateral settings are core to 
soft power attributes97. These attitudes point out at a rather unilateral and arrogant 
US in its foreign policy dealings. This has undoubtedly resulted in a loss of 
legitimacy and soft power.  
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Concerning the development assistance, the track record is also mixed. For instance 
under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)98 passed in 2004, the aim 
was to decrease the trade imbalances with Africa and to provide incentives for 
diversifying Africa’s economies. Nevertheless, under AGOA, 99 percent of Angolan 
exports to US were energy related and Nigerian exports are very much the same99.  
Another facet of the US development assistance, as related to the African energy 
producing/exporting countries, is provided by the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC)100. The MCC is an innovative initiative which has made participation 
dependant of certain conditionalities and standards, it does, though, by doing so, 
exclude most of energy-producing countries, in a time when those countries are most 
in need of improved governance101. Here we have useful tools that do not properly 
address the contexts of the oil-producing African countries. It may be sustained that 
because of the substantial influence of neoconservatist ideology within the Bush 
administration and of the subsequent justification of the Iraq war in terms of 
democracy spreading, the US democratisation track record during the Bush years is 
extremely flawed, and through it the soft/smart power image.  
Another endogenous factor for such shrinking of the US soft/smart power in this 
field, is also provided by the fact that ‘[a]t least 18 different federal agencies, from 
DoE [US Department of Energy] to HHS [US Health and Human Services], conduct 
at least 158 energy related program activities’102. In the face of such conditions, there 
is no room for wondering why the CSIS Report on Smart Power, sustains that a 
major factor for a diminished US soft/smart power effecting, is largely due to these 
                                                            
98 AGOA will be handled at greater detail further down on the section of US Aid and Trade 
Policies in Africa.  
99 More information is available at the official website of AGOA: http://www.agoa.info, last 
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fractured and compartmentalised US foreign policy institutions, and their output is a 
‘wrong-headed’ and ‘incoherent’ agenda, that ‘lack[s] in credibility’103. 
In concluding about the US energy policy towards Africa during the Bush years, its 
administration identified Africa’s rising potential and risks104, nevertheless, 
‘transparency and governance were low-priority issues, diplomatic engagement with 
energy producers atrophied, and no significant sums of new resources were deployed 
to address the challenges associated with rising revenues and eroding capacity of 
governments to manage them’105. 
 
 
US AID AND TRADE POLICIES IN AFRICA 
Aid and trade policies concerning Africa, are considered as the paramount 
achievements of the Bush administration. As a matter of fact, aid to sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) almost tripled from $2.3 billion in 2000 to $6.6 billion in 2006, and 
further President Bush pledged to increase aid to $9 billion by 2010106. This meant 
that US’ Official Development Aid (ODA) disbursements in 2006 averaged 
something less than $9 dollar per African per year. A great contributor to these 
figures is the President’s Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), 
accounting for quite 25 percent in 2006, while humanitarian assistance, another 
substantial contributor, accounted for 31 percent. The most, though, was contributed 
by one time debt relief (especially DRC, $689 million; Nigeria, $597 million; and 
Zambia, $188 million)107. On trade, the Bush administration took over and advanced 
the Clinton’s African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Another important 
initiative was the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) which aimed at 
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improving and strengthening trade capacity in Africa through infrastructure projects. 
At a less positive note, US ODA to SSA decreased in real terms by a staggering 15 
percent to $5.9 billion in 2007 at about $7.25 dollar per African per year108. 
The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 
In 2000, a National Intelligence Council (NIC) Report identified a number of specific 
diseases as possible threats to the US, between them the HIV/AIDS pandemic109. 
HIV/AIDS has a tremendous toll especially in sub-Saharan Africa: it ranges there as 
one of the greatest threats110, thus it ‘quickly came to the forefront as a concern in US 
policy approaches to Africa’111. A subsequent NIC report focused on HIV/AIDS only 
and five populous ‘second wave countries’ which may be heavily affected by the 
high prevalence of HIV/AIDS112. This report appeared just after the White House 
published its NSS in September 2002, where infectious diseases and health 
inequalities were identified as a major cause for global instability, and accordingly a 
strategy was outlined to address explicitly issues concerning HIV/AIDS, TB, and 
Malaria113.  
The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)114, is considered as ‘one 
of the most important new US foreign assistance programs’115 that ‘leads the 
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world’116. From the 2003 bipartisan effort led by the Bush administration to create 
‘the largest commitment ever by a single nation to combat […] HIV/AIDS around 
the world’117, was born PEPFAR a $15 billion, five-year programme, which aims at 
tripling US commitments from $1 billion to $3 billion per year. Of the obligated $15 
billion some 83 percent ($10 billion) have been pledged for bilateral programmes, 16 
percent to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria and about 1 percent has 
gone to UNAIDS. Disbursement have been kept at a lower scale than obligations, 
nevertheless in the first four years they have totalled $9.4 billion, and in 2007 
HIV/AIDS disbursement amounted to 15 percent of the total US ODA118. The 
programme was reauthorized in 2008 and extended to cover another five-year time-
span from 2009 to 2013 with some $48 billion earmarked to fight HIV/AIDS, TB 
and malaria diseases119. During its first quinquennial PEPFAR provided to nearly 2 
million HIV infected sub-Saharan Africans with antiretroviral (ARVs) drugs as 
compared to only 50 thousand in late 2003; it has supported some 30 million HIV 
testing; and some 200 thousand infants were spared the fate of being born with 
HIV120. Undoubtedly, as Meads writes ‘the generosity of US humanitarian assistance 
abroad enhances US soft power’121, thus ‘[t]he ‘soft power’ success of treating such 
large numbers of people with AIDS [...] build considerable good will in Africa’ 
toward the US’122. Nye points out that apart from being ‘a wise investment in US soft 
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power’123, the US, when it promotes public goods like fighting HIV/AIDS, gains 
greatly ‘from the goods themselves, and from the way that being a major provider 
legitimizes and increases its soft power’124. Another reason for the success of 
PEPFAR may lay on its new management structure: the Office of the Global AIDS 
Coordinator (S/GAC) who reports to Secretary of State and the President and has 
authority over all official US funding and programmes that address global 
HIV/AIDS. This assures coherence, since it ‘has forged exceptionally successful 
interagency coordination and cooperation by creating a ‘one-US government’ 
approach to decision-making and program implementation at the policy, technical, 
and managerial levels’125. Coherence is a buzzword, which, as Nye and the CSIS 
Report on Smart Power have pointed out, is also a major source to soft/smart power. 
The close work of the US with local and international actors provided another source 
for increasing US soft power and legitimacy. Thus in FY2008, PEPFAR partnered 
with 2667 organisations, 86 percent of which were local, up from 1588 in FY2004126.  
Such international cooperation has, though, expanded to other programmes, 
accounting so for other sources of US soft power. An example is provided by the 
President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), created in 2006, which is another public health 
policy of the Bush administration, also a quinquennial programme dotted with $1.2 
billion, aiming at fighting the falciparum malaria – a disease that kills yearly some 
880 thousand people, most of them in Africa. The DoD had previously carried out 
programmes addressing malaria, with the aim of protecting US troops. PMI though 
                                                            
123 Nye, Jr, J S 2003, ‘The Velvet Hegemon’ in Foreign Policy, Issue No. 146, p.75. 
124 Nye, Jr, J S 2004, ‘Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in World Politics’, p.61. 
125 US Office of Inspector General, 2008 ‘Report of Inspection: Review of the Office of the US 
Global AIDS Coordinator – Report Number: ISP-I-08-23’, US Department of Sate and 
Broadcasting Board of Governors, Washington DC, p.1, available at: http://oig.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/111953.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009. For a critical view at an 
earlier stage see: US Government Accountability Office, 2004 ‘Report to the Chairman, Sub-
Committee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs, Committee on 
Appropriations, House of Representatives: Global Health – US AIDS Coordinator addressing 
Some Key Challenges to Expanding Treatment, But Others Remain’, US GAO, Washington 
DC, available at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04784.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009.  
126 PEPFAR, 2008 ‘Latest Results’, Washington DC, available at: http://www.pepfar.gov/ 
about/c19785.htm, last accessed on 30.03.2009. This international cooperation moved 
actually beyond HIV/AIDS to encompass malaria and ‘neglected tropical diseases’ through 
PEPFAR, USAID and HHS’ CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), which have 
provided funding to the WHO’s Stop TB Department. 
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has moved beyond it and implements projects in close collaboration with 
international and in-country partners, especially the Roll Back Malaria (RBM) 
Partnership, a combined initiative of WHO, UNICEF, WB, UNDP, Gates Foundation 
and others, with a predominant focus on Africa127. 
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 
AGOA, is a North-South preferential scheme, which began during the Clinton years, 
as a bipartisan congressional initiative, and was taken over and strengthened by the 
Bush administration. Its aim is to promote better opportunities for African producers 
through diversification and competitiveness, by exchanging policy reform for 
preferential access –duty-free, quota-free (DFQF)– of SSA exports to the US. It 
comprehends mainly oil and related energy products, but also textiles and apparel 
merchandise, and it is envisioned to last till 2015. Today, there are 40 AGOA-
eligible African countries, 27 receive AGOA apparel benefits, 98 percent of AGOA-
related exports enter the US duty free128. ‘The AGOA Forum’ which takes place 
under the form of annual meetings between the US and the AGOA partners has been 
seen as ‘institutionali[sing] a high-level dialogue […] to foster closer economic ties 
between the United States and the region’129. Indeed, AGOA has led to a rapid 
expansion of trade in certain African countries such as Kenya, Lesotho and 
Swaziland, as well as almost all SSA exports to the US were under the AGOA 
preferential trade. Accordingly, apparel exports reached a volume worth $1.3 billion 
in 2007, as compared to $359.4 million in 2001. Although, it has to be said that, 
African exports saw a drop of $300 million as a result of the expiration of restrictions 
on Chinese exports to the US in 2005. Another distortion is provided by the fact that 
the very largest increases are in terms of oil and related energy products. For instance 
of the $67 billion in African exports in 2006, only a volume $3.4 billion is filled by 
                                                            
127 More at: PMI at http://www. fightingmalaria.gov/; and RBM at http://www.rollbackmalaria 
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128 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2008 ‘Comprehensive Report on US Trade 
and Investment Policy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa and Implementation of the African 
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AGOA-related nonpetroleum products. As hinted on the previous section, AGOA 
does not provide additional resources and financial incentives or not enough for 
energy producing countries. For instance, exports of agriculture products in 2007 
declined130, in a time when agriculture is widely seen as ‘a major conduit for African 
economic growth and development […] AGOA benefits to that sector have been 
miniscule [… and] it has not lived up to [its] promise’131. Thus, critics sustain that 
the US gives ‘lip service to free trade while maintaining tariff barriers and paying 
subsidies to their farmers’132. By some analysts, the potential that AGOA has, is seen 
as a gain for US soft power, since, as Mead finds, economic ties create ‘sticky 
power’, through which the US ‘attract[s] other countries to the US system and then 
trap[s] them in it’133. AGOA, by eventually contributing to increases in private 
business investments, provides on the one hand, the US with another source of soft 
power since ‘vast deposits of soft power reside in the private sector’134, and on the 
other hand, by aiming at the ‘global development [… it] reinforces basic American 
values, contributes to peace, justice, and prosperity, and improves the way [the US] 
are viewed around the world’135.  
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 
Established in January 2004, MCC is based on the principle that ‘aid is most 
effective when it reinforces good governance, economic freedom and investments in 
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131 Committee of Foreign Affairs, 2007 ‘Rep. Payne Weights AGOA in Myth Versus AGOA in 
Reality’, US House of Representatives, Washington DC, available at: http://foreignaffairs. 
house.gov/press_display.asp?sub_id=19, last accessed on 30.03.2009. For more extended 
information on the costs of protectionist attitudes about agriculture products see also: Moss, 
T, Bannon, A 2004 ‘Africa and the Battle Over Agricultural Protectionism’, in World Policy 
Journal, Volume 21, Issue No. 2, available at: http://www.cgdev.org/doc/commentary/ 
Moss.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
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people’136. It aimed at pledging large amounts of aid, reaching a volume of $5 billion 
by FY2006 –figure never reached–137 through compacts with poor countries that 
have a proven track-record in progressing their governance standards138. On the 
MCC official website is sustained that indicators such as the protection of civil 
liberties, primary education expenditure, government effectiveness, as well as 
business start-up times come from organizations such as the World Bank, Freedom 
House, and UNESCO. African countries have to date received some $5 billion worth 
in compacts139, which result in putting the responsibility on the ‘recipient 
governments [… to build up] proposals in line with their own development 
priorities’140. This letting the African governments taking the initiative on developing 
their own compacts, increases the legitimacy of MCC in particular and that of the US 
in general. Pushing too hard though, may prove the wrong approach141. Nevertheless, 
MCC is seen as a positive contributor to US soft power. Nye sustains that: 
                                                            
136 For instance see: Nowels, L 2003 ‘Congressional Research Service Report: Millennium 
Challenge Account – Congressional Consideration of a New Foreign Aid Initiative’, CRS, 
Washington DC, available at: http://lugar.senate.gov/services/pdf_crs/foreign/Millennium_ 
Challenge_Account.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009; Tarnoff, C 2009 ‘Congressional 
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available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ row/RL32427.pdf, last accessed on 12.12.2009;. 
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‘The Millennium Challenge Account: Moving Toward Smarter Aid’, The Brookings 
Institution, Washington DC, p.4; Clark, E, S 2005 ‘The Millennium Challenge Account: Spur 
to Democracy?’ in Foreign Service Journal, April 2005, available at: http://www12.george 
town.edu/sfs/isd/asso ciates_clark_mca.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009; Brown, K, Siddiqi, 
B, Sessions, M 2006 ‘US Development Aid and the Millennium Challenge Account: Emerging 
Trends in Appropriations’, CGDEV, Washington DC, available at: http://www.cgdev.org/ 
doc/ MCA/USDev_Aid_MCA.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009.   
139 MCC 2010 ‘MCC and Africa: A Growing Partnership for Success’ MCC, Washington, DC, 
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last accessed on 30.03.2010. 
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‘The Bush administration deserves credit for its efforts to align the 
United States with the long-term aspirations of poor people in 
Africa […] through its Millennium Challenge Initiative […]. 
Success in implementing these programs will represent a 
significant investment in American soft power’142. 
To the first stage euphoria, after the perceived expectations that US ODA would 
increase, also through the MCC, showcasing so the importance that Africa’s 
development has to the US, and the consequent deliberations that ‘[…] when the 
United States is seen as supporting [democracy and human rights], US soft power 
grows’143, came the rather sober awakening as a result of the failure to live up to 
promises. Accordingly, to the requests of the Bush administration for a combined 
$15 billion dedicated to MCC for the FY2004-FY2009, the Congress allowed little 
more than the half (55 percent) of that figure, namely $8.3 billion144.  
In concluding about the Bush administration’s aid and trade policies in Africa, it can 
be said that, the record of promoting soft power, is mixed. It created innovative and 
independent programmes and institutions such as PEPFAR and S/GAC, who have 
accounted for great US soft power sources in Africa, but at the same time it created 
the need for greater coherence between aid and trade, with a greater focus on long-
term development and more attention for relatively neglected areas such as 
agriculture145. As a matter of fact, Nye sustains that: 
‘International development is also an important global public good. 
Nonetheless, American foreign aid was .1 percent of GDP, […], 
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and protectionist trade measures, particularly in agriculture and 
textiles, hurt poor countries more than the value of the aid 
provided. […] Despite the Bush administration’s efforts, the United 
States has a distance to go to gain soft-power resources in the 
development area’146. 
 
 
US POLICIES IN ADVANCING DEMOCRATISATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 
Democracy is ‘a core American value [...] Democracy promotion 
also enable[s] the United States to present its best face to the world 
as an example of American ‘soft power’’147. 
As the Bush administration entered in office, Africa was seen as the least 
democratised region in the world except the Middle East, despite the ‘Third Wave’ 
having hit Africa at the beginning of the 1990s: two-thirds of SSA’s 48 countries 
were either facing a stalled transition from authoritarian to democratic rule or the 
transition itself had remained incomplete148. The US, through the USAID, 
increasingly promoted democracy in SSA, by building capacities in the fields of 
good governance, rule of law, electoral and political processes and civil society. In 
this sense, USAID spent some $274.4 million in 2008, as compared to $89,2 million 
in 2001149. In 2007, of the 24 countries where USAID had democratisations program, 
some 60 percent of the total figure was invested on only five countries – Sudan: 
$55.6 million; Liberia: $22.2 million; Sierra Leone: $15.3 million; DRC: $14.6 
million; Somalia: $9.0 million – living so the remaining 19 countries with an average 
of $3.9 million150. The Bush administration’s democracy promotion did book a few 
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successes in Africa, and not just the innovative initiative of MCC discussed on the 
section above, but also i.e. the public diplomacy engagement of the then Secretary of 
State Colin Powell in urging serving African presidents to respect constitutional 
provisions that limited their time in office to two elected terms. During the Bush 
administration’s second term though, these efforts declined sharply. So when the 
presidents of Nigeria, Mr. Obasanjo and that of Uganda, Mr. Museveni, declared that 
they would extend their terms and amend their respective constitutions accordingly, 
the US instructed its ambassadors to ease up with their initial stance. Here again the 
US appeared to hold a double standard: yes to democratic principles, but when the 
US interests are in play then an eye can be closed, or both151. These, though, stand in 
stark contrast with the US democracy promotion in DRC and Liberia both in 2006, or 
during the last Kenyan elections, when President Bush dispatched the Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice to Nairobi to move the negations forward. 
Bush administration’s democracy promotion is best understood within the context of 
the administration’s overall foreign policy. The neoconservative thought, as analysed 
on the above section of power conceptions, took the upper hand within the Bush 
administration, especially during the first term. They had proposed a foreign policy 
agenda which claimed as necessary regime change, preemtive action, benevolent 
hegemony, unipolarity and American exceptionalism. Because ‘[d]emocracy is [seen 
as] desirable because democracies do not breed those who engage in terrorist acts 
against the United States’152 the instrument of democracy promotion was used to 
advance short term goals, such as the Global War On Terror (GWOT). In general, the 
stance endorsed by the Bush administration resulted in an ‘increasing [global] 
disapproval of the cornerstones of US foreign policy’153. The Bush administration’s 
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preference for regime change to direct negotiations with loathed countries and 
leaders, took for many in the world a very different meaning. The leaders of 
democratic movements across Africa met the administration’s approach to 
democracy promotion with caution and at times with distrust154. The war in Iraq, the 
images and US practices in handling prisoners especially those in Guantanamo and 
Abu Graib, the US pressures to African states to either not ratify the International 
Criminal Court or to pass laws that exempted US forces from prosecution, as well as 
the refusal of the Kyoto Protocol, further strengthened this suspicion. Such practices 
and double standards have accounted for a heavily undermined US claim to the 
moral high ground155. Consequently, in these terms, the image of US and its soft 
power withered.  
 
US RECORD ON ENVIRONMENTAL, FOOD SECURITY AND DEMOGRAPHICAL POLICIES IN 
AFRICA 
Environmental conservation projects enjoyed significant support by the Bush 
administration. Thus, the Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CFBP), launched in 2002 
was supported with approximately $15 million yearly156. Another positive note 
comes from the support that the US administration gave to the multilateral sanctions 
on Liberia’s timber exports, which contributed to give a halt to unsustainable logging 
and the funding it provided to Charles Taylor’s regime157. These efforts stand in stark 
contrast with the initial reluctance of the Bush administration to acknowledge the 
phenomenon of global climate change. As mentioned above, the refusal of the Kyoto 
Protocol, from a country like the US, who is responsible for the most greenhouse gas 
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emission in the world, and ‘the way Bush’s policy toward it was handled resulted in 
foreign reactions that undermined American soft power’158. The other point which 
accounted for further loss of soft power was the fact that the US failed to provide 
‘superior alternatives’ in the light of these rejections159. This stance was mirrored 
through the environmental policies pursued by the US administration. For instance, 
their funding has been at best modest, and with time it declined. USAID’s Global 
Climate Change Program which aims at tackling issues of natural resource 
management, clean energy and climate change adaptation in Malawi, South Africa, 
Madagascar, Uganda, Mali, Senegal and Guinea as well as regional programmes in 
Central and West Africa, was covered by a volume of only $27.4 million during the 
FY2007160.  
Concerning the US policies, which aim at addressing the demographics in Africa, the 
track record is also at best mixed. Funding in FY2007 for family planning projects 
declined steeply, for instance a staggering 18 percent from $436 million during the 
FY2006 to $357 million161, in a time when experts argued for a constant increase 
aiming at reaching $1.2 billion by FY2010 and when currently there are over 44 
million women with unmet needs in SSA162. In line with the best neoconservative 
thinking regarding scepticism towards multilateral and/or international organisations, 
the US administration withheld funding from the UN’s specialised agency for 
population matters –UNFPA. The administration felt that girls and the young in 
general were being engaged through the other initiatives, such as PEPFAR, which 
actually, as analysed above, focus rather narrowly on HIV/AIDS but not on family 
planning.  
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Food security is also another new African challenge, where the US involvement has 
been lagging behind. Funding declined by 3 percent over the course of the 
administration’s first term, and the US Government Accountability office (US GAO) 
sustained that the situation did not improve during the second term163. Thus, the 
President’s Initiative to End Hunger in Africa, launched in 2002, seemed to have 
been more of a new name to the ongoing efforts, and ‘merely an organising scheme 
for existing efforts involving about $200 million a year’164. The MCC, as discussed 
above, was more successful, with one of its six focuses concerning agricultural 
development. Thus in 2007, some 39 percent of the $605 million pledged was 
earmarked for agriculture projects165. 
 
US’ STANCE ON CHINA INTO AFRICA 
‘America has reason to welcome the rise of a confident, peaceful, 
and prosperous China. We want China as a global partner, able and 
willing to match its growing capabilities to its international 
responsibilities’166. 
The US began to develop a framework within which to engage China as late as mid 
2005, despite the fact that China has been active with its Africa strategy through the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) since early 2000s167. The first signal 
of such strategic dialogue was given by the then Deputy Secretary of State Robert 
Zoellick who, at a hearing of the National Committee on US-China Relations in 
September 2005, stated that: 
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‘China has a responsibility to strengthen the international system 
that has enabled its success [and therefore called on China] to 
become a responsible stakeholder [in the international system]’ 168. 
At a Congressional hearing, the then Deputy Assistance Secretary of State for 
African Affairs, Michael Ranneberger, pointed out that China’s increasing  presence 
in Africa should be seen as a potential for cooperation ‘as part of a broader, 
constructive bilateral relationship’169. Issues of concern, that US need to tackle, he 
followed, was ensuring that such engagement promotes free and open market; that 
respective political and economic policies promote stability, democracy, good 
governance, economic prosperity and human rights; foster conflict resolution; as well 
as to identify areas where interests converge, but also ensure that the US remains the 
key partner to African countries and institutions170.  
Chinese and US officials, alike, especially those in respective foreign affairs 
ministries, have been diplomatic, arguably as one might expect from diplomats, in 
trying not to present China’s engagement as being ‘in direct competition to the 
United States’171, though perception within the broader public continued to see 
potential for friction as well as threat to the US interests in Africa172. Such 
perceptions were furthered especially by the statement of the US Treasury 
Department. For instance, during the 2006 China visit, the then Treasury Secretary 
urged China to be a ‘responsible stakeholder’, referring so to the US concerns about 
China’s lending practices in Africa. During all the Bush administration’s period such 
perceptions persisted. In his last Africa visit in February 2008, President Bush stated 
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that he did not ‘view Africa as zero sum for China and the United States’ in 
answering whether China’s huge aid and commerce agenda was ‘ignoring human 
rights issues and corruption’173. For all the good-willing words, deliverance of results 
in practice has lagged behind. One of the reasons for it was that the administration 
was slow in recognising the enormous impact China has been having on the African 
continent since the early 2000s. Once recognising it, though, the DoS officials 
continued to insist treating China as any other country with interests in Africa.  
‘[The US] administration was late in recognising the exceptional 
scope and impact of [China’s engagement in Africa]. It was then 
tardy in realising that this engagement warranted a US policy 
approach different from that toward other significant external 
actors in Africa’174. 
A further reason for lagging behind was the lack of tangible results from the few 
projects in cooperation with China175.  
While it might be true that China does not pose a strategic threat to the US in Africa, 
it, though, poses serious challenges for political and commercial influence176. Thus, 
in analysing such in terms of soft/smart power, the US soft power potential in 
engaging in multilateral dialogue is given, but nevertheless it needs to accompany 
words with deeds. 
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Administration’, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington DC, pp.142-61. 
176 Lyman, P 2009 ‘China and the US in Africa: A Strategic Competition or an Opportunity for 
Cooperation?’, in  Freeman, S (ed.) 2009 ‘China, Africa and the African Diaspora: 
Perspectives’, available at: http://www.cfr.org/content/thinktank /ChinaandUS_Africa.pdf, 
last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S/US 21ST 
CENTURY AGENDA IN AFRICA  
During the Bush Administration’s term, the US agenda into Africa received a 
remarkable makeover, where security, energy and health took the lion’s part of it. 
PEPFAR and MCC are nowadays seen as the best legacy of the Bush years and an 
example of US soft power in Africa. For all the good wording, though, the US 
agenda had its limitations:  
‘[Despite attracting] consistently strong bipartisan support, it was 
also criticised for imbalanced, un-sustained, underpowered, and 
inconsistent approaches’177. 
Although, US assistance to Africa almost trebled, paradoxically, its influence 
wavered on the continent. Such, not just because of the above-mentioned ‘significant 
weaknesses’ of US policies, but also due to the rising of Africa as a more confident 
actor politically and economically. As a result of the high commodity prices and 
revenue flows, Africa is nowadays in a better position to choose among the many 
partners who court it actively, such as the EU, China, India, Brazil, etc. The 
undermined US diplomatic skills and leadership did further exacerbate the situation. 
The US security and energy engagement in Africa, sought to satisfy only the 
American interests, and engagement with China has been inexistent. Counter-
terrorism programmes were narrowly defined, HIV/AIDS commitment gave the 
impression of crowding out other public health problems and commitment to basic 
development needs and democracy promotion remained quite unchanged at previous 
levels. The same can be said about the US engagement with Sudan, which left little 
space for engagement with other problem countries, such as Somalia or DRC. US 
trade and investment in Africa have lagged behind, if compared to the engagement of 
other actors in the continent, such as EU and China.    
                                                            
177 Cooke, J G, Morrison, J S 2009 ‘A Smarter US Approach To Africa’, in Cooke, J G, 
Morrison, J S (eds.) 2009 ‘US Africa Policy Beyond the Bush Years: Critical Challenges for 
the Obama Administration’, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington DC, 
p.1. 
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In a 2007 article in Foreign Affairs, a former Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, notes that the mistake of the Bush administration lies at ‘a profound 
misunderstanding of the relationship between strategy, power, and diplomacy’. The 
Bush administration failed to make use of, what he calls ‘smart statecraft’, a pulling 
together of ‘wits, wallet, and muscle to create realistic policies’. The smartness of it 
all relies in setting ‘them in motion through agile diplomacy’178 and clearly, the Bush 
administration failed to bring that about in Africa. 
                                                            
178 Crocker, C, A 2007 ‘The Art of Peace: Bringing Diplomacy Back to Washington’, in Foreign 
Affairs, Volume 86, Issue No. 4. Statecraft is dealt in greater detail at: Ross, D 2007 
‘Statecraft: And How to Restore America’s Standing in the World’, Farar, Straus and Giraux, 
NY. In defining smart statecraft he sustains that ‘[s]mart statecraft does not dispense with 
hard power; it uses hard power intelligently, recognizing both its potential and its limits and 
integrating it into an overarching strategy. [...] Diplomacy, contrary to the current 
misconception, is not about making nice, exchanging happy talk, and offering concessions. It 
is the engine that converts raw energy and tangible power into meaningful political results. In 
other words, diplomacy is all about the intelligent use of power. Diplomacy is not an 
alternative to coercion and other forms of power; its effectiveness depends on their skilful 
use’. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE EUROPEAN UNION IN AFRICA 
 
AT THE SEARCH OF AN EU-AFRICA STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK  
‘Europe has a strong interest in a peaceful, prosperous and 
democratic Africa. Our strategy is intended to help Africa achieve 
this’1. 
Up to 2000 the EU policies towards Africa were fragmented and did not reach the 
continent as a whole. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), the most 
prominent in a series of EU’s trade and development concerned frameworks, does 
not cover all African countries and it is a selective and in as such in opposition with 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules requiring the elimination of preferential 
practices2 as set up within it for the African, Caribbean and the Pacific states (ACP)3. 
The other framework that the EU had, the Barcelona Process, was also selective in as 
such it concerned, in regard to Africa, only the North African countries4.  
                                                            
1 Council of the European Union, 2005 ‘The EU And Africa: Towards A Strategic Partnership’, 
p.1, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/876 
73.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009 
2 Huber, J 2000 ‘The Past, Present and Future of EU-ACP Trade Regime and the WTO’, in 
European Journal of International Law, Volume 11, Number 2, pp. 427-438, OUP, Oxford. 
Considering the preferential relations, the WTO Doha Round Table in November 2001, did 
grant the EU and ACP countries a waiver expiring 31 December 2007. After that, these 
relations have to conform to WTO rules (i.e. Article XXXVIII of GATT). For more see: 
WTO, 2001 ‘European Communities – The EC – ACP Partnership Agreement’ Decision of 14 
November 2001, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Doha. Available at: http://cpqrack2. 
sice.oas.org/trade/ WTODoha/ACP_EC_e.asp, last accessed 01.03.2010. 
3 More information can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/cotonou 
intro_en.cfm, last accessed on 01.03.2010. 
4 For more see: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm, last accessed on 
01.03.2010. 
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It was not until 3-4 April 2000 that the EU moved forward towards a tentative 
comprehensive framework with Africa, just a couple of months before the world 
leaders adopted the United Nations Millennium Declaration committing for the 
MDGs. At the dawn of the new millennium, the EU first considered in her policies 
Africa as a whole5. This happened under the form of a summit between the heads of 
State and Government of African and EU countries as well as the president of the 
European Commission. The summit was also attended by the Secretary General of 
the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), the Secretary General of the European 
Council / HR CFSP as well as a representative of the UN Secretary General.  
Since then EU’s Africa policy has changed fundamentally. It does not only cover the 
development agenda, as it has been the case since its earliest moves, but it 
increasingly covers human rights, good governance issues, and the promotion of 
democracy. An exemple par excellence is provided through the Cotonou Agreement 
that considered these issues as ‘essential elements’ upon which the partnership shall 
evolve. Another characterising factor moves within the realm of security issues: 
peace and security became peremptory, as conflicts became endemic within the 
continent and cost the lives of hundreds of thousands. This pointed at the necessity 
and opened the road for a greater African ownership in terms of capacity, be they 
institutional, structural, military or civilian nature. In short EU’s policy has become 
more and more political, assuring so that Africa climbs up to and enters the level of 
high politics. 
The historicity of the Cairo summit lays not just in being the first ever in its form, but 
mainly because of the erection of a platform for a structural political dialogue 
between the actors concerned in the form of regular meetings between senior 
officials (bi-regional groups) and ministers. The aim of the dialogue was to build a 
strategic partnership with the whole continent based on shared objectives and 
common values6. 
                                                            
5 Overhaus, M 2008 ‘Editorial‘ in Overhaus, M, Maull, H, W, Harnisch, S (eds.) ‘Perspectives 
and Strategies of the European Union’s Africa Policy After the Lisbon Treaty’, Foreign 
Policy in Dialogue, Volume 8, Issue 24, University of Trier, Trier, p.4 
6 Summaries of EU Legislation, ‘Taking EU-Africa Dialogue Forward’, available at: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/african_caribbean_pacific_states/r12109
_en.htm, last accessed on 01.03.2010. 
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The Cairo Declaration, as the summit’s outcome document, highlights six main 
general areas of concern, which include economic issues such as regional economic 
cooperation and integration in Africa, the African integration into the world 
economy, a deeper link between trade and development issues, human rights, 
democratic principles, rule of law and good governance issues, peace building and 
conflict prevention matters as well as management and resolution, and development 
measures aimed at combating poverty such as health, education, environment, food 
security, drug consumption and trafficking as well as culture matters about stolen or 
inappropriately exported cultural goods from Africa to European countries7. 
The plan of action adopted at the summit8, highlighted the six main areas described 
above. Finding them as too broad, eight more specific areas of cooperation were 
picked: conflict prevention and resolution (including the problem of anti-personnel 
landmines); regional cooperation and integration, integrating Africa into the world 
economy and trade; the environment, including the fight against drought and 
desertification; HIV/AIDS and communicable diseases; food security; human rights 
and democracy; the return of cultural items that have been stolen or exported 
illegally; and Africa's external debt. The last issue was linked with the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries / HIPC, an international debt relief mechanism which has an 
effect on mainly African countries9. This continental dialogue exposed as well some 
differences, among the prominent ones most notably the preference of identified 
priorities that the one part had as compared to the other: EU did put peace and 
security as the main concern while the African side was more interested about trade, 
economic and debt matters.  
Despite the first steps undertaken through the Cairo Process towards a 
comprehensive EU Africa policy, there was still a wealth of sectoral and fragmented 
                                                            
7 For more information see: SN 106/4/00 REV 4, Africa-Europe Summit under the Aegis of the 
OAU and the EU, Cairo, 3-4 April 2000 ‘Cairo Declaration’, available at: http://www.iss.co. 
za/Af/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/au/afreurdecl00. pdf, last accessed 17.11.2009 
8 For more see: Africa-Europe Summit under the Aegis of the OAU and the EU, Cairo, 3-4 April 
2000 ‘Cairo Plan of Action’, available at:  http://www.issafrica.org/AF/RegOrg/unity_ 
to_union/pdfs/au/afreurplan00.pdf,  last accessed 17.11.2009 
9 Summaries of EU Legislation, ‘EU-Africa Partnership’, available at: http://europa. 
eu/legislation_summaries/development/african_caribbean_pacific_states/r12106_en.htm, last 
accessed on 01.03.2010. 
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policies. Apart from the ACP Agreement, the Barcelona Process and the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership which have been mentioned above there was the Trade 
Development and Cooperation Agreement with South Africa (2004) which later in 
2006 evolved into Strategic Partnership with South Africa10 as well as the 2006 EC 
proposal of a partnership with the Horn of Africa. The challenges to coordination for 
a more efficient and effective action, asserted the need for a new and comprehensive 
single approach, which evolved under the form of the ‘EU Strategy for Africa’ 
(ESA). It expressed the guidelines, objectives and principles for a new partnership 
with Africa11. This constituted the first  
‘political strategy document since the development cooperation 
between Europe and Africa [which] had been launched with the 
Treaties of Rome nearly 50 years earlier’12.  
The strategy rested upon the principles of equality, partnership and ownership, 
solidarity, and upon a culture of the political dialogue. The main objectives of this 
EU Strategy were the provision of a single framework for all EU actors and the 
development of Africa, namely the attainment of the MDGs as one of the EU’s main 
political priorities. Peace and security, good governance principles, regional 
integration and trade together with sustainable economic development as well as 
distinctive issues that have a direct impact on the MDGs (such as health, education, 
environment, social cohesion etc.) were seen as prerequisites to a sustainable 
accomplishment of MDGs.  
For all the good wording, the new strategy was faced with challenges and criticism. 
By starting with the critiques, one main issue, which actually was also the greatest 
problem, was that the African partners saw themselves excluded from it, since they 
                                                            
10 Summaries of EU Legislation, 2006, Strategic Partnership with South Africa, available at: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/south_africa/r12551_en.htm, last acces-
sed on 01.03.2010. 
11 For more see: Council of the European Union, 2005, ‘The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic 
Partnership’, available at:  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData 
/en/er/87673.pdf, last accessed on 17.11.2009 
12 Schmidt, S 2008 ‘Towards a new EU-African Relationship – A Grand Strategy for Africa?‘ in 
Overhaus, M, Maull, H, W, Harnisch, S (eds.) ‘Perspectives and Strategies of the European 
Union’s Africa Policy After the Lisbon Treaty’, Foreign Policy in Dialogue, Volume 8, Issue 
24, University of Trier, Trier, p.11 
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perceived it as a strategy FOR rather than a strategy WITH Africa. On the other 
hand, the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) criticized that the strategy not only did 
not provide for a clear role for CSOs, but also found that in fostering good 
governance, instead of using the ‘political conditionality’ as it has been usual with all 
other policies concerning third countries, the EU seemed to have traded it for 
incentives, i.e. it overtly relied on the African Peace and Review Mechanisms 
(APRM). The problem is seen in the fact that ‘very few African countries have the 
moral authority to indulge a meaningful peer review process’ and consequently the 
principle of ‘despots watching themselves’ would not work in practice13.  
Another point of contention was seen on the strategy’s absence of an ‘added value’ 
as compared to i.e. the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA). The strategy is seen 
as rather a summary of already existing policies and measures, lacking ‘any clear 
sequencing or priorities in the wide spectrum of anticipated measures’14 and also by 
some as a ‘clever move’ on the part of the Directorate General for Development, so 
as to ensure control over new mechanisms such as the ‘heavy weight’ Peace 
Facility15. Apart from these external critiques, the Strategy faced challenges which 
were raised up from within the EU itself. Although the strategy is seen as an attempt 
to attain greater coherence in the policy of the whole EU towards Africa, by so 
‘reducing conflicts about goals at the level of policy formulation as well as aiming at 
diminishing coordination conflicts within the EU’16, it nevertheless cannot eliminate 
the EU’s ‘institutional weaknesses’. The organisation of the EU institution does not 
                                                            
13 Tegulle, G 2008 ‘The EU must find Alternative Paradigms in its Relationship with Africa’, in 
Overhaus, M, Maull, H, W, Harnisch, S (eds.) ‘Perspectives and Strategies of the European 
Union’s Africa Policy After the Lisbon Treaty’, Foreign Policy in Dialogue, Volume 8, Issue 
24, University of Trier, Trier, pp.42-50. 
14 Schmidt, S 2008 ‘Towards a new EU-African Relationship – A Grand Strategy for Africa?‘ in 
Overhaus, M, Maull, H, W, Harnisch, S (eds.) ‘Perspectives and Strategies of the European 
Union’s Africa Policy After the Lisbon Treaty’, Foreign Policy in Dialogue, Volume 8, Issue 
24, University of Trier, Trier, p.12. 
15 For more on APF see: European Commission, External Cooperation Programmes, ‘African 
Peace Facility‘, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/ 
peace /index_en.htm, as well as at the Official Website of the Africa-Europe Partnership: 
http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/partnerships/ items/peace_security_en.htm, both last 
accessed on 01.03.2010. 
16 Grimm, S, Kielwein, N, 2005 ‘Die Afrika-Strategie der Europäischen Union – Kohärenz 
gegenüber einem vielschichtigen Kontinent im Wandel?‘, in Analysen und Stellungnahmen 
8/2005, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, Bonn, p.1. 
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mirror with this policy framework, in as much there is a fragmentation of authority 
within Commission’s Directorates General and between Commission itself and the 
Council as well as between the Commission’s development policy and those of the 
EU member states. For instance there is a division of responsibilities for external 
relations within the Commission, not only in terms of policy areas but also 
geographically seen: North Africa falls under the responsibility of DG RELEX 
whereas EU development policy towards sub-Saharan African countries was 
accountable to DG DEV Commissioner Louis Michel. These two DGs conflicted as 
well with the responsibilities of the High Representative of the CFSP, who has the 
overall responsibility for the EU’s CFSP.  Another controversial issue is provided 
through the financing instruments. ESA did not have an own financial instrument 
thus it had to rely on the existing ones, such as the European Development Fund 
(EDF), European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), etc. Since there are 
many in number they create an additional matter which requires coordination.  
In sum, the European Union’s Africa strategy of 2005 was an important step on the 
way, but it did not pursue a holistic approach and ‘offered little guidance for the day-
to-day relations’. In any way, for being rather a political statement than a strategy, it 
initiated important EU activities in Africa.    
The Lisbon Summit, the second between the Europe and Africa, marked a real 
turning point in the EU-Africa relationship. Its agenda, as presented within the 
Action Plan of the Joint Africa European Strategic (JAES) Partnership, has been 
characterized by far-flung objectives as well as an all-embracing list of measures for 
future activities. JAES has to be understood as the product of a process, which had its 
highs and lows. The controversy about the attending of President Mugabe constituted 
one of the lows. One of the first highs was signalled at the 5th Ministerial Meeting 
EU-Africa in Bamako (December 2005)17 where an initial agreement over a joint EU 
Africa Strategy was accorded. Concluding arrangements were made at the 8th 
Ministerial-Troika EU-Africa, from where the final document was then agreed at the 
                                                            
17 Council of the European Union, 2005, EU Africa Ministerial Meeting, Bamako (Mali), 
Communiqué, 2 December 2005, pp. 2-3. Available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/ 
en/05/st15/st15389.en05.pdf, last accessed on 17.11.2009 
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second Lisbon summit in December 200718. The Joint Strategy, testimonies its 
civilian/normative ‘distinct nature’ by being based on common values and principles 
such as the unity of Africa, interdependence between Africa and the EU, ownership, 
joint responsibility, equal partnership, respect for human rights, democratic 
principles and the rule of law, as well as the right to development. The JAES as a 
long-term framework for the EU-Africa relationships shall find its implementation 
through successive short-term Action Plans accompanied by a political dialogue at 
all levels. Both parties agree to enhance the coherence and the efficiency of 
previously agreed accords, policies and instruments19. The novel strategy has brought 
new political approaches as well, which consist in handling all political questions of 
mutual interests, not just the development matters or the so called ‘African’ issues. It 
has to be understood as a people-centred strategy which aims at supporting civil 
society in both the continents but also supporting Africa in finding its own regional 
and continental solutions. This mode d’emploi would guarantee so for measurable 
results in all eight defined partnerships20. 
The objectives of the strategy are to offer ‘a political vision and a roadmap for the 
future cooperation between the two continents in existing and new areas and 
arenas’21. It aims at a continent-to-continent partnership with the AU and the EU at 
the centre of it, giving so prominence to the institutional cooperation in mastering 
joint challenges such as peace and security, migration, sustainable development, 
regional and continental integration, as well environmental issues and the attainment 
of MDGs in all Africa by 2015. Another main pillar of the partnership is the support 
for an effective multilateral system, and therefore the need for a reformed UN. 
Overall the strategy seeks a broad-based, wide-ranging and people-centred 
                                                            
18 Council of the European Union, 2007. 8th EU-Africa Ministerial Troika Meeting. Final 
Communiqué, Brussels 15 May 2007, pp. 2-3. Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/94126.pdf, last accessed on 17.11.2009 
19 The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, A Joint Africa EU Strategy. Available at http:/ /africa-eu-
partnership.org/pdf/esa2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf, last accessed on 17.11.2009 
20 The eight partnerships are as follows: Peace and Security; Democratic Governance and Human 
Rights; Trade, regional Integration and Infrastructure; MDGs; Energy; Climate Change; 
Migration, Mobility and Employment; and Science, Information Society and Space. For a 
detailed information see: http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/, last accessed on 11.10.2009. 
21 Ibid. 
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partnership, in short a holistic approach22. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy is financed 
through multiple sources. Concerned instruments are such as the European 
Development Fund (EDF), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the 
European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), and the Instrument for Stability 
(IfS) as well as the various thematic Programmes. An instrument which is alone 
responsible for the financing of JAESP is still missing consequently, the problems in 
ensuring a coherent and efficient financing still persist. 
Speaking in terms of civilian/normative concepts, the participation of the main 
multilateral international organisations concerned in Africa through their respective 
high representatives in the form of a forum, as well as its proceeding under given 
specific values, principles and norms, witness the ‘distinctive nature’ of EU activities 
be it in civilian terms –‘cooperation with others in the pursuit of international 
objectives, and a willingness to develop supranational structures’23– as well as EU’s 
‘distinct nature’ in normative terms –‘her unique institutional set-up and multi-level 
governance system which make the EU ‘particularly well equipped to grasp and 
utilise the potential of multilateral network organisations’24. 
--- 
Prior to analysing the EU engagement in Africa since the early 2000s, it is 
envisioned, as already attested within the US counterpart chapter of this paper, to put 
a greater focus on the different patterns and nuances that power takes, as expressed 
by its different appellatives, and as it is attested to and/or executed by the European 
Union in order to bring about her foreign policy in the world25. The focus will, 
                                                            
22 Ibid. 
23 Maull, H, 1990 ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’, in Foreign Affairs, Volume 
69, Issue No. 5, pp.92-3.  
24 Elgström, O, Strömvik, M 2004 ‘The EU as an external actor’, in Elgström, O, Jönsson, C 
(eds.) 2004 ‘European Union Negotiations: Processes, Institutions, Networks’, Routledge, 
London. 
25 The author is aware that, as pertaining to the power tools that the EU and /or US is attested to 
and /or uses in executing their respective foreign policies, –from civilian and normative, to 
hard, soft, or smart,– no clear cut can be made, the distinguishing line has, especially lately, 
become very vague, since both actors may make use of tools which may belong to the type of 
power indicated here as predominantly performed by the other actor. Therefore, the aim of 
this paper is not seen as an all comprehensive analysis of the US and EU types of power, 
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obviously, be on civilian and normative power, which in their turn will provide this 
author with valuable conceptions to be applied and thus, evaluate on these grounds, 
the concerned EU policies in Africa. 
 
OF EU’S CIVILIAN AND NORMATIVE POWER 
‘The EU is not an island, it’s a part of a global community. For 
large parts of the world, the word Europe itself has become 
associated with a philosophy of humanity, solidarity and 
integration. Therefore the EU has to play a bigger role to work for 
the ‘global common good’’.  Havier Solana EU HR CFSP, 2005 
At the beginning of the 21st century the European Council posed the question of 
‘What is Europe’s role in this changed world?’26 Since then, the Europe’s global role, 
within the academia and the decision-makers alike, has increasingly turned into a 
topic of great recurrence. Indeed, it became imperative because of September 11 and 
new international challenges, such as security, climate change and energy 
dependency, rising of new economic powers and globalisation, but also lasting 
problems of poverty and epidemics, such as HIV/AIDS, and their soaring toll in 
developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. The literature focusing on the 
EU as an international actor27 has predominantly been focused on the ‘nature of the 
                                                                                                                                                                        
rather it focuses itself at the respective foreign policies and the power discourse it has 
accompanied them since the early 2000s, when both actors decided ground breaking policies 
towards Africa. 
26 European Council, 2001 ‘Annexes to Presidency Conclusions: European Council Meeting in 
Laeken, 14-15 December 2001‘, in ‘Presidency Conclusions: European Council Meeting in 
Laeken, 14 to 15 December 2001’ p.21, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/governance/im 
pact/background/docs/laeken_concl_en.pdf, last accessed 30.03.2009. 
27 Cameron, F 2007, ‘An Introduction to European Foreign Policy’, Routledge, Oxon; 
Bretherton, C, Vogler, J (eds.) 2006, ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’, 2nd Edition, 
Routledge, Oxon; Lucarelli, S, Manners, I (eds.) 2006, ‘Values and Principles in European 
Union Foreign Policy’, Routledge, Oxon; Elgström, O, Smith, M (eds.) 2006, ‘The European 
Union’s Roles in International Politics. Concepts and Analysis’, Routledge, Oxon; Hill, C, 
Smith, M (eds.) 2005 ‘International Relations of the European Union’, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford; Smith, M E 2004, ‘Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy. The 
Institutionalization of Cooperation’, Cambridge Uiversity Press, Cambridge; Knodt, M, 
Princen, S (eds.) 2003, ‘Understanding the European Union’s External Relations’, Routledge, 
Oxon. 
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beast’. Some see the EU as a potential and/or future state, which already performs 
state-pertinent functions. Others see it as an aggregated actor, ‘something more than 
a system of regular diplomatic coordination between the member states’. Some other 
still, see it for what it actually does and what it actually is, and focus on issue areas 
by working with concepts such as ‘presence’ and ‘capabilities’28. Thus, the EU 
continues to remain an ‘unidentified international object’29, a unique, ‘sui generis’ 
actor in international politics.  
‘The fact that the Union is at the same time an actor, a process and 
a project makes it behave differently in comparison to traditional 
actors in world politics’30. 
Duchêne in the early 1970s conceptualised the Union –then EC– as a new kind of 
civilian power/actor31. Others think that, if the Union ought to become a power, then 
it has to develop a full-spectrum military capability32. The sustainers of EU as 
civilian power/actor have developed a thesis which maintains that the Union, 
inasmuch uniquely capable and/or uniquely configured, constitutes an effective 
exporter of norms and values in the international system33. The following 
conceptualisations are a product of such thinking34. 
                                                            
28 For a detailed analysis see previous chapter, section 2.2. 
29 Quotation from Jacques Delors. 
30 Lucarelli, S 2006 ‘Introduction: Values, principles, identity and the European Union foreign 
policy‘, in Lucarelli, S, Manners, I (eds.) 2006 ‘Values and Principles in European Union 
Foreign Policy’, Routledge, Oxon, p.7. 
31 Duchêne, F 1972 ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’, in Mayne, R (ed.) 1972 ‘Europe Tomorrow: 
Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead’, Fontana, London, pp.32-47 
32 Smith, K, 2005 ‘Beyond the Civilian Power Debate’, in Politique Europeene, Volume 1, Issue 
17; Stavridis, S, 2002 ‘Militarizing the EU: the Concept of Civilian Power Europe Revisited’, 
in The International Spectator, Volume 36, Issue 1; Kagan, R, 2004 ‘Paradise and Power: 
America and Europe in the New World Order’, Atlantic Books, NY. 
33 Manners, I, 2002 ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, in Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Volume 40, Issue 2; Sjursen, H, 2006 ‘EU as a Normative Power, 
How can this Be?’, in Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 13, Issue 2; Lucarelli, S, 
Manners, I (eds.) 2006 ‘Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy’, 
Routledge, Oxon 
34 Duchêne, F 1972 ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’, in Mayne, R (ed.) 1972 ‘Europe Tomorrow: 
Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead’, Fontana, London, pp.32-47; Bretherton, C, Vogler, J 2003, 
‘The European Union as a Global Actor’, Routledge, Oxon; Smith, H, 2002 ‘The European 
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Duchêne’s original idea, had a second renaissance35 in late years, and became ‘one of 
the main conceptual anchors for debate over the sources of EU influence in the 
world’36. The debate was bifurcated among those who sustained that civilian meant 
not necessary an exclusion in the use of military means37, rather a preference of 
political and economic ones, and those who argued that a civilian power ought to use 
only civilian means38. EU as a civilian power, though, is defined not just by the 
means but also by way it uses such means and the ends it internationally pursues. 
Duchêne argues that the EC ought to remain ‘true to its inner characteristics [...] 
values of equality, justice and tolerance’39.  
Hanns Maull defines as well that being a civilian power implies acceptance of the 
necessity for cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives, a 
preference for civilian means, and a willingness to develop supranational structures 
to address pressing international issues. He also stresses the necessity for the 
development of a set of values encompassing ‘solidarity with other societies, and a 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Union Foreign Policy: What It Is And What It Does?’, Pluto Press, London; Orbie, J 2008 
‘Europe’s Global Role: External Policies of the European Union’, Ashgate, Surrey; Duchêne, 
F 1973 ‘The European Community and the Uncertainties of Intedependance‘, in Konstamm, 
M, Hager, W (eds.) 1973 ‘A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems Before the 
European Community‘, Macmillan, London. 
35 For instance see: Orbie, J 2006 ‘Civilian Power Europe: A Review of the Original and Current 
Debate’, in Cooperation and Conflict, Volume 41, Issue 1, p. 123; Whitman, R 2002 ‘The 
Fall, and Rise, of Civilian Power EU?’, in National Europe Centre, Paper No. 16, Paper 
presented to Conference on The European Union in International Affairs, National Europe 
Centre, Australian National University, 3-4 July 2002. 
36 Nicloaïdis, K, Howse, R 2002 ‘This is my EUtopia: Narrative as Power’, in The Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Volume 40, Issue No. 4, p.770. 
37 Maull, H, 1990 ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’, in Foreign Affairs, Volume 
69, Issue No. 5, pp.92-3. 
38 It has to be said that there it seem to be a confusion over where to draw a line between civilian 
and military means. K.Smith, who prefers a rather rigid definition of civilian power, points 
out that i.e. peacekeeping are frequently considered to be a ‘civilian foreign policy 
instrument’, but since peacekeepers, armed or not armed, remain troops who are trained to 
eventually kill, then, the civilian attribute falls down. For more see: Smith, K 2005 ‘Still 
Civilian Power EU?’, in LSE European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper 2005-1; Smith, K 
2000 ‘The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern’, in 
International Spectator, Volume 35, Issue 2; Smith, K 2005 ‘Beyond the Civilian Power EU 
Debate’, in Politique Europeenne, Volume 1, No. 17. 
39 Duchêne, F 1973 ‘The European Community and the Uncertainties of Intedependance‘, p.19-
20. 
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sense of responsibility for the future of the world’40. Thus, a civilian power seeks 
international cooperation, domestication of international relations41 through the 
strengthening of the rule of law in international relations, solidarity, and the diffusion 
of equality, justice and tolerance. In this sense, many of EU’s objectives/ends are, it 
is argued, ‘milieu goals’, rather than ‘possession goals’42.  
‘[... Possession goals] are apt to be praised by some for being truly 
in the national interest, while condemned by others as indicating a 
reprehensible spirit of national selfishness and acquisitiveness [...] 
Milieu goals [aim not] to defend or increase possession [...] to the 
exclusion of others, but aim instead at shaping conditions beyond 
[...] national boundaries’43.  
Concerning the way a civilian power uses its means Christopher Hill sees four 
different approaches: the first approach concerns using the sticks, the second its 
threat, the third involves the use of the carrots and the fourth concerns latent 
                                                            
40 Maull, H, 1990 ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’, in Foreign Affairs, Volume 
69, Issue No. 5, pp.92-3. Maull’s definition of civilian power, although it refers specifically to 
Germany and Japan, has been regularly used with reference to the EU. 
41 A recent evolution of Duchêne’s domestication of foreign affairs is Habermas’s idea of 
Weltinnenpolitik –domestic politics of the world, which sees the civilian power EU as better 
equipped than others to assume the responsibility of best executing Weltinnenpolitik. For 
more see: Habermas, J 1998 ‘Die postnationale Konstellation und die Zukunft der 
Demokratie’, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main. Weltinnenpolitik –domestic politics of the world 
as the disappearance of barriers between internal and international politics make any political 
decision-maker before all those affected by their decisions, despite a formal belonging to a 
political community. Cited in Lucarelli, S 2006 ‘Introduction: Values, Principles, Identity, 
and European Union Foreign Policy’, in Lucarelli, S, Manners, I (eds.) 2006 ‘Values and 
Principles in European Union Foreign Policy’, Routledge, Oxon, pp.5-6. See also: Bonanate, 
L 2001 ‘La politica interna del mondo’, in Teoria Politica, Fascicolo 1, available at: 
http://www.francoangeli.it/Riviste/Scheda_Riviste.asp?IDarticolo=15687, last accessed on 
30.03.2009.   
42 Smith, M 2004 'Foreign Economic Policy in Post-Cold War Europe: Concepts, Frameworks 
and Implications', in Carlsnaes, W, Sjursen, H, White, B, (eds.) 2004 ‘European Foreign 
Policy Today’, Sage, London. The terms of milieu and possession goals were originally used 
and developed by Arnold Wolfers. For more see: Wolfers, A 1965 ‘Discord and 
Collaboration: Essays on International Politics’, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore/London, Chapter 5, in particular pp.73-76.   
43 Wolfers, A 1965 ‘Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics’, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore/London, p.74. 
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influence44. Hill argues that, ‘civilian models’ (such as EU) rely on persuasion and 
negotiation in dealing with third parties, encouraging so regional cooperation with 
and within other parts of the world, supporting global and regional institution-
building, and by relying on multilateralism to resolve conflicts rather than on 
unilateral measures. Karen Smith, though, points out that the predilection of a 
civilian power for persuasion and negotiation does not hinder it to use its civilian 
means quite coercively45. In this sense, EU’s conditionality clauses (i.e. Art.96 of 
Cotonou Agreement), would point at the EU as a non ‘ideal type’ civilian power. 
Some scholars and most decision-makers, sustain that the EU remains a civilian 
power, even when it uses non civilian means, such as military instruments, or 
conditionality clauses – what most counts, they sustain, are the pursued civilian 
ends46.    
‘[D]eveloping and strengthening the military instrument is not 
sufficient to validate or invalidate the notion of civilian power 
Europe’47. 
Such definition, though, implies that any actor by using civilian instruments can be 
attributed as a civilian power. It is further argued that such militarisation would 
weaken EU’s distinct civilian international identity48, for it ‘would represent the 
culmination of a ‘state building project’ and ‘integration would [so] recreate the state 
on a grander scale’49. Such conceptualisation is found by Ian Manners as one of the 
problems with the notions of civilian vs. military power, namely, ‘their unhealthy 
                                                            
44 Hill, C 2003 ‘The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy’, Palgrave, Houndmills, especially 
Chapter 6. 
45 Smith, K 2005 ‘Still Civilian Power EU?’, in European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper 1, 
LSE p.9. 
46 This is sustained by Maull’s definition, presented above, by which civilian powers concentrate 
on non-civilian means but retain military power to safeguard other means of international 
interaction. 
47 Larsen, H 2002 ‘A Global Military Actor?’, in Cooperation and Conflict, Volume 37, Issue 
No. 3, p. 292. 
48 Zielonka, J 1998 ‘Explaining Euro-paralysis: Why Europe is Unable to Act in International 
politics’, Basingstoke Macmillan, London, p.229.   
49 Smith, K. (2000) ‘The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?’. 
in International Spectator, Volume 23, No. 2, pp.11–28. 
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concentration on how much like a state the EU looks’50. A second problem is also 
‘[t]he use of civil, civilian, civilianise, civilianising, civilise, civilisation, and 
civilising as if they were interchangeable’ and exactly this ‘makes their use highly 
problematic’51. ‘Civilising’ is a far too laden term from the historical European 
relations with the rest of the world and ‘civilisation’ is also a term considered as too 
Eurocentric, which it implies that ‘Europe can congratulate [so] itself for progress’52.  
Manners has advanced that the notion of Normative Power Europe better describes 
the EU, for it heads off of the civilian / military dichotomy, and focuses on the 
‘ideational impact of the EU’s international identity/role’53, shaping so conceptions 
of ‘normal’ in international relations54.  The nature of a particular actor –the EU– is 
given by whether and how it constructs itself as an international actor and whether 
and how the surrounding world it constructs the entity –the EU– as an actor55, i.e. 
through the expectations they raise. In this sense, roles are determined both by an 
actor’s own conceptions about appropriate behaviour and by the expectations, or role 
prescriptions, of other actors. Actors follow so the ‘logic of appropriateness’, by 
which it is to be understood that they behave in a way they believe it is expected 
from them56. From these dynamic interactions ‘it is formed a complex mixture of 
geographical, power-politics, historical and socio-economic characteristics, shared 
ideas and norms as well as system structures’57. In this sense, ‘the European model is 
                                                            
50 Manners, I 2002 ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, in Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Volume 40, No.2, p239. 
51 Manners, I 2006 ‘’, p.184. 
52 Spivak, G, C 1999 ‘A Critique of Post-Colonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing 
Present’, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, p.91-93. 
53 Ibid., p.238. 
54 Ibid., p.239. 
55 Harnisch, S, Maull, H, W 2001 ‘Conclusion: Learned its lesson well? Germany as a Civilian 
Power ten years after unification’, in Harnisch, S, Maull, H, W (eds.) 2001 ‘Germany as a 
Civilian Power? The foreign policy of the Berlin Republic’, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, pp.129-130 
56 For more see: Allison, G, Zelikow P 1999 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis‘, Longman, NY; March, J, G, Olsen, J, P 1989 ‘Rediscovering Institutions: The 
Organisational Basis of Politics’, Free Press, NY. 
57 Tewes, H 2002 ‘Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe. Enlarging NATO and the 
European Union’, Palgrave, Houndmills, pp.28-31. 
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spoken of as part of a European understanding of self, history, principles, and 
politics’58. It is so argued that these normative ambitions have their source from, 
firstly, an explicit rejection of the divisive nationalisms, imperialism and war of 
Europe’s past, secondly, its unique character as a ’hybrid polity’, and thirdly, the 
development, over the past 50 years, of a body of values which are firmly embedded 
in successive Treaties and in the Union’s practices59. It is further argued that within 
the acqui communautaire and the acqui politique there can be identified five core 
values –(sustainable) peace, (social) liberty, (consensual) democracy, (supranational) 
rule of law and (associative) human rights–, and four subsidiary values –(inclusive) 
equality, (social) solidarity, (sustainable) development, and (good) governance60.  
The normative ambitions of the EU are best exemplified by the inclusion of 
normative conditions in most of its international agreements, which in their turn 
demonstrate EU’s conscious efforts to shape her environment: 
‘The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by 
the principles which have inspired its own creation, development 
and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: 
democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human 
dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the 
principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. The 
Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with 
third countries, and international, regional or global organizations 
which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It 
shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in 
particular in the framework of the United Nations’61. 
                                                            
58 Manners, I 2006 ‘The Constitutive Nature of Values, Images and Principles in the European 
Union’, in Lucarelli, S, Manners I (eds.) 2006 ‘Values and Principles in European Union 
Foreign Policy’, Routledge, Oxon, p.19. 
59 Manners, I 2002 ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, p.240. 
60 Manners, I 2006 ‘The Constitutive Nature of Values, Images and Principles in the European 
Union’, especially pp.32-38. 
61 Treaty of Lisbon, Art.21 TEU 
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EU’s identity is thus based upon the difference from and superiority over other 
global actor, most notably the USA, which is claimed to be more focused on threats 
to its security62. As it has already been mentioned the EU’s foreign policy is a 
principled one, aimed ‘to play a stabilising role worldwide’ inspired by an ‘ethics of 
responsibility’ towards others: 
‘[...] Europe is not weak, but rather it has developed a new type of 
power that starts not with geopolitics but domestic politics. When 
the US talks to other countries, it is about the war on terror, Iraq or 
the ICC. Europeans start from the other end of the spectrum: what 
values underpin the state? What are its constitutional and 
regulatory frameworks?’63 
Increasingly, certain circles within the academia as well as pundits and decision-
makers alike, are keen to see in the EU an international actor with a ‘principled 
behaviour’ within the international arena64. They argue that the best way to 
understand the foundations of the EU actorness is by looking at the concept of 
identity, rather than deliberating on the Union’s interests65. This inclination seems to 
                                                            
62 Daalder, I H, 2001 ‘Are the Unites States and Europe Heading for Divorce?’, in International 
Affairs, Volume 73, Issue No. 3, p.553, available at: http://www.brookings.edu/views/ 
Articles/Daalder/divorce.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009; Kupchan, C 2002 ‘The End of the 
American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century’, Alfred 
A. Knopf, NY; Weller, M 2002 ‘Undoing the Global Constitution: UN Security Council 
Action on the International Criminal Court’, in International Affairs, Volume 78; Issue No. 4, 
p.694. 
63 Leonard, M, Gowan, R 2004 ‘Global Europe: Implementing the European Security Strategy’, 
The Foreign Policy Center/The British Council, London, p.10, available at: 
http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/187.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
64 For more information see: Duchêne, F 1972 ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’, in Mayne, R 
(ed.) 1972 ‘Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead’, Fontana, London, pp.32-47; 
Bretherton, C, Vogler, J 2003, ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’, Routledge, Oxon; 
Smith, H, 2002 ‘The European Union Foreign Policy: What It Is And What It Does?’, Pluto 
Press, London. 
65 Tonra, B, 2003 ‘Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of a 
Cognitive Approach’, in Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 42, Issue 4; Aggestam, 
L, 1999 ‘Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy’, in ARENA Working 
Paper, No.: 8; Aggestam, L, 2000 ‘A Common Foreign and Security Policy: Role 
Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in the EU’, in Aggestam, L, Hyde-Price, A (eds), 
‘New Perspectives on Security and Identity in Europe’, Macmillan, London; Bretherton, C, 
Vogler, J (eds.) 2006, ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’; Manners, I, Whitman, R 
2003 ‘The ‘difference engine’: Constructing and Representing the International Identity of the 
European Union’, in Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 10, Issue 3. 
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be attributable to the very patterns the EU creates upon delivering her foreign policy 
actions66.  
‘The VIPs [values, images, principles] present in the Union’s 
international conduct, are not simply idealistic symbolism in the 
pursuit of EU material gains, but they are the defining elements of 
a polity which is constructed differently to pre-existing political 
forms, and that this particular difference predisposes it to act in a 
[different] way’67 
Excellent examples, which highlight the Union’s commitment to project its values 
externally, are the international negotiations on climate change in Kyoto 1997, Bonn 
2001, Johannesburg 200268 (less successful Copenhagen 2009); Doha Summit of the 
WTO (although, less successful on certain issues i.e. labour standards)69; her role in 
the creation of an International Criminal Court70, her opposition to the death penalty 
(shaming the ‘super-executioners’ USA and China, and strongly influencing 
decisions of abolishment in many other countries)71. EU activities suggest that: 
                                                            
66 For a more detailed information see: Keukeleire, S 2000 ‘The European Union As A 
Diplomatic Actor’, in Discussion Paper 71, Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, University of 
Leicester; Keukeleire, S 2002 ‘Reconceptualising (European) Foreign Policy: Structural 
Foreign Policy’, Paper presented at the 1st pan-European Conference on European Union 
Politics, Bordeaux, 26-28 September 2002. Available on: http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/docs/ 
0209-SK-ECPR.pdf, last accessed 16.05.2010; Telò, M 2003 ‘L’Unione Europea tra 
Neoregionalismo e Governance Globale: Tre Scenari’, in Lucarelli, S (ed.) 2003 ‘La Polis 
Europea; L’Unione Europea oltre l’Euro’, Asterios, Trieste. 
67 Manners, 2006 cited in Lucarelli, S, Manners, I (eds.) 2006 ‘Values and Principles in 
European Union Foreign Policy’, Routledge, London, p.15. 
68 Backer, S 2006 ‘Environmental Values and Climate Change Policy’, in Lucarelli, S, Manners I 
(eds.) 2006 ‘Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy’, Routledge, Oxon  
69 van den Hoven, A 2006 ‘European Regulatory Capitalism and Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations’, in Lucarelli, S, Manners I (eds.) 2006 ‘Values and Principles in European 
Union Foreign Policy’, Routledge, Oxon; Laidi, Z 2008 ‘European Preferences and Their 
Reception’, in Laidi, Z (ed.) 2008 ‘EU Foreign Policy in a Globalised World: Normative 
Power and Social Preferences’, Routledge GARNET Series: Europe in the World, Oxon. 
70 Human Rights Watch 1999 ‘Human Rights Watch World Report 1999’, Human Rights Watch, 
NY; Weller, M 2002 ‘Undoing the Global Constitution: UN Security Council Action on the 
International Criminal Court’. 
71 Manners, I 2002 ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, pp.249-250. 
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‘[...] not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but 
importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in 
world politics. It is build upon the crucial and usually overlooked 
observation that the most important factor shaping the international 
role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is’72. 
Concluding, there seem to be a vast number of terms used to describe the EU’s 
power/role in the international system. Apart from the two analysed above –which 
are also the two most established terms in defining the EU– there can be found terms 
such as a ‘superpower’, ‘quite superpower’, ‘strange superpower’ ‘post modern 
power’, ‘ambiguous power’, ‘gentle power’, ‘a silent global player’, ‘transformative 
power’, and even ‘metrosexual power’73. In this run for providing with the EU’s 
eventual permanent conceptual categorisation, Karen Smith offers, arguably, the 
most conciliating one: 
‘[T]he broad conclusion is that none of the categories really fits the 
EU well enough to justify an uncritical use of them (and in fact, all 
might fit some aspects of its behaviour – just like individuals, the 
EU can have ‘multiple identities’)’74. 
The following section will concentrate itself on analyzing the most relevant, recent 
EU policies in Africa, by focusing on a civilian/normative power discourse. 
                                                            
72 Ibid, p.251. 
73 For more see, respectively: McCormick, J 2006 ‘The European Superpower’, Palgrave 
Macmillan, London; Moravcsik, A 2007 ‘Make Way for the Quite Superpower’, in 
Newsweek, December 22, 2007, available at: http://www.newsweek.com /2007/12/22/make-
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The Strange Superpower’, Dartmouth, Aldershot; Rifkin, J 2005 ‘The European Dream: How 
Europe’s Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream’, Jeremy P. Tarcher / 
Penguin, NY; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, G 2000 ‘Perspectives for a new Regionalism: 
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Diplomacy’, in Foreign Policy, July 1, 2004, available at: http://www.paragkhanna.com/ 
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74 Smith, K 2008 ‘European Union Foreign Policy In a Changing World’, 2nd Edition, Polity 
Press, Cambridge, p.2. 
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Consequently, this approach will lent on the academic deliberations about the 
civilian and normative characteristics of EU’s foreign policy which in their turn will 
provide this author with valuable conceptions to be applied and thus, evaluate on 
these grounds, the concerned EU policies in Africa.  
 
THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICIES IN AFRICA 
‘Europe and Africa are bound together by history, by geography, 
and by a shared vision of a peaceful, democratic and prosperous 
future for all their peoples’75 
Europe has a longstanding relationship with Africa, which is deeply rooted in history 
and has progressively advanced from a colonial heritage into a strong and equal 
partnership based on common interests, shared recognition and accountability. The 
two continents are closely linked with each other in crucial sectors. An excellent 
example of, i.e. strong trade links, is provided by the fact that the EU constitutes the 
largest export market for African products. For instance, Africa exports some 85 
percent of selected agricultural products to Europe. Another prove which attests this 
special relationship, is the substantial and predictable aid flow, i.e. in 2005 the EU 
institutions only provided Africa with some €15 billion with development aid, while 
if one takes into account the contributions from the member states as well, then 
Africa received in i.e. 2008 €50 billion76. The EU has consistently been by far the 
biggest donor in Africa, constituting some 60 percent of the total ODA going to 
Africa. Along member states who have a long standing political, economic and 
cultural relations with many African countries and regions, the EU institutions, 
especially the European Commission ‘has build up extensive experience and 
concluded a number of contractual arrangements with different parts of Africa’77. 
                                                            
75 Council of the European Union, 2005 ‘The EU and Africa: Towards A Strategic Partnership’, 
p.1, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/876 
73.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
76 Council of the European Union, 2005 ‘The EU and Africa: Towards A Strategic Partnership’, 
p.1, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/876 
73.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
77 Commission of the European Communities, 2007 ‘Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council: From Cairo to Lisbon –The EU-Africa Strategic 
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The experience gained and the agreements consented provide for a predictable and 
secure foundation upon which to further the intercontinental relationship. On the 
other side, the EU has acknowledged and at the same time welcomed the changes the 
African continent chose and went through, especially since the beginning of the 21st 
century.  ‘Africa is now at the heart of international politics, but what is genuinely 
new is that Africa – and the African Union (AU) in particular –is emerging, not as a 
development issue, but as a political actor in its own right’78. Indeed, Africa has 
increasingly become a political, economic, and cultural actor within the international 
arena, an actor that the world cannot any further afford to condescend.  
The following will concern the EU’s agenda in Africa and will concentrate at the 
peace and security; promotion of democratic governance; MDGs; energy and climate 
change and migration policies, as well as EU’s stance on China into Africa, for 
ending with some concluding remarks about the EU into Africa in the 21st century.  
 
THE EU’S PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA IN AFRICA79 
‘Without peace there can be no lasting development. Without 
African leadership to end African conflicts there can be no lasting 
peace’80.  
‘[P]ersistence of numerous conflicts, […] continue to cause […] 
loss of human life as well as destruction of infrastructure and 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Partnership’, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus! 
prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=COMfinal&an_doc=2007&nu_doc=357, last accessed 
on 30.03.2009. 
78 Commission of the European Communities, 2007 ‘Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council: From Cairo to Lisbon –The EU-Africa Strategic 
Partnership’. 
79 Having chosen, for this dissertation, as a starting point for review the EU policies from the year 
2000 one should however, recognise that the debate within the EU on conflict issues in Africa 
has started well before that year. Reference is being made to the EC’s initiative on Peace 
Building, Conflict Prevention and Resolution in 1993; to the decision from the Madrid EU 
Summit in 1995, where security problems in Africa were officially recognised as a concern in 
Europe; and of course the Petersburg Tasks discussion at the Cologne Summit in 1999. 
80 Council of the European Union, 2005 ‘The EU And Africa: Towards A Strategic Partnership’, 
p.2, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/876 
73.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009  
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property and threaten peace, stability, regional and international 
security and hinder the aspirations of African peoples to peace, 
prosperity and development’81. 
Starting from 2000, the first relevant policy documents, which concern conflict 
issues in Africa, are the Joint Statement on EC Development Policy82 and the ACP 
Partnership Agreement83. Although, these documents serve as key milestones to the 
EU Development policy, they nevertheless maintain crucial relevance to be 
mentioned in this section. The first document identified conflict as a ‘horizontal 
issue’ which undermines development in countries affected and as such it required 
‘systematic attention’. The Cotonou Agreement, which in his ‘The Political 
Dimension’ chapter includes a whole section dedicated to ‘Peace-Building Policies, 
Conflict Prevention and Resolution’84, underlines once more the two-way 
relationship between development and security.   
In 2001 the EC made public its Communication on Conflict Prevention85, which was 
followed by a Common Position of the EU Council86. These two documents opened 
the way to a period of debate among the EU institutions on the suitable approach the 
Union should take to tackle conflict. Confirming the EU as a civilian/normative 
power, these documents assert once again the preference for and importance to work 
inside the framework provided by the UN Security Council as well as the preference 
for and importance to work at the regional level:  
                                                            
81 SN 106/4/00 REV 4, Africa-Europe Summit under the Aegis of the OAU and the EU, Cairo, 3-
4 April 2000 ‘Cairo Declaration’, available at: http://www.iss.co.za/Af/RegOrg/unity_to_ 
union/pdfs/au/afreurdecl00.pdf, last accessed 17.11.2009 
82 Summaries of EU legislation, 2000 ‘Statement by the Council and the Commission of 20 
November 2000 on the European Community’s Development Policy’, available at: 
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83 EC-ACP, 2000 ‘The Cotonou Agreement’, Benin on 23 June 2000, full text available at: 
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84 Ibid., ‘Title II: The Political Dimension, Article 11’.  
85 EC, 2001 ‘Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention’, Brussels, available 
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last accessed on 17.11.2009 
86 Council of the EU, 2001 ‘Common Position Concerning Conflict prevention, Management and 
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‘The Commission will give a higher priority to its support for 
regional integration and in particular regional organisations with a 
clear conflict prevention mandate’87.  
In May 2002, by taking in consideration the peak in conflicts especially in SSA, the 
Development Council published its ‘Conclusions on Countries in Conflict’, where 
apart from the importance of a work in partnership with the UN, the Council 
emphasised the importance of coherence, coordination, and complementarity as well 
as the importance of working in partnership with ACP governments, civil society 
organisations and with regional/sub-regional organisations (SROs)88. With these 
conclusions the period of policy reflection on conflict prevention, came to end and 
the EU moved to an operationalisation phase, as it is best reflected through the next 
official documents.  
EU’s Political and Security Committee, in November 2004, submitted to the Council 
for adoption an Action Plan for ESDP in Africa89. It included actions such as 
capacity building, planning support, Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration 
(DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR). The addressees were individual African 
states, SROs and predominantly the AU90. Within the framework of the EU Strategy 
for Africa (ESA), EU it committed to ‘step up its efforts at all stages of the conflict 
cycle and to support the emerging new structures, collectively known as the African 
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)’, with the African Union and its PSC at the 
centre’91. As a further support to ESA, the EU’s General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (GAERC) adopted in 13 November 2006 the document entitled 
                                                            
87 EC, 2001 ‘Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention’, p.8. 
88 Council of the EU, 2002 ‘Conclusions of the 2429th Council Meeting’, Brussels, 30 May 2002, 
pp.36-42, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ 
gena/70867.pdf, last accessed on 17.11.2009. 
89 Council of the EU, 2004 ‘X. ESDP in Africa’, in Council of the EU 2004 ‘ESDP Presidency 
Report’, Brussels, 17 December 2004, p.11, available at: http://www.consilium.europa. 
eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ESDP%20Presidency%20Report%2017.12.04.pdf, last accessed on 
09.12.2009. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Summaries of EU Legislation, ‘EU Strategy for Africa’, available at: http://europa. 
eu/legislation_summaries/development/african_caribbean_pacific_states/r12540_en.htm, last 
accessed on 30.03.2009. 
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‘EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management 
and Resolution of Conflicts’92, notably in response to the ‘EU Common Position on 
the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Violent Conflicts in Africa’93. The 
EU Concept ‘is intended to provide a coherent and comprehensive EU framework for 
the implementation of key aspects of the Peace and Security cluster of the EU 
Strategy for Africa’94. 
Under the Joint Africa EU Strategic Partnership the priorities of the EU peace and 
security agenda in Africa include overseeing Africa’s peace and security architecture 
and supporting African peace and security operations95. Generally seen, the conflict 
prevention and peace-building efforts are classified into two categories: direct and 
indirect ones. Under the first one is understood a broad range of humanitarian 
activities led by DG ECHO96; support for conflict resolution through i.e. assessments 
of root causes of conflict prepared by the EC (by its geographic desks and EC 
delegations)97; and institutional reform through i.e. EIDHR98. The second category 
includes the mainstreaming of conflict prevention objectives into sector programmes, 
                                                            
92 Council of the EU 2006 ‘EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the 
Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts’, adopted at the 2760th EU GAERC 
Meeting, Brussels, 13 November 2006, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/91667.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
93 Summaries of EU Legislation, ‘EU Strategy for Africa’, available at:  http://europa.eu/legisla 
tion_summaries/development/african_caribbean_pacific_states/r12540_en.htm, last accessed 
on 30.03.2009. 
94 Council of the EU 2006 ‘EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the 
Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts’, adopted at the 2760th EU GAERC 
Meeting, Brussels, 13 November 2006. 
95 Quotation from Daniela Dicorrado Andreoni, Head of the Peace and Security Sector, DG Dev, 
EC, cited in Europafrica.net, ‘Security and Development in Africa: strengthening conflict 
prevention, resolution and management’, available at: http://europafrica.net/2008/07/21/secu 
rity-and-development-in-africa-strengthening-conflict-prevention-resolution-and-managemen 
t/, last accessed on 28.02.2010. 
96 The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) was created in 1992. Initially placed 
under the DG DEV, in 2004 it became an independent DG on its own. DG ECHO strictly 
identifies humanitarian action as an apolitical, neutral and impartial activity. Being not part of 
the ‘crisis management’ system, DG ECHO is not such an instrument.  
97 The information gained through these assessments is provided to the General Secretariat of EU 
Council and EC used in preparing a ‘watch-list’ of countries at the start of each Presidency.  
98 For more on the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) see the 
following section of EU Democratic Governance and Human Rights Agenda in Africa.  
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which serve to bridge security concerns with other policy fields such as trade, i.e. 
The Kimberly Process or the FLEGT99. 
Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that EU is still a young global actor needing 
essential reforms and improvements at policy, political, financial, technical and 
structural levels. Such, contributes greatly to an expectations-capability gap, which in 
its own terms accounts for a weak representing of the civilian/normative power, the 
EU intends to project in international politics. The same can be said about the lack of 
coherence between institutions and actors involved in CFSP. Notwithstanding these 
difficulties the EU has significantly contributed to support peace and security in 
Africa. For instance, the African Peace Facility has been an important instrument the 
EU has provided aiming at supporting Africa towards effectively establishing its 
APSA. The Facility has been ‘the backbone of the funding for AU operations’100 for 
it ‘remains by far the most important source of funding for th[e] support’101 of these 
operations. Thus, 
‘[APF] has been a very positive initiative which has allowed the 
EU to support African work on peace and security in a practical, 
flexible and highly relevant manner that has respected the principle 
of African ownership’102. 
                                                            
99 The Kimberly Process aims to prevent the trade of goods which fuels conflicts, in this case the 
trade of the so called ‘blood diamonds’, which financed the conflicts in West Africa. The EU 
Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT), regulates trade of 
timber.  
100 Quotation from Ambassador Said Djinnit, the AU Peace and Security Commissioner, cited in 
WEU 2005 ‘Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Practical Approach’, Report submitted 
on behalf of the Political Committee by Charles Goerens, Rapporteur at the 51st Session of the 
Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly on 6 December 2005, available 
at: http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2005/1913.php, last 
accessed on 12.12.2009. 
101 Council of the EU, 2007 ‘8th EU – Africa Ministerial Troika Meeting’, Final Communiqué, 
Brussels, 15 May 2007, p.3, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/ 
docs/pressdata/en/er/94126.pdf, last accessed on 12.12.2009. 
102 Mackie, J et al. 2005 ‘Final Report of Mid-Term Evaluation of the African Peace Facility’, 
ECDPM, Maastricht, p.14, available at: http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/ 
Download.nsf/0/A96DA4D82E645FCEC125761E005016AD/$FILE/APF%20Evaluation%20
-%20Final%20Report%20Ecorys%20version%20_010206%20KG_.pdf, last accessed on 
12.12.2009. 
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Nearly €440 million of financial support has been channelled through the APF under 
the 9th EDF (2004-7), including Additional Voluntary Contributions (AVCs) of EU 
Member States and a first tranche of €300 million is already committed under the 
10th EDF (2008-10)103. Efforts in enhancing the political dialogue take place at all 
levels, be it continental through the AU Peace and Security Council and the EU 
Political and Security Committee; to the regional level through regular exchanges 
with i.e. ECOWAS and other sub-regional organisations; and lastly at the national 
level within the framework of the CPA’s Article 8. Concerning the predictable 
funding it sustains that: 
‘€1 billion of EU funding [is provided] to support the African 
Peace and Security Agenda and [APSA]. This support covers a 
range of activities such as the [CEWS], the definition and 
implementation of disarmament and counter-terrorism policies and 
the operationalisation of the [ASF], including African Training 
Centres [sic]’104. 
To date, Africa has been the theatre of ten operations conducted within the EU 
CFPS/ESDP framework. Some of them have already been completed and others are 
ongoing and they have been/are of military, civil-military and civilian nature105. As 
military operations account: Operation ARTEMIS in Bunia/DRC (12 June – 1 
September 2003); EUFOR DRC (- 30 November 2006); EUFOR Tchad/RCA (28 
January 2008 – 15 March 2009); EU NAVFOR Atalanta (end of 2008 – still 
operating); EUTM Somalia (April 2010 – still operating). There has been to date one 
civil-military operation, namely that of EU Support to AMIS Darfur 18 July 2005 
and was came to an end on 31 December 2007. The civilian operations in Africa are 
as follows: EUPOL Kinshasa (April 2005 – June 2007); EUSEC RD CONGO (June 
2007 – 30 September 2010); EUPOL DRC (June 2007 – still operating); EU SSR 
                                                            
103 A detailed information and presentation of the APF is to be found at http://euro 
pafrica.net/jointstrategy/1_peace-and-security/, last accessed on 12.12.2009 
104 European Commission, 2010 ‘Memo/10: Africa-EU Relations – Key Facts and Figures’, 
Brussels, p.1, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/files/europa_only/memo_ 
africa_eu_relations.pdf, last accessed on 12.06.2010. 
105 For detailed information on all EU completed and ongoing missions of military, civilian and 
civil-military nature see the official website of the Council of the European Union at 
http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=EN. 
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Guinea-Bissau (June 2008 – 30 September 2010). From November 2008 a major 
capacity building programme to the AU /APSA has been stood up. Reference is 
being made to the AMANI AFRICA – EURO RECAMP106, which it originated at 
the Africa-France summit at Louvre some ten years ago by a French initiative, under 
the name of Renforcement des capacités Africaines de maintien de la paix 
(RECAMP). This initiative was operationalised in close collaboration with US, Great 
Britain and the willing African countries and deliberately placed under the auspices 
of the UN and the then OAU107.  
From the analysis provided above it becomes clear that European preferences in 
conflict prevention and crisis management do take into consideration the 
commitment to the normative principle of lasting/ sustainable peace, by which it is 
meant resolving both the structural causes and violent symptoms of conflict108 so that 
‘war [...] becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’109. In terms of 
policies, the EU focuses on a comprehensive approach including development aid, 
trade, regional integration/cooperation110 and political dialogue. In terms of resolving 
the violent symptoms of conflict, EU has developed, as part of her CFSP/ESDP 
policy, a civil and military capability, which aims at sustainable peace missions by 
focusing on ‘peace-keeping, [...] and strengthening international security in 
                                                            
106 European Union, 2009 ‘ESDP: EURO RECAMP – AMANI AFRICA 2008-2010’, Brussels, 
available at:  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090703Factsheet_EURORE 
CAMP-version3_EN.pdf; as well as detailed information on the programme itself  available at 
its official website http://www.amaniafricacycle.org/?lang=en, both last accessed on 
22.12.2009. 
107 Reinforcement of African Peace-Keeping Capacities RECAMP, available at: http://www.un. 
int/france/frame_anglais/france_and_un/france_and_peacekeeping/recamp_eng.htm, last ac-
cessed on 22.12.2009. 
108 Manners, I 2008 ‘The Normative Power of the EU in a Globalised World’, in Laidi, Z (ed.) 
2008 ‘EU Foreign Policy in a Globalised World: Normative Power and Social Preferences’, 
Routledge, Oxon, p.31; Manners, I 2006 ‘The Constitutive Nature of Values, Images and 
Principles in the European Union’, in Lucarelli, S, Manners, I 2006 ‘Values and Principles in 
European Union Foreign Policy’, Routledge, Oxon, pp.26-8. 
109 Quoted in the ‘Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950’, available at: http://europa.eu/abc/ 
symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm, last accessed on 28.04.2010. 
110 Each of these issues will be handled further down at greater detail. 
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accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charta’111. Apart from the 
above stated objective of sustainable peace, the variety of instruments/means as well 
as the way these are used, –preference for economic and diplomatic action, 
persuasion, positive incentives, rather than coercion, constructive engagement rather 
than isolation, all within a multilateral setting and not to forget the EU’s complex 
multi-level governance system that makes it ‘particularly well equipped to grasp and 
utilise the potential of multilateral network organisations’ – all these factors 
underline the EU’s ‘distinctive nature’ as a civilian/normative power within the 
peace and security agenda in Africa.  
 
THE EU’S DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA IN AFRICA 
The EU’s promotion of democratic governance and human rights agenda in Africa is 
a prominent characteristic of both the EU’s development cooperation policy and 
generally of its foreign policy112. EU’s democracy promotion is guided by her 
inherent normative values of 
‘[...] democracy – the promotion of a particular form, organisations 
and philosophy of political life; [... supranational] rule of law – the 
political foundations provided by just legal systems and equal 
protection for all; and [...] good governance – the provision of 
open, participatory democratic governance without creating 
hierarchical, exclusionary and centralised government. [This last 
one] is the most recent value to develop within the EU, especially 
                                                            
111 EU 2008 ‘Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union’, Article 42.1 (ex Article 17 
TEU), available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115: 
0013:0045:EN:PDF, last accessed on 28.04.2010. 
112 Two key documents, both of early 1990s, testimony of the rise up of democracy promotion: 
the Council of Ministers Resolution on ‘Human Rights, Democracy, and Development’ in 
1991, which made democracy promotion an objective and condition for EU development 
cooperation and the Maastricht Treaty, in 1993, most notably Art.11 (democracy promotion 
as an objective of the then new CFSP), and Art.177 (‘essential elements’ for EC development 
cooperation). It can be sustained that through these documents the EU makes use of 
standardised human rights and democracy clauses in all her agreement with third countries, 
allowing thus the use of a conditionality mechanism.  
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reflecting its external promotion through [...] development 
policies’113. 
Democracy promotion has been incorporated as a shared value and objective within 
EU’s regional agreement, notably the CPA and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 
concerning respectively SSA and North Africa. The CPA signed in June 2000114, 48 
of its signatories are countries in SSA, affirms that the ‘respect for human rights, 
democratic principles and the rule of law’ are essential elements of the Agreement115 
which are coupled by a suspension clause in case of serious violation. ‘Good 
governance’ on the other hand becomes a ‘fundamental and positive element’116. The 
EU’s making conditional alignment with the ‘essential’ and ‘fundamental elements’ 
have fuelled a discourse on the positive/negative conditionality or the use of ‘carrots 
and sticks’. Obviously, arguing through the arguments of Karen Smith, even by using 
‘civilian means’ the EU makes use of these conditionality clauses in a ‘quite coercive 
way’, which then make the EU fail her ‘ideal type’ civilian power image117. While 
others believe that the ends aimed are thoroughly civilian and therefore that is what 
should matter. The proponents of EU as a normative power see in her promotion of 
democratic governance, exactly that what the attribute ‘normative power’ was coined 
for in the first place.  
‘[T]he EU as a normative power has an ontological quality to it – 
that the EU can be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the 
international system; a positivist quantity to it – that the EU acts to 
                                                            
113 Manners, I 2006 ‘The Constitutive Nature of Values, Images and Principles in the European 
Union’, in Lucarelli, S, Manners, I 2006 ‘Values and Principles in European Union Foreign 
Policy’, Routledge, Oxon, pp.34-8. 
114 ACP-EC, 2003 ‘Partnership Agreement’, Cotonou 2003 / Luxembourg 2005, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/Cotonou_EN_2006 _en.pdf, last accessed 
on 01.03.2010. 
115 ACP-EC, 2003 ‘Partnership Agreement’, Art.9. 
116 Inclusion of ‘good governance’ in CPA was object of fierce discussion between EU and the 
ACP countries. Such discussion resulted in ‘good governance’ being not one of the ‘essential 
elements’ of Art. 9 but instead a ‘fundamental and positive element’, meaning that it is not 
subject to a non-execution or suspension clause, but for in ‘serious case of corruption’ where 
significant funds provided by the Community are involved (Art.97). 
117 Smith, K 2005 ‘Still Civilian Power EU?’, in European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper 
1, LSE p.9. 
153 
 
change norms in the international system; and a normative quality 
to it – that the EU should act to extend its norms into the 
international system’118. 
Coming back, to EU in Africa, apart from the high-level EU-Africa dialogue 
delineated at the very beginning of this chapter, the CPA provides another 
framework through which to act. The EU has attached to the ‘political dialogue’ 
increasing importance, be that with regions, sub-regions or individual countries119 as 
well as representatives of civil society120. Such political dialogues include ‘a regular 
assessment of the developments concerning the respect for human rights, democratic 
principles, rule of law and good governance’121.  
Another way of promoting democratic governance has been the continuous attempts 
on the EU side to enhance policy coherence and consistency between different EU 
actors. For instance, there is room for greater effectiveness by ‘[p]romoting coherent 
and consistent policies both within European Community activities, and between 
those and other EU actions, especially the CFSP, as well as Member State 
activities’122. In line with such policy prioritisation, there is the fourth way of 
promoting democratic governance through the provision of funds, usually 
highlighting the role of the civil society. There is a range of different sources from 
where the EU makes available such funds. The most substantial contributions are 
made through the European Development Fund (EDF), which is at the same time the 
financial instrument of CPA. In addition to these mainstream regional funding, the 
EC provides of so-called thematic-budget lines. The most prominent in the 
promotion of democratic governance is the European Initiative on Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR), which has at its disposition some €100 million per annum, 
                                                            
118 Manners, I 2002 ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, in Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Volume 40, No.2, p.252, (original emphasis). 
119 ACP-EC, 2003 ‘Partnership Agreement’, Art.8(6). 
120 ACP-EC, 2003 ‘Partnership Agreement’, Art.8(7). 
121 ACP-EC, 2003 ‘Partnership Agreement’, Art.8(6). 
122 European Commission, 2001 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament: The European Union’s role in promoting human rights and 
democratisation in third countries’, p.5, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri 
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52001DC0252:EN:NOT, last accessed on 07.11.2009 
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focusing especially on electoral assistance. At the beginning of 2007, EIDHR was 
replaced by the new European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and 
provides of a budget of € 1.104 million for the period 2007-2013. Promotion of 
democratic governance in Africa is also presented as an exemple par excellence of 
the importance the EU puts on the people-centeredness of its activities, executed in 
partnership and ensuring ownership: 
‘[promotion of democratic governance] should focus on working 
with civil society to promote greater participation of people in 
decision-making at all levels [...] a flourishing civil society [...] 
plays a fundamental role in holding governments accountable and 
denouncing human rights abuses’123.  
Despite, a general scepticism regarding the real effects of external democracy 
promotion, where the majority of the studies argue that in order to be sustainable, 
democracy promotion should come from within and not induced and/or enforced 
externally and the fact that the EU, sometimes seem to have a large gap between 
theory/rhetoric on the one hand and the reality/ actual application on the other one124, 
arguably, due to a lack a strategic and coherent application, nevertheless, the current 
EU framework for democracy promotion can be seen as quite promising. As a matter 
of fact, some of the latest actions undertaken by the EU, within the democratic 
governance partnership of the JAESP framework, are the provision of €1 million to 
the AU’s Electoral Assistance Fund; €2.7 million to the APRM and some €2 million 
to the UNDP-managed Trust Fund aimed at supporting APRM secretariat and some 
of its national structures125. 
                                                            
123 European Commission, 2001 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament: The European Union’s role in promoting human rights and 
democratisation in third countries’, pp.139-157. 
124 i.e. Crawford, G 2006 ‘The European Union and Strengthening Civil Society in Africa’, in 
Lister, M, Carbone, M (eds.) 2006 ‘New Pathways in International Development: Gender and 
Civil Society in EU Policy’, Ashgate, Aldershot, p.149; Arts, K 2003 ‘Political Dialogue 
Requires Investment: Meeting the Human Rights Commitment of the Cotonou Agreement’, in 
ACP-EU Courier, issue No. 200, pp. 21-23; Nwobike, J 2005 ‘The Application of Human 
Rights in African Caribbean and Pacific-European Union Development and Trade 
Partnership’, in German Law Journal, Volume 06, Issue No. 10, pp.1381-1406; etc. 
125 European Commission, 2010 ‘Memo/10: Africa-EU Relations – Key Facts and Figures’, 
Brussels, p.2. 
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THE EU’S REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE AGENDA IN AFRICA 
‘[R]egional integration, if implemented properly, will build 
markets where economies of scale, return on investment, and 
enhanced domestic competition become really meaningful and 
stimulate economic growth and employment’126. 
EU’s external relations policy includes support for and promotion of regional 
integration with the world. Such policy is as well greatly supported by the fact that 
other parts of the world see in the EU a successful model of regional integration, 
which in their terms has fuelled demands for EU political and financial assistance. 
This has led to the EU being seen as a ‘natural supporter’127 for such policies. Thus 
the EU, according to the ‘logic of appropriateness’128, and concerning the regional 
integration behaves in a way it believes it is expected from her.  
Next to the support provided in promoting integration at a pan-African level, done 
through/with the AU, as this entire chapter points out at, the EU is also actively 
supporting the institutionalisation of SROs in Africa. The CPA is the most prominent 
instrument for regional integration and at the time was seen as the ‘most advanced 
and comprehensive [South-North] development cooperation agreement [… going] 
hand-in-hand with ownership and mutual confidence’129. The CPA rests on three 
pillars: encouraging the political dialogue, assisting countries and regions with 
development and economic cooperation and promoting the negotiation of bi-regional 
free trade agreements. Article 28 presents the general approach, through which the 
EU affirms her assistance in achieving African owned objectives and priorities in the 
                                                            
126 Address by Peter Mandelson, EU Trade Commissioner, at the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary 
Assembly, Bamako, 19 April 2005, p.2, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/ 
2005/april/tradoc_122653.pdf, last accessed on 08.11.2009.  
127 Pietrangeli, G 2009 ‘Supporting Regional Integration and Cooperation Worldwide: An 
Overview of the European Union Approach’, in de Lombaerde, P, Schulz, M (eds.) 2009 ‘The 
EU and World Regionalism: The Makability of Regions in the 21st Century’, Ashgate, Surrey, 
p.9. 
128 Allison, G, Zelikow P 1999 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis‘, 
Longman, NY; March, J, G, Olsen, J, P 1989 ‘Rediscovering Institutions: The Organisational 
Basis of Politics’, The Free Press, NY. 
129 Quotations from Paul Nielsen, the then EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian 
Aid. 
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context of regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration, by i.e. fostering 
gradual integration in the world economy, accelerating diversification as well as 
economic cooperation and development, promoting free movement of persons, goods 
and services130. Further articles, which focus on regional economic integration, are 
Article 22 (macro-economic and structural reforms and policies), Article 29 (regional 
economic integration) and Article 30 (regional cooperation). Articles 6 to 14 of 
Annex IV attached to the CPA refer as well to regional integration. 
Another important feature of the EU’s promotion of regional integrations, as 
expressed through CPA’s Article 35, is that ‘economic and trade cooperation shall 
build on regional integration initiatives of ACP states bearing in mind that regional 
integration is a key instrument for the integration of ACP countries into the world 
economy’131. Article 35 is important, for it points out that for the EU the support for 
regional integration is not an end in itself but is rather an intermediary step to foster 
the integration of developing and transition economies into the global market132. 
Under these terms, the CPA heralds a new dimension in the North-South 
Cooperation, in a time when regional integration became one of the main goals 
aimed by the African leaders, as by the way best mirrored through the creation of the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). 
 By 2002, though, the CPA partners had to accept that their partnership had produced 
rather disappointing results concerning the integration of ACP economies into the 
world market: 
‘Despite our common efforts, the ACP market share in the EU - its 
main export market by far - has shrunk dramatically. The wider 
                                                            
130 ACP-EC, 2003 ‘Partnership Agreement’, Art.28. ‘Cooperation shall provide effective 
assistance to achieve the objectives and priorities, which countries have set for themselves in 
the context of regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration [...] In this context 
cooperation support shall aim to a) foster the gradual integration of ACP States into the world 
economy; b) accelerate economic cooperation and development both within and between the 
regions of the ACPs states; c) promote the free movements of persons, goods, capital services, 
labour and technology among ACP countries; d) accelerate diversification of the economies 
of the ACP states and coordination and harmonisation of regional and sub-regional 
cooperation policies; e) promote and expand inter and intra-ACP trade and with third 
countries’ 
131 ACP-EC, 2003 ‘Partnership Agreement’, Art.35. 
132 Pietrangeli, G 2009 ‘Supporting Regional Integration and Cooperation Worldwide: An 
Overview of the European Union Approach’, p.9. 
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picture is no better: Africa’s share of world trade dropped from 
around 6 per cent in 1980 to 2 per cent in 2002’133. 
Such sobering view created the background context of the decision to stand up the 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), meant to succeed CPA. Another reason 
behind the decision to stand up EPAs was provided by the fact that the ACP-EU 
relationship was a preferential-based one, therefore by definition it discriminated on 
others not included in it. Thus, within the framework of the CPA, as written down in 
Article 36, the ACP and EU agreed to conclude new WTO compatible trading 
arrangements, who would count for the progressive removal of trade barriers as well 
as enhancing cooperation in all areas relevant to trade. Furthermore, Article 37 of the 
CPA saw the regional bodies (RECs) as the accurate media through which EPAs may 
be negotiated; it further elucidates the procedure for these new South-South-North 
negotiations, envisioned to be concluded after a five year preparatory period starting 
by September 2002 and scheduled to enter in force by 1st January 2008. Through the 
EPAs is aimed the expansion of liberalisation of services and trade‐related issues 
(investment, public procurement, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, etc) in a time 
when WTO requires it only in terms of trade in goods. 
EPAs are based on four pillars: partnership, regional integration, development and 
link to the WTO134. Their main objectives, as indicated at the Cotonou Agreement, 
are to: achieve an ACP‐EU free trade area based in reciprocity, in line with Article 
24 GATT135, through the gradual elimination of trade restrictions. Countries, though, 
are allowed to exclude some products in liberalising their markets access offer136; 
promotion of sustainable development and poverty reduction through supporting the 
integration of ACP within the world trading system and at the same time their own 
                                                            
133 Address by Peter Mandelson, EU Trade Commissioner, at the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary 
Assembly, Bamako, 19 April 2005, p.1.  
134 As stated in the DG Trade website, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/ 
regions/acp/nepa_en.htm, last accessed on 11.09.2009 
135 Article 24 GATT concerns the liberalisation ‘of substantially all trade’ in goods ‘in a 
reasonable length of time’. For more information see: http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/ 
index.php?loc=epa/background.php, last accessed on 12.09.2009. 
136 ACP-EC, 2003 ‘Partnership Agreement’, Art.37. 
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regional integration137; ensuring through the EPAs a further step towards regional 
integration, since following this is seen as the first step towards integration within the 
world trading system138; and take into account the different levels of development 
that exist between the ACP countries. For these reasons EPAs are envisioned to 
possess great flexibility in order to provide special and differentiated treatment to the 
concerned countries139. The EU, in terms of the liberalisation commitments, agrees to 
a 100% elimination of tariffs of almost all goods imported from the ACP countries 
(exception transitional periods for rice and sugar) and some 80% of imports from the 
ACP countries over a period of fifteen years140. The ACP countries were initially 
divided into six regional groupings, four being in SSA, then eventually a seventh 
regional grouping was added – the East African Community (EAC) – bringing so the 
number to seven, five of which are in SSA: West Africa/ECOWAS & Union 
Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA); Central Africa / Communauté 
Économique et Monétaire des États d’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC); East and South 
Africa/Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); East African 
Community/EAC; and Southern African Development Community/SADC141. 
EPAs, however, have been surrounded by a great amount of criticism, be it within 
the academia as well as within the partner countries. African countries rejected EPAs 
on the grounds of fearing a loss of custom revenues, which do constitute something 
like a quarter of African state revenues, as well as business feared unfair competition 
from subsidized European imports142. Thus, at the Lisbon summit, coinciding with 
                                                            
137 Ibid., Art.34. 
138 Ibid., Art.35.2. 
139 Ibid., Art.35. 
140 For more information see: http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/index.php?loc=epa/back ground.php, 
last accessed on 12.09.2009. 
141 For more information see: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/ economic-
partnerships/negotiations-and-agreements, last accessed on 12.09.2009; Bilal, S, Stevens, C 
(Eds.) 2009 ‘The Interim Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and African 
States: Contents, challenges and prospects’, in Policy Management Report 17, ECDPM, 
Maastricht, available at: http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/ 
0/B6CB574AC6DA08AAC125760400322BDE/$FILE/pmr17-def.pdf, last accessed on 
12.09.2009 
142 Johnson, D 2008 ‘How Europe Lost Africa’, in Spiegel Online International, available at: 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,537699,00.html, accessed on 12.09.2009. 
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the deadline for the WTO waiver, no concluding agreement was reached143. The 
initial intent not to negotiate through the AU but with individual states grouped by 
sub-regions was furthered after the failure to abide by the WTO deadline, so the EU 
initialled negotiations with individual countries. By doing so it breached the very 
rationale the EU proclaims to pursue integration in Africa as well as snubbed her 
natural pan-continental partner of choice in Africa, the AU. This undoubtedly counts 
for a weakening of EU’s normative claims in preferring a ‘pick and choose attitude’ 
rather than ‘finding solutions within a multilateral setting’.   
Apart from EPAs, the EU has offered the Everything But Arms (EBA) for 49 Least 
developed Countries (LDCs), which provides with Duty Free Quota Free (DFQF) 
access for all products except, as the name says it, for arms and ammunitions. While 
for others, the EU offers the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), which is 
seen, though, as offering less favourable conditions144. In June 2005, the EU 
introduced the ‘GSP+’, with the aim of providing development aid within GSP but 
under certain conditions.  
‘Whenever an individual country's performance on the EU market 
over a three-year period exceeds or falls below a set threshold, 
preferential tariffs are either suspended or re-established. This 
graduation mechanism is only relevant for GSP and GSP+ 
preferences: LDC access under EBA is not at all 
affected. Graduation is triggered when a country becomes 
competitive in one or more product groups and is therefore 
considered no longer to be in need of the preferential tariff rates – it 
is a sign of growing export success!’145 
Developing countries had to have ratified a number of international agreements such 
as the Kyoto Protocol. Although certain circles among representatives of African 
                                                            
143 ‘Reviewing the Africa-EU Lisbon Summit: No to EPAs’, in The Africa Research Bulletin, 
Volume 44, Issue No. 12, on 15 January 2008. 
144 Detailed information is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wideragenda/development/ 
generalised-system-of-preferences/, last accessed on 07.08.2010. 
145 European Commission: Trade – Development – Generalised System of Preferences, available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/generalised-system-of-preferences/, 
last accessed on 25.08.2010.  
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countries, see the EU conditions as an expression of ‘new colonialism’, the kind of 
such programmes goes in perfect line with the EU’s aspirations as a 
civilian/normative power, for such conditionality is considered as a ‘structural aid’ 
measure, providing developing countries with incentives to meet international 
obligations. 
 
THE EU MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AGENDA IN AFRICA 
The new millennium brought with it the recognition that the paradigm that became 
known under the name of the ‘Washington Consensus’146 was finally dead, and its 
subsequent ‘Post-Washington Consensus’147 which takes a deeper look at the 
connections between development, trade and the role of governments, is at least 
incomplete148. Sings of the ailing paradigm, have been evident since the early 1990s, 
when as a counterweight to the World Bank’s annual World Development Reports, 
the UNDP started to publish its Human Development Reports, which pointed out that 
the approach based on market-oriented policies has failed to deliver results on the 
                                                            
146 The term was coined by the economist John Williamson in a conference in Washington DC, 
where he outlined what he thought to be the standard reform package, which the Washington 
D.C. –based institutions, such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), ought to promote in their policies towards the developing countries. His 1994 version 
was concerned with ten macro-economic and financial management topics such as fiscal and 
monetary policy, trade and the regulatory framework. For more see: Williamson, J 1989, 
‘What Washington Means by Policy Reform’, in Williamson, J (ed.) ‘Latin American 
Readjustment: How Much Has Happened’, Institute for International Economics, Washington 
D.C., available at: http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/ paper.cfm?researchid=486, last 
accessed on 28.12.2009. For more on the ‘Washington Consensus’ in general consult, for 
example, The Center for International Development, Harvard University, available at: 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ cidtrade/issues/washington.html, last accessed on 28.12.2009    
147 Joseph Stiglitz pinpointed at the fact that consensus cannot be made only in Washington D.C., 
that there is a need for a framework which is flexible to the circumstances of concerned 
countries, and that a greater emphasis should be put at issues concerning equity and 
employment as well as especially at a more balanced relationship between the role of 
governments and markets.For more on the ‘Post-Washington Consensus’, see: Stiglitz, J 1998 
‘Towards a New Paradigm for Development: Strategies, Policies, Processes’. Delivered at the 
UNCTAD 9th Raul Prebisch Lecture, 19 October 1998, UNCTAD, NY; Stiglitz, J 2002 
‘Globalisation and Its Discontents’, W.W. Norton & Company, NY; Stiglitz, J 2005 ‘The 
Post Washington Consensus Consensus’ in Initiative for Policy Dialogue, Carnegie Council, 
NY, available at: http://www.policyinnovations.org/innovators/organizations/data /00126, last 
accessed on 28.12.2009. 
148 Cited in Maxwell, S 2005 ‘The Washington Consensus is Dead! Long Live the Meta-
Narrative!‘, Working Paper 243, Overseas Development Institute, London, p.1  
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betterment of many people’s life, and it forwarded its sustainable human 
development approach, which to say it in their own words ‘Human Development is a 
development paradigm that is much more than the rise and fall of national 
incomes’149. This approach is a people-centred paradigm, based on participation, 
ownership as well as on a more equal partnership between developing countries and 
aid donors150 as compared to the top-down, outside-experts of the former. Through 
this approach, in itself an all-encompassing framework is made a connection between 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), nationally owned poverty reduction 
strategies, harmonized aid and good governance practices. Security problems are also 
included into the rationale, especially in those cases when failing or failed states are 
of concern. Here it is thought that humanitarian aid is the best support as well as, in 
selected cases, security interventions may be the appropriate approach.   
It is within this framework that the EU has staged and anchored its development 
policies towards the Global South and in particular towards Africa. Issues such as the 
people-centeredness, participation, ownership, equal partnership, but not only, are 
nowadays, all important parts of the concerned EU policies towards Africa. An 
important step in EU’s development policy has been the 2005 ‘European Consensus 
on Development’ (ECD)151, a policy statement which put the poverty eradication at 
the centre of EU’s development policy. It identified shared values and principles 
upon which the EU MS and EC will implement their development policies, by 
focusing especially on three main issues: the achievement of MDGs which ‘will help 
meet other challenges such as sustainable development, HIV/AIDS, security, conflict 
prevention, forced migration, etc., to bring about equitable globalisation’; a 
development based on Europe’s democratic values; and the third component put a 
crucial importance on the ownership of countries concerned. In this policy statement, 
in order to achieve the above-mentioned goals, the EU makes a commitment to raise 
the ODA to 0.56 per cent by 2010 putting herself on the best track to achieve the UN 
                                                            
149 UNDP, http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/, last accessed on 28.12.2009 
150 UNDP, http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/reports/, last accessed on 28.12.2009 
151 European Parliament, Council, Commission, 2005 ‘2006/C 46/01: Joint Statement by the 
Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the 
Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development 
Policy: ‘The European Consensus’’, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/re 
pository/european_consensus_2005_en.pdf, last accessed on 25.09.2008.  
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target of 0.7 per cent by 2015: half of the additional aid will be earmarked for Africa. 
The EU collectively is the world’s biggest donor, covering some 56 per cent of the 
global figure, showing an almost doubling of the figure since the MDGs were 
adopted to reach by 2008 some €50 billion.  
In these terms, in achieving the MGD 1: reduction of poverty and hunger, the EU has 
committed to respect the principle of ownership by aligning its aid to national 
strategies and procedures and further by providing aid more efficiently through better 
coordination, since there seem to be room for gains (between €3 - €6 billion 
annually)152. Food security is considered as another important step in achieving 
MDG 1. The EU has established a new EC Food Facility, through which it has 
mobilised some €1 billion. Of that figure €560 million are earmarked for Africa. 
There are other instruments which concern food security, such as EDF/B-envelope153 
that provides some €200 million to approximately 30 African countries, as well as 
the Food Security thematic programme with an annual budget of approximately €220 
million of which 40 percent is allocated to Africa. Here again comes to light the 
‘distinct civilian/normative nature’ of the EU by preferring arrangements at the 
supra-national / sub-regional level such as support in the form of fund mobilisation 
of over €45 million provided to the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa 
(FARA) and other sub-regional organisations. 
Concerning the MDG2-Education, the EU collectively remains the main donor to 
international education ‘Education For All’ (EFA) initiative, providing some 90 per 
cent of the $1.6 billion pledged for the period 2003-2013154. 21 of the 30 countries 
who participate are African. The EU has funded within her human 
development/education the Erasmus Mundus and the Julius Nyerere student 
                                                            
152 Cited in European Commission, 2010, ‘Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the 
Committee of the Regions: A twelve Point EU Action Plan in Support of the Millennium 
Development Goals’, EC, Brussels, p.5, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/ 
repository/COMM_COM_2010_0159_MDG_EN.PDF, last accessed on 25.04.2010.  
153 This envelope covers unforeseen needs such as emergency assistance not financeable from 
regular EU budget; contributions to international agreed debt relief initiatives; whereas 
envelope A covers long-term programmable development operations. 
154 More information available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ 
EXTEDUCATION/0,,contentMDK:20374062~menuPK:540090~pagePK:148956~piPK:2166
18~theSitePK:282386,00.html, last accessed on 25.06.2010. 
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exchange programmes. The last one focuses exclusively on student exchanges 
between universities in EU and ACP countries by supporting up to 250 student-years 
of mobility/exchanges annually155. EDULINK is another instrument concerning the 
ACP countries through which in its first phase from 2006-2008 involved some €30 
million, financed through the 9th EDF intra-ACP envelope156. Within the JAESP 
framework, it has been agreed to support collaboration at the regional level between 
SADC and EAC on ‘quality management of education and linkage between 
education and economic growth strategies’157.  
Gender equality was also identified by the EU’s Consensus on Development (ECD) 
as a core part of all policy strategies158. In 2007 the EC and consecutively the 
Council deliberated on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in 
Development Cooperation159 by stressing the close inter-linkages between 
sustainable achievements in poverty reduction, development and the empowerment 
of women. Financing has been provided through the country cooperation strategies 
and through the thematic instrument ‘Investing in People’. The last one has provided 
since 2007 some €3 million annually and for the period 2007-2013 is foreseen a 
budget of €57 million. The EU has heavily engaged itself also with the fourth, fifth 
and the sixth MDGs which concern health issues160. For instance, the EC alone has 
                                                            
155 More information available at: http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/9interventionareas/ 
humandev/humandeveduc5_en.cfm, last accessed on 25.11.2009. 
156 More on EDULINK at: http://www.acp-edulink.eu/en/help/about-edulink.html, last accessed 
on 25.11.2009 
157 Quoted in the Africa-EU Millennium Development Goals Partnership, available at: 
http://africa-eu-partnership.org/partnerships/millennium-development-goals, last accessed on 
25.05.2010. 
158 More on EU’s focus on gender equality is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/ 
development/policies/crosscutting/genderequ_en.cfm, last accessed on 23.11.2009. 
159 Respectively: European Commission, 2007 ‘Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council: Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in 
Development Cooperation’, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? 
uri=CELEX:52007DC0100:EN:HTML; Council of the European, 2007 ‘Council Conclusions 
on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Development Cooperation’, available at: 
http://register.consilium. europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st09/st09561.en07.pdf, both last accessed on 
23.11.2009. 
160 More on EU’s focus on global health see, for instance European Commission, 2010 
‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
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provided €100 million annually to the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria (GFATM), as well in 2008 in committed some €9,5 million to the Global 
Fund for Vaccines and Immunisation. Africa receives some 60 percent of these 
funds. EU’s work in close cooperation with the AU representatives, civil societies 
and international partners, especially the World Health Organisation (WHO), 
testimonies once more her civilian/normative preference for international 
arrangements in finding solutions to health problems in Africa.  
 
THE EU ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE AGENDA IN AFRICA 
‘If the Millennium Development Goals – particularly poverty 
eradication - are to be met, people everywhere need access to 
modern, affordable energy services. This is the goal of the EU 
energy initiative’161. 
Such stance counts for the higher priority that energy and climate change have 
acquired within the EU’s development policy. It was in 2002, when within the 
framework of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD)162, the EU 
MS and the EC jointly launched the EU Energy Initiative for Poverty Eradication and 
Sustainable Development (EUEI)163. Its aim is three fold: to raise political awareness 
among high level decision-makers; promote coherence and synergies on energy-
related activities; and draw new resources in terms of capital, human, and technology 
from all involved and concerned parties be they financial institutions, private sector, 
civil society and/or end-users. Ownership by the partner country and local 
participation are seen as EUEI’s key features164. In 2003, the Nairobi meeting 
                                                                                                                                                                        
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The EU Role 
in Global Health’, EC, Brussels, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/ 
repository/COMM_PDF_COM_2010_0128_EN.PDF, last accessed on 23.05.2010. 
161 Cited from the EC’s Development policies official website:  http://ec.europa.eu/development/ 
policies/9interventionareas/waterenergy/energy/energy_en.cfm, last accessed on 20.04.2010. 
162 For more on the Johannesburg Summit 2002 see: http://www.johannesburgsummit. 
org/html/prep_process/africa.html, last accessed on 15.03.2008. 
163 More information of EUEI is available at: http://www.euei.net/about-euei; http://www.euei-
pdf.org/africa-eu-energy-partnership.html, both last accessed on 15.03.2010. 
164 Ibid. 
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‘Energy for Africa’165 was a milestone on the EUEI dialogue with Africa. The 
Nairobi Conference set the priorities for the EUEI, which included: rural 
electrification, a stronger focus on national and regional strategies and policies and 
capacity building at all levels. The ‘Energy for Africa’ has had several follow up 
conferences and workshops such as those in Ouagadougou in 2004, which 
concentrated on energy in West Africa, followed by those in Maputo in 2005 for 
Southern and Eastern Africa and that in Brazzaville also in 2005 which focused on 
energy policy in Central Africa. The EC proposed166 in 2004 a financial instrument 
to be named the ACP-EU Energy Facility, which was consequently approved by the 
joint ACP-EU Council of Ministers in 2005, initially credited with some €220 
million167. Another financial instrument is the Intelligent Energy COOPENER 
established in 2003, with a budget of approximately €17 million and concerning 
some 40 countries in SSA, Latin America and Asia168. The EUEI Partnership 
Dialogue Facility (EUEI PDF) is another joint instrument of EC and some EU MS 
aiming at supporting developing countries, mainly in SSA. The EU-Africa 
Infrastructure Trust Fund, was launched in 2007 and dotted with some €383,7 
million so far concerning 47 eligible SSA countries169.   
One of the partnerships agreed at the Lisbon summit in 2007 was the Africa-Europe 
Energy Partnership (AEEP), which is to be understood as a forum and ‘long-term 
                                                            
165 A detailed information on the proceedings of the Nairobi conference can be found at: EUEI, 
2003 ‘Proceedings of the EUEI Energy for Africa Event, Nairobi, 20-21 November 2003’, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/EUEI_proceedings_Nairobi_ 
2003_en.pdf, last accessed on 15.03.2008 
166 EC, 2004 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
on the Future Development of the EU Energy Initiative and the Modalities for the 
Establishment of an Energy Facility for ACP Countries’, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/deve 
lopment/icenter/repository/COMM_PDF_COM_2004_0711_F_EN_ACTE.pdf, last accessed 
on 15.03.2008 
167 Detailed information of ACP-EU Energy Facility I can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/ 
europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/energy/energy-facility-formercalls/former_calls_e 
n.htm, last accessed on 15.03.2008 
168 Detailed information of COOPENER can be found at: http://www.euei.net/activities, as well 
as EC 2007 ‘COOPENER Energy Services for Poverty Alleviation in Developing Countries: 
24 Projects for Sustainable Energy Services in Sub-Saharan Africa’, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/intelligent/library/doc/ka_reports/ subsaharan_africa.pdf, both last 
accessed on 15.03.2008 
169 More on the Trust Fund can be found at: http://www.eu-africa-infrastructuretf.net/about/ 
index.htm, last accessed on 15.03.2008. 
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framework for structured political dialogue and cooperation between Africa and the 
EU on energy issues of strategic importance’. The AEEP is financed through the 
above mentioned financial instruments170. The EU, out of an ethics of 
responsibility171, has established herself in the leader’s role concerning global 
environmental protection172.  
‘As Europeans and as part of some of the wealthiest societies in the 
world, we are very conscious of our role and responsibilities’173. 
Elgström argues that the EU, because of the recognition of her expertise and 
economic power, exercises a high influence on African countries. Protection of the 
environment and especially climate change has increasingly become a part of the 
EU’s agenda in Africa, where the EU does not shy away from using adherence to 
international frameworks on environment and climate change as a conditional to her 
development and/or trade cooperation such as GSP+ mentioned above. Although, 
adherence to the Kyoto Protocol stigmatised the US opposition, it was coherent with 
the development interests of African countries, who sustain that there is an urgent 
need to address global warming and its consequences, such as desertification, since 
they have a considerable negative effect especially on the agriculture sector. The 
African continent believes its interests are better served when cooperating with the 
EU. For instance, the President of Tunisia during the Lisbon Summit in December 
2007, expressed a positive view of the cooperation between the European Union and 
the African Union and stressed ‘[t]he need to establish a long-term African-European 
partnership that helps our countries rationalize the use of energies extracted from oil 
                                                            
170 More on AEEP can be found at: http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/ partnerships/energy, 
last accessed on 15.03.2008. 
171 Elgström, O 2006 ‘Leader or Foot-Dragger: Perceptions of the European Union in 
Multilateral International negotiations’, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 
Stockholm. 
172 Lucarelli, S 2006 ‘Introduction: Values, Principles, Identity and European Union Foreign 
Policy’, in Lucarelli, S, Manners, I (eds.) 2006 ‘Values and Principles in European Union 
Foreign Policy’, p.3, Routledge, Oxon. 
173 European Commission, 2001 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions: Environment 2010: Our Future, Our Choice’, p.10, available at: 
http://www.czp.cuni.cz/knihovna/6eap/6eap_en.pdf, last accessed on 20.04.2008. 
167 
 
product, and promote the use of environment-preserving alternative energies’174. As 
a matter of fact the resulting document, JAES, links environmental protection and 
economic development by highlighting the need for a comprehensive approach to 
environmental protection and climate change. 
‘Africa-EU cooperation in this field will link positively with 
economic growth, job creation, social stability, and the building of 
capacities for adaptation to, and mitigation of, negative effects of 
climate change. It will address interrelated areas such as food 
security, sustainable agriculture and land management and will 
cover a vast number of interrelated areas and issues such as land 
degradation, desertification, the preservation of biodiversity, bio-
safety issues including GMOs, prevention of toxic waste dumping, 
environmentally sound waste management, sustainable use and 
management of natural resources including forest, fish stocks and 
integrated water management, weather observation and early 
warning systems to improve disaster risk management’175. 
Under these terms, out of the €20 million provided through the EC Multilateral 
Environment Agreements (MEA) programme with the ACP countries, some €3.3 
million were earmarked for the implementation and compliance with the 
international agreements on climate change, biodiversity, chemicals and 
desertification; another €20 million is provided under the 9th EDF in implementing 
the African Monitoring of Environment and Sustainable Development (AMESD)176. 
Under the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA)177, which aims at greater 
                                                            
174 Quotation from Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, President of the Republic of Tenisia, cited in 
Sicurelli, D ‘A Contested Model and Partner – The EU in the eyes of the African Union. A 
Report of the Forum Per i Problemi della Pace e della Guerra: Garnet Jointly Executed 
Research Project 5.2.1.’, p.24, available at: http://www.garnet-eu.org/fileadmin/docu 
ments/working_papers/0109/0109_11.pdf, last accessed on 12.01.2010. 
175 General Secretariat of the European Council, 2008 ‘The Africa-European Union Strategic 
Partnership’, p.40, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/ 
PDF/EN_AFRICA_inter08.pdf, last accessed on 21.10.2008. 
176 Quotation from the JAESP joint website of AUC and EC at: http://www.africa-eupartner 
ship.org/partnerships/climate-change, last accessed on 21.06.2010. 
177 EC 2007 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 
Building a Global Climate Change Alliance between the European Union and poor 
developing countries most vulnerable to climate change’, available at: http://ec.euro 
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dialogue and exchange between the parties and provision of technical and financial 
support to developing countries, the EC as a start up package has pledged around 
€110 million. The intra-ACP funds of the EDF have earmarked some €40 million to 
the GCCA. For instance under this last instrument has provided COMESA and 
ECOWAS with each €4 million for capacity building purposes as well as better 
integration of climate change issues within the concerned strategies. 
By concluding on the EU’s energy and climate change agenda in Africa, the above 
analysed best mirrors EU’s civilian/normative nature for, as Hill argues, ‘civilian 
models’ –such as EU– rely on persuasion and negotiation in dealing with third 
parties, encouraging so regional cooperation with and within other parts of the world, 
supporting global and regional institution building. If, by arguing in Whitman’s 
terms, from looking at the vast variety of instruments the EU has at her disposal one 
might define the EU’s role it internationally plays, then the instruments used within 
the energy and climate change agenda in Africa are thoroughly normative in nature 
for they highlight the predilection for the use of economic and diplomatic measures 
and a preference to use persuasion, positive incentives and constructive 
engagement178. 
 
THE EU MIGRATION AGENDA IN AFRICA 
‘The EU's goal is to manage legal migration coherently and to 
address the root causes in countries with high emigration rates 
(especially low/middle-income countries)’179. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
pa.eu/development/icenter/repository/COMM_PDF_COM_2007_0540_F_EN_ALLIANCE_
MONDIALE.PDF, last accessed on 21.10.2009. More information on the GCCA can be 
found at: http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/9interventionareas/environment/climate/ 
climatechangealliance_en.cfm, last accessed on 12.06.2010. 
178 Whitman, R 1998 ‘From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the 
European Union’, p.235; Orbie, J 2003 ‘The EU as a Civilian Power: The Role of Trade 
Policy?’; Smith, K 2002 ‘Conceptualising the EU’s International identity: Sui Generis or 
Following the Latest Trends?’; Johnston, A, I 2001 ‘Treating international institutions as 
social environments’ 
179 European Commission, Migration and Development available at EC’s official website 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/9interventionareas/migration_en.cfm, last accessed 
on 20.08.2010 (original emphasis). 
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Concerning the root causes, migration is seen as being mainly originated by poverty, 
civil wars, violent conflicts and forced displacements. Africa as the continent of 
almost 300 million people living in abject poverty and the continent of endemic 
conflict and war is particularly hard hit by migration. To the above are added natural 
and other man-made disasters that cause a severe and lasting damage on the 
environment. Such environmental degradation deprives Africans of their livelihoods.  
Migration on this side on the Mediterranean is associated with discourses of fear and 
exclusion and EU is referred to as ‘fortress Europe’180. At the same time though, as 
certified by the first quotation of this section, the EU has attempted to approach 
migration comprehensively, by connecting it closely with developmental policies 
such as those concerning employment issues, governance and demographic 
developments. On October 2005 in Hampton Court, UK the EU Heads of State called 
for a comprehensive approach to tackle migration, by stating that ‘the Commission 
would develop a list of priority actions for improving global migration, with a special 
focus on the African region’181. Such list of priority actions addressed both the 
security and development issues related to immigration182. A couple of months later, 
the European Council deliberated on ‘The Global Approach to Migration’183, which 
it focused on Africa and Mediterranean and calls for working in partnership with 
countries and regional organisations in tackling legal and illegal migration, 
development, refugee protection and trafficking as well as for a greater coordination 
among EU policy areas such as external relations, development, employment and 
justice and home affairs. In these terms the EU has recognised the potential positive 
                                                            
180 While the notion itself was created by closely referring to trade concerns, nowadays is refers 
to immigration and asylum issues. For more on this see: Guiraundon, V 2004 ‘Immigration 
and Asylum: A High Politics Agenda’, in Cowles, M, Dinan, D 2004 ‘Developments in the 
European Union’, Palgrave, Houndmills, pp.160-80; Geddes, A 2000 ‘Immigration and the 
European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe’, Manchester University Press, Manchester. 
181 Quotation from President Barroso, cited in European Commission, 2005 ‘Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – Priority Actions for 
Responding to the Challenges of Migration: First Follow-Up to Hampton Court’ Brussels, 
p.2, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0621: 
FIN:EN:PDF, last accessed on 20.08.2010. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Council of the European Union, 2005 ‘Presidency Conclusion’, Brussels 15-16 December 
2005, pp.2-3, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/ 
en/ec/87642.pdf, last accessed on 20.08.2010. 
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role that it can contribute to development concerning remittances, skills 
transfer/’brain train’, limiting ‘brain drain’, and setting up of transnational 
networks184. A year after the EC underlined once more the close link that exists 
between migration and development, by stressing that ‘[t]he EU must recognise that 
creating jobs in developing countries could significantly reduce migratory pressure 
from Africa. Migrants should be supported in contributing to the development of 
their countries of origin’185. Migration remained a central topic at the Troika Meeting 
between ECOWAS and the EU in May 2006 and both parties stressed the need for 
close cooperation at the national, regional and continental level186. For instance, at 
the national level, regular political dialogue has been based on Article 13 of the 
CPA187.  
On 10-11 July 2006 at the Ministerial Euro-African Conference on Migration and 
Development and as expressed in its Rabat Declaration, partner countries agreed to 
focus on the central and west African migratory routes to Europe188 as well as it 
adopted an action plan laying out the concrete measures in tackling migration189. In 
November 2006 at Tripoli, was held the first continent to continent meeting ministers 
of foreign affairs, migration and development from EU MS, African states as well as 
                                                            
184 European Commission, 2005 ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Council, 
the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions – Migration and Development: Some Concrete Orientations’ http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005: 0390:FIN:EN:PDF, last accessed 
on 20.08.2010. 
185 European Commission, 2006 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament – The Global Approach to Migration One Year On: Towards a 
Comprehensive European Migration Policy’ Brussels, p.5, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/ 
development/icenter/repository/COMM_PDF_COM_2006_0735_F_EN_ACTE.pdf, last ac-
cessed on 20.08.2010. 
186 Council of the European Union, 2006 ‘Final Communiqué: 9th ECOWAS-EU Ministerial 
Troika Meeting, Vienna, 26 May 2006’, p.10, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/89735.pdf, last accessed on 20.08.2010. 
187 ACP-EC, 2003 ‘Partnership Agreement’, Art.13 
188 Ministerial Euro-African Conference on Migration and Development, 2006 ‘Euro-African 
Partnership for Migration and Development: Rabat Declaration’, available at: http://www. 
maec.gov.ma/migration/Doc/RABAT%20DECLARATION_EN.pdf, last accessed on 
20.08.2010. 
189 Ministerial Euro-African Conference on Migration and Development, 2006 ‘Action Plan’, 
available at: http://www.maec.gov.ma/migration/Doc/PA%20final%20EN.pdf, last accessed 
on 20.08.2010.  
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representatives from the EC and AUC. At this groundbreaking meeting, it was 
agreed to ‘facilitate mobility and free movement of people in Africa and the EU and 
to better manage legal migration between the two continents; To address the root 
causes of migration and refugee flows; To find concrete solutions to problems posed 
by illegal or irregular migratory flows; Address the problems of migrants residing in 
EU and African countries’190. 
On that same meeting it was agreed an ‘EU-Africa Plan of Action on Trafficking of 
Human Beings, Especially Women and Children’ aiming at effectively combat 
trafficking in human being, especially women and children; addressing the root 
causes of trafficking in countries of origin and of destination and to contribute to the 
empowerment of women and children191. On these same terms, but concerning the 
North African countries, on November 2007 in Algarve, was held the first Euro-
Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Migration192. A month later, at the second 
Africa-EU summit, and within the JAES, Africa and EU agreed the 7th Partnership 
on ‘Migration, Mobility and Employment’, which aims at providing 
‘holistic responses to the issues of Migration, Mobility and 
Employment in the interest of both partners, with the particular 
objectives to create more and better jobs for Africa and to better 
manage migration flows’193.  
                                                            
190 Official website of Africa and Europe in Partnership ‘Migration, Mobility and employment’, 
available at: http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/partnerships/ migration-mobility-and-
employment; a full text of the ‘Tripoli Declaration: Joint Africa-EU Declaration on 
Migration and Development’ can be found at: http://www.africa-eupartnership.org/sites/ 
default/files/AU-UE-22.11.06.pdf, last accessed on 20.08.2010. 
191 Ibid; a full text of the ‘Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Being, 
Especially Women and Children, As Adopted by the Ministerial Conference on Migration and 
Development, Tripoli, 22-23 November 2006’ can be found at: http://www.africa-eu-
partnership.org/sites/default/files/OUAGADOUGOU.pdf, last accessed on 20.08.2010.  
192 Portugal Presidency 2007 and EUROMED, 2007 ‘Agreed Ministerial Conclusions: First 
Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Migration, Algarve, 18-19 November 2007’, 
available at: http://www.eu2007.pt/NR/rdonlyres/8D86D66E-B37A-457E-9E4A-2D7AFF26 
43D9/0/20071119AGREEDCONCLUSIONSEuromed.pdf%5D, last accessed on 20.08.2010.  
193 Official website of Africa and Europe in Partnership ‘Migration, Mobility and employment’, 
available at: http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/partnerships/migration-mobility-and-emp 
loyment, last accessed on 20.08.2010. 
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Its action plan aims at implementing the Tripoli Declaration and Migration and 
Development, the EU-Africa Action of Plan on Trafficking of Human Beings –both 
mentioned above–, as well as Ouagadougou Declaration and Action Plan on 
Employment and Poverty Alleviation. This last one aims at ‘creat[ing] more, more 
productive and better jobs in Africa, in particular for youth and women in line with 
the UN ‘Decent Work for all’ Agenda’194. 
Apart from this political dialogue and good-willing declaration, if looking at the 
practices associated to migration and asylum, the picture is quite something else. For 
instance, in 2008 some 1861 migrants are known to have died in attempting to reach 
Europe, slightly better that the 2006 figure which counted 2088 dead195. EU’s image 
has been further stained by prosecuting, on grounds of ‘human trafficking’, Tunisian 
and Italian fishermen who rescued migrants at sea. Another less honouring practice 
has been the fact that the EU, nowadays, relies increasingly on North African 
countries, such as Algeria and Libya, to curb migration flows from SSA to Europe. 
Such reliance has caused an outcry among particularly human rights NGOs and 
CSOs who point at the inhumane treatment illegal African migrants are faced with in 
these countries once they get caught by the respective authorities. Such breaches 
have, though, not blocked the EU to pursue business deals with i.e. Libyan’s Qaddafi 
in a time when SSA countries undergo intense scrutiny concerning issues of human 
rights violations and democracy. This has undeniably produced an image that 
sustains the thesis of a double-standard EU. 
In concluding on EU’s migration agenda in Africa, it can be said that, while at the 
one side, the EU’s preference for multilateral settings where such issues can be 
discussed points out at her distinct nature as a civilian/normative power, it 
nevertheless, the negative and exclusionary discourses and practices associated to the 
migration and asylum, do point at the opposite of what, at least theoretically, a 
civilian/normative power does, for, as argued by Bretherton and Vogler, 
                                                            
194 Official website of Africa and Europe in Partnership ‘Migration, Mobility and employment’, 
available at: http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/partnerships/ migration-mobility-and-
employment; a full text of the ‘Ouagadougou Declaration and Action Plan on Employment 
and Poverty Alleviation’ can be found at: http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/ 
default/files/declaration_on_employment_and_poverty_alleviation.pdf, last accessed on 
20.08.2010. 
195 Data from the NGO Fortress Europe, cited in Johnson, D 2008 ‘How Europe Lost Africa’. 
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‘[p]ractices are evidently inconsistent with the inclusive, value-
based understandings on the EU [...] which have been so strongly 
promoted by EU officials’196. 
 
EU’S STANCE ON CHINA INTO AFRICA 
‘It is good for China, Africa and Europe, because in this process 
China has gained room to develop itself, Africa has got new 
investment and Europe has been stimulated to be competitive’197. 
The political dialogue between EU and China was institutionalised through the EU-
China Annual Summits since 1998, but it was not until 2006, when the European 
Commission through a Communiqué, laid down the principles upon which such 
dialogue has to evolve concerning Africa. Some of the main points were: engaging in 
a structured dialogue on Africa’s sustainable development; support of regional 
efforts to improve governance in Africa; as well as better integrate China into the 
international efforts for improved aid efficiency, coordination and opportunities for 
practical bilateral cooperation on the ground198. The EU wishes to intensify 
cooperation with China, but at the same time argues that this would mean greater 
responsibilities and expectations from China. Reference is most obviously made to 
i.e. China’s policy of ‘trade only, no politics’ in Africa199. 
The situation in practice is somehow different from the rhetoric used, albeit the 
common concerns that all three parties share, namely, development, peace and 
                                                            
196 Bretherton, C, Vogler, J 2006 ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’, 2nd Edition, 
Routledge, London and NY, p.40. 
197 Quotation from Jacques Chirac, cited in ChinaView 2007 ‘Chirac Says China-Africa 
Cooperation Benefits Europe’, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/12/ 
content_7234430.htm, last accessed on 20.08.2010. 
198 European Commission 2006 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament: EU-China: Closer Partners, growing Responsibilities’, available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52006DC0631:EN:NOT, 
last accessed on 20.08.2010. 
199 European Parliament, 2008 ‘China’s Policy and its effect on Africa: European Parliament 
Resolution of 23 April 2008’, available at; http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_20 
09/documents/dv/d-cn20080602_09/D-CN20080602_09en.pdf, last accessed on 20.08.2010. 
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political stability. One of the reasons for it are the different models of development. 
While EU focuses more on the strategic goals of its policies in Africa, China in a 
more pragmatically approach, focuses on the process200. Notwithstanding this China 
argues, as an author sustains, ‘that what might appear to be crass commercial moves 
are actually the result of careful thinking about mutually beneficial activities’201. 
China sustains that her engagement with Africa evolves within the ‘South-to-South 
cooperation’ framework and prefers it to evolve within bilateral frameworks rather 
than multilateral initiatives, which are perceived as western-driven. In these terms, 
China is perceived by Africans as better understanding their development needs, and 
‘as a welcome alternative to Western ‘white man’s burden’ policies’202.  
Nevertheless, as the EC claims, ‘closer co-operation on international development 
issues would benefit the EU, China and partners in the developing world. There are 
significant downsides if we are not able to co-ordinate effectively, particularly in 
Africa [...]’203. Under these premises, the European Commission proposed in October 
2008 a tripartite cooperation and dialogue between EU, China and Africa204.  
‘[…] China has become a factor and accelerator in European 
considerations about reorienting the EU-Africa Partnership. [...] 
                                                            
200 DGAP 2008 ‘Common Interests – Common Action: strategies and initiatives of the European 
Union and China towards Africa’, p. 3, available at: http://en.dgap.org/midcom-
serveattachmentguid-1dd21ba80cf4aa021ba11ddb8d03f1362f9483a483a/DGAP%20ECFR-A 
siaCentre_EU-China%20in%20Africa_Conference%20 Report%2008.pdf, last accessed on 
20.08.2010 
201 Van der Walle, N, 2010 ‘Book review: The Dragon’s Gilft: The Real Story of China in 
Africa’, in Foreign Affairs, Volume 89, Issue No.1. 
202 Berger, B, Wissenbach, U 2007 ‘EU-China-Africa Trilateral Development Cooperation: 
Common Challenges and New Directions’, in Discussion Paper 21/2007, German 
Development Institute, Bon, p.3 available at: http://www.die-gdi.de/CMSHomepage/openweb 
cms3.nsf/%28ynDK_contentByKey%29/ADMR-7BRFHU/$FILE/BergerWissenbachEU-Chi 
na-Africa.pdf, last accessed on 20.08.2010. 
203 European Commission 2008 ‘Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions of 17 October 2008: The EU, Africa and China: Towards trilateral dialogue and 
cooperation’, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX: 
52008DC0654:EN:NOT, last accessed on 20.08.2010. 
204 European Commission 2006 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament: EU-China: Closer Partners, growing Responsibilities’, available at: ht 
tp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52006DC0631:EN:NOT, last 
accessed on 20.08.2010. 
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The traditional donor-recipient relationship will be transformed 
into a new kind of partnership. This new kind of partnership is 
designed to respond to common global and regional challenges and 
no longer focuses on a unidirectional –primarily charity-based– 
approach to development cooperation’205. 
Although, it has to be added that while China policies in Africa did not prompt the 
development of the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership, it nevertheless, added new 
impetus206. 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON EU’S 21ST CENTURY AGENDA IN AFRICA 
This chapter started by looking at the main milestones that characterised the EU 
policy towards Africa. In this revue of the first eight years of the last decade of EU 
into Africa, it has become clear that considerable progress has been made. Due to her 
colonial past and her geographic vicinity to Africa, as well as to changes in both 
continents, EU has committed herself to substantial engagement in all sectors of 
cooperation with Africa. In short, in can be said that the EU has been on the look for 
a deepening and widening of the already close cooperation with Africa. The Cairo 
Process led the way but nevertheless remained vague, while the European Union’s 
Africa strategy of 2005 was an important step on the way but offered little guidance 
for the day-to-day relations. The last move –JAESP– provides the needed framework 
within which among others a more coherent and a most efficient agenda are aimed at 
being put at practice. Every possible field is included in the given strategy and the 
degree of the political commitment has never been as high as at present.  
The EU’s unique institutional set-up, such as her legal order and decision-making 
structure, contributes to her ‘distinctive nature’207. The ‘particular new and different 
                                                            
205 Berger, B, Wissenbach, U 2007 ‘EU-China-Africa Trilateral Development Cooperation: 
Common Challenges and New Directions’, p.4. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Whitman, R 1998 ‘From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the 
European Union’, Macmillan, Basingstoke, p.235 
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form of hybridy’, as well the ‘experimental and innovative nature of the EU that 
enables it to respond to multiple agendas and Europe’s diversity in a flexible 
manner’208, makes it normatively different’209. As international political processes 
are increasingly characterized by fluidity, complexity and multi-level games, and as 
actors cannot always rely on traditional power assets, EU’s complex multi-level 
governance system accounts for making it ‘particularly well equipped to grasp and 
utilise the potential of multilateral network organisations’210. The exceptionality or 
uniqueness of the EU is due also to the peculiar configuration of her external policy 
instruments211. The vast wealth of literature available, has consistently pointed out 
that the EU has a predilection for the use of economic and diplomatic instruments, 
instead of military ones. Recent literature highlights the preference to use persuasion 
and positive incentives, rather than coercion, as well as preference for constructive 
engagement rather than isolation212, but also the use of other tools such as shaming 
and opprobrium213. In concluding, there is, therefore, a symbiotic relation between 
values and external policies determining so the nature of the processes which 
emphasise 
‘diplomatic rather than coercive instrument, the centrality of 
mediation in conflict resolution, the importance of long-term 
economic solutions to political problems, and the need for 
                                                            
208 Laffan, B, O´Donnell, R, Smith, M 2000 ‘Europe’s Experimental Union. Rethinking 
Integration’, Routledge, London, p.189 
209 Manners, I 2002 ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, pp.249-240. 
210 Elgström, O, Strömvik, M 2004 ‘The EU as an external actor’, in Elgström, O, Jönsson, C 
(eds.) 2004 ‘European Union Negotiations: Processes, Institutions, Networks’, Routledge, 
London. 
211 Whitman claims that the international role of the EU may be conceived in terms of the 
instruments available to the Union. Whitman, R 1998 ‘From Civilian Power to Superpower? 
The International Identity of the European Union’, p.235 
212 For more see: Orbie, J 2003 ‘The EU as a Civilian Power: The Role of Trade Policy?’, Paper 
presented at the EUSA 8th Biennial International Conference, Nashville, Tennessee, 27-29 
March; Smith, K 2002 ‘Conceptualising the EU’s International identity: Sui Generis or 
Following the Latest Trends?’, Paper presented at the First Pan-European Conference on 
European Union Politics, Bordeaux, 26-28 September. 
213 Johnston, A, I 2001 ‘Treating international institutions as social environments’, in 
International Studies Quarterly, Volume 45, Issue No. 4, pp.487-515. 
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indigenous people to determine their fate – all of these in 
contradistinction to the norms of superpower politics’214. 
The EU can so rely on a much wider range of policy instruments than any other 
actor215. Nevertheless, it is, much more difficult to argue that the EU is unique in 
promoting normative ambitions, as it is eminently clear that the US, and many other 
actors, share and pursue similar normative goals. So it is rather the vague notion that 
the EU ‘so far has represented something different from states in the international 
system in that it has not been an actor that only is guided by its self-interest’216 that 
possibly makes the EU special. Each of the policies analysed above are integrated 
within the development cooperation programmes, and do point –in stark contrast and 
as a counterweight to the US–, at an EU, which is to be taken as ‘a model and 
promoter of values, an alternative approach to international relations, based upon 
networks of communication and cooperation rather than expressions of military 
power and political domination217. 
  
                                                            
214 Johnston, A, I 2001 ‘Treating international institutions as social environments’, in 
International Studies Quarterly, Volume 45, Issue No. 4, pp.487-515. 
215 For more information look: Hill, C 1990 ‘European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc, Civilian 
Model - or Flop?’, in Rummel, R (ed.) ‘The Evolution of an International Actor’, Boulder, 
SF/London; Smith, K 2002 ‘Conceptualising the EU’s International identity: Sui Generis or 
Following the Latest Trends?’, Paper presented at the First Pan-European Conference on 
European Union Politics, Bordeaux, 26-28 September. 
216 Sjursen, H 2002 ‘Beyond the State? The Role of Identities, Values and Rights in European 
Security’, Paper presented at the 1st Pan-European Conference on European Union Politics, 
Bordeaux, 26-28 September, p.15. 
217 Bretherton, C, Vogler, J 2006 ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’, 2nd Edition, 
Routledge, London and NY, p.60. 
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GRAHAM ALLISON’S THREE LEVEL FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS 
 
Part III of this research effort will analyse two US and EU pivotal policies 
concerning their peace and security engagement in Africa, respectively AFRICOM 
and JAES P&S. As stated at the introduction section of ‘Theoretical Framework’, 
such analysis will be done by applying Graham Allison’s approach. It is therefore, 
envisioned to provide with a short introductory of his three frameworks for analysing 
foreign policy. Reference is being made to the rational actor model (RAM), the 
organisational behaviour model (OBM) and the bureaucratic politics model (BPM) 
Most foreign policy analysts usually utilise RAM in explaining different actor’s 
behaviours and their foreign policies. Since events in foreign affairs are understood 
as purposive acts of a given international actor, RAM provides one of the most 
compelling and widespread models of decision-making. This means that in trying to 
analyse any specific purposive act –explanandum, one has to focus on the goals and 
objectives –explanans, the concerned actor had in the very first place. The 
assumption made in this case is, that if an actor carried out such an action, it is 
because it must have had a goal of this type. The event is then explained when one 
can show that taking such action was a reasonable behaviour given the strategic 
objectives, the actor has. Seen in these terms, RAM links purpose with action. ‘If one 
knows an actor’s objective, then one has a major clue of his likely action’1. 
The interesting thing about this model is that it does not only include the objectives 
of the actor concerned, but also it takes into consideration the situation within which 
the actor operates. This situation or context is seen in terms of threats and 
opportunities as perceived by the given actor, who then chooses to behave in a 
certain way which best advances his interests. Summarising it can be said that, in 
analysing foreign policy behaviour through the imperatives of RAM, one must 
                                                            
1 Allison, G, Zelikow, P 1999 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’, 2nd 
Edition, Longman, NY, p.49; Allison, G 2008 ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis‘, in Smith, S, 
Hadfield, A, Dunne, T (eds.) 2008 ‘Foreign Policy: Theories-Actors-Cases’, Oxford 
university Press, Oxford, pp.207-27. 
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assume that this behaviour is the action of an international actor, unified, who has a 
coherent utility function, it acts in relation to external threats and opportunities, and 
its actions are value maximising. In doing so the RAM analyst must provide answers 
to relevant questions such as what threats and opportunities arise for the actor and 
what is its utility function2. 
A further analysis sees, what RAM names ‘acts’ and ‘choices’, as outputs, which 
originate of existing organisations functioning according to regular patterns of 
behaviour – the standard operation procedures (SOPs), which secure the way a given 
organisation acts. Here the foreign policy analyst assumes that ‘if organisations 
produced an output of a certain kind at a certain time, that behaviour resulted from 
existing organisational structures and procedures’3.  This kind of analysis is basic to 
the organisational behaviour model (OBM). With it the utility and usefulness of 
RAM is not undermined, simply the analyst in this case takes into account that a 
government/governance is composed of a ‘conglomerate of loosely allied 
organisations, each with a substantial life of its own’4. Such analysis at the meso 
level is focused on the causal relationship between the actor and its foreign policy 
agencies5.  
Foreign policy is also analysed by looking at the relationship between the 
bureaucracies involved in the foreign policy output. This is the focus of the third 
approach the bureaucratic politics model (BPM), which views foreign policy events 
neither as a unitary choice (RAM) nor as an organisational output (OBM)6. Such 
events are understood as resultants of bargaining games –‘the pulling and hauling 
                                                            
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid, p.224. 
4 Ibid, p.224. 
5 Hollis, M, Smith, S 1991 ‘Explaining and Understanding International Relations’, Clarendon 
Press, London, quoted in Carlsnaes, W 2008 ‘Actors, Structures and Foreign Policy 
Analysis’, in Smith, S, Hadfield, A, Dunne, T (eds.) 2008 ‘Foreign Policy: Theories-Actors-
Cases’, Oxford university Press, Oxford, p.92. 
6 Allison, G, Zelikow, P 1999 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’; 
Allison, G 2008 ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis, pp.207-27. 
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that is politics’7– among players of the concerned bureaucracies, since these last ones 
fight among themselves for influence, power and resources. The resultants are so 
originated by a tendency to seek the first minimally acceptable solution, which 
require the least changes to the own SOPs. This phenomenon is else called 
‘satisficing’, which though conflict avoidant engenders less optimal solutions8. 
None of these three models is comprehensive, but they complement each other. 
RAM concerns the broader context, the larger patterns and the shared images. Within 
this context OBM highlights the organisational routines (SOPs), which produce the 
information and actions, and the third model, the BPM, concerns the interrelationship 
among bureaucracies that outline the final shape of actions.  
‘Each in effect, serves as a search engine in the larger effort to 
identify all the significant causal factors without which the decision 
or action would not have occurred’9.  
  
                                                            
7 Allison, G, Zelikow, P 1999 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’, 
pp.255; Allison, G 1971 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’, Little, 
Brown & Company, Boston, p.144. 
8 Allison, G, Halperin, M 1972 ‘Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy 
Implications’, in World Politics, volume 24, Supplement: Theory and Policy in International 
Relations, p.176; Wilson, J, Q 1989 ‘Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and why 
They Do it’, Basic Books, NY, p.24; Jervis, R 1976 ‘Perception and Misperception in 
International Politics’, Princeton University Press, Princeton, p.24; March, J, G, Simon, H, A 
1958 ‘Organizations’, John Wiley & Sons, NY, p.136. 
9 Allison, G 2008 ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis, p.227. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CASE STUDY 1: US AFRICOM 
THE AFRICOM CRISIS THROUGH THE LENS OF RAM 
 
 ‘African states oppose US presence’ 
Ghana web 
 
 ‘SADC Shuns Spectre of US Africom Plan’ 
IOL, South Africa 
 
‘Scramble for an African response’  
Business Day, South Africa 
 
 ‘Questions Over Real Intentions Of US’s Africa Command’ &  
‘Ironically, Africom was announced as Chinese President Hu Jintao was touring 
eight African nations to negotiate deals that will enable China to secure oil flows 
from Africa’ 
Daily Nation, Kenya 
 
 ‘Africom would destabilise an already fragile continent and region, which will be 
forced to engage wit US interests on military terms’ 
Business Day, South Africa 
 
‘[Africom is] aimed at influencing, threatening and warding off any competitors by 
using force’ 
The Post, Zambia 
 
‘[African countries] should wake up after seeing the scars of others [Afghanistan and 
Iraq]’ 
Reporter, Algeria 
AFRICOM, as made clear from the above African newspaper headlines, was faced 
with an ‘unprecedented unity of opposition’ and hostility across Africa. Thus, it is 
logical to ask why such hostility; whether AFRICOM’s intention and purpose 
were/are misunderstood; and whether Bush’s foreign policy track record can be made 
responsible for such opposition. 
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It is the aim of this section, by using Allison’s RAM, to provide with a detailed 
analysis of the rationale for the establishment of the new US Africa unified 
combatant command1 (COCOM), its ‘goal and objectives’, ‘utility function’, and ‘the 
perceived threats and/or opportunities’ that are tackled and/or created by AFRICOM. 
Through such analysis it is meant at trying to give an explanation of why AFRICOM 
engendered such a significant, unified and widespread resistance across Africa. In his 
FPA seminal work, by outlining the rational actor model (RAM) upon which the 
foreign policy of a given actor may be analysed, Graham Allison sustains that ‘RAM 
links purpose with action’2. The following statement is, in this sense, a succinct 
resume from where to start with Allison’s RAM analysis of AFRICOM. 
‘Africa is a continent of growing economic, social, political, and 
geostrategic importance. […] The establishment of a new 
Combatant Command for Africa —AFRICOM— marks an 
important milestone in the evolution of relations between the 
United States and the governments of Africa. Through AFRICOM, 
the US Department of Defense will consolidate the efforts of three 
existing command headquarters as it seeks a more stable 
environment for political and economic growth in Africa. In line 
with this goal, AFRICOM is pioneering a bold new method of 
military engagement focused on war prevention, interagency 
cooperation, and development rather than on traditional 
warfighting’3. 
                                                            
1 A unified combatant command is defined as “a command with a broad continuing mission 
under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more 
Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President, through the 
Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff,” according to DOD’s Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 
2 Allison, G, Zelikow, P 1999 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis‘, 2nd 
Edition, The Edison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., p.49; Allison, G, 2008 ‘The Cuban 
Missile Crisis’, in Smith, S, et al (eds.) ‘Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases’, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford/NY, p.223 
3 Lovelace, D, 2007 ‘Foreword’, in Berschinski, R, G, 2007 ‘AFRICOM’s Dilemma: ‘The Global 
War on Terrorism’, ‘Capacity Building’, Humanitarianism, and the Future of US Security 
Policy in Africa’, SSI, p.iii, available at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/ 
download.cfm?q=827, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
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As already analysed by the previous chapter, Africa’s relevance to the US in terms of 
national and strategic security interests has moved up on the US agenda, from low to 
high politics. The end of the Cold War Era and mostly so, the event of 9/11, made 
peremptory for the US government to give more attention to Africa, as indeed, it is 
sustained by the US policy documents and statements4. 
‘Simply put: a convergence of threats, vulnerabilities and 
opportunities created by the War on Terror […] have been able to 
push African-centric issues onto the government’s agenda. As the 
[US] becomes increasingly concerned with reducing the conditions 
that lead to terrorism worldwide, it has had to acknowledge that 
chronic poverty, conflict and violence, corrupt governments and 
unprofessional militaries create critical vulnerabilities for terrorist 
recruitment and operations’5.  
Another analyst sustains that, ‘the whole idea is, to a large extent, a bureaucratic 
issue within the US government (State Department vs the Pentagon) on the best way 
of promoting American interests in Africa—securing investments and oil sources, 
fighting off Chinese competition and waging the war against terrorism’6. 
 
 
 
                                                            
4 White House Africa Policy, available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ 
infocus/africa/, last accessed on 30.03.2009; The White House, 2002 ‘The National Security 
Strategy of the United States’, pp.26, 31, 37-38; Mills , G 2006 ‘Africa’s New Strategic 
Significance’, in The Washington Quarterly, Volume 27, Issue No.4, pp.158-162; Princeton 
N. Lyman, P, N, Morrison, J, S 2006 ‘More Than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. 
Approach Toward Africa’, Council on Foreign Relations, Independent Task Force Report, 
No. 56, Washington DC, pp.9-14; Cohen, H, J 2003 ‘The United States and Africa: Nonvital 
Interests Also Require Attention’, in American Foreign Policy Interests, Volume 25, pp.20-
24; Stevenson, J 2003 ‘Africa’s Growing Strategic Resonance’, in Survival, Volume 45, Issue 
No.4, pp.155-166. 
5 Piombo, J, R 2007 ‘Introduction: Africa’s Rising Strategic Significance’, in Strategic Insights, 
Volume 6, Issue No. 1, available at: http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/ 
OnlineJournal/2007/Jan/introJan07.html, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
6 Okumu, W 2007 ‘Africa Command: Opportunity for Enhanced Engagement or the 
Militarization of U.S.-Africa Relations?’ Dr. W Okumu, Head, African Security Analysis 
Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa, testimony given to the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, available 
at: http://allafrica.com/stories/200708031070.html, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
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CHANGE IN THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN 
The above mentioned quotations do point out at a ‘conceptual shift to a strategic 
view of Africa’7 that did take place within the US foreign policy agenda for Africa. 
Such ‘conceptual shift’ is also best mirrored by the change that the DoD’s global 
command structure underwent. Prior to it, Africa has been split between three 
regional Combatant Commands (COCOMs): Central Command (CENTCOM), 
European Command (EUCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM)8, thus, ‘Africa has 
been divided up and been the poor stepchild in each of these different commands and 
not gotten the full attention it deserves’9. Accordingly, such division created huge 
problems in coordinating and ensuring coherence10 of US activities in Africa. An 
example par excellence were the 1998 bombings of US embassies in the capitals of 
two neighbouring African countries, Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, which however, fell 
within the areas of responsibility (AOR) of two different US COCOMs: EUCOM 
and CENTCOM. Another example of coordination and burden sharing problems 
arose when the US provided with airlift and training the African peacekeeping troops 
in Sudan, which fell on the AOR of CENTCOM, nevertheless, much of the activities 
                                                            
7 CSIS Africa Policy Advisory Panel Report 2004 ‘Rising U.S. Stakes in Africa: Seven Proposals 
to Strengthen U.S.-Africa Policy’, p.6. 
8 The allocation of Africa or parts of her to different US COCOMs has a long history in the post 
WWII era, thus, Africa or parts of her have been allocated as AOR to EUCOM, CENTCOM, 
PACOM, LANTCOM, and STRICOM/ RDECOM. There was even a time, from 1971 to 
1983, when no US COCOM whatsoever had any responsibility concerning security issues in 
Africa. The creation of, and allocation of AOR to, US COCOMs is done through the DoD’s 
Unified Command Plan (UCP), which is regularly reviewed, updated, ‘approved by the 
President [and] sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatants commanders; establishes 
their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographic area of 
responsibility for geographic combatants commanders; and specifies functional 
responsibilities for functional combatant commanders’. As to date there are ten US COCOMs, 
six geographic, and four functional. The last UPC, which codified US AFRICOM as well, 
was signed by President George W. Bush on 17 December 2008. More information is 
available at the official website of the US Department of Defence: http://www.defense.gov/ 
home/features/2009/0109_unifiedcommand/, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
9 Quotation from Susan Rice, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and the Clinton’s 
administration Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, cited in Hanson, S 2007 
‘AFRICOM’s Genesis’, in Hanson, S 2007 ‘US Africa Command (AFRICOM)’, Council on 
Foreign Relations, Washington DC, available at: http://www.cfr.org/publication/13255/us_ 
africa_command_africom.html#, last accessed on 30.03.2009  
10 Whelan, T 2010 ‘Africa: A New Strategic Perspective‘, in Francis, J, D (ed.), 2010 ‘US 
Strategy in Africa: AFRICOM, Terrorism, and Security Challenges’, Routledge Global 
Security Studies, London & NY, p.34. 
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were done by the EUCOM forces11, overstretching so their capabilities, especially 
since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
It is rather logical to sustain that in this situation with an expanded US agenda in 
Africa, not just in terms of GWOT, and the pressing need for coherent action within 
the Pentagon but not just, the US government had to take action to appropriately 
tackle the situation that has arisen. Indeed, although, plans to create a unified 
combatant command have been circulating for over 10 years, these were brought to 
maturation only by the end of 2006, when, finally, in order to repair the lack of 
coherence and coordination among the different COCOMs, the then Secretary of 
Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, requested presidential authority to create a centralised 
command for Africa. On 6 February 2007, President Bush announced the creation of 
a new US military command exclusively for Africa, to be known under the name of 
AFRICOM. A special transition team, situated in Stuttgart, Germany, -EUCOM 
headquarters-, and composed of, predominantly, DoD and DoS officials, were 
assigned to guide the formation process for AFRICOM in coordination with 
EUCOM. Consequently, AFRICOM reached the status of a sub-unified command 
under EUCOM by 1 October 2007 and came into being fully operational a year later, 
on 1 October 200812.  
As deducting from the above said, the rationale behind the creation of AFRICOM is 
self-evident. In Allison’s word, ‘[i]f I know an actor’s objective, I have a major clue 
of his likely action’13, consequently, through the identification of such objective that 
made it peremptory to change an inefficient and incoherent command structure, it 
was rational for the US to create a new unified command. Thus, AFRICOM was 
about a reorganisation internal to DoD14 aiming at ‘greater consistency of focus’15 
                                                            
11 Ploch, L, 2010 ‘Africa Command: US Strategic Interests and the Role of US Military in 
Africa’, CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress, CRS, 
Washington DC, p.2, available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf, last 
accessed on 15.07.2010 
12 Quotation from Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for African Affairs 
during the Bush years, cited in Volman, D 2009 ‘AFRICOM and the Obama Administration’, 
African Security Research Project Reports/Papers, available at: http://concernedafricascho 
lars.org/african-security-research-project/?p=43, last accessed on 30.05.2009. 
13 Allison, G, 2008 ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis’, p.223. 
14 Forest, J,F, Crispin, R, 2009 ‘AFRICOM: Troubled Infancy, Promising Future’, in 
Contemporary Security Policy, Volume 30, Issue 1. 
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and the betterment of an ‘outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War’16 in a 
way that ‘reflects post-Cold War and post-9/11 lessons learned‘17. In analysing, 
though, the African hostility towards AFRICOM, one might arguably assume that, a 
greater focus on Africa which seeks to enhance the coherence and consistency of US 
Africa agenda should not necessarily be negative and thus it should not account for 
the widespread African hostility AFRICOM faced. The clue for it is to be sought 
somewhere else. The best spot to begin with is the President and its own words while 
announcing the establishment of AFRICOM: 
‘Today, I am pleased to announce my decision to create a 
Department of Defence Unified Combatant Command for Africa. I 
have directed the Secretary of Defence to stand up US Africa 
Command by the end of the FY2008. [...] We will be consulting 
with African leaders to seek their thoughts on how Africa 
Command can respond to security challenges and opportunities in 
Africa. We will work closely with African partners to determine an 
appropriate location for the new command in Africa’18.  
Based on the above stated, it is assumed that AFRICOM was planned and established 
without having consulted the African partners. Although as David J. Francis wrights, 
that this is an approach which has been traditionally used by the US in the 
establishment of the other unified COCOMs19, nevertheless, the Cold War era is long 
                                                                                                                                                                        
15 Whelan, T 2010 ‘Africa: A New Strategic Perspective‘, p.33. The lessons, the US, had to learn, 
concerned the changing nature of the twenty-first-century threat environment, as well as the 
importance of a holistic approach to security and stability issues. As a matter of fact, and as 
witnessed by 9/11, threats to states were no longer generated only from the other mighty 
nation-states, the poor and least developed countries were added to that list as well. 
16 Quotation from Robert M. Gates, US Secretary of Defence, cited in Garamone, J 2007 ‘DoD 
establishing US Africa Command’, in American Forces Press Service February 6, 2007, 
available at: http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?id=2940, last accessed on 
30.03.2009. 
17 Whelan, T 2010 ‘Africa: A New Strategic Perspective‘, p.33. 
18 White House 2007 ‘President Bush Creates a Department of Defence Unified Combatant 
Command for Africa’, Office of the Press Secretary, February 6, 2007, Washington DC, 
available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/02/200702063. 
html, last accessed on 30.03.2009, (emphasis added). 
19 Francis, J, D 2010 ‘Introduction: AFRICOM – US Strategic Interests and African Security’, in 
Francis, J, D (ed.), 2010 ‘US Strategy in Africa: AFRICOM, Terrorism, and Security 
Challenges’, Routledge Global Security Studies, London & NY, p.3. 
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gone and Africa has considerably changed too. Both factors are deemed as extremely 
important in initially explaining the African opposition. As a senior AFRICOM 
officer had to admit  
‘The Africans are changing. [...] Times are changing and the 
institutions are changing. Look at the institution of the African 
Union […]. [Listening to the African part] is something that all of 
us who work with Africans need to do better. You only need to live 
and work in Africa to understand that we may think that we have 
all the answers; but we really don’t have very many answers that 
are going to work in many of these countries and in these 
institutions’20.  
Thus, it becomes clear that the ability of the US government, or its agencies involved 
within AFRICOM, to listen to the African aspirations, is crucially important; the 
same about the ‘realization that the new world in which AFRICOM is operating is 
going to require a sophisticated kind of public diplomacy that is grounded in 
listening’21. Therefore, behaving like ‘we are the United States. We know what’s 
good for you. Do it’, and continuing doing business as usual did not work any longer 
in Africa, as exemplified by the very stark hostility this very paper concerns. So, 
while AFRICOM was about a legitimised reorganisation internal to DoD aiming at 
‘greater consistency of focus’ as well as at promoting ‘greater unity of effort across 
the government’, it nevertheless, was not, at least not wholly, as claimed by a high 
rank DoD official, about ‘a way that reflects post-Cold War [...] lessons learned‘22. 
 
 
                                                            
20 Yates, M C 2008 ‘Opening Dinner and Keynote Speech: Ambassador MC Yates, Deputy to the 
Commander for Civil Military Activities AFRICOM’, in Seib, P (ed.) 2008 ‘AFRICOM: The 
American Military and Public Diplomacy in Africa – Proceedings of the UCS Public 
Diplomacy Conference, University of Southern California, February 7-8, 2008’, Figueroa 
Press, CA, pp.16-17, available at: http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/media/AFRICOM%20Web 
%20Publication.pdf, last accessed on 20.03.2009 
21 Seib, P 2008 ‘Opening Remarks’, in Seib, P (ed.) 2008 ‘AFRICOM: The American Military 
and Public Diplomacy in Africa – Proceedings of the UCS Public Diplomacy Conference, 
University of Southern California, February 7-8, 2008’, Figueroa Press, CA, p.25. 
22 Whelan, T 2010 ‘Africa: A New Strategic Perspective‘, p.33. 
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HEADQUARTERS LOCATION 
The issue of the location provided a further point upon which to disagree. The search 
of a headquarters in the continent seems to have started prior to explaining how the 
command would help Africa. Even from within the US there was some criticism 
about the way the Bush administration did approach the issue of location. Chester C 
Crocker, a former assistant secretary for African affairs under President Regan, puts 
it: Pentagon ‘rolled it [AFRICOM] out before they were ready to roll it out’23. On the 
African side, to put it in the words of one African politician, Africans felt that ‘very 
little was really known by the majority of people or countries in Africa who were 
supposed to know before such a move was made’24. Therefore, the opposition was/is 
quite popular among Africans, and is led by civil society organizations25, leading 
African governments, as well as prominent regional economic and political 
organisations such as Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the 
AU itself. For example, the only African country who has been willing to accept 
AFRICOM’s location in its own territory Liberia has declared itself as ‘the US 
historic ally, [who] has stood resolutely with the [US], through good times and bad, 
and is offering its territory as it has done in the past, for the establishment of 
AFRICOM Headquarters’26. In direct opposition to Sirleaf’s words, Nigeria –who 
acts as the hegemon in West Africa–,  has countered that it ‘will oppose any location 
of AFRICOM headquarters in all of West Africa’27. Thus, ‘no foreign troops are 
                                                            
23 Quotation from Chester C Crocker, a former assistant secretary for African affairs under 
President Regan, cited in Hanson, S 2007 ‘The Feasibility of an Interagency Command’, in 
Hanson, S 2007 ‘US Africa Command (AFRICOM)’. 
24 Quotation from Mosiuoa Lekota, South African Minister of Defence, cited in Mills, G 2008 
‘The U.S. and Africa: Prisoners of a Paradigm’, in Current History, Volume 107, Issue No. 
709, pp.228-9. 
25 i.e. http://africaagainstafricom.org/ 
26 Quotation from Ellen Jonson Sirleaf, President of Liberia, cited in Kuumba Chi Nia, 
Matamba.net, 2007 ‘AFRICOM: Imperialism, Neo-colonialism, and the fight for African 
resources’, available at: http://www.mathaba.net/news/?x=572854, last accessed on 
30.03.2009. 
27 Quotation from Umaru Yar’Adua, President of Nigeria, cited in Francis, D J 2007 ‘AFRICOM 
& ECOWAS: African Security Vs. US Strategic Interests – Policy Implications’, p.13, 
available at: http://www.nuffic.nl/home/news-events/docs/events/kotm/abstracts-and-papers/ 
AFRICOM%20Presentation-18-08.ppt, last accessed on 30.03.2009.  
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welcomed on African soil’28. Such statement is very much in line with the fear of 
losing regional influence by the emerging African regional hegemons such as Nigeria 
in West Africa, Kenya in East Africa, and, by South Africa in Southern Africa, 
where ‘AFRICOM seems to be clashing with South Africa’s sense of itself as an 
emerging African power’29.  
Others believe that AFRICOM may revive neo-colonialism in Africa, after the 
English and French experiences, AFRICOM may be seen as the perfect example of 
American colonial domination30. Another recurrent perception concerning 
AFRICOM’s headquarters is that the command may be used as a Trojan horse to 
achieve US strategic interest and objectives in the continent. Furthermore there exists 
a perception that an AFRICOM headquarters on African soil would ‘inevitably set up 
Africa as a target for terrorists’ as, by the way, exemplified by the bombings of US 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania31. Given the track record of the Bush 
administration’s foreign policy doctrine and that of the US in general, Africans fear 
that AFRICOM may be used as an instrument in achieving regime change, or for that 
matter prop up dictators or other unpopular regimes who act in accordance with the 
US interests in Africa. Such fears were sustained by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 
and more so by the US-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006-2007. 
Historically seen, a report of the US Sub-Committee on Security Agreements and 
Commitments Abroad of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee brings further hold 
to such claims. ‘Overseas bases, the presence of United States armed forces, joint 
                                                            
28 Quotation from Chief Ojo Maduekwe, Nigerian Foreign Affairs Minister, cited in Jonah, N 
2007 ‘Nigeria: US AFRICOM and African Development’, available at: http://allAfrica.com/ 
stories/printable/200710110233.html, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
29 Fabricius, P 2007 ‘Flexing Our Political Muscle; Is South Africa the emerging African power 
or the top dog on the continent?’, in South African Daily News October 23, 2007, cited in 
Reed, V 2007 ‘A Big Image Problem Down There: Prospects for an African Headquarters for 
AFRICOM’, p.5, available at: http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/reedAFRICOM.pdf, last accessed on 
30.03.2009. 
30 i.e.: Kuumba Chi Nia, Matamba.net, 2007 ‘AFRICOM: Imperialism, Neo-colonialism, and the 
fight for African resources’; AfricanLoft, 2008 ‘Open Debate: Does Africa Need 
AFRICOM?’, available at: http://www.africanloft.com/open-debate-does-africa-need-africom-
us-africa-command-base-on-the-continent/; VoANewsCom, 2008 ‘AFRICOM Boosts Public 
Relations Efforts – Part 4 of 5’, available at: http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/ 
africa/a-13-AFRICOM-Boosts-Public-Relati ons-Efforts-PART-4-of-5.html; different blogs 
on http://africaagainstafricom.org/, all last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
31 Francis, J, D 2010 ‘Introduction: AFRICOM – US Strategic Interests and African Security’, 
p.5. 
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planning, joint exercises, or excessive military assistance programs [...] all but 
guarantee some involvement by the United States in the internal affairs of the host 
government’32. Seen in these terms, the concerns African are faced with, when 
considering AFRICOM, are more than well-founded, and the dangers of becoming 
‘entangled and embroiled in the activities of the American empire’ are all but 
misplaced33. Consequently, by not having taken into consideration the colonial and 
neo-colonial legacy as well as current African sensitivities about outsiders, the 
planners of AFRICOM, convinced of their benign behaviour, have, nonetheless, 
paved the way for less favouring African interpretations. 
Thus by coming back at, and speaking in terms of Alison’s RAM, the Bush 
administration decision to locate AFRICOM’s headquarters in Africa was self-
evident, –there is, arguably, little to oppose to the logic for an African headquarter of 
a COCOM just for Africa, at least with the intention to keep AFRICOM in synch 
with local African issues–. The US government must have assumed this as a given, 
since all other regional COCOMs have, as a matter of fact, their headquarters 
situated in their respective AORs. Where they seem to have failed, is in predicting 
the consequences which such action would have brought with. Little effort seems to 
have been made in understanding the African sensitivities and consequently they 
were not included in the planning of this new COCOM. The resultant of such 
approach is that AFRICOM headquarters will remain for the foreseeable future 
outside Africa34. It seems that the Pentagon has accepted such reality and has settled 
for a ‘distributed command’ with five regional centres on the continent.  
‘This was a rare ‘victory’ for Africa and a major challenge to the 
US stranglehold on the continent, demonstrating that Africa has 
                                                            
32 Cited in Francis, J, D 2010 ‘Introduction: AFRICOM – US Strategic Interests and African 
Security’, p.16. 
33 Ibid. 
34 On 18 February 2008, President Bush announced a major policy shift by stating that 
AFRICOM’s headquarters will remain in Stuttgart, Germany, where the EUCOM 
headquarters are as well located. On a funny note, it has to be said that, on that same day, 
General Ward, did not speak at all in terms of such a major policy shift, instead he reasserted 
that the location of AFRICOM in Africa had yet to be discussed. General Ward delivered a 
keynote address at a London RUSSI conference titled ‘AFRICOM and US-Africa Relations’ 
on 18 February 2008. More is available at: http://www.rusi.org/news/ref:N47BB07643AB7E/, 
last accessed on 30.03.2009.  
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come of age and could no longer be taken for granted in the post-
Cold War era’35. 
 
AFRICOM’S MISSION: A COCOM ‘PLUS’? 
AFRICOM, which within the DoD officials is sometimes also referred to as a 
combatant command ‘plus’, is supposed to be a wholly new approach to US security 
concerns; apart from fulfilling the conventional roles as other traditional unified 
command, it attempts to pioneer the ‘Three-D’ approach by aiming to carry out ‘soft 
power’ activities such as creating a stable security environment. For this purpose, it 
is composed of both military and civilian personnel, the later one coming from DoS, 
USAID, agriculture, treasury, and commerce36. The Commander of AFRICOM 
itself, a four-star General, William E. ‘Kip’ Ward, has both a military and a civilian 
deputy. Such structure is seen as pointing at the relationships between security, 
development, diplomacy and prosperity in Africa and thus AFRICOM would carry 
out both traditional military activities as well as programmes which are funded 
through the DoS’s budget. AFRICOM, in this sense, is as such a direct consequence 
of some of, what Whelan above names, ‘the lessons learned from the post-Cold War 
era and post 9/11’. The approved mission statement declares that the 
‘[AFRICOM], in concert with other US government agencies and 
international partners, conducts sustained security engagement 
through military-to-military programs, military sponsored 
activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a 
stable and secure African environment in support of US foreign 
policy’37. 
                                                            
35 Francis, J, D 2010 ‘Introduction: AFRICOM – US Strategic Interests and African Security’, 
p.8. 
36 Quotation from Rear Admiral Robert T. Moeller, head of the transition team for standing up 
AFRICOM, cited in Hanson, S 2007 ‘The Feasibility of an Interagency Command’, in 
Hanson, S 2007 ‘US Africa Command (AFRICOM)’.  
37 US AFRICOM, 2009 ‘Posture Statement of General William E. Ward, USA Commander, 
United States Africa Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House 
Armed Services Committee, on 17-18 March 2009’, available at: http://www.africom.mil/ 
pdfFiles/USAFRICOM2009PostureStatement.pdf,  last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
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Further, it has four core objectives which include: bolstering security and stability in 
Africa; improving cooperative security and partnership between US and African 
states in addressing transnational terrorism; and developing and sustaining enduring 
efforts that contribute to African peace, security and unity by focusing on capacity 
building to prevent, rather than fight wars. 
AFRICOM is so designed as a new US approach to the security challenges in Africa, 
‘to prevent problems from becoming crises, and crises from becoming 
catastrophes’38. As assured through the mission statement above, AFRICOM seems 
to be more about African security rather than US strategic interests in Africa. By 
taking this as a given, then the question of why the establishment of AFRICOM was 
confronted with such a unified, stark opposition across the continent, becomes more 
than legitimate to ask. In trying to give an answer to this question, this section will 
start by first looking for clues at the mission AFRICOM was mandated with. Even 
after having been trimmed off39, the mission statement did create the heart of the 
critical challenges AFRICOM is faced with40. Such, is best reflected by the assertion 
of Ambassador Mark Bellamy that there is ‘a great deal of scepticism and 
misapprehension in regard to AFRICOM’s mission in Africa and elsewhere’41, [and 
that] the main public diplomacy task that AFRICOM is going to face for the next 
                                                            
38 Whelan, T 2010 ‘Africa: A New Strategic Perspective‘, p.41. 
39 When first announced the draft statement of mission was: ‘US Africa Command promotes US 
National Security objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to 
help strengthen stability and security in the AOR. US Africa Command leads the in-theater 
DoD response to support other USG agencies in implementing USG security policies and 
strategies. In concert with other US government agencies and other international partners, US 
Africa Command conducts theater security cooperation activities to assist in building security 
capacity and improve accountable governance. As directed, US Africa Command conducts 
military operations to deter aggression and respond to crises. […] Its main objective is that of 
building partner capacity through coordinating the kind of support that will enable African 
governments and existing regional organizations, such as the African Standby Force, to have 
greater capacity to provide security and respond in times of need’. 
40 DeYoung, C 2008 ‘US Africa Command Trims its Aspiration: Nations Loath to Host Force; 
Aid Groups Resisted Military Plan to Take Over Relief’, in The Washington Post June 1, 
2008, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/31/AR 
2008053102055.html?referrer=emailarticle, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
41 Quotation by Mark Bellamy, former US ambassador to Kenya and senior fellow in residence 
for the Africa Program and the International Security Program at CSIS, cited in Seib, P (ed.) 
2008 ‘AFRICOM: The American Military and Public Diplomacy in Africa – Proceedings of 
the UCS Public Diplomacy Conference, University of Southern California, February 7-8, 
2008’, p.7. 
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year or so is really going to be one of explaining its mission’42. Furthermore, because 
AFRICOM ‘will be operating in an environment of skepticism and suspicion […] it 
is essential that AFRICOM take public diplomacy seriously [... since] public opinion 
in African countries will be a powerful force that will help or impede AFRICOM’s 
mission’43. These statements receive a greater meaning when compared with the 
speculations, in Africa and abroad, concerning AFRICOM’s ‘real mission’. It is felt 
that the establishment of AFRICOM had little to do with US altruism towards Africa; 
rather, it is thought, it had more to do with US selfish motives such as assuring 
access to oil and natural resources, the GWOT, and countering China’s growing 
influence on the African continent44. 
As a result, DoD officials felt that AFRICOM’s mission has been misunderstood, 
and in May 2007, a ‘strategic communications’ campaign was launched to respond to 
these negative attitudes towards AFRICOM aiming at winning over African leaders 
and media. This campaign crafted a less interest–based message about AFRICOM, 
and focused on the uniqueness of its hybrid structure, emphasising the interagency 
and non-kinetic side of AFRICOM. Many officials highlighted such attributes and 
used them as evidence that the new command has only benign purposes.  
‘Some people believe that we are establishing AFRICOM solely to 
fight terrorism, or to secure oil resources, or to discourage China. 
This is not true [... those are] not AFRICOM’s singular mission’45.  
President Bush asserted as well that AFRICOM was created with the aim of 
‘help[ing] Africans achieve their own security, not to extend the scope of the war on 
                                                            
42 Ibid., p.68. 
43 William, A, 2007 ‘Panel II: The Military’s Mandate – Determining the Scope of AFRICOM’s 
Public Diplomacy Responsibilities’ in Seib, P (ed.) 2008 ‘AFRICOM: The American Military 
and Public Diplomacy in Africa – Proceedings of the UCS Public Diplomacy Conference, 
University of Southern California, February 7-8, 2008’, p.71. 
44 Taylor, D, 2007 ‘New US Military Command for Africa Stirs Intense Emotion’, in Voice of 
America News on 22 October 2007, available at http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/ 
2007-10/New-US-Military-Command-For-Africa-Stirs-Intense-Emotion.cfm?CFID=1995359 
23&CFTOKEN=94823263, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
45 US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2007 ‘Exploring the US Africa Command and a new 
Strategic Relationship with Africa’, Testimony of Theresa Whelan, DASD for African 
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terrorism or secure African resources’46. Having said that, it is clear that US interests 
in Africa include not just GWOT, access to resources and counterbalancing China’s 
influence but also HIV/AIDS, conflicts, humanitarian disasters etc. Whelan herself, 
implies that these three objectives –access to oil and natural resources, GWOT, 
counterbalancing China-  are part of the AFRICOM mission, albeit, not the only ones 
(not AFRICOM’s singular mission). What critics sustain as ‘disingenuous’ is the fact 
that the Bush administration maintains ‘that accomplishing the former three 
objectives is not the main reason that Washington is now devoting so much effort 
and attention to the continent’47.  
‘It’s one of the problems with the rhetoric […] around AFRICOM 
[which] defies belief when people hear that this has nothing to do 
with China. […] US national interest is to ensure that we have 
enough oil and we know that 25 percent of US oil will be coming 
from Africa in the near future, why wouldn’t this be about ensuring 
that the natural resources that we need can come to us? When the 
Gulf of Guinea is filled with oil platforms from China and we have 
very few, when the Niger delta is overrun with rebels, why 
wouldn’t this be about ensuring that we can attain these natural 
resources? I think that it’s difficult for people on the continent and 
for civil society in the US to believe that it has absolutely nothing 
to do with China, and that this has nothing to do with the war on 
terror, nothing to do with resources. It kind of defies what you 
would think this would truly be about if this command is to ensure 
that our [US] national interests are ascertained’48. 
                                                            
46 Cited in Glaros, G, E 2007 ‘The New Africa Command: A Hedge against Neo-Colonialism or 
a True Agent of Change?‘, in Signal, Volume 62, p.120. 
47 Volman, D 2010 ‘AFRICOM: What Is It For And What Will It Do?’, in Francis, J, D (ed.), 
2010 ‘US Strategy in Africa: AFRICOM, Terrorism, and Security Challenges’, Routledge 
Global Security Studies, London & NY, p.46. 
48 Quotation by Nicole Lee, Executive Director of TransAfrica Forum, cited in Seib, P (ed.) 2008 
‘AFRICOM: The American Military and Public Diplomacy in Africa – Proceedings of the 
UCS Public Diplomacy Conference, University of Southern California, February 7-8, 2008’, 
pp.54-5. 
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Indeed, disingenuous, inasmuch above-mentioned statements of US government 
officials about the rationale for the stand-up of AFRICOM were contradicted by yet 
other statements by i.e. professional military officers who actually run AFRICOM. 
Vice Admiral Robert Moeller, who led AFRICOM’s transition team, told journalists 
on a press conference that the rationale behind the creation of AFRICOM had to do 
with the increasing importance that Africa accrued as related to the US interests, seen 
in strategic, diplomatic and economic terms49. Yet in other briefings DoD high 
ranked officials sustained that the command ‘will focus on some efforts […] to 
defeat or preclude the development of terrorists or terrorists’ networks’50, and that 
‘Africa is of significant strategic importance to the United States […for] its natural 
resources […and] you can see our main objectives include defeating terrorists’51. A 
high ranked DoD official has summed it up by stating that the underlying cause to 
the US in creating AFRICOM was fighting terrorists in Africa, countering Chinese 
diplomacy on the continent, and gaining access to Africa’s natural resources, 
especially oil52. As late as one year after the announcement for the stand-up of 
AFRICOM and half a year later after AFRICOM having reached the status of sub-
unified command, General Ward referred to America’s growing dependence on 
African oil as a priority issue for AFRICOM and that combating terrorism would be 
‘AFRICOM’s number one theatre-wide goal’53.  
                                                            
49 Cited in Wood, S 2007 ‘Africa Command Will Consolidate US Efforts on Continent’, in US 
Federal News Service of 6 February 2007, available at: http://www.defense.gov/news/news 
article.aspx?id=2946, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
50 US AFRICOM, 2007 ‘Changes to the Unified Command Plan to Create an Africa Command’, 
DoD Briefing on 7 February 2007 by Mr. Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of 
Defence for Policy and Lt. General Walter L. Sharp, USA Director Joint Staff, Arlington, VA, 
available at: http://www.africom.mil/getArticle. asp?art=1548, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
51 Whelan, T 2007 ‘US To Establish New US Africa Command (AFRICOM)’, in Foreign Press 
Center Briefing of 9 February 2007, p.1, available at: http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/AF/ 
State/80454.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
52 Pessin, A 2007 ‘African Officials Express Concerns About US Africa Command Plan’, VOA 
News on 23 April 2007, available at: http://www.voanews.com/english/ archive/2007-
02/2007-02-06-voa31.cfm, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
53 US HASC, 2008 ‘Statement of General William E. Ward, USA Commander, United States 
Africa Command -- Before the House Armed Services Committee on 13 March 2008’, US 
HASC, Washington DC, p.9, available at: http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC031308/ 
Ward_Testimony031308.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
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The so much sought-after soft power image aimed through the ‘strategic 
communications’ campaign failed because as Nye says:  
‘a communications strategy cannot work if it cuts against the grain 
of policy. Actions speak louder than words, and public diplomacy 
that appears to be mere window dressing for hard power projection 
is unlikely to succeed’54. 
 
AFRICOM, SECURITY & THE SECURITY – DEVELOPMENT NEXUS 
An issue upon which African states are apprehensive concerning AFRICOM is that 
they believe that US, through AFRICOM, will posit itself unilaterally as the best 
arbitrator of African security priorities and policies55. As it is well known to all of us, 
Africa faces multiple security threats and challenges which fundamentally differ 
from the traditional militaristic conception of security, which, last one has been 
largely state-centric, both in terms of policy and practice56. Such conception seem to 
be outdated in a time when more than 60 percent of territories in Africa are governed 
and ruled by non-governmental actors such as chiefs57. Consequently, security in 
Africa is about ‘[...] nation building, the search for secure systems of food, health, 
money and trade’58. Africa, as already mentioned in previous chapters, is plagued by 
                                                            
54 Nye, Jr, J S 2008, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, p.102. 
55 Reed, V 2007 ‘A Big Image Problem Down There: Prospects for an African Headquarters for 
AFRICOM’, p.5, available at: http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/reedafricom.pdf, last accessed on 
30.03.2009 
56 Ibid., p.20. For a detailed information on the traditional security approaches in Africa see, i.e. 
Howe, H 2001 ‘Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States’, pp.70-5; Thomas, C 
1987 ‘In Search of Security: The Thrid World In International Relations’, Lynne Rienner, 
Boulder; Ayoob, M 1995 ‘The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional 
Conflict and the International System’, Lynne Rienner, Boulder; Mohamed Salih, M, A 2010 
‘An African Perspective on Security’, in Francis, J, D (ed.) 2010 ‘US Strategy in Africa: 
AFRICOM, Terrorism and Security Challenges’, Routledge Global Security Studies, Oxon & 
NY; Beebe, S 2010 ‘Solutions Not Yet Sought: A Human Security Paradigm for Twenty-First-
Century Africa’, in Francis, J, D (ed.) 2010 ‘US Strategy in Africa: AFRICOM, Terrorism 
and Security Challenges’, Routledge Global Security Studies, Oxon & NY. 
57 Tieku, T, K 2010 ‘The African Union and AFRICOM’, in Francis, J, D (ed.) 2010 ‘US 
Strategy in Africa: AFRICOM, Terrorism and Security Challenges’, Routledge Global 
Security Studies, Oxon & NY, p.136. 
58 Thomas, C 1987 ‘In Search of Security: The Thrid World In International Relations’, Lynne 
Rienner, Boulder, p.1. 
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the HIV/AIDS pandemic, malaria and other preventable diseases; climate change is 
another threat, not to mention, extreme poverty, under-development, and bad 
governance. Accordingly, African perceptions of security are about the so called 
human security which concerns the survival on a daily basis and issues of basic 
human needs59. Such has, obviously, created huge gaps on how Africa and the US 
see security. Accordingly, Africans feel frustrated for 
‘[...] Americans are always looking for terrorists and weapons of 
mass destruction. Yes, we have those things in Africa. We have 
terrorism: it is poverty, HIV/AIDS and malaria. We have weapons 
of mass destruction as well: it is an AK-47 usually carried by a 
child’60. 
Through AFRICOM, the US, in this sense, failed to make an approach which would 
have accounted for greater African ownership in security matters. Consequently, it 
‘has led to the increasing neglect of African traditional approaches, societal agencies 
and indigenous resources [...]. Little wonder, then, the widespread opposition to 
AFRICOM for its lack of consultation with Africa and its neglect of core African 
security imperatives’61. As an analysts has pointed out, if the US wants to maintain 
relevance in the eyes of Africans, then there is a need, on the US side, to shift from 
imposing what it sees as right definition of security for Africa towards what Africans 
themselves see as relevant definition for their own security62. 
One of the much heralded features of AFRICOM is its merging of traditional US 
military thinking and activities with the humanitarian and development foreign 
policy issues. 
                                                            
59 Thomas, C 2001 ‘Global Governance, Development and Human Security: Exploring the 
Links’, in Third World Quarterly, Volume 22, Issue 2, pp.159-75. 
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Century Africa’, in Francis, J, D (ed.) 2010 ‘US Strategy in Africa: AFRICOM, Terrorism and 
Security Challenges’, Routledge Global Security Studies, Oxon & NY, p.96. 
61 Francis, J, D 2010 ‘Introduction: AFRICOM – US Strategic Interests and African Security’, 
p.19. 
62 Beebe, S 2010 ‘Solutions Not Yet Sought: A Human Security Paradigm for Twenty-First-
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‘[T]he new command will enhance our [US] efforts to bring peace 
and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals 
of development, health, education, democracy and economic 
growth in Africa’63. 
Such statement clearly illustrates the linking between security and development 
matters, which, as a result of 9/11 security threats and the ensuing ‘politics of fear’ 
further reinforced such link64. For instance, US NSS in 2002 established an 
association between poverty, bad governance, weak and failed states, terrorism and 
organised crime, all phenomena present at different degrees in Africa. This approach, 
endemic not just to the US government but also to international policies in Africa, 
has contributed considerably that the mainstream security community is increasingly 
preoccupied with the securitisation of development and on the other side, the 
development community is forced to engage with ‘developmentalising security’65.  
The securitisation of development, in our case AFRICOM usurping the development 
lane, is best reflected by the nature of AFRICOM. DoD endowed the command as a 
combatant one, meaning that AFRICOM would command US forces in combat, but 
at the same time it was advised that while ‘AFRICOM [would] be responsible for 
any necessary military action in Africa [...] many of the missions of AFRICOM will 
be non-kinetik’66. Accordingly, Ryan Henry, a high DoD official, confirmed that 
AFRICOM’s primary missions include humanitarian assistance, civic action, and 
response to natural disasters67. The choice by the DoD officials to emphasize the 
                                                            
63 US White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2007 ‘Statement by President Bush: President 
Bush Creates a Department of Defence Unified Combatant Command for Africa’, 6 February 
2007, available at: http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070 
206-3.html, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
64 Francis, J, D 2010 ‘Introduction: AFRICOM – US Strategic Interests and African Security’, 
p.16. 
65 Francis, J, D 2010 ‘Introduction: AFRICOM – US Strategic Interests and African Security’, 
p.19. 
66 Cited in Burgess, S, F 2008 ‘US Africa Command, Changing Security Dynamics, And 
Perceptions of US Africa Policy’, p.16, available at: http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/Research 
%20Papers/2008/US%20AFRICA%20COMMAND,%20CHANGING%20SECURITY%20D
YNAMICS.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
67 Henry, R 2007 ‘Principal Deputy Undersecretary Ryan Henry Briefing At The State 
Department Foreign Press Center’, available at: http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/ 
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3999, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
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non-military roles of AFRICOM, has created much controversy within the US and 
among US, Africa and the broader international community, especially the NGO one. 
This kind of ‘messaging’ on the part of Bush administration’s officials, has amplified 
especially African concerns, creating the impression that the Pentagon, through 
AFRICOM, is taking charge of US development policy and humanitarian assistance 
in Africa. By this ‘Pentagon taking charge’ many fear a militarisation of US Africa 
policy. They, arguably rightly, pose the question of why is it necessary to use the 
military, in a time when other effective civilian methods, like USAID, or Peace 
Corps, were very effective in their work in winning the hearts and the minds of 
African people68. It is also feared that, since the DoD has at its disposal much larger 
budgets than DoS, or USAID –it is not for nothing called the ‘600 pounds gorilla’–, 
AFRICOM may as well exacerbate such situation even further69.    
It has, though, to be said, that when considering the total amount that the US invests 
in the continent, –some $9 billion–, 97 percent of it is done through the civilian arm 
of the US government: the DoS, USAID, etc. Only about 3 percent goes through the 
DoD, most of it is consumed by the CJTF-HoA, this last one, actually, having 
changed from a combatant to a civil affairs mission. Other main instrument being 
financed through this same 3 percent is i.e. the Pan Sahel Initiative, which concerns 
the terrorist threat in the continent. Consequently, as sustained by DoD officials, less 
than 1 percent goes in other military-to-military activities with partners in the 
continent. Accordingly, ‘[t]he leadership is clearly in the developmental and the 
diplomatic end. The defense end is only a very small part’70.  
                                                            
68 Okumu, W 2007 ‘Africa Command: Opportunity for Enhanced Engagement or the 
Militarization of U.S.-Africa Relations?’ Dr. W Okumu, Head, African Security Analysis 
Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa, testimony given to the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, available 
at: http://allafrica.com/stories/200708031070.html, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
69 i.e. Professor Jonathan Taplin, Annenberg School of Communication, USC, cited in Seib, P 
(ed.) 2008 ‘AFRICOM: The American Military and Public Diplomacy in Africa – 
Proceedings of the UCS Public Diplomacy Conference, University of Southern California, 
February 7-8, 2008’, p.32; TransAfrica Forum, 2008 ‘AFRICOM: The Militarisation of US 
Diplomacy and Foreign Aid’, available at: http://www.transafricaforum.org/files/AFRICOM 
The%20Militarisatio%20of%20US%20Diplomacy%20and%20Foreign%20Aid.pdf, accessed 
on 30.03.2009. 
70 Quotation by Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defence for Policy - DoD, cited 
in Seib, P (ed.) 2008 ‘AFRICOM: The American Military and Public Diplomacy in Africa – 
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Under these circumstances, AFRICOM’s hybrid structure highlights the ‘whole-of-
government’ approach and the underlying principle that the ‘military cannot do it all 
alone’. It is argued that, with the 3 percent DoD has at its disposal, it could do, in this 
sense, a better job of supporting that other 97 percent71. 
For all the good wording, the mistrust that the African side has, is, though well 
founded, since, historically seen the sustainability of US foreign policies is not 
necessarily an example to follow. Thus, 
‘[w]hen you look at history, whether it’s two years, or ten years, or 
twenty years of US military engagement on the continent of Africa, 
it has been a selective engagement that very rarely has had 
anything to do with the interest of African peoples. […] One of the 
major concerns that comes up, is this notion that we need to 
whitewash or erase the past US involvement on the continent. […] 
We say: forget about that because what we are really doing now is 
building schools and health clinics for our long-term benefit. […] 
What we are asking people to do on the continent is believe what 
you hear not what you see. […] All of these things continue to 
breed mistrust. [Therefore] it’s not merely going to be, ‘Just believe 
us, we really are trying to do the right thing’’72. 
Accordingly, AFRICOM’s mission continued to remain vague to Americans and 
Africans alike73.  
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‘When Pentagon strategists sought to create a new military 
command to oversee Africa, they believed they could build one that 
deemphasized military might and would serve as an exemplar of 
what so-called US soft power could do around the world’74. 
They were proved wrong. DoD officials struggled to straighten the 
misunderstandings about AFRICOM’s mission concerning its non-kinetic activities. 
They put great effort at showing that the fears about AFRICOM becoming the lead 
US government interlocutor with Africa and AFRICOM representing a militarisation 
of US policy in Africa were unfounded75. The first step they had to do, in convincing 
the audiences, be they African or else, was to admit the shortcomings in their 
‘strategic communications’ campaign:  
‘At its core, public diplomacy or strategic communications is about 
harmonizing our actions with our words to generate an alignment 
among key stakeholders —an alignment of their perceptions with 
our policy goals and objectives. That has proven much harder in 
execution than it might seem, since the American government 
operates in a very competitive international marketplace of ideas’76. 
AFRICOM failed to send out a soft power message, in large parts because its 
‘belated and clumsy outreach generated suspicion about the military’s true 
motives’77. Africa did not buy AFRICOM’s claim to ‘help development, health, 
education, democracy, and economic growth’.  
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AFRICOM & UNILATERALISM VS. MULTILATERALISM 
There exist a large number of Africanists which sustain that a multilateral approach 
directed to the AU, African regional economic communities and other regional 
organizations is the only viable approach to help Africans solve their problems78. It 
perfectly marries the adage ‘African solutions to African problems’. The 
establishment of AFRICOM, in this sense, is seen as a unilateral US approach to 
Africa, thus ‘unneeded and unwarranted’79. There is a rather surprising statement 
pertaining to AFRICOM, which sounds conciliatory with the above said.  
‘By nature, Americans are individualistic, which is probably one of 
the reasons that we tend to act more than we tend to listen, while 
European countries are more communalistic. But to be successful, 
America has to adapt its approach to a more multilateral, 
supporting and less dominating way of dealing with African 
partners’80. 
Surprising, because the rhetoric usually rolled out by the US administration on the 
case of AFRICOM, wants us to go at the exact opposite direction. It contends that 
AFRICOM’s leadership, just as that of the AU, envisions an Africa that is secure and 
prosperous and aims at sustaining the AU security apparatus to contribute to the 
realization of such vision. The literature on the topic is bifurcated, inasmuch there are 
two different concurring views. On the one side, there are those who suggest that 
there is a complementary relationship between AFRICOM and AU81 and on the other 
side, those who sustain that such relationship is at best conflictual. Ellen Johnson 
Sirleaf, the Liberian President, a sustainer of the ‘complementary relationship’, 
points out that even though AFRICOM  
                                                            
78 Editorial, Mmegi/The Reporter (Gaborone), February 21, 2008, available at 
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79 Ibid. 
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Africa, cited in Corey, C, W 2008 ‘AFRICOM is Historic Step in US – Africa Relationship’, 
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‘is undeniably about the projection of American interests [… it] 
does not mean that it is to the exclusion of African ones. [… For it 
seeks to empower] African partners to develop a healthy security 
environment through embracing good governance, build security 
capacity, and developing good civil-military relationships’82.   
It is predicted that AFRICOM will positively impact the AU, inasmuch as a creature 
of the transformational diplomacy approach, it will cooperate with the AU security 
regime ‘to build and sustain democratic, well governed states that will respond to the 
needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international 
system’83, will strengthen AU’s security architecture, especially the African Standby 
Force (ASF)84, and it will provide training and technical support to AU’s counter-
terrorism activities.  
Opposed to these views there are those who emphasize the lack of a synergy between 
AFRICOM and AU. For instance, there have been previous efforts such as the Africa 
Crisis Response Initiative and various other initiatives to strengthen security 
arrangements on the continent. But with the dawn of AFRICOM, observes suggest 
that the US is not, in fact, as interested in multilateral approaches to strengthening 
Africans’ own capabilities to handle their own security arrangements.  
‘Instead we [the US] are saying [that] ‘This didn’t work and so we 
are coming in on our own now’’85. 
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It is further stressed that US policy-makers have failed to provide an outline of how 
AFRICOM intends to improve AU’s security institutions, especially the Peace and 
Security Council’s objectives, rather it is feared that AFRICOM will undermine the 
security policy of AU86. For instance, AU’s ability to engage in proactive 
interventions may be undercut, if AFRICOM uses its military presence to determine 
African security priorities, thus weakening the chances for a deployment of ASF. 
US’ scepticism about pan-continental structures exudes through the following 
statement of a high DoD official:  
‘[T]he Standby Force looks like it could potentially be a viable 
mechanism in the future if it’s built right. That’s a big ‘if’’87. 
African fears are fuelled by such reluctance, together with past experiences which 
show that western states are unwilling to act even when they do have troops stationed 
on the ground. Related to this last condition ‘the [US] in particular often discourages 
and even deters others from intervening in areas in which it has a strong military 
presence’88. The use of proxy African states, especially of those who are key member 
states of AU PSC, such as 2006-7 Ethiopian incursions into Somalia, have left a 
bitter taste and had a negative long-term impact of AU security. The negative attitude 
towards AFRICOM among key AU members is further sustained by the unilateral 
US approach to counter-terrorism. It is felt that the US chose the bilateral approach 
because it was unwilling to work within AU rules and structures. A reason for this 
choice is probably the fact that Americans feel that AU and its member states do not 
take terrorism seriously enough, and see AU as neither willing nor capable of strong 
counter-terrorism programmes, as made clear from the above-comment on ASF.  
Another area which is increasingly important to the AU is the fight against 
international organised crime. AFRICOM again has shown little enthusiasm for a 
multilateral approach and coordinating their work with African regional 
                                                            
86 Makinda, S 2008 ‘Why AFRICOM Has Not Won Over Africans?’, available at: 
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organisations89. As General Ward and other high ranked DoD officials made a visit 
to the AU headquarters back in November 2007, AU officials felt that the 
‘consultation meetings’ were a bit too late, since Washington has already finalised 
every detail on the establishment of AFRICOM. Thus, no great deal could be 
expected from such ‘informational sessions, courtesy calls, or even, educational 
tours’.  
‘Neither was there any indication that the officials who visited the 
AU headquarters were interested [sic] in knowing the genuine 
opinions of the AU, nor were they interested in involving the key 
PSC officials in the operationalisation of AFRICOM’90. 
 
THE AFRICOM CRISIS THROUGH THE LENS OF OBM & BPM 
The OBM theory sustains that resistance to given policies, in our case AFRICOM, 
engender as a result of organisational inertia and broadly speaking of 
innovation/change91. Change, within the decentralised bureaucracies is unwelcome 
since it means that routine or standard operating procedures (SOPs) are disrupted 
and/or have to be altered. Thus, when innovation/change comes as a result of reforms 
that make necessary coordination between agencies, resistance to it becomes even 
bigger. AFRICOM’s interagency structure, as the name says it, calls for extended 
coordination between different US administration agencies. According to the OBM 
theory rationale, resistance to AFRICOM was to be expected. Consequently, the 
structural differences between the different agencies involved within AFRICOM 
prop out as significant sources, which have hindered coordination and furthered 
resistance to AFRICOM’s unique structure. 
                                                            
89 AFRICOM’s programmes on this field focus on providing funds to militaries and police in 
individual African states, by extension one might presume that, at the given status, there is no 
multilateral component. 
90 Tieku, T, K 2010 ‘The African Union and AFRICOM’, p.141.  
91 Allison, G, Zellikow, P 1999 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis‘, 2nd 
edition, Addison Wesley Longman, NY, p.165. 
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This section will start by looking at the SOPs, which are defined as determining how 
an organisation acts92 allowing it to operate systematically. They may generate, 
though, inefficiencies and become so in fact enemies of innovation93. In these terms, 
SOPs can retard ‘the performance of new tasks’94 and thus the organisations will 
prefer to continue functioning the way they always have95 and when forced, they will 
seek the first minimally acceptable solution96. Such phenomenon is called 
‘satisficing’, which accounts for less than optimal outputs. Consequently, when 
different organisations with varying SOPs try to coordinate their actions, as a result 
of the rationale stated above, they will be faced with greater than usual resistance and 
challenges.  
AFRICOM’s activities require daily or regular coordination between the personnel of 
different US agencies, which are embedded within the AFRICOM’s structure. This 
has proved very difficult, since each agency has its own chain of command. For 
instance, the position of the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs 
(DCMA), a senior DoS staff, has caused concerns within the military, since the DoD 
chain of command orders that, except the US President and the DoD Secretary, no 
other civilian can give legally binding orders to any military personnel97. Such 
situation persists also with other low level interagency personnel, inasmuch they 
continue to be accountable to their respective agencies in Washington, -who continue 
to pay them–, and not to the Commander of AFRICOM. Under this point of view, 
                                                            
92 Allison, G, Zellikow, P 1999 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis‘, 
pp.169-70. 
93 Wilson, J, Q 1989 ‘Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and why They Do it’, Basic 
Books, NY, pp.221-2 
94 Wilson, J, Q 1989 ‘Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and why They Do it’, p.222. 
95 Ibid, p.375. 
96 Allison, G, T, Halperin, M, H 1972 ‘Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy 
Implications’, in World Politics, Volume 24, Supplement: Theory and Policy in International 
Relations, p.176; Wilson, J, Q 1989 ‘Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and why 
They Do it’, p.24; Jervis, R 1976 ‘Perception and Misperception in International Politics’ 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, p.24; March, J, G, Simon, H, A 1958 ‘Organizations’, 
John Wiley & Sons, NY, p.136. 
97 US Armed Services Committee, 2007 ‘Advanced Questions for General William E. ‘Kip’ 
Ward, US Army, Nominee for Commander of US Africa Command on 27 September 2007’, 
p.6, available at: http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/ 2007/September/Ward%2009-27-
07.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
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AFRICOM gets so expertise from other agencies without having to pay for it. It is 
clear that such situation has engendered fiery debates on resources.     
Budget planning, provides another clear SOP conflict between the DoD and other US 
administration agencies, such as the DoS. For instance DoD plans in seven-years 
cycles, which it, thus, requires for long-term strategies. The DoS, on the other hand, 
has shorter planning cycles due to the nature of its actions, which are reflective of 
diplomatic compromises. Another feature concerning the budgetary discrepancies is 
the fact the DoD has been continually favoured and as a matter of fact makes use of 
huge resources, be they of financial or human nature. The civilian agencies, who 
suffer from endemic understaffing, fear that rather soon than late, DoD resources will 
overwhelm their owns.  
On the other side, DoD’s ability, to conduct humanitarian assistance is limited by the 
US Code’s Title 10, which governs the armed services: 
‘Humanitarian and civic assistance may not be provided under this 
section (directly or indirectly) to any individual, group, or 
organisation engaged in military or paramilitary activity [and can 
only] serve the basic economic and social need to the people of the 
country concerned’98.  
Title 10, thus prohibits DoD to use its humanitarian budget for i.e. governance 
programmes and police training. This may put Pentagon at disadvantage, since it 
must rely on the resources of other agencies. Given DoD’s clout on the national 
security structure, it nevertheless can put considerable pressure on civilian agencies 
in order to support its own humanitarian aims. Thus, here we have the DoD, with the 
largest budget of any agency by far, and yet it asks for resources by other agencies. 
The civilian agencies have all the reasons to feel such since the Bush administration, 
in order to overcome Title 10 limitations, it has set in motion a, for many worrying, 
trend in authority transfers. Reference is being made of the transfer to DoD of 
authorities which once were executed exclusively by civilian agencies, most notably 
                                                            
98 US Code, 2006 ‘Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 20: Humanitarian And Other Assistance’, 
§401, a, US House of Representatives, Washington DC, available at: http://www.law.cornell. 
edu/uscode/10/usc_sec_10_00000401----000-.html, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
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the Department of State and USAID. An exemple par excellence is provided through 
the sections ‘1206’ and ‘1207’ authorities of the National Defence Authorisation Act 
(NDAA) of 200699, through which the DoD can in predefined circumstances train 
and equip non military counterparts and transfer its funds to the State Department for 
purposes of security and stabilisation requirements. This authority transfer has 
obviously created frictions between the two departments. Such function has been 
followed with suspicion and distrust not just by the State Department but also the 
Congress itself, as well as the broader developmental and nongovernmental 
community over an alleged erosion of civilian command within the assistance 
programmes. It is thought that this ‘militarisation’ –programmes, including the non-
military ones, funded and / or executed by DoD- has progressively expanded to 
include large percentages of the US policy towards Africa100. Generally speaking, in 
1998 USAID managed 64.3 percent of US official development assistance; the State 
Department 12.9 percent; DoD only 3.3 percent. Meanwhile in 2006, USAID 
dropped to 45 percent while DoD rose to 18 percent. Other agencies, apart from 
State, USAID and DoD, saw an increase in official development assistance as well, 
from 19.3 percent to 23.6 percent101. 
                                                            
99 US Congress, 2006 ‘National Defence Authorisation Act: Public Law 109-163, Jan.06, 2006’, 
US Congress, Washington DC. For the full text of the National Defence Authorisation Act of 
2006 see: http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/olc/docs /PL109-163.pdf, the sections 1206 and 1207 to 
be found at, respectively, p.322 and p.324, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
100 Anderson, G W 2008 ‘USAID Collaboration with DoD: Why? How? With Whom?’, 
Presentation at the USAID-DoD Cooperation and Implications for Development Event, Centre 
for Global Development, Washington DC, presentation and transcript available at: 
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/events/5.06.08/Event_Transcript.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009; 
Oxfam America, 2008 ‘Smart Development: Why US Foreign Aid Demands Major Reform’, 
Oxfam America, Boston, available at: hffp://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsand 
publications/publications/briefing_papers/smart-development/smart-development-may2008.p 
df, last accessed on 30.03.2009; Moncrieff, V M 2008 ‘Potentially Lethal: Increased 
Relationship Between Military and Aid’, in The Huffington Post December 22, 2008, 
available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/virginia-moncrieff/military-civilian-policy_b_15 
2749.html, last accessed on 30.03.2009; Cherico, A, 2009 ‘Humanitarian Organisations Fight 
for Federal Funds’, available at: http://upiu.com/articles/humanitarian-organizations-fight-
for-federal-funds, last accessed on 30.03.2009; Williams, R 2010 ‘Militarisation of US 
Foreign Policy: Why it Matters to DoD’, available at: http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/ 
2010/01/11/militarization-of-us-foreign-policy-why-it-matters-to-dod/, last accessed on 
25.06.2010. 
101 Oxfam America, 2008 ‘Smart Development: Why US Foreign Aid Demands Major Reform’, 
Oxfam America, Boston, p.12, available at: hffp://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpub 
lications/publications/briefing_papers/smart-development/smart-development-may2008.pdf, 
last accessed on 30.03.2009 
213 
 
Under these conditions, ‘[the US civilian agencies] can’t help but feel like their turf’s 
being invaded by the gun-toting crowd, hell-bent on opening a new front in a new 
war’102. 
Another facet that may be analysed through the lens of the OBM, and which points 
out at another explanatory fact of the inter-agency resistance AFRICOM faces, is the 
different organisational culture that Pentagon and US civilian agencies, i.e. DoS, 
have.  
‘Organisational culture is [...] the set of beliefs the members of an 
organisation hold about their organisation, beliefs they have 
inherited and pass on to their successors’103.  
The DoD, as it may be expected, has a strong culture of planners. Plans are seen as 
essential, and the SOPs require that directions, commands, etc are passed up or down 
the chain of command in well defined paths. While on the other side DoS, by its own 
admission does not have a planning culture, as mentioned above, due to the nature of 
its activities, which involve, predominantly discussion and compromise. These two 
organisational cultures account for two very different approaches: DoD’s is rather 
unilateral and DoS more bilateral and/or multilateral. Accordingly, in an interview, 
the AFRICOM’s Deputy to the Commander had to accept: 
‘[...] And, again, it's not been easy. But because we work together, 
because our cultures –and we do have different cultures– meet on a 
daily basis, we are understanding each other more and more. We 
laugh about things, you know, whether it's phraseology or 
terminology, and the way we play, which is sometimes different. 
The cycles are different. [...] So it's going to be an iterative process 
[...]’104. 
                                                            
102 Quotation from Thomas Benett in Esquire 2007, cited in Hentz, J, J 2008 ‘Into Africa’, in 
Hoover Digest No.4, available at: http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/ 
5815, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
103 Allison, G, Zellikow, P 1999 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis‘, 
p.153  
104 Yates, M, C 2009 ‘Transcript: Yates Discusses Interagency Integration in US Africa 
Command with Al-Jazeera English’, available at: www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=3007, 
last accessed on 31.05.2009. 
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The basic tenant of the bureaucratic politics model (BPM) is that bureaucratic 
behaviour consists of power struggles between rival agencies105. Accordingly, 
agencies will resist changes that appear to threaten their physical size and their 
general ability to fulfil their mandates as they interpret them. Thus organisational 
interests play a crucial role in decision-making, since, as Allison argues, ‘career 
officials are prone to believe that the health of their organisation is vital’106, since 
such health will assure that the agency will continue to ‘maintain influence, fulfilling 
its mission, and securing the necessary capabilities’. Health, under these conditions, 
is ‘[...] defined in terms of bodies assigned and dollars appropriated’107.  
So, while each agency is seeking to maximise it power, budget and mandate, the 
resultant is very much depending on the bargaining process, as Allison calls it ‘the 
pulling and hauling that is politics’108. The ‘pulling and hauling’ goes on within the 
larger bureaucracy as individuals and agencies act within the limits defined by SOPs 
and on behalf of their particular position109.  
Thus, in attempting to maximise tasks to be delegated to own organisation, 
interagency coordination is seen as a threat, since most agencies believe such will 
dilute their interdependence and authority. The resultant tends to be interagency turf 
wars. Relating it to AFRICOM, US civilian agencies feared that their abilities to 
carry out their mandates in Africa will be diminished. An argument for it, as 
sustained by mostly DoS and USAID officials, was the so called ‘politicisation of 
aid’. DoD, through AFRICOM, aimed at increasing its soft power capabilities, by 
using humanitarian and assistance aid to win hearts and minds. Many feared that, 
                                                            
105 Allison, G, T 1971 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’, Little, Brown, 
and Company, Boston, p.167. 
106 Allison, G, Zellikow, P 1999 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis‘, 
pp.301-2. 
107 Allison, G, T 1969 ‘Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missiles Crisis‘, in The American 
Political Sciences Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, p.700, available at: http://www.metu.edu.tr/ 
~utuba/Allison.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009 
108 Allison, G, T 1971 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’, p.144; Allison 
Zelikow, p.255 
109 Allison, G, T 1971 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’, p.144. 
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under these terms, aid will be used as a political, strategic and defence tool failing to 
make lasting changes for the neediest people. This goes against any accepted 
definition of humanitarian aid, which ought to be ‘impartial, neutral and 
independent’110, as well as need-based111. 
Thus, politicising aid may mean that aid will go where politics will benefit the most, 
so the respect for the above mentioned principles may disappear. The perception that 
aid provided by the US may no longer be impartial as well as the perceived 
affiliation of humanitarian/civilian agencies with DoD, is rightly arguably, very 
damaging for USAID, which it also fears that under such conditions its influence will 
shrink and mistrust will be brewed concerning projects in Africa, be they as part of a 
DoD-USAID coordinated effort or even the independent ones. Similar to the issue of 
politicisation of aid, experts raise concerns about the ‘militarisation of humanitarian 
and development assistance, as well as US policy in Africa’112. The use of 
development funds may, thus, be made on grounds of military/security objectives 
and not under humanitarian ones. In this case, a militarisation of aid means that 
USAID may lose its independent ability to create and implement its own 
development strategies.   
There exist also discrepancies on the purpose of humanitarian assistance in furthering 
US national security interests. As Allison argues, ‘[r]easonable men can disagree on 
how national security interests will be affected by a specific issue’113. While DoD’s 
and AFRICOM’s humanitarian projects are short-term and aim at securing 
immediate friendships abroad, USAID sustains that long-term, sustainable economic 
development helps not only the advancement of US interests but also enhances 
democracy and decreases extremism, thus diminishes threats to the US national 
                                                            
110 ICRC, 2007 ‘The ICRC’s Mission Statement’, available at: http://www.icrc.org/ 
Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/icrc-mission-190608, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
111 ECHO 2005 ‘European Humanitarian Aid Values And Principles’, available at: http://ec.eu 
ropa.eu/echo/files/media/publications/values_principles_en.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009. 
112 Malan, M 2007 ‘AFRICOM: A Wolf In Sheep’s Clothing? – Testimony before the Sub-
Committee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate’, available at: 
http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/MalanTestimony070801.pdf, last accessed on 
30.03.2009. 
113 Allison, G, T 1969 ‘Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missiles Crisis‘, p.707 
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security. Both agencies are convinced of the rightness of their approach and resist 
any decrease in their respective abilities to carry out concerned tasks. 
USAID and DoS also believe that AFRICOM will reduce civilian control over the 
military, as, by the way, shown by practices in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the 
military has authority over the projects of civilian agencies such as DoS and USAID. 
Furthermore, USAID had a tough time during the Bush administration years, which 
saw it going from an independent government agency to having to answer to the 
Secretary of State. Thus, USAID has well grounded reasons for its hostility to 
DoD’s/AFRICOM’s usurping the aid lane. A further issue of discordance is the loss 
of staff. AFRICOM’s interagency structure requires staff from other agencies, 
mainly USAID and DoS, in a time when they themselves are faced with capacity 
deficits. This is best mirrored by the personnel asymmetries in even quite small 
embassies throughout Africa, where DoD has an abundance of personnel114. 
‘Asymmetrical power dynamics arise from this imbalance and can 
easily cause friction between the agencies even when none 
intended harm’115. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON AFRICOM CRISIS 
AFRICOM was intended as a new kind of military command, aimed at integrating 
traditional security functions with humanitarian aid and development, through 
application of i.e. hard power for counterterrorist and security issues, and soft power 
for military training, officer exchanges and humanitarian projects. This was to be 
achieved through a greater and closer cooperation between the DoD, State 
Department and USAID. In this sense, the AFRICOM’s potential to increase US soft 
power is given, since ‘the military can sometimes play an important role in the 
                                                            
114 Quotation from Dr. Andre Le Sage, Senior Research Fellow for Africa of the Institute for 
National Strategic Studies at the National Defence University, cited in Hubbard, E with 
Menkhaus, K 2009 ‘Essence of Indecision: Towards an Explenation of Intra-Governmental 
Conflicts over AFRICOM’, Paper Presented at the International Studies Association Annual 
Conference in New York, p.10.   
115 Ibid.   
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generation of soft power [… with its] broad range of officer exchanges, joint 
training, and assistance programs with other countries in peacetime’116. 
Given the fact that Africa has not traditionally been of high importance to the US, it 
seems that, by using the RAM rationale, to the AFRICOM’s decision-makers, the 
costs derived by a possible African decline were not considered as relevant. 
Consequently, consultations with the African states and institutions were deemed 
futile. Once the error was noticed and AFRICOM was vested with a soft power 
message, it nevertheless, failed in large parts because of its ‘belated and clumsy 
outreach [which] generated suspicion about the military’s true motives’117. 
Perceptions, that AFRICOM ‘was an inappropriate and knee-jerk US militaristic 
response to clumsy Chinese mercantilism’118, ran rampant. The so much looked-after 
soft power image failed because as Nye says ‘a communications strategy cannot 
work if it cuts against the grain of policy. Actions speak louder than words, and 
public diplomacy that appears to be mere window dressing for hard power projection 
is unlikely to succeed’119. Accordingly, Africa did not buy AFRICOM’s claim to 
‘help development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth’120.   
Turf wars between the different concerned US agencies have provided the heftiest 
reasons for resistance to AFRICOM. In using the OBM & BPM rationale, due to the 
fact that the DoD is seen as the ‘600 pound gorilla’ among the US departments and 
agencies, DoS and USAID feared that by working in AFRICOM, part of them would 
be subordinated to the DoD. Under such conditions, DoS and USAID feared of 
losing autonomy about relevant strategic goals, meaning less influence on US Africa 
policies which in its own turn meant further cuts of budget and human resources. 
  
                                                            
116 Nye, Jr, J S 2008, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, in The ANNALS of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 616, Issue No.1, p.106. 
117 Bellamy, M, Hicks, K, Morrison, J, S 2007 ‘Strengthening AFRICOM’s Case’.  
118 Geldof, B 2008 ‘Sir Bob Geldof’s Travels with George Bush’ in The Sunday Times, March 9, 
2008, available at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ africa/article3510768.ece, 
last accessed 30.03.2009. 
119 Nye, Jr, J S 2008, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, p.102. 
120 Bellamy, M, Hicks, K, Morrison, J, S 2007 ‘Strengthening AFRICOM’s Case’.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CASE STUDY 2: THE JAES P&S PARTNERSHIP 
 
‘We believe that this summit will be remembered as a moment of 
recognition of maturity and transformation in our continent to 
continent dialogue, opening new paths and opportunities for our 
common future’1. 
Since the chosen case study –JAES P&S is an integral part within a broader JAES 
Partnership, agreed between Europe and Africa at the Lisbon Summit in December 
2007 it is deemed necessary to provide a short introduction of the rationale behind 
the broader strategy, for this is expedient in analysing the rationale behind the JAES 
P&S itself. As it has been mentioned throughout this dissertation Africa’s standing 
on the EU’s agenda received a big boost up since the dawn of the century. The 
changed contexts in both the continents and abroad have had a big role in that. On 
the African side is, of course, the creation of the AU together with its socio-
economic programme NEPAD, across the Mediterranean, the EU’s grows from a 
union of 15 to 25 and 27, and broadly speaking the world has changed too, since the 
emergence of new post 9/11 international global challenges, which together with an 
accelerating of the globalisation have pointed out at an increasingly interdependent 
world. This is seen as the broad rationale for the intensified cooperation between the 
EU and Africa2. On the road to the agreement of a Joint Strategy both parties have 
                        
1 Quotation from John Agyekoum Kufour, then President of Ghana and Chairman of AU at the 
Africa EU Summit in Lisbon, 7-9 December 2007, cited in Bonsu, K, O 2007 ‘EU-Africa 
Pledged New Strategic Partnership’, in Ghana Web, available at: http://www.ghanaweb. 
com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=135637, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
2 For instance see: Council of the European Union, 2007 ‘The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A 
Joint Africa-EU Strategy’, Brussels, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ 
cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf; the joint official website of the JAESP available at: 
http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/; as well as, all last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
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attempted to develop political strategies and policy documents aimed at providing 
guidance to their cooperation. The ones mentioned at the European section in Part II 
of this writing, need not to be named again, but they did create a momentum upon 
which to forge the new EU-Africa cooperation. The JAES is seen to have brought the 
Africa-EU relationship at new highs strategically as well as politically. One of the 
important features of this partnership is the fact that it is based on a shared consensus 
on values, common interests as well as common strategic objectives. Principles, such 
as the unity of Africa, interdependence, ownership and joint responsibility as well as 
respect for human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and the right to 
development, lay at the foundation of this partnership. Its four main objectives 
concern, firstly a strengthened Africa-EU political partnership, by which is meant a 
strengthening of institutional ties, and treating Africa as one which ensures a strong 
and sustainable continent-to-continent relationship, with the AU and EU at the 
centre; secondly promotion of peace, security, democratic governance, fundamental 
freedoms, gender equality, sustainable development and regional/continental 
integration in Africa, all of which contribute to the attainment of the MDGs by 2015; 
thirdly, an effective multilateralism and fourthly the promotion of a broad-based 
people-centred partnership by facilitating civil society participation. The JAES is 
thus a wide-ranging strategy considered as the ‘capstone doctrine of EU-Africa 
relations’3, which takes stock of the fifty years of cooperation originated with the 
Rome Treaties. The JAES and its first Action Plan for 2008-2010 identify eight 
priorities for cooperation, with peace and security featuring prominently4.  
 
THE JOINT AFRICA EU STRATEGY – PEACE AND SECURITY PARTNERSHIP 
As a result of geographic proximity and historical experiences, but also as mentioned 
on Part II EU-relevant chapter, both continents agree that peace and security are 
preconditions to development, be it in political, economic or social terms, thus, the 
                        
3 Pirozzi, N, 2010 ‘Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing a New Africa-EU 
Partnership–A European Perspective’, in Quaderni IAI 17–English Series, IAI, Rome, p.28. 
4 The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Action Plan, EU-Africa 
Summit, Lisbon, 8-9 December 2007, available at: http://eu2007.pt/NR/rdonlyres/D449546C-
BF42-4CB3-B566-407591845C43/0/071206jsapenlogos_form atado.pdf, last accessed on 
22.05.2010. 
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imperative for a comprehensive and holistic approach to security issues. This is 
translated in, firstly, a necessity for a strengthened dialogue and institutional 
cooperation which addresses both the African and EU security challenges5, ensuring 
so the facilitation of a better coordination of efforts within the international arena, 
with a special reference to the UN Security Council6. The main objective for the first 
priority action is to ‘reach common positions and implement common approaches on 
challenges to peace and security in Africa, Europe and globally’, which is translated 
in common understanding of root causes to conflict, strengthened cooperation, 
improved coordination all of which should increase the influence of EU and Africa 
within the international and global fora. Secondly, the EU has committed, by taking 
into account the emergent AU’s APSA, to support its operationalisation and its 
various components, especially CESW, Panel of the Wise and the ASF, which is 
mostly translated with training exercises, exchanges and logistics. Thirdly, support 
the establishment of a predictable and sustainable funding mechanism for African-
led peace support operations. This will be achieved by building on the experience of 
the African Peace Facility (APF) and the Additional Voluntary Contributions 
(AVCs) of EU MS7. These main issues are the points of departure for the work 
carried out within the partnership and contain clearly specified objectives, expected 
outcomes and planned initiatives8. The three priority actions of JAES P&S point at a 
remarkable similarity with the priorities set within the EU Strategy for Africa (ESA) 
adopted by the EU in 2005. JAES P&S takes advantage of a number of key 
mechanisms, such as the APF9, the EU concept for Strengthening African 
                        
5 General Secretariat of the Council of European Union, 2008 ‘The Africa European Union 
Strategic Partnership’, European Communities, Brussels, p.19, available at: http://www.consi 
lium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/EN_AFRICA_inter08.pdf; The Africa-EU 
Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Action Plan, EU-Africa Summit, 
Lisbon, 8-9 December 2007, available at: http://eu2007.pt/NR/rdonlyres/D449546C-BF42-4C 
B3-B566-407591845C43/0/071206jsapenlogos_form atado.pdf, both accessed on 22.05.2010. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Elowson, C 2009 ‘The Joint Africa-EU Strategy: A Study of the Peace and Security 
Partnership’, Swedish defence Research Agency/FOI, Stockholm, p.7, available at: http://eur 
opafrica.files.wordpress.com/2009/06/jaes-ps-foir2736.pdf, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
9 APF was created in 2003 upon a request by African leaders. It is funded through the EDF: €440 
million for the period 2004-7; €300 million for 2008-2010. In 2007 it received additional 
funding through the voluntary contributions of EU MS. African countries also contribute, i.e. 
South Africa. APF is at the centre of JAES P&S priority action three. Its aims were twofold: 
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Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts10, the EU 
Delegation to the AU11 and the Special Adviser for African Peace-Keeping 
Capabilities12. The first two mechanisms were established prior to JAES P&S and the 
last two ones at about the same time. 
 
THE JAES P&S THROUGH THE LENS OF RAM 
After having presented the broad rationale and actions intended for the JAES P&S, 
the chapter will continue by applying Allison’s approach to JAES P&S. Allison 
sustains that 
‘By observing behaviour and considering what the actor’s objective 
might be, when I identify an objective that is advanced effectively 
by the action, I have a strong hypothesis about why [concerned 
actors – in our case EU] did whatever they did’13. 
                                                                  
support African led PSOs and capacity building for APSA including RECs. For instance, to 
African PSOs: €300 million to AMIS; €15.5 million to AMISOM; € 23.4 million to 
FOMUC/CAR; €5 million to AMISEC. 
10 Initiated through an agreement between France and the UK in 2005-6, and adopted by the EU 
in May 2006 and was intended as the framework for implementing ESA, with the focus of 
supporting the establishment of AU APSA, including the creation of ASF, focus which has 
been transferred to JAES P&S. For more see: European Council 2006 ‘The EU Concept for 
Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of 
Conflicts’, Brussels, available at: http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/ 
pressData/en/gena/91667.pdf, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
11 The EU Council established the position of an EU delegation exclusively dedicated to the AU. 
The position of ambassador Koen Vervaeke, is a double-hatted, meaning it represents both the 
Council as the EU Special representative (EUSR) and the Commission as the Head of its 
Delegation. For more: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1397&lang=EN.    
12 Established by the European Council in February 2008, with the aim of providing with 
decisive resources in order to implement the JAES P&S, ‘coordinating all related activities’ 
within the Council Secretariat. For more see: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage. 
aspx?id=942&lang=EN, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
13 Allison, G, T 1971 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’, Little, Brown, 
Boston; Allison, G, T, Halperin, M 1972 ‘Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy 
Implications’, in World Politics, Volume 24, pp.40-79; Allison, G, Zelikow, P 1999 ‘Essence 
of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’, 2nd Edition, Longman, NY; Allison, G 
2008 ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis’, in Smith, S, Hadfield, A, Dunne, T (eds.) 2008 ‘Foreign 
Policy: Theories-Actors-Cases’, Oxford university Press, Oxford, p.223. 
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RAM, though, broadens this angle by including in its analysis the calculations, –
threats and/or opportunities–, about the situation in which the actor finds itself14.  
 
WHY ENGAGE IN AFRICA? 
The European Union is seen as the ‘natural partner’ for Africa. There are several 
reasons for it. Firstly, due to their geographical proximity which accounts for the 
long history on the relationship between the two continents which spans many 
centuries, -a relationship not always harmonious, though, as witnessed by the 
colonialist legacy of the past. Despite this legacy, former colonial powers such as 
France and UK have maintained close ties with their former colonies. Secondly, the 
European trade and investment have continuously remained of particular importance 
to Africa – over 50 per cent of global Official Development Aid (ODA) in provided 
by EU which it still holds the commitment to increase ODA to .56 per cent of GNI 
by end of 2010, being so on the best way to reach the UN target of 0.7 percent by 
2015. And thirdly, the increased concerns about security problems in Africa and their 
repercussions in Europe15. Fourthly, the continent’s abundance in natural resources, 
is an important factor as well, especially energy. EU is looking for other sources to 
secure supply and Africa is an alternative to the volatile Middle East and to her 
disadvantageous dependence on Russia16.  
Another subjective factor may be seen on the EU’s perception of being about to 
‘miss the boat’, since Africa has been placed at the centre of foreign policies of old 
and new powers. Undoubtedly, the engagement of US in Africa and the 
establishment of AFRICOM, as well as the huge amounts on investment flowing to 
Africa from the emerging powers especially from China, do point out at this 
direction. Thus, the scramble between major players, such as the USA, China, India, 
etc., for access to the African market, has pointed to the importance perceived by the 
                        
14 Ibid. 
15 This factor will be handled at greater length on the following section of this same chapter 
‘Conceptualisation of Security & Securitisation of External Borders’. 
16 Kotsopoulos, J 2007 ‘The EU and Africa: Coming Together at Last?’, in Policy Brief July 
2007, European Policy Center, Brussels, available at: http://merlin.dicoruna.es/ipe/doce/pdfbo 
letin/794069478_The%20EU%20and%20Africa.pdf, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
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EU to continue to remain the biggest partner in Africa, for out of this positions can 
the EU ensure her influence on the continent17.  
Some argue that the EU action, concerning the strategic partnership with Africa, was 
exclusively pushed due to an imperative not to ‘miss the boat’. For instance: 
‘The planned EU-Africa Summit [Lisbon 2007] is one example. 
This high-level meeting between the two continents had been put 
on the back burner for the past seven years. And then out of the 
blue, the EU made it a pressing issue. Without such a summit, the 
EU fears that it may lose its foothold in Africa. [...] Africa has now 
become the continent to be won over’18. 
Such argument is also sustained by the following rhetoric used by African journalists 
in Lisbon who saw the summit taking ‘place at a time when there is growing Chinese 
investment and influence and a recognition that the continent is no longer ‘Europe’s 
private hunting grounds’’19. Others, though, would argue that ‘[Such] did not prompt 
[the] development [of JAES] but gave it new impetus’20. 
 
CONCEPTUALISATION OF SECURITY & SECURITISATION OF EXTERNAL BORDERS 
EU’s internal development process has also to be taken into account when 
considering the reasons for the new found eagerness to engage in Africa. The 
deepening of integration has brought EU MS together to coordinate their standpoints, 
                        
17 Elowson, C 2009 ‘The Joint Africa-EU Strategy: A Study of the Peace and Security 
Partnership’, p.59. 
18 Karlen M-T 2007 ‘New Donors: China’s Africa Policy as a Prime Example’, in Development 
Policy Briefing 02/07, Swiss Agency for Cooperation and Development, available at: 
http://www.sdc.admin.ch/en/Home/Documentation/Bulletins/dp_briefing, last accessed on 
22.05.2010.  
19 Kwaku Osei Bonsu, 2007 ‘EU-Africa Leaders Pledged New Strategic Partnership’, in 
GhanaWeb, available at: http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel. 
php?ID=135637, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
20 Berger, B, Wissenbach, U 2007 ‘EU-China-Africa Trilateral Development Cooperation: 
Common Challenges and New Directions’, in Discussion Paper 21/2007, German 
Development Institute/DIE-GDI, Bonn, p.4, available at: http://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-
Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/%28ynDK_contentByKey%29/ADMR-7BRFHU/$FILE/Berge 
rWissenbachEU-China-Africa.pdf, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
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including aspirations for a greater role within the international arena. The subsequent 
development concerning CFSP/ESDP raised issues on how to deal with i.e. Africa. In 
the 1990s and at the dawn of the new century the centre-stage was occupied by issues 
concerning security, be it in terms of wars and conflicts within EU’s very own 
backyard but also in Africa or in terms of new threats and their transnational nature 
such as the phenomenon of terrorism. The EU had to first and foremost, identify 
what her security interests as well as threats were, and what instruments it had to 
develop in order to deal with them. Therefore in analysing the JAES P&S, of utmost 
importance is the inclusion within the discourse of the conceptualisation of security 
and how this is related to the African realities and sensitivities. The EU had to 
provide answers to questions such as what are her values and goals, what security 
instruments it intends to use to protect those values and attain those goals, as well as 
what is the security threat to the EU. The answer to such questions came not easily 
since the EU traditionally has not been conceived of as an international security 
object –it does not have a collective defence in the traditional sense– nor has it been 
analyzed as a subject pursuing an active security policy because ‘security policy’ was 
competence of the EU member states (or to be taken care of in other organizations 
such as the NATO). Therefore, the EU has mostly been viewed as an outcome or 
reflection of the considerations of other players, rather than an actor in itself. This 
lack of own international security identity has been addressed by one of the main 
strategic documents of the EU’s security policy: the European Security Strategy 
(ESS). The ESS acknowledged that Europe has security interests beyond its 
immediate neighbourhood, which in some geographical areas, especially Africa, are 
negatively affected by conflicts, poverty and poor governance and require an active 
engagement. This marked what has been called ‘the end of territorial defence’21 for 
the EU. Its objectives are in a more narrow sense of course the protection of the EU 
citizens and the protection of EU as space but they do also include the protection of 
universal values wherever they are threatened in the world22. So seen, threats to the 
                        
21 Gärtner, H 2003 ‘European Security: The End of Territorial Defence’, in Brown Journal of 
World Affairs, Volume 9, Issue No.: 2, pp.135-147, available at: http://www.watsoninstitute. 
org/bjwa/archive/9.2/EU/Gartner.pdf, last accessed on 22.05.2010  
22 Whitman, R, G 2002 ‘The fall, and rise, of civilian power Europe?’, Paper presented at the 
Conference on the European Union in International Affairs, National Europe Centre, 
Australian National University, 3-4 July 2002, available at: http://dspace.anu.edu.au/ 
bitstream/1885/41589/2/whitman.pdf, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
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EU security are best defined as those who threaten the core values of the EU (such as 
those defined within the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights), as well as the 
international law23. In that case, EU security would equal international security, 
which would imply that the EU has no specific external security space24. This 
rationale has made imperative to develop a foreign policy which requires an active 
engagement within the international security arena, making so crucial the 
development of a capacity which outlines a common focus on the promotion of peace 
in ‘distant places’25. Today’s security threats —from climate change to avian 
influenza, from terrorism to failed states— pose new and complex challenges26, since 
they seem to originate from many sources, cross political and functional boundaries 
with ease and have the potential to affect a wide variety of critical infrastructures. 
The EU also recognises that the 21st century security picture has fundamentally 
changed: ‘the post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in 
which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked’27. 
Consequently, poverty and pandemic diseases as well the cyber security and climate 
change were added to threats such as terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, international 
organized crime and regional conflicts28. Thus, the divide between external security, 
such as i.e. wars, international order and internal security matters such as terrorism, 
public order, and organised crime, has become to be considered largely inexistent, 
                        
23 Sundelius, B 2001 ‘The seeds of a functional security paradigm for the European Union’, 
Paper presented at the Second Pan-European Conference on EU Politics of the ECPR 
Standing Group on European Union Politics, 2001 
24 Ibid. 
25 European Council, 2003 ‘European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World’. 
Brussels, pp.7-9. 
26 Sundelius, B 2001 ‘The seeds of a functional security paradigm for the European Union’, 
Paper presented at the Second Pan-European Conference on EU Politics of the ECPR 
Standing Group on European Union Politics, 2001 
27 Ibid., p.2 
28 European Council, 2003 ‘European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World’. 
Brussels, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms Upload/78367.pdf; 
European Council 2008 ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: 
Providing Security in a Changing World’, available at: http://www.euun.europa.eu/ 
documents/en/081211_EU%20Security%20Strategy.pdf, both last accessed on 22.05.2010  
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pointing so to the emergence of a security continuum29. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 
in US but also the ones in own ground like the 7/7 in London and Madrid bombings 
in 2004, proved the interdependence that has come to characterise the international 
order. In terms of EU policies this resulted with a growing assimilation of Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA) and EU external affairs, as indicated by the fact that addressing 
the instability of the African continent advanced as one of the major security 
concerns for EU MS. The JAES P&S, at the request of EU MS aims to address these 
issues, since they feel to experience repercussions in terms of drugs and arms 
trafficking, illegal immigration, transnational organised crime, illicit trade in natural 
resources and terrorism, originating from Africa30.   
In summarizing, there appear to be three major motives that seem to ‘function in a 
conceptual and practical symbiosis and are mutually inseparable’ which help shed 
light on EU’s conceptualisation and approach to security: morality, legality and self-
interest31. The EU is morally committed to helping those who are lacking, or 
threatened to their, basic security. The legal motive as shaped within the international 
law, concerns the fact that the EU is obliged to secure human security for all people.  
‘Europeans have to take on their full responsibility and their role in 
their security and that of the world’32. 
Finally, an understanding that Europeans cannot be safe as long as others live in 
insecurity, for ‘external insecurity’ will ultimately affect Europe33.  
EU’s conceptualization of security provides a ground for agreement with the African 
counterpart, for they too see security not only in traditional terms but also in terms of 
                        
29 Gnesotto, N (ed.) 2004 ‘EU Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999-2004)’, 
Institute for Security Studies, Paris. 
30 Pirozzi, N, 2010 ‘Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing a New Africa-EU 
Partnership–A European Perspective’, p.28. 
31 Glasius, M, Kaldor, M 2005 ‘Individuals First: A Human Security Strategy for the European 
Union’, in Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, Volume 1, pp.62-82, available at: http://w 
ww.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityIPG.pdf, last accessed on22.05.2010. 
32 Quotation from French President Nicolas Sarkozy at the French Amabassodars Conference on 
27 August 2007.  
33 Ibid. 
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human security, as Chapter II of this same work already evaluated. By applying 
Allison’s concept of RAM, the EU has a clear objective and strategy pertaining to 
security which ultimately is instrumental to the attainment of her security interests 
and that provides a common ground with the African conceptualisation of security; 
all in all it seems that such perfectly marries with the JAES P&S partnership. 
 
SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS:  
The EU, especially since the Goteborg Programme in 200134, has developed into a 
key actor in shaping and defining the agenda about issues concerning the security-
development nexus. The EU has increasingly sought to influence the debate on this 
matter at an international as well as national level. For instance, it has provided a 
platform for launching discussions in i.e. the making of a ‘Human Security Doctrine 
for Europe’, and in these terms, the EC has proposed that the human security (HS) 
concept should be at the basis of bridging development and security policies. 
Internationally seen the HS is disputed, but at the EU level, the HS is sought with the 
aim to ensure that EU security policies do take into account the human security 
needs35 in concerned countries, regions and continents such as Africa. The EU, with 
its ‘multi-functional approach’, as it is also claimed by the ESS, promotes a holistic 
approach, through which it aims to position itself as a major actor on the 
international arena. The reasoning behind this is that the EU, inasmuch an 
international actor offering a multi-dimensional approach to security issues, can 
claim the status of an international power36. EU’s added value as a multi-institutional 
                        
34 The Göteborg Programme concerns issues of conflict prevention with a focus on especially 
long-term commitments. For more information on it see: Europäischer Rat 2001 
‘Schlussforgerungen des Vorsitzes Europäischer Rat – Göterborg 15-16 Juni 2001’, available 
at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/press Data/de/ec/00200-r1.d1.pdf, 
last accessed on 22.05.2010.  
35 Gänzle, S 2009 ‘Coping with the ‘Security-Development Nexus’: The European Community’s 
Instrument for Stability – Rationale and Potential’, German Development Institute/GDI-DIE, 
Bonn, p.2, available at: http://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/%28 
ynDK_contentByKey%29/ANES-7V59M2/$FILE/Studies%2047.2009.pdf; Bueger, C, Ven-
nesson, P 2009 ‘Security, development and the EU’s Development Policy’, European 
University Institute, Firenze, available at: http://erd.eui.eu/media/vennesson2.pdf, both last 
accessed on 22.05.2010. 
36 Bretherton, C, Vogler, J 1999 (2nd edition 2006) ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’, 
Routledge, London/NY; Piening, C 1997 ‘Global Europe: The European Union in World 
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and/or hybrid structure is likely to provide all types of crisis management tools – 
from humanitarian to civilian to military – within one unique framework37. Due to 
the complexity and multiplicity of problems faced – poverty, conflicts, wars, and 
humanitarian catastrophes – the African continent fits perfectly within this EU 
approach. Such debate is also welcomed by Africa/AU since it too it looks to tackle 
security comprehensively. African perceptions of security include poverty, pandemic 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria, food insecurity, child soldiers, bad 
governance etc38.  
At the EU, the security-development nexus is seen as to embrace two dimensions, the 
one concerning the politico-legal facet mentioned above, and the other, the 
implementation through instruments that comprehensively tackle the security and 
long term development agendas. This second dimension is fully included within the 
i.e. instruments funding JAES P&S such as the EDF, the African Peace Facility 
(APF), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the Instrument for Stability 
(IfS)39, etc. Although, it has to be said that, the fact that APF funds are sourced from 
                                                                  
Affairs’, Lynne Rienner, Boulder; Soeterdorp, P 1999 ‘Foreign Policy in the European 
Union’, Longman, NY.   
37 Bagayoko, N, Gilber, M, V 2007 ‘The European Union in Africa: The Linkage Between 
Security, Governance and Development from an Institutional Perspective’, in IDS Working 
Paper 284, Brighton, p.9, available at: http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0002781/EU_ 
Africa_IDS_May2007.pdf, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
38 For instance see: Thomas, C 2001 ‘Global Governance, Development and Human Security: 
Exploring the Links’, in Third World Quarterly, Volume 22, Issue 2, pp.159-75; Beebe, S 
2010 ‘Solutions Not Yet Sought: A Human Security Paradigm for Twenty-First-Century 
Africa’, in Francis, J, D (ed.) 2010 ‘US Strategy in Africa: AFRICOM, Terrorism and 
Security Challenges’, Routledge Global Security Studies, Oxon & NY, p.96 
39 Strzaska, A, Moeller, J 2008 ‘The African Peace Facility’, European Commission DG DEV & 
DG AIDCO, Brussels, p.3, available at: http://europafrica.files.wordpress.com/2008/05/ 
african-peace-facility.ppt, last accessed on 22.05.2010; General Secretariat of the Council of 
European Union, 2008 ‘The Africa European Union Strategic Partnership’, European 
Communities, Brussels, pp.65-6; Gänzle, S 2009 ‘Coping with the ‘Security-Development 
Nexus’: The European Community’s Instrument for Stability – Rationale and Potential’.  The 
APF established in 2003, has come to be a major financing source to African Peace and 
Security Operations (PSOs) as well as to capacity building projects for APSA. Established in 
2007, IfS is an instrument which focuses on crisis management and peacebuilding concerning 
both short- and long-term interventions, and is envisioned as a complement especially to EDF 
and APF, in either to kick-start an initiative or when both EDF and PAF have temporarily run 
out. The budget for urgent interventions in Africa for 2007-8 amounted to €64 million. DCI 
Thematic Budget Lines for Africa concern i.e. funds that enhance the collaboration between 
non-state actors and local authorities. More can be found on Elowson, C 2009 ‘The Joint 
Africa-EU Strategy: A Study of the Peace and Security Partnership’, p.20. 
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the EDF has raised some restrictions on the type of support to be provided, i.e. APF 
funds are earmarked for personnel and logistical needs and cannot be used for direct 
military assistance, which it has created complications for the AU to effectively 
employ APF funds in supporting peacekeeping operations. 
Coming back to the EU and African conceptualisations of the security-development 
nexus, it can be said that the main objective for both actors, rather than finding 
common grounds on what security for each of them is (they seem to share most of 
these common grounds), would instead be   
‘[...] to come out with the framework and measures to promote a 
common policy to help out fragile African states or those in 
difficulty, taking into account the socio-economic and humanitarian 
dimensions of human security’40. 
From the official statements remarked at the Lisbon summit, it becomes clear that the 
JAES, its P&S partnership and especially its Action Plan aim at doing exactly this. 
 
 
THE AFRICAN CONTINENT AS A TEST CASE FOR EU’S PEACE AND SECURITY 
CAPACITIES 
‘Once the EU knew where it stood, there was an urge to try the 
ideas in practice. [...] Africa is the opportunity – an ideal incubator, 
some argue – to develop greater EU coherence in foreign policy 
making and to further improve the external relations’ capacity. 
Africa is also an arena in which the EU can fulfil its commitments 
under the 2003 Joint EU-UN Declaration on Crisis Management41, 
                        
40 Bonsu, O, K 2007 ‘Mixed Euro-African Think Tank on Security’, in Ghana Web, available at: 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=135620&commen
t=3381155#com, last accessed on 22.05.2010 
41 2003 ‘Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management’, available at: 
http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_2768_en.htm, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
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and where the battle groups concept could start to be 
implemented’42. 
The dawn of the new century evidenced a growing desire on the EU’s part to become 
increasingly involved in the resolution of Africa’s security problems. It started with 
the launching of Operation Artemis from June to September 2003 in DRC43, which is 
seen as a founding act in the mobilisation of the second pillar instruments in Africa44. 
Operation Artemis opened the way to a new form of cooperation between the EU and 
the UN. Moving away from Operation Artemis, the EU’s engagement in Africa’s 
conflict management and resolution has a deeper rationale which aimed at providing 
legitimacy, from an internal as well as external perspective, to the new EU security 
structures. Africa’s conflicts were instrumental to prove that the EU and her military 
structures –the Military Committee (EUMC) and Military Staff (EUMS)–, were able 
to plan military operations autonomously without resort to i.e. NATO means and 
instruments. Such has accordingly pointed out to the fact that the EU has found a 
niche where her ESDP can gain increasing international credibility. Internally seen, 
the EU’s engagement on Africa’s peace and security matters, would serve to test the 
decision-making procedures at the politico-military level45. The relative success of 
ESPD missions in Africa has served to consolidate the EU’s contributions to peace 
and post-conflict reconstruction, which in their own terms, consolidate the legitimacy 
of EU activities in and beyond Africa, placing so the EU as an international security 
actor which is to be taken seriously. EU’s engagement in Africa is also seen in terms 
of boosting EU’s image as a provider of innovative solutions for peace and security 
                        
42 Elowson, C 2009 ‘The Joint Africa-EU Strategy: A Study of the Peace and Security 
Partnership’, p.59. 
43 Operation Artemis was launched on 12 June 2003, with the aim to prevent a humanitarian 
catastrophe in Ituri, in the North East of DRC, as a result of violent fighting between the 
Hema and Lendu ethnic groups. The operation was explicitly mandated by the UN’s Security 
Council (Resolution 1484) in order to maintain the security in the camps hosting the internally 
displaced, secure the airport in Bunia and protect civilians, UN staff and humanitarian 
agencies in the region. It was intended as a bridging mission till the mandate of the United 
Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC) was reinforced and its strength increased. 
44 For instance: Faria, F 2004 ‘La Gestion des Crises en Afrique Subsaharienne: Le Rôle de 
l’Union Européenne’, in Occasional Paper 55, EU ISS, Paris, available at: 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ55.pdf, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
45 More on the decision-making procedures with the EU are to be handled at the second section 
of this chapter when JAES P&S will be analysed through the OBM and BPM approaches. 
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problems which do take into account the security-development nexus as pertaining to 
i.e. good governance practices, evidenced by the Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
missions46. Most importantly though, EU ‘experimentations’ in Darfur evidenced 
another crucial EU feature, that of being able to implement at an operational level its 
partnership with the AU. This exercising pointed at the EU’s preference to work 
multilaterally, to enhance the capacity of African structures indicating the importance 
it places on the principle of African ownership and at the same time building up the 
legitimacy of future EU-AU cooperation within the peace and security sector. 
Undoubtedly, that such experience did create a significant goodwill basis during the 
standing up of JAES P&S between EU and AU. 
 
MULTILATERALISM AND JAES P&S 
‘We want international organisations, [...] to be effective in 
confronting threats to international peace and security, and must 
therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken. [...] the 
African Union make[s] an important contribution [...]’47. 
As a result of the intensifying of regionalism processes, as mentioned in Chapter 4, 
EU has been eager to assert itself as an important international actor by establishing 
communication channels and closely cooperating with regional and continental 
organisations such as the AU. Such cooperation is seen in terms of ‘contributing to 
order in world politics’48, inasmuch EU is perceived as a model for successfully 
tackling peace and security matters at the regional/continental level. Furthermore, 
EU’s ‘distinct nature’ and her preference for cooperation rather than confrontation 
provide a significant goodwill basis for an enhanced dialogue with other international 
actors. The already mentioned ESS stressed the need to work with international 
                        
46 Reference is being made to i.e. EUPOL Kinshasa, EUSEC DRC, etc. 
47 European Council, 2003 ‘European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World’, 
p.9. 
48 van Veen, E 2006 ‘Order in World Politics: An Inquiry Into the Concept, Change, and the 
EU’s Contribution’, in UNU-CRIS Occasional Papers, 0-2006/17, available at: http://www. 
cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/20060724144024.O-2006-17.pdf, last accessed on 
30.03.2009.  
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partners, including Africa. The EU aims to contribute to international security by 
exercising effective multilateralism, international cooperation and strengthening the 
multilateral institutions49. For instance, such stance has its origins in May 2001 when 
the Council adopted a Common Position Concerning Conflict prevention, 
Management and Resolution in Africa. It is with this common position that an 
essential feature of EU’s security strategy in Africa was made apparent, namely that 
of an increased multilateralism aimed at intensifying EU’s partnership with African 
regional organisations and the UN on the matter and at the same time an increased 
EU contribution in strengthening their capabilities. This Common Position was 
adapted to the changing times in 2004 and in 2005 and 2007. In the later, the 
imperative for greater coordination between EU MS bilateral actions was highlighted 
with special reference for the support of AU and African SROs. Taking into 
consideration, on the one side, the fact that the African continent represents the most 
needs for international peacekeeping/building interventions, –EU has committed to 
deploy civilian and military personnel in the framework of ESDP, UN and NATO50–, 
and on the other side, the fact that most EU MS lack capacity to deal individually 
with Africa’s conflicts51, EU has, thus, developed a genuine interest in reinforcing 
African capabilities with the aim of creating an autonomous African security system 
which firstly hinders security problems to reach Europe, secondly, aims at avoid 
increasing costs to the EU52, and thirdly  increases the EU’s legitimacy in peace and 
security matter internationally. This also supports the notion of ‘African Solutions to 
African Problems’ that has been advanced by AU and NEPAD, by pointing out that 
ultimately the Africans maintain primary responsibility for the prevention, 
                        
49 European Council, 2003 ‘European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World’. 
Brussels, pp.7-9. 
50 EU SSR Guinea Bissau, EUSEC RDC, EUPOL RDC, EUNAVFOR Atalanta; EUTM Somalia 
account for the 1765 personnel deployed within ESDP missions in Africa; MINURCAT 
Chad/RCA, UNAMID Darfur; UNMIS Sudan; UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire; UNMIL in Liberia, 
MONUC in RDC MINURSO in Western Sahara, BINUB in Burundi account for the 68296 
UN personnel out of which 3704 are pledged by the EU countries; EU MS who are also 
NATO members are involved in assisting AMISOM with airlift support as well as through the 
counter-piracy Operation Ocean Shield off the coast of Horn of Africa.  
51 House of Lords, 2005-06 ‘The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership’, p.13. 
52 Ibid. 
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management and resolution of conflicts in Africa, and that the central actors are the 
AU and African SROs53.  
The so-called ‘African Renaissance’ has gone hand in hand with the awakening of 
the African political elite which has pushed for a consolidation of the regional 
integration and developed common mechanisms for conflict prevention, management 
and resolution.  
‘I say yes to ‘Africa to Africans’, but no to Africa without the 
international community’54. 
This newly found assertiveness of the AU to deal with peace and security has been 
also acknowledged by the UN, as subsequent documents bear testimony. The G8, as 
well has made Africa a central point of the agendas of its last eight summits. The EU 
has acted very much in the same way, and undeniably, the creation of AU/APSA, 
provided the EU with a platform for a more systemic engagement in Africa and the 
emergence of APSA with even clearer channels for dialogue. The JAES P&S 
partnership is obviously ‘not an isolated occurrence on the EU Africa sky’. Its 
objectives have taken stock, continued on, have been formed, strengthened and 
complemented by several Africa-EU contacts and EU policies, which have 
increasingly expanded since 200055. EU, through the JAES P&S, took advantage of 
these opportunities and put the regional/continental structures of Africa (AU/SROs) 
at the centre of the partnership, by arguing that: 
                        
53 European Council 2001 ‘Council Common Position 2001/374/CFSP Concerning Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa’; ________ 2004 ‘Common Position 
2004/85/CFSP of 26 January 2004 Concerning Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution in Africa’, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri 
=OJ:L:2004:021:0025:0029:EN:PDF; ________ 2005 ‘Common Position 2005/304/CFSP of 
12 January 2005 Concerning Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa’, 
available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:097:0057:00 
62:EN:PDF, all last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
54 Quotation from Abdou Diouf the Secretary-General of the Francophonie addressing the 8th 
Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale (IHEDN) Forum on African Continent, Paris, 
9 June 2007, cited in Assavno, W, Pout, C, E, B 2007 ‘The European Union (EU): African 
Peace and Security Environment’s Champion?’, in Points de Vue, Fondations pour la 
Recherche Stratégique, Paris, p.17, available at: http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/ 
publications/pv/stabilisation/ pv_20071127_eng.pdf, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
55 This has been elaborated at greater length within Part II, Chapter 6, of this dissertation.   
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‘The EU has a privileged relationship with the AU which is at the 
heart of the [JAES]. As a regional organisation itself the EU has 
experience of institution building, a history of integration and an 
inclusive approach to partnership. African states can benefit from 
working together through regional organisations, and the EU is 
best-placed to assist in this process’56. 
 
THE JAES P&S THROUGH THE LENS OF OBM & BPM 
EU involvement in African peace and security matters, as it has been mentioned 
throughout most part of this dissertation, predates the JAES P&S. This is partly a 
response to the desire of certain EU MS to avoid charges of colonial interference in a 
direct reaction to i.e. France’s unilateralist moves in Africa, for France 
‘rather than being a driving force, [...] has long been an obstacle to 
the EU’s further involvement in African security issues. France’s 
unilateralist policy in Africa has acted as a disincentive on other 
European states, which were reluctant to associate their image and 
the image of the EU with a policy often considered neo-colonial’57. 
Thus, the actions of EU MS in Africa, at least of some of them, did not concord with 
the EU stance, i.e. France’s unilateral behaviour is an example. When these EU MS 
are the same as the main traditional actors in Africa, then, arguably rightly, the 
difficulties in reaching a common policy such as JAES P&S are indeed very big. 
Nonetheless, the JAES P&S is agreed, and this section focuses on explaining why 
and how EU MS chose to walk the same way. This will be done by using a specific 
OBM tool: the logic of appropriateness. Graham Allison, claims that the logic of 
                        
56 House of Lords, 2005-06 ‘The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership’, 34th Report 
of Session 2005-06, Volume I: Report, House of Lords, London, p.13, available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeu com/206/206i.pdf, last 
accessed on 22.05.2010. 
57 Bagayoko, N, Gibert, M, V 2007 ‘The European Union in Africa: The Linkage Between 
Security, Governance and Development From An Institutional Perspective’, in IDS Working 
Paper 284, IDS, Brighton, p.25, available at: http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d00027 
81/EU_Africa_IDS_May2007.pdf, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
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appropriateness is very much at the heart of the OBM to explaining foreign policy58. 
The logic of appropriateness is a perspective on how action –policy making 
included– is to be interpreted and that the logic of appropriateness is seen as driven 
by rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour, organised into institutions59.  
‘Rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, 
expected and legitimate. Actors seek to fulfil the obligations 
encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political 
community [...] and the ethos, practices and expectations of its 
institutions. Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they 
see as appropriate for themselves in a specific type of situations’60. 
In our context the analysis of action within a ‘formally organised political institution’ 
and/or ‘membership in a political community’ will initially focus within the EU’s 
intergovernmental Pillar II61. 
 
EUROPEANISATION OF EU MS AFRICA PEACE AND SECURITY POLICIES 
Concerning Africa and EU’s engagement in the continent’s peace and security 
matters, traditionally seen most of the EU MS have not vested in Africa any 
significant political or economic interest. For instance, Germany has long been 
                        
58 Allison, G, Zelikow P 1999 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis‘, 
Longman, NY, p.146, pp.153-8; March, J, G, Olsen, J, P 1989 ‘Rediscovering Institutions: 
The Organisational Basis of Politics’, Free Press, NY. 
59 March, J, G, Olsen, J, P 2004 ‘The Logic of Appropriateness’, in ARENA Working Papers WP 
04/09, Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, Oslo, p. 3, available at: 
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp04_9.pdf, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
60 Ibid., p. 2. 
61 The European Union, as delineated by the Treaty on European Union signed in Amsterdam on 
02.10.1997, is structured on three pillars: the first one is the ‘Community Pillar’ concerns the 
economic, social and environmental policies; the second is the ‘CFSP Pillar’ which concerns 
foreign policy and military matters; and the third one or the ‘Police and Judicial Cooperation 
in Criminal matters (PJCC)’ concerns cooperation in the fight against crime. The three pillars 
function according to different decision-making procedures, the first one uses the Community 
procedure, which has the exclusive right to submit proposals to the Council and Parliament 
and a QMV is sufficient for a Council act to be adopted; while the two others use the 
intergovernmental procedure, where the Commission shares the right of initiative with the EU 
MS and unanimity in the Council is generally required for an act to be passed.  
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adamant about the necessity to limit peace and security interventions within the 
enlarged European space and been against to the idea of any EU involvement in the 
management of Africa’s conflicts62. France hasn’t also been keen to the idea of an 
EU involvement into Africa security matters, for it preferred a unilateralist policy, 
especially within the francophone Africa. Such behaviour prompted deterrence, 
toward France’s Africa policy, on the part of other EU MS, especially Germany, who 
did not want to see themselves and EU acquiring a neo-colonial image in Africa63.  
It has, though, to be said that France, particularly since the dawn of the new century, 
has been gradually and increasingly reducing its direct presence in Africa. It has 
become hesitant to act unilaterally, as demonstrated by i.e. its involvement in DRC 
only within the EU or its presence in Côte d’Ivoire under UN mandate within the UN 
forces. This is also sustained by the rhetoric of French ministers, for instance the 
French Foreign Minister is quoted to have said that France would no longer be ‘the 
gendarme of Africa’64. These latest developments bear witness to a sea change on 
France’s behaviour: it has increasingly acquired a multilateral feature, or other said 
France’s behaviour in Africa has ‘Europeanised’65. The reason to it is that the 
inclusion of France within the EU framework allows France to remain involved in 
Africa, – perceived by France as a crucial quality to ensuring its position on the 
international arena–, but with the bonus of an image void of a paternalist or neo-
colonial trait. Such Europeanisation of France’s Africa policy allows France also to 
share the costs of interventions. Thus, according to the ‘logic of appropriateness’, 
France acts in, what it sees as, an appropriate behaviour by Europeanising its Africa 
policy, for such is instrumental to her international image as well as cost efficient 
within this specific type of situation. France would also like to see EU’s involvement 
                        
62 Bagayoko, N, Gibert, M, V 2007 ‘The European Union in Africa: The Linkage Between 
Security, Governance and Development from an Institutional Perspective’, p22. 
63 Ibid., p.25. 
64 Cited from House of Lords, 2005-06 ‘The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership’, 
p.65. 
65 Europeanisation is defined as ‘an ongoing and mutually constitutive process of change linking 
national and European levels, capturing the growing ‘interwovenness’ of both’, cited in 
Major, C, Pomorska, K 2005 ‘Europeanisation: Framework of Fashion?’, in FORNET CFSP 
Forum, Volume 3, Issue No.: 5, p.1, available at: http://www.fornet.info/documents/CFSP 
%20Forum%20vol%203%20no%205.pdf, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
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in Africa as a prove that the EU can, if necessary, act alone, rendering so dispensable 
the need to coordinate with other actors, most obviously NATO and USA. 
Very much like France, UK, another traditional actor in Africa, has not been keen to 
Europeanise it Africa policies, at least initially66. The UK given the specific situation 
in early 2000s, perceived their Africa polices as solidly efficient, and thus, saw it as 
appropriate not to Europeanise them. In 2005, which was declared the ‘year of 
Africa’, by putting Africa at the centre stage of i.e. G8 Summit Gleneagles, but also 
the year when the EU MS agreed the EU Africa Strategy, UK showed a sea change 
to its attitude concerning the Europeanisation of its Africa policy: 
‘The European Union now covers most of Europe, including all 
those states with particular interests in Africa; it is the obvious 
means by which European countries should cooperate to deliver aid 
to Africa effectively and ensure coherent policies in areas such as 
peacekeeping [...]’67.   
The British, also, insists on the necessity of coordinating these activities at an 
international level, most obviously with USA, Canada etc. As made clear from the 
official statements ensued, UK views, for instance, ESA and the G8 Gleneagles Plan 
for Africa as totally interconnected. Germany also prefers a multilateral approach 
and promotes a closer cooperation among EU and NATO. 
Due to the importance Africa has gained as it relates to EU security, as evaluated at 
the beginning of this chapter, many other EU MS, such as Sweden, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Portugal, etc., have increasingly stepped up their involvement, via EU, 
within the African security concerns. Such claim is sustained by the large number of 
participating EU MS within i.e. ESDP missions in Africa. The EU MS have 
developed a genuine interest in reinforcing African capabilities allowing this last one 
                        
66 UK, since 2001, has considerably invested in developing African peacekeeping capabilities in 
former colonies via the British Peace Support Teams, which became part of an ambitious 
interdepartmental programme: the Africa Conflict prevention Pool (ACPP). The departments 
involved are that for International Development (DfID), the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD).   
67 House of Lords, 2005-06 ‘The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership’, p.14, 
(emphasis added). 
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to erect an autonomous structure able to tackle security matters in own space, thus 
ultimately, avoiding an increase in costs on the side of EU.  
That the EU MS reached a common position concerning the JAES P&S, has to be 
seen under the prism offered from the ‘logic of appropriateness’ concept. By 
fulfilling the obligations, as required by the practices and expectations of the 
community they are members – i.e. EU’s preference for multilateral cooperation, and 
for moving away from paternalistic, neo-colonial behaviour–, they did what they saw 
as appropriate –common position concerning JAES P&S– given the specific situation 
they were in –as defined by the security threats and opportunities in Africa. 
The process of Europeanisation has made peremptory the need for greater 
coordination among EU MS policies as well as for greater coherence between them 
and the EU institutions themselves. Accordingly, Africa’s security has offered an 
interesting opportunity for doing exactly that. The EU, as a matter of fact, through its 
security policy, especially concerning SSA, aims to ‘integrate the policies and 
actions of its member states’68.  
The role EU plays within Africa’s peace and security, is defined by both its ‘own 
conception about appropriate behaviour and by the expectations and role 
prescriptions of other actors’69. The EU’s own conception about appropriate 
behaviour is enshrined by the image it projects as a civilian/normative power, which 
has been evaluated on the previous chapters. For this chapter is though relevant to 
mentioned that what is felt as the ‘EU’s obsession’ for normative behaviour i.e. good 
governance and democracy promotion, has raised harsh criticism, especially referring 
to the negative conditionality measures. This was clearly evidenced during the 2007 
Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon, concerning the participation of the Zimbabwean 
President Robert Mugabe. The head of the AU Commission is quoted to have said 
                        
68 Ginsberg, R 1989 ‘Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community’, Lynne Rienner, 
Boulder, cited in Bagayoko, N, Gibert, M, V 2007 ‘The European Union in Africa: The 
Linkage Between Security, Governance and Development from an Institutional Perspective’, 
p22. 
69 Holsti, K, J 1970 ‘National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy’, in International 
Studies Quarterly, Volume 14, Issue No.: 3, pp.238-9, cited in Elgström, O 2004 ‘The EU as 
an Actor in International Negotiations: Roles and Identities’, Paper presented at the 2nd Pan-
European Conference, Standing Group on EU Politics, Bologna, 24-6 June 2004, p.4, 
available at: http://www.jhubc.it/ ecpr-bologna/docs/186.pdf, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
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that, although sharing the EU’s concern, ‘we will not let ourselves be bullied or 
pressurised regarding who (from Africa) should attend the Summit or not’70.   
Concerning expectations and role prescriptions of other actors, such as the African 
ones, the EU due to its contribution to peacekeeping in Africa is generally viewed 
positively, and as a result of its long-standing commitments to conflict prevention 
and resolution, leaders and officials at the AU describe the EU as a ‘preferential 
partner’71. The fact that the EU has developed an approach to foreign policy which is 
based on civilian/normative means and structural stabilisation processes, has found 
broad acceptance at the AU level72. The EU is, first and foremost, seen as a model of 
achieving peace through integration, making the EU well accepted to provide 
African continental structures with capability/capacity support and advice. Although, 
it has to be said, the fact that the ‘African leaders and the public opinion [...] do not 
share the willingness [...] for a political union’73, puts some restrains on the repertoire 
of the EU in Africa. The fact that the EU, concerning the APF, has trusted ‘the 
leadership of the African Union as regards its management to defend both the 
interests of the regional communities and the African countries’, accounts for another 
factor that contributes to the EU being perceived as a ‘preferential partner’ by the 
AU. In this sense, and seen from the prism of the ‘logic of appropriateness’, 
inasmuch ‘roles of actors are determined both by an actor’s own conceptions about 
appropriate behaviour and by the expectations, or role prescriptions, of other actors’, 
JAES P&S’ priority actions, concerning respectively enhanced dialogue between 
AU-EU, support for the operationalisation of the APSA structure and financing, 
dwell in already fertile grounds. 
 
                        
70 Fioramonti, L 2009 ‘African Perceptions of the European Union: Assessing the Work of the 
EU in the Field of Democracy Promotion and Peacekeeping’, IDEA, Stockholm, p.8, 
available at: http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/upload/Fiora monti_paper21.pdf, last 
accessed on 22.05.2010. 
71 Ibid., p.6. 
72 Ibid., p.7. 
73 Sicurelli, D 2008 ‘The EU in the Eyes of the African Union’, in Lucarelli, S (ed.) 2008 
‘Research Report on the External Image of the European Union’, Forum on the Problems of 
War and Peace and University of Bologna, p.10, available at: http://www.garnet-
eu.org/fileadmin/documents/working_papers/6209. pdf, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
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EU’S AFRICAN SECURITY, INTER-INSTITUTIONAL & INTER-PILLAR COORDINATION 
JAES P&S, as well as each and every new policy paper concerning EU’s security in 
Africa, stresses the importance for inter-institutional and inter-pillar coordination. 
The very success of the European approach to African conflict prevention, 
management and resolution relies heavily on the aptitude of the EU to overcome 
rivalry among its institutions. The competition is fuelled by the different interests and 
desire of relevant institutions to play the ‘lead role’ on the issues of peace and 
security. Such behaviour is best explained through the Bureaucratic Politics Model 
(BPM) which sustains that bureaucratic behaviour consists of power struggles among 
rival agencies74. Accordingly, agencies concerned will resist any change that may 
diminish their role as a leading agency. Career officials will seek to maximise power, 
budget and mandate, all of which will ensure the organisational health of their own 
agencies.  
‘[Organisational health is] defined in terms of bodies assigned and 
[Euros] appropriated75 [which ensures that the agency will continue 
to] maintain influence, fulfilling its mission, and securing the 
necessary capabilities76 [thus,] career officials are prone to believe 
that the health of their organisation is vital77’. 
Thus, in attempting to maximise tasks to be delegated to own organisation, the 
resultant, within the governance structure composed of these rivalling agencies, will 
be turf wars. JAES P&S requires inter-agency coordination, especially among 
Directorate General for Development and relations with ACP States (DG DEV) and 
Directorate General for External Relations (DG RELEX), who have ‘the overall 
                        
74 Allison, G, T 1971 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile crisis’, Little, Brown 
and Co., Boston, p.167. 
75 Allison, G, T 1969 ‘Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis’, in The American 
Political Sciences Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, p.700, available at: http://www.metu.edu. 
tr/~utuba/Allison.pdf, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
76 Allison, G, Zelikow, P 1999 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’, 
pp.301-2.  
77 Ibid. 
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responsibility for policy steering, guidance and coordination’78 and which are also 
involved with the rest seven partnerships of JAES. JAES P&S also requires 
cooperation with the General Secretariat of the Council. It is envisioned that these 
three institutions/agencies will ensure coherence and overall coordination for JAES 
P&S79. 
Within the EC the rival agencies are most obviously its Directorate General, 
particularly those with a mandate focused on Africa. The most powerful agencies in 
this sense are DG RELEX and most obviously the DG DEV, which often tends to see 
Africa as its ‘exclusive territory’80. The discourse on the security-development nexus 
has provided DG DEV with an approach that allows it to defend their privileged 
geographic area of intervention and investing in a functional field which has not been 
traditionally theirs. Undoubtedly, that the ‘organisational health’ has received a 
distinct boom in terms of personnel and budget. The allocation of APF under the 
responsibility of DG DEV, decidedly, points at this direction. Thus, DG DEV has 
acted, by using BPM terminology, with the aim of enhancing organisational health 
which has ensured that it ‘maintains influence, fulfilling its mission, and securing the 
necessary capabilities’.  
DG RELEX plays a pivotal role in conflict prevention through its Crisis 
Management and Conflict Prevention Unit, which is also ‘in charge of coordinating 
and mainstreaming the Commission’s conflict prevention and management activities 
[as well as it] provides the necessary link between the Commission’s institutions and 
their Council counterparts’81. The fact that a Crisis Management and Conflict 
Prevention Unit’s member is at the same time the Commission’s representative 
within the Council’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) as well as within the 
                        
78 European Commission, 2008 ‘Commission Staff Working Document: Commission 
Contributions to the Implementation of the EU-Africa Action Plan (2008-2010)’, EC, 
Brussels, p.2. 
79 Europafrica.net, ‘EU Actors in the JAES’, available at: http://europafrica.net/ jointstrategy/eu-
actors-in-the-jaes/, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
80 Dimier, V 2003 ‘Institutional Change Within a Multinational organisation: Life and Death of 
DG DEV (European Commission) 1958-2002’, European Consortium for Political Research, 
Edinburgh.  
81 Bagayoko, N, Gibert, M, V 2007 ‘The European Union in Africa: The Linkage Between 
Security, Governance and Development from an Institutional Perspective’, pp.13-4. 
243 
 
Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM), is a very good 
omen concerning future coordination efforts needed for the JAES P&S. 
Nevertheless, the EC is far from being a unified actor within the JAES P&S. As a 
matter of fact, EC is plagued by coordination problems among its DGs as a result of 
unclear divisions of labour caused from the securitisation and intertwining of 
different fields within conflict prevention, management and resolution. For instance, 
DG DEV and DG Trade are required to take into account the assessment 
reports/watch-lists on the root causes of conflict delivered by DG RELEX through its 
specific Country/Regional Strategy Papers (CSPs), but they do ‘often pursue 
different, or even contradictory objectives’82.    
A further point of contention concerning coordination problems within the EC is 
provided through EU MS forwarding their national interests, and as pointed out at 
the beginning of this section, they too often are contradictory and pursue different 
objectives83.  
Moving to the second pillar, the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) together 
with its directorates general constitute another important actor among the EU actors 
for JAES P&S. DGE, which is in charge of external, political and military affairs, is 
of relevance here. DGE is divided into geographic and functional directorates and, as 
of 2007 and prior to the Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon, the responsibility to 
coordinate the management of African security matters was hardly fought, especially 
among two DGE’s directorates the DGE VIII and DGE IX. DG VIII, who oversees 
defence matters, was animated to get involved within a turf war with DGE IX, out of 
a calculation that being endowed with the task of coordinating the management of 
African security matters would increase her legitimacy vis-à-vis other DGE 
directorates, since this would imply an expanded mandate, higher budgets and, 
arguably, increased number of personnel. The DGE IX, on the other side, oversees 
the civilian aspects of crisis management which include the following instruments: a 
Police Unit, relevant to SSR projects; a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit 
(Policy Unit) responsible for strategic and geopolitical analyses at the service of HR 
                        
82 Ibid., p.15. 
83 Bagayoko & Gibert claim that important actors in EU Africa policy like the Belgian European 
civil servants within DGDEV are seen as promoting their national interests. 
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CFSP; and the Situation Centre (SITCEN). The DGE IX saw itself as better 
positioned to coordinate the management of African security issues within JAES 
P&S, since it also nurtures closer relationships with the EC, especially DG DEV. A 
losing out to DGE VIII would mean for the DGE IX a tough setback for its 
organisational health. A third contender has also arisen, the civilian-military cell 
(CivMil Cell) which also sees a chance to grow its legitimacy vis-à-vis older DGE 
institutions84.  
The cross-pillar rivalries provide another reason to worry concerning JAES P&S. 
The establishment of APF, the most important funding instrument for JAES P&S, is 
an interesting example which highlights such claim. The Commission, with the 
establishment of APF in 2004, reached an important victory against the Council, 
inasmuch APF is an instrument which funds African-owned peacekeeping 
operations, in a time when CFSP/ESDP and by extension peacekeeping missions, are 
a prerogative of the Council.  
The debate about the source of APF funding is revealing on the inter-pillar struggle. 
There were four possible alternatives. Firstly, it was the consideration to allocate the 
new funds from the then current EDF. Such would have the consequence that despite 
the fact that EDF are not part of the Community budget, nevertheless, EDF and 
accordingly APF funds are managed by the Commission/DG DEV. This means that 
the Commission/DG DEV’s organisational health –defined at least partially, in terms 
of monies appropriated– receives a great boost and accounts for assuring EC/DG 
DEV’s influence, fulfilling its mission, and foremost, securing the necessary 
capabilities. The second option saw the CFSP budget as the source of APF, which 
would imply a reduction of EC/DG DEV’s influence, whereas the Council would 
savour a Pyrrhic victory, as the following statement highlights: 
‘Representatives of the Belgian government, in their evidence to us 
[UK House of Lords], supported keeping APF funding within the 
EDF to avoid diverting resources away from the under-funded 
CFSP, and to ensure that the EU remains fully involved in the 
                        
84 For more on the CivMil Cell see i.e. Pullinger, S (ed.) Quille, G, Gasparini, G, Menotti, R, 
Pirozzi, N 2006 ‘Developing EU Civil Military Coordination: The Role of the New Civilian 
Military Cell’, Joint Report by ISIS Europe & CeMiSS, available at: http://www.isis-
europe.org/pdf/reports_10.pdf, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
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process, thereby maintaining a coherent approach between the 
different European institutions and the EU Member States. [...] 
Witnesses also considered the CFSP budget too small to support 
the minimum level of funding required for an effective APF [...]’85. 
This option would have had only one winner, the European Parliament (EP), who as 
part of its competence in the CFSP budget would have a say on the use of the APF 
funds. The third option contemplated was the creation of a new multi-annual EDF-
like fund to be managed either through EDF procedure (EC/DG DEV) or wholly 
managed by EU MS. The fourth option would see the control of funds according to 
their purpose, i.e. funds used for AU capability building would be managed by EC, 
while the small support for AU PSOs would be controlled by the EP.  
After the provisional period of APF ended, it was decided to maintain the procedures 
already used, meaning the choice fell on the first option portrayed above. 
Nevertheless, the heated inter-pillar turf war did not recede. Contention focused on 
two main subjects, firstly, on the EDF funds being used for security purposes; and 
secondly, the different conceptualisation of the notion of ‘effective ownership’ or 
‘African ownership’. The first is actually mirrored from the international dispute 
concerning the use of development monies for security purposes already analysed at 
previous parts of this dissertations. Within the European context, for DG ECHO 
(European Commission Humanitarian Office), humanitarian assistance is apolitical, 
neutral and impartial86. DG ECHO disputes the definition by the Petersberg tasks 
which claim humanitarian assistance as eventually an important part of i.e. ESDP 
missions. DG ECHO argues that such reasoning would contribute towards a 
politicisation of aid further blurring the difference between military and humanitarian 
actors. Accordingly, there is a frosty relationship among DG ECHO and the 
Council’s DG VIII. The second concerns the idea of ‘African solutions to African 
problems’ meaning that the responsibility for EU’s financial, technical assistance and 
training initiatives earmarked for supporting African capabilities in peace and 
security matters (conflict prevention, management and resolution), relies by the 
                        
85 House of Lords, 2005-06 ‘The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership’, p.74. 
86 ECHO ‘European Humanitarian Aid: Values and Principles’, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/ 
echo/files/media/publications/values_principles_en.pdf, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
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African partners. The Commission preferred to use APF funds to support AU, given 
the achievement it has booked especially with the creation of the AU’s Peace and 
Security Council, while EU MS and GSC would predominantly or exclusively want 
to earmark these funds for supporting African SROs, especially ECOWAS which 
actually had the operational experience87. As the very JAES P&S shows, the 
Commission had the upper hand.  
The above give concern and makes room for strengthening inter-pillar inter-
institutional coherence, cooperation, and coordination focused on Africa’s peace and 
security issues. This seems to have been addressed as follows: Since June 2007 an 
ad-hoc group was established charged to draft and adopt the JAES and its Action 
Plan. Being an ad-hoc instrument, the Council is on the looking for a more 
permanent provision. Two alternatives seem to crystallise. The first concerns the 
creation of a Brussels-based, cross-pillar working group vested with the 
responsibility to manage JAES. Such working group will cover SSA (ACP) and 
North African countries, pan-African issues, and the preparation of Africa-EU 
Ministerial meetings and Summits. The second alternative sees the revision of the 
mandate and working modalities for the Africa Working Group (COAFR) already 
existing as well as the first option but with a reduced mandate, namely covering pan-
African issues for both SSA and Northern Africa which would so reflect the new 
vision of treating Africa as one88. 
 
EU-AFRICA: EQUAL PARTNERS?  
Many involved within JAES feel that the EU has been far too ambitious and has put 
unrealistic expectations89, which will further contribute towards an EU being 
                        
87 Nivet, B 2006 ‘Security by Proxy? The EU and (sub)Regional Organisations: the Case of 
ECOWAS’, in Occasional Papers No.: 63, ISS, Paris, available at: http://www.iss.europa. 
eu/uploads/media/occ63.pdf, last accessed on 22.05.2010. 
88 The second option has been adopted by now. The strengthened and expanded mandate for the 
Africa Working Group has been adopted at the 10th Africa EU Troika on 16 September 2008. 
Information available at: http://europafrica.net/2007/03/17/africa-working-group-of-the-
council/, last accessed on 22.05.2010.  
89 Elowson, C 2009 ‘The Joint Africa-EU Strategy: A Study of the Peace and Security 
Partnership’, p.55. 
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perceived as an actor with a, already familiar term, ‘capability–expectations gap’ 
problem. JAES emphasises an EU and AU relationship among equals, which is in 
stark contrast to the recurrent underfunding and understaffing of AU90. The EU has 
more resources and capacities, and may  
‘push too much [...] and put too much pressure on the African 
partners by overdoing things, such as preparing ready ‘lists of 
things to do’. However, due to its ownership of the process, the 
African side controls the pace’91. 
The combination of unrealistic expectations with the African way of doing things 
may give rise to frustrations. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON JAES P&S 
By concluding on RAM analysis of JAES P&S, it can be said that the geographical 
proximity, the long history, the high trade and investment volume as well as the 
natural resources’ abundance of Africa make the EU the ‘natural partner’ to Africa. 
The renewed interest that Africa gained especially post 9/11 and the perceived 
scramble for its resources between traditional and emerging powers just provided an 
impetus for relating with Africa at a strategic level. In particular, the rationale behind 
JEAS P&S is to be found at the way EU conceptualises her own security, which as a 
matter of fact, goes beyond the spatial area of EU as well as its citizens to include the 
world citizens who are lacking, or being threatened to, their basic human security 
needs. By applying Allison’s concept of RAM, the EU has a clear objective and 
strategy which ultimately is instrumental to the attainment of her security interests 
and such perfectly marries with the JAES P&S policy. Further the EU’s added value 
as a multi-institutional and/or hybrid structure that is likely to provide all types of 
                        
90 On this topic see i.e. Murithi, T 2008 ‘The African Union’s Evolving Role in Peace 
Operations: The African Union Mission in Burundi, The African union Mission in Sudan and 
the African Union Mission in Somalia’, in African Security Review, Volume 17, Issue No.: 1, 
Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, available at: http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/ 
17NO1MURITHI.PDF, last accessed on 22.05.2010.  
91 Elowson, C 2009 ‘The Joint Africa-EU Strategy: A Study of the Peace and Security 
Partnership’, p.55. 
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crisis management tools – from humanitarian to civilian to military – within one 
unique framework, accounts for her being viewed by i.e. AU officials as a 
‘preferential partner’. Due to the complexity and multiplicity of problems faced – 
poverty, conflicts, wars, and humanitarian catastrophes – the African continent fits 
perfectly within this EU approach. The EU has taken account of the changed African 
continent, and put the AU/APSA at the centre of the JAES P&S. Also the fact that 
the EU sees a close relationship between security and development, and that 
accordingly it implements policies which take into account such nexus make out of 
her a preferred AU partner, for it too prefers the same approach. The privileged 
relationship it has forged with the AU, as well as her being taken as a model regional 
organisation point out at the benefits that Africa may seize by working together. All 
these, undoubtedly, account for the goodwill basis upon which the P&S partnership 
is built.   
By taking an OBM approach to JAES P&S, it can be argued that the EU MS 
common position concerning the JAES P&S, has to be seen under the prism offered 
from the ‘logic of appropriateness’ concept. By fulfilling the obligations, as required 
by the practices and expectations of the community they are members – i.e. EU’s 
preference for multilateral cooperation, or moving away from paternalistic, neo-
colonial behaviour–, they did what they saw as appropriate –common position 
concerning JAES P&S– given the specific situation they were in –as defined by the 
security threats and opportunities in Africa. 
By taking into consideration that ‘roles of actors are determined both by an actor’s 
own conceptions about appropriate behaviour and by the expectations, or role 
prescriptions, of other actors’, then the EU’s approach to foreign policy which is 
based on civilian/normative means and structural stabilisation processes, has found 
broad acceptance at the AU level. The broad acceptance is also sourced by the fact 
that the EU is seen by Africa as a model of achieving peace through integration and 
her insistence for African ownership as it is evidenced by the APF process. In these 
terms, JAES P&S’ priority actions, concerning respectively enhanced dialogue 
between AU-EU, support for the operationalisation of the APSA structure and 
financing, dwell in already fertile grounds.  
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In taking a BPM approach, the overall picture gets smudged, for its shows the many 
coordination problems at an inter-institutional and inter-pillar level. EU is plagued by 
turf wars, be they within the Commission’s DGs, as indicated especially by the thrust 
with which DG DEV fights to maintain and further gain an increasingly influential 
standing in African security matters. The picture that the Council’s agencies offer 
does not differ very much either.  
These research results point out that while the standing up of JAES P&S did take into 
consideration the necessary strategic steps, the implementation of JAES P&S, as the 
insights gained through the BPM approach seem to suggest, faces considerable 
operational challenges. The JAES P&S risks to be stamped with a ‘too good to be 
true’. 
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CONCLUSION 
This research effort had as its object of interest the agendas that the USA and EU 
have set up with regard to Africa since the dawn of the 21st century. The main focus 
was placed on two pivotal policies, USAFRICOM and JAES P&S, which stated to 
have put Africa into the high politics agenda of USA and EU respectively. Since the 
reactions to these two policies diametrically differed, the research question 
concerned the reasons behind it by focusing on the decisions taken by the US and EU 
concerning Africa particularly during the standing up of AFRICOM and JAES P&S, 
respectively. The results from the research work point out at the fact that both actors, 
although, as stated, seemingly aiming the same, –support Africa in better dealing 
with her security problems–, chose different approaches which had a direct impact on 
the policy output that in its own terms attracted different reactions, especially from 
the African leaders.  
In aiming to explain the above, the study has applied the imperatives offered by a 
body of theory which analyses foreign policy critically. A critical foreign policy 
analysis accepts the fact that a variety of actors other than the state are also capable 
of foreign policy, thus allowing the techniques used to analyse foreign policy to be 
equally transferred from the state to other significant international actors, such as the 
EU. Nevertheless, the use these techniques had to abide to five general rules: first, 
analysis should be empirical, meaning that analysis ought to look at actual cases and 
evidence, within an explicit theoretical framework; second, it had take into 
consideration both structure and agency, –decisions are always made (agency) within 
a set of constraints (structure)–; third, it had to accept a broad view of politics, 
meaning that analysis should not be exclusively focused at the governmental level 
but look at i.e. the influence of transnational norms; fourth, confront theoretical 
issues with knowledge and reality, meaning ‘search for gaps between words and 
deeds’; and five, recognise the contingency of the political process, meaning ‘accept 
that things could have always been different’.  
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In trying to satisfy the above-mentioned imperative one, the Foreign Policy Analysis 
(FPA), a subfield within the International Relations (IR) theory, was chosen as the 
appropriate approach because it offered ‘a means [to bring together] foreign and 
domestic action under the same umbrella’ and a useful structure for a comparative 
analysis. By building on the premises that the essence of FPA is that it offers an actor 
perspective and a policy focus, the rest of the analysis was done by posing the six 
standard FPA questions concerning contexts, actors, processes, issues, instruments 
and outputs. The analysis centred on the notion of a foreign policy system in action, 
composed of the actors involved, the context within which they act, the policy 
processes, issues and instruments available and finally the policy output. This last 
one is seen as being generated by the interrelationship between actors, contexts, 
processes, issues and instruments. Such system has been mirrored in the structure 
that this dissertation was built upon.   
The increasingly important place that Africa gained within the US and EU agendas, 
is explained through the remarkable changes occurred in and within Africa itself. For 
instance, the increased presence of new emerging powers in Africa, more than others 
that of China, accompanied with their unorthodox methods concerning trade and 
development cooperation, is found to have prompted a discourse on the 
appropriateness and timeliness of trade and development approaches from 
traditional/western donors (most prominently EU, USA, etc). The perceived 
scramble for access to Africa’s resources is found to constitute another important 
feature which sustains the need for greater US/EU influence in Africa. The rise of 
Africa on the respective agendas is thus due to the counterweight offered by the 
growing presence of new powers in Africa and their development cooperation, which 
seems to have enabled Africa use such presence as a leverage and place itself in a 
position which better allows her to negotiate and bargain with the other actors 
involved in the continent. All in all, they seem to have contributed to an African 
condition which has become a far more intensely competitive political and economic 
marketplace. This newly acquired feature is found to be also due to endogenous 
changes that Africa itself has implemented, as highlighted through the trends and 
challenges Africa is faced with. Obviously, the evolution and institutionalisation of 
peace and security structures at a pan-African level, most importantly the emergence 
of the AU/APSA is of utmost importance to the US EU engagements within the 
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African peace and security matters. It has been asserted that these last developments 
have provided Africa with an important structure with which to present itself as a 
unified actor within the international arena, as particularly, the EU Africa relations 
give evidence. 
The agency of US and EU in Africa was also found to have been informed, at 
varying degrees, of the paradigm shifts in the conceptualisations of security and 
development, which emerged by the mid 1990s and were firmly established after the 
shock of 9/11. This has meant a preference for a security that goes beyond its 
traditional state-centric conceptualisation, having made so imperative for policies 
that tackle in a comprehensive and coherent manner the symbiotic interrelationship 
between security and development concerns. Another important paradigm has been 
that on regional integration and cooperation as an appropriate instrument in tackling 
security and instability concerns. The EU has proved a weighty example in this 
matter. The occurrence of 9/11 accounts for another structural transformation which 
has, undoubtedly, provoked a change in the way many international actors, US and 
EU included, modelled and implemented their respective foreign policies. For 
instance, within a post-9/11 environment and Global War On Terror (GWOT) 
strategy context, in the US, academia and policy makers alike invoked for a 
combination of hard and soft powers with the aim of strengthening existing alliances, 
bolstering potential allies as well backing up and supporting failing states who were 
perceived as vulnerable to extremist penetrations. This calling upon and attempts to 
invoke the global appeal of US values, its strengthening of partnerships with like-
minded states, and imperatives for a multilateral diplomacy became paramount 
benchmarks for an informed and effective foreign policy.  
The inclusion of hard/soft/smart and civilian/normative power discourses, not only 
accounted for the observance of the third rule of a critical foreign policy analysis 
mentioned above, but also it offered a means to effectuate an evaluation and ‘search 
for gaps between words and deeds’ within the US and EU agendas in Africa on these 
same grounds, thus obeying to the fourth rule of the same. On these grounds, the US 
foreign policy in Africa is found to have been ‘inconsistent, imbalanced’ and with 
‘significant weaknesses’, while the EU with its distinct civilian/normative nature and 
new form of hybridy expressed through a complex multi-level governance system, is 
found to be ‘particularly well equipped to grasp and utilise the potential of 
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multilateral network organisations’. There seems to be a symbiotic relation between 
values and external policies determining so the nature of the processes which 
emphasise ‘diplomatic rather than coercive instruments, the centrality of mediation in 
conflict resolution, the importance of long-term economic solutions to political 
problems, and the need for indigenous people to determine their fate – all of these in 
contradistinction to the norms of superpower politics’. Although, not everything at 
the EU Africa agenda is as rosier as it sounds, the EU’s trade/EPAs and migration 
policies are a case in point.  
With the end of the Part II the first five elements of a foreign policy system in action 
had been concerned. The USAFRICOM and JAES P&S constitute the sixth element 
of the foreign policy system, the output. Of concern to this dissertation was why the 
US and EU decided to choose such approaches as well as the reasons behind the very 
different receptions these two policies obtained at their announcements. The 
arguments were focused around two hypotheses.  It is firstly argued that  
Hypothesis 1. if outputs are generated as a result of the interrelationship 
between the context, actors, issues, instruments, and processes, 
then a difference on how they are conceptualised by both 
actors as well as the partly/wholly omission of one or more of 
these elements at the decision-making process may/will 
account for less than optimal outputs,  
and secondly,  
Hypothesis 2. since bureaucracies have a clear preference for continuity as 
opposed to change, unless change means increase in own 
organisational health, then the respective bureaucracies 
involved would try to mould the policies (USAFRICOM, 
JAES P&S) in a way that would best fit their own 
organisational health/interests, which may account for less than 
optimal outputs. 
These arguments were thought as being best evaluated through that branch of the 
FPA which has focused on and analysed the dynamics of the decision-making 
process. The appropriate tool in assessing this claim is provided by Graham Allison’s 
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three-level framework. The analysis through the lens of the Rational Actor Model 
(RAM) was instrumental for setting the broader context including interests, threats 
and opportunities perceived out of the given context. The setting of the broader 
context through RAM highlighted the issues of interest and the instruments preferred 
or available to both the US and EU. It is here where points of discordance have been 
revealed, such as i.e. differences concerning the respective conceptualisation of 
security. It was found that while the US holds the traditional conceptualisation to 
security, and thus indicating on the use of military as the preferred instrument, the 
Africans have moved to accept a more holistic concept, namely that of human 
security which makes peremptory the use of instruments that aim at tackling security 
at a comprehensive and cohesive manner. EU’s stance and commitment to security, 
as by the way imposed by her distinct nature as a civilian/normative power, 
accounted for a goodwill basis with Africa, and the heralding of these values did not 
backfire as in the case of US where soft/smart power discourses about AFRICOM 
were seen as merely window dressing. RAM analysis also indicated at the choice of 
and preference for a specific kind of actors: i.e. US preferred to advance AFRICOM 
unilaterally and seemed to have ignored the pan-African peace and security 
structures; while the EU emphasised more the relationship with multilateral 
institutions such as the AU. This seem to have had a direct influence on the nature of 
processes which on the US side have highlighted the unilateral and only if needed the 
bilateral approach, while the EU has preferred to place JAES P&S within processes 
which emphasise the diplomatic, structural and multilateral kind of activities. The 
Organisational Behaviour Model (OBM) and the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM) 
point out at the importance of recognising the contingency of the political process 
(last rule for a critical foreign policy analysis) in order to understand why a foreign 
policy (AFRICOM, JAES P&S) acquired a particular quality which accounted for 
the very different reactions. For instance, the turf wars among the US governmental 
agencies involved with AFRICOM engendered a considerable amount of inter-
agency resistance, which seem to have generated on its own an image of AFRICOM 
that did not appeal much confidence on the side of Africans. On the EU side, the 
research results point out that the standing up of JAES P&S did take into 
consideration the necessary strategic steps, including the one of fully involving the 
African part on the formation of JAES P&S. It is, though, predicted that, as the 
insights gained through the BPM approach seem to suggest, the implementation of 
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JAES P&S may face considerable operational challenges. Accordingly, the JAES 
P&S risks to be stamped as ‘too good to be true’. 
--- 
This dissertation does not claim to be all-comprehensive, it merely aimed to analyse 
the reasons for the very different reactions towards two pivotal peace and security 
policies, such as AFRICOM and JAES P&S. There remains still much to be 
elucidated on both policies, such as i.e. the influence of individual figures, –
Rumsfeld/Barroso and relevant Commissioners–, on the standing up of AFRICOM 
and JAES P&S, respectively. Another interesting research may focus on the role of 
(certain) EU MS on JAES P&S –although this dissertation briefly touched upon it. A 
further appealing research effort may focus on the implementation of both policies, 
which was not embraced within the present research, simply because its set aims and 
goals would have otherwise burst. 
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ABSTRACT 
This research effort had as its object of interest the agendas that the USA and EU 
have set up with regard to Africa since the dawn of the 21st century. The main focus 
was placed on two pivotal policies, USAFRICOM and JAES P&S, which stated to 
have put Africa into the high politics agenda of USA and EU, respectively. Since the 
reactions to these two policies diametrically differed, the research question 
concerned the reasons behind it by focusing on the decisions taken by the US and EU 
concerning Africa during the standing up of AFRICOM and JAES P&S, 
respectively. The evaluation and analysis was done by applying the analytical 
techniques offered by the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) theory, a subfield within 
the International Relations (IR) theory. FPA was seen as instrumental because it 
offered ‘a means [to bring together] foreign and domestic action under the same 
umbrella’ as well as a useful structure for a comparative analysis. The analysis 
centred on the notion of a foreign policy system in action, composed of the actors 
involved, the context within which they act, the policy processes, issues and 
instruments available and finally the policy output. This last one is seen as being 
generated by the interrelationship between actors, contexts, processes, issues and 
instruments. 
Such system has been mirrored in the structure that this dissertation was built upon.  
The remarkable changes, starting from the paradigm shifts concerning security and 
its being increasingly linked to development as well as the regional integration and 
cooperation having ever more acquired features as an appropriate instrument with 
which to tackle security and instability problems, have had a significant influence on 
the US and EU foreign policy conceptualisations. These last ones have been subject 
to endogenous changes within Africa as well. On the one side, the presence and the 
massive investments of the new emerging powers, above all that of China, have 
provided Africa a leverage with which it can place itself at a place that allows it to 
better bargain and negotiate with i.e. US and EU. The emergence and 
institutionalisation of pan-African structures concerning peace and security have 
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provided Africa with an important structure with which to present itself as a unified 
actor within the international arena. The occurrence of 9/11 provoked a change in the 
way many international actors modelled and implemented their foreign policies, 
ranging from recommendations for a mix between hard and soft power (US relevant) 
to appealing for civilian/normative values at the international stage (EU relevant). It 
is on these last grounds that both the US and EU agendas have been evaluated by 
especially focusing on ‘gaps between words and deeds’. 
The analysis of outputs focused on the decision-making processes during the 
standing up of AFRICOM and JAES P&S, respectively. The arguments were focused 
around two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. if outputs are generated as a result of the interrelationship 
between the context, actors, issues, instruments, and processes, 
then a difference on how they are conceptualised by both 
actors as well as the partly/wholly omission of one or more of 
these elements at the decision-making process may/will 
account for less than optimal outputs,  
Hypothesis 2. since bureaucracies have a clear preference for continuity as 
opposed to change, unless change means increase in own 
organisational health, then the respective bureaucracies 
involved would try to mould the policies (USAFRICOM, 
JAES P&S) in a way that would best fit their own 
organisational health/interests, which may account for less than 
optimal outputs. 
Graham Allison’s three-level framework (RAM, OBM, BPM) was applied. The 
results from the research work point out at the fact that both actors, although, as 
stated, seemingly aiming the same, –support Africa in better dealing with her 
security problems–, chose different approaches, which were determined by i.e. 
different conceptualisations of security (traditional vs. Human Security); preference 
for a specific type of actors (states vs. multilateral institutions), etc. Such accounted 
for different policy outputs that in their own terms attracted different reactions.   
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Das gewählte Forschungsgebiet befasst sich mit den Afrika-Agenden der USA und 
der EU seit Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts. Ausgewählt wurden USAFRICOM und 
JAES P&S, zwei Politiklinien, die zeigen, dass Afrika an strategischer Bedeutung 
gewonnen hat, jedoch sehr diametrale Reaktionen ausgelöst haben. Die 
Forschungsfrage bezieht sich auf die Hintergründe der Entstehung dieser 
Politiklinien und die von ihnen hervorgerufenen Reaktionen. Die Analyse 
konzentriert sich auf die Entscheidungsprozesse der USA und der EU. Angewandt 
wurden analytische Techniken aus der Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) Theorie, einer 
Untergruppierung der International Relations (IR) Theorie. Die FPA-Theorie wurde 
gewählt, weil sie außen- und innenpolitische Aktionen unter demselben analytischen 
Dach verbindet und eine anwendbare Struktur für eine vergleichende Analyse bietet. 
Diese Arbeit basiert auf dem Begriff der ‘foreign policy system in action‘, welche 
aus den Akteuren, dem Kontext, den Politikprozessen, den Interessenspunkten, dem 
Instrumentarium, sowie dem Output besteht. Letzteres ergibt sich aus dem 
Zusammenwirken der vorgenannten Faktoren.  
Das beschriebene System spiegelt sich in der Struktur dieser Dissertation wieder.  
Der Paradigmenwechsel betreffend Sicherheit und ‘security-development nexus‘, 
aber auch die regionale Integration und Kooperation, sowie Veränderungen innerhalb 
Afrikas, haben die Konzeption der Außenpolitik der USA und der EU signifikant 
beeinflusst. Einerseits haben die Präsenz und massive Investitionen neuer Mächte 
(vor allem China), Afrika in eine bessere Verhandlungsposition gegenüber den USA 
und der EU gebracht, andererseits hat das Entstehen und die Institutionalisierung der 
Pan-Afrikanischen Strukturen in Sachen Frieden und Sicherheit Afrika ermöglicht, 
innerhalb der internationalen Arena einheitlich aufzutreten. 9/11 schuf eine 
Trendwende für die Außenpolitik relevanter Akteure. Während in den USA die 
Vermischung von Hard und Soft Power angeregt wurde, bevorzugte die EU das 
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Werben für zivile/normative Werte. Die Afrika- Agenden der USA und der EU 
wurden hinsichtlich dieser Veränderungen auf Stichhaltigkeit geprüft. 
Die Output Analyse basierend auf der Graham Allison drei-Ebenen-Analyse (RAM, 
OBM, BPM) konzentriert sich auf die Entscheidungsprozesse während der 
Entstehung von AFRICOM und JAES P&S. Das Resultat zeigt, dass beide Akteure 
bei gleicher Intention, nämlich Afrikas Sicherheitsbemühungen zu unterstützen, 
divergente Herangehensweisen wählten. Während beispielsweise das 
Sicherheitskonzept der EU für Afrika dem afrikanischen Entwurf ähnelt, indem beide 
auf die ‘root causes‘ der Sicherheitsproblemen zu zielen beabsichtigen, erweist sich 
das Sicherheitskonzept der USA als eher traditionell-militärisch ausgerichtet. Afrikas 
Reaktionen fallen u.a. auch deshalb dementsprechend unterschiedlich aus. 
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